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American 


EDITED    BY 


JOHN  T.  MORSE,  JR. 


3tmerican 


ANDREW  JACKSON 


AS  A  PUBLIC  MAN 


WHAT  HE  WAS,  WHAT  CHANCES  HE  HAD,  AND 
WHAT  HE  DID  WITH  THEM 


3ITY 

^s   ~         BY^* 
WILLIAM  GRAHAM   SUMNER 

PROFESSOR  OP  POLITICAL  AND  SOCIAL  SCIENCE  IN  YAJ.E  COLLEGE 


BOSTON 

HOUGHTON,   MIFFLIN  AND   COMPANY 
NEW  YORK:  11  EAST  SEVENTEENTH  STREET 


,  Cambridge 

1898 


Copyright,  1882, 
BY  WILLIAM  GRAHAM  SUMNER. 


4//  n^Afc  reserved. 


The  Riverside  Press,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  U.  S.  A, 
Electrotyped  and  Printed  by  H.  O.  Houghton  &  Company. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  L 

FMN 

THE  FIRST  FORTY-FIVE  YEARS  OF  JACKSON'S  LIFE  1 

CHAPTER  II. 
THB  CREEK  WAB  AND  THE  WAB  WITH  ENGLAND  26 

CHAPTER  IH 
JACKSON  IN  FLORIDA          ,  .        .      49 

CHAPTER  IV. 
ELECTION  OP  18?*C  .        .        t        .        .        .      73 

CHAPTER  V. 
ADAMS'S  ADMINISTRATION 100 

CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  RELIEF  SYSTEM  OF  KENTUCKY       .        .        .        .119 

CHAPTER  VII. 

INTERNAL  HISTORY  OF  JACKSON'S  FIRST  ADMINISTRA 
TION  . 136 

CHAPTER  VTIL 

PUBLIC  QUESTIONS  OF  JACKSON'S  FIRST  ADMINISTRA- 

IION.  —  i *       ,    164 

(a.)  1.  West    India    Trade;    2.    Spoliation    Claims. 
(6.)  1    Federal  Judiciary ;  2.  Indians. 


^,v 

VI  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

KMi 

PUBLIC  QUESTIONS   OP  JACKSON'S  FIRST  ADMINISTKA- 
TION. —  ii 184 

3.  Land;  4.  Internal  Improvements ;  5.  Tariff. 

CHAPTER  X. 

PUBLIC  QUESTIONS  OP  JACKSON'S  FIRST  ADMINISTRA 
TION.  —  in 207 

6.  Nullification. 

CHAPTER  XL 
PUBLIC  QUESTIONS  OP  JACKSON'S  FIRST  ADMTINISTRA- 

.—  IV ...      224 

7.)Bank. 

CHAPTER  XII. 
"THE  CAMPAIGN  OP  1832 250 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

/       TARIFF,  NULLIFICATION,  AND^BANK  DURING  JACKSON'S 

SECOND  ADMINISTRATION 277 

CHAPTER  XIV 
SPECULATION,  DISTRIBUTION,  CURRENCY  LEGISLATION, 

AND  END   OF   THE  BANK  OP    THE    UNITED    STATES       .       322 

CHAPTER  XV. 

IHE  NEW   SPIRIT   IN   VARIOUS  POINTS    OP  FOREIGN 
AND  DOMESTIC  POLICY 343 

CHAPTER  XVL 
THE  ELECTION  OF  1836. — END  OF  JACKSON'S  CAREER    374 

FULL  TITLES  OF  BOOKS  REFERRED  TO  IH  THIS  VOLUME    387 
.        .        i    1 .    393 


. 


ANDREW  JACKSON. 

CHAPTER  I. 

THE   FIKST   FORTY-FIVE   YEAHS    OF  JACKSON'S   LIFE. 

IN  the  middle  of  the  last  century  a  number  of  Scotch 
men  and  Scotch-Irishmen  migrated  to  the  uplands  of 
North  and  South  Carolina.  Among  these  was  Andrew 
Jackson,  who  came  over  in  1765,  with  his  wife  and  two 
sons,  being  accompanied  also  by  several  neighbors  and 
connections  from  Carrickf ergus,  County  Antrim,  Ireland. 
They  appear  to  have  been  led  to  the  spot  at  which  they 
settled,  on  the  upper  waters  of  the  Catawba  river,  by 
the  fact  that  persons  of  their  acquaintance  in  Ireland 
had  previously  found  their  way  thither,  under  special 
inducements  which  were  offered  to  immigrants.1  The 
settlement  was  called  the  Waxhaw  Settlement,  and  was 
in  Mecklenburg  County,  North  Carolina,  but  close  to  the 
South  Carolina  boundary.  Andrew  Jackson  had  no  capi 
tal,  and  never  became  an  owner  of  land.  In  1767  he 
died.  His  son  Andrew  was  born  within  a  few  days  of 
the  father's  death,  March  15,  1767.  Parton  fixes  his 
birthplace  in  Union  County,  North  Carolina;  Kendall 

1  2  Hewitt,  13,  268,  272.  A  bounty  was  offered  equal  to  th« 
:.«t  of  passage.  Ship  captains  became  immigration  agents.  (Foi 
full  titles  of  books  referred  to  see  the  list  at  the  end  of  the  voi 
uoa.) 

1 


2  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

in  South  Carolina.  In  Jackson's  Proclamation  of  1832^ 
in  a  letter  of  December  24,,  1830,1  and  in  his  will,  he 
ipeaks  of  himself  as  a  native  of  South  Carolina. 

It  appears  that  Andrew  Jackson's  mother  abandoned 
the  settlement  which  her  husband  had  commenced,  and 
it  is  probable  that  she  owed  much  to  the  assistance  oi 
her  relatives  and  connections  while  Andrew  was  a  child. 
Circumstances  of  birth  more  humble  than  those  of  this 
child  can  scarcely  be  imagined.  It  was  not,  probably, 
hard  to  sustain  life  in  such  a  frontier  community. 
Coarse  food  was  abundant ;  but  to  get  more  out  of  life 
than  beasts  get  when  they  have  enough  to  eat  was  no 
doubt  very  difficult.  The  traditions  of  Jackson's  educa 
tion  are  vague  and  uncertain.  Of  book-learning  and 
school-training  he  appears  to  have  got  very  little  indeed. 

The  population  of  the  district  was  heterogeneous,  and, 
when  the  Revolutionary  War^broke  out,  the  differences 
of  nationality  and  creed  divided  the  people  by  oppos 
ing  sympathies  as  to  the  war.  The  English  penetrated 
the  district  several  tunes  in  the  hope  of  winning  re 
cruits  and  strengthening  the  tories.  On  one  of  these 
raids  Andrew  Jackson  was  wounded  by  an  officer,  who 
struck  him  because  he  refused  to  brush  the  officer's  boots. 
He  and  his  brother  were  taken  prisoners  to  Camden. 
The  war  cost  the  lives  of  both  Andrew's  brothers,  and 
also  that  of  his  mother,  who  died  while  on  a  journey  to 
Charleston  to  help  care  for  the  prisoners  there.  An 
drew  Jackson  accordingly  came  to  entertain  a  vigorous 
fcatred  of  the  English  from  a  very  early  age.  In  1781 
ae  was  alone  in  the  world.  What  means  of  support  hs 
had  we  do  not  know,  but,  after  trying  tLe  saddler's  trade, 
he  became,  in  1784,  a  student  of  law  at  Salisbury,  North 
1  39  Kiles,  385. 


THE   STUDY  OF  LAW.  3 

Carolina.  The  traditions  collected  by  Parton  of  Jack 
son's  conduct  at  this  time  give  us  anything  but  the  pict 
ure,  so  familiar  in  political  biography,  of  the  orphan  boy 
hewing  his  way  up  to  the  presidency  by  industry  nnd 
self-denial.  If  the  information  is  trustworthy,  Jackson 
was  gay,  careless,  rollicking,  fond  of  horses,  racing, 
cock-fighting,  and  mischief.  Four  years  were  spent  in 
this  way. 

It  is  necessary  to  note  the  significance  of  the  fact  that 
a  young  man  situated  as  Jackson  was  should  undertake 
to  "  study  law." 

In  the  generation  before  the  Revolution  the  intellectual 
activity  of  the  young  men,  which  had  previously  been 
expended  in  theology,  began  to  be  directed  to  the  law. 
As  capital  increased  and  property  rights  became  more 
complicated  there  was  more  need  for  legal  training.  In 
an  agricultural  community  there  was  a  great  deal  of 
leisure  at  certain  seasons  of  the  year,  and  the  actual 
outlay  required  for  an  education  was  small.  The  stand 
ard  of  attainments  was  low,  and  it  was  easy  for  a  farm 
er's  boy  of  any  diligence  to  acquire,  in  his  winter's  lei 
sure,  as  much  book-learning  as  the  best  colleges  gave. 
In  truth  the  range  of  ideas,  among  the  best  classes, 
About  law,  history,  political  science,  and  political  econ 
omy,  was  narrow  in  the  extreme.  What  the  aspiring 
'lass  of  young  men  who  were  self-educated  lacked,  as 
Compared  with  the  technically  "  educated,"  was  the  bits 
of  classical  and  theological  dogmatism  which  the  colleges 
taught  by  tradition,  and  the  culture  which  is  obtained 
by  frequenting  academical  society,  however  meagre  may 
be  the  positive  instruction  given  by  the  institution. 
What  the  same  aspiring  youths  had  in  excess  of  th« 
educated  was  self-confidence,  bred  by  igno 


1  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

ranee  of  their  own  short-comings.  They  were  therefore 
considered  pushing  and  offensive  by  the  colonial  aris 
tocracy  of  place-holders  and  established  families,  who 
considered  that  "  the  ministry "  was  the  proper  place 
for  aspiring  cleverness,  and  that  it  was  intrusive  when 
it  pushed  into  civil  life.  The  restiveness  of  the  aspiring 
class  under  this  repression  was  one  of  the  great  causes 
of  the  Revolution.  The  lawyers  became  the  leaders  in 
the  revolt  everywhere.  The  established  classes  were,  as 
classes,  tories.  After  the  war  the  way  was  clear  for 
every  one  who  wanted  office,  or  influence,  or  notoriety,  to 
attain  these  ends.  The  first  step  was  to  study  law.  If 
a  young  man  heard  a  public  speaker,  and  was  fired  by 
the  love  of  public  activity  and  applause,  or  if  he  became 
engaged  in  political  controversy,  and  was  regarded  by 
his  fellows  as  a  good  disputant,  or  if  he  chanced  to  read 
something  which  set  him  thinking,  the  result  was  very 
ixire  to  be  that  he  read  some  law.  The  men,  whose  bi- 
c graphics  we  read  because  they  rose  to  eminence,  present 
us  over  and  over  again  the  same  picture  of  a  youth,  with 
only  a  common  school  education,  who  spends  his  leisure 
in  reading  law,  while  he  earns  his  living  by  teaching  or 
by  farm  work.  Those,  however,  whose  biographies  we 
read  are  only  the  select  few  who  succeeded,  out  of  the 
thousands  who  started  on  the  same  road,  and  were  ar 
rested  by  one  circumstance  or  another,  which  threw 
them  back  into  the  ranks  of  farmers  and  store-keepers. 
We  shall  see  that  Andrew  Jackson  so  fell  back  into  the 
position  of  a  farmer  ana  store-keeper.  Chance  plays  a 
great  role  in  a  new  community,  just  as  it  does  in  a  primi 
tive  civilization.  Jhance  had  vsry  much  to  do  with 
Jackson's  career.  We  have  no  evidence  that  he  wai 
dissatisfied  with  his  circumstances,  and  set  himself  to 


JACKSON  GOES   TO   TENNESSEE.  5 

to  get  out  of  them,  or  that  he  had  any  strong  am 
bition  towards  which  the  law  was  a  step.  There  is  no 
proof  that  he  ever  was  an  ambitious  man ;  but  rather 
the  contrary.  He  never  learned  any  law,  and  never  to 
the  end  of  his  life  had  a  legal  tone  of  mind ;  even  hia 
admirer,  Kendall,  admits  this.1  His  study  of  law  had 
no  influence  on  his  career,  and  no  significance  for  his 
character,  except  that  it  shows  him  following  the  set  or 
fashion  of  the  better  class  of  young  men  of  his  gener 
ation.  If  conjecture  may  be  allowed,  it  is  most  probable 
that  he  did  not  get  on  well  with  his  relatives,  and  that 
he  disliked  the  drudgery  of  farming  or  saddle-making. 
A  journey  which  he  made  to  Charleston  offers  a  very 
possible  chance  for  him  to  have  had  his  mind  opened 
to  plans  and  ideas. 

In  1788,  Jackson's  friend,  John  McNairy,  was  ap 
pointed  judge  of  the  Superior  Court  of  the  Western 
District  of  North  Carolina  (i.  e.,  Tennessee),  and  Jack 
son  was  appointed  public  prosecutor.  Jackson  arrived 
in  Nashville  in  October,  1788.  Tennessee  was  then  a 
wild  frontier  country,  in  which  the  Whites  and  Indians 
were  engaged  in  constant  hostilities.  It  was  shut  off 
from  connection  with  the  Atlantic  States  by  the  mount 
ains,  and  its  best  connection  with  civilization  was  down 
the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  rivers.  Such  frontier  com 
munities  have  always  had  a  peculiar  character.  In 
them  the  white  man  has  conformed,  in  no  small  degree, 
to  the  habits  and  occupations  of  the  Indians.  Cut  off 
from  tools,  furniture,  clothing,  and  other  manufactured 
articles  such  as  civilized  men  use,  he  has  been  driven  to 
luch  substitutes  as  he  could  produce  by  bringing  hii 
intelligence  to  bear  on  the  processes  and  materials 
,  109. 


6  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

by  the  Indians.  Living  where  game  is  abundant,  and 
where  the  forests  make  agriculture  difficult,  he  has  often 
sunk  back  to  the  verge  of  the  hunting  stage  of  civili 
zation.1  The  pioneers,  so  much  lauded  in  song  and 
story,  were  men  who  first  broke  the  path  into  the  wil 
derness,  but  who  derogated  from  the  status  of  their  race 
to  do  it.  They  became  incapacitated  for  the  steady 
laboi  of  civilized  industry,  and  when  the  country  became 
BO  filled  up  that  game  was  scarce,  agriculture  a  necessity, 
and  "  law  "  began  to  be  recognized  and  employed,  the 
pioneers  moved  on  into  the  wilderness.  In  their  habits 
they  were  idle  and  thriftless,  and  almost  always  too 
fond  of  strong  drink.  The  class  of  settlers  who  suc 
ceeded  them  were  but  little  better  in  their  habits,  al 
though  they  began  to  clear  the  forests  and  till  the  soil. 
They  were  always  very  litigious.  Court  day  was  an 
occasion  which  drew  the  men  to  the  county  town,  form 
ing  an  event  in  a  monotonous  existence,  and  offering 
society  to  people  oppressed  by  isolated  life.  This  con 
course  of  people  furnished  occasion  for  gossip  and  news- 
mongering,  and  the  discussion  of  everybody's  affairs  for 
miles  around.  "  Public  opinion  "  took  control  of  every 
thing.  Local  quarrels  involved  the  whole  county  sooner 
or  later.  Friendships,  alliances,  feuds,  and  animosities 
grew  up  and  were  intensified  in  such  a  state  of  society. 
If  there  was  an  election  pending  the  same  concourse  of 
people  furnished  an  opportunity  for  speech-making  and 
argument.  The  institution  of  "stump-speaking"  was 
born  and  developed  in  these  circumstances.  In  the 
ftourt  itself  the  parties  to  the  suits  and  the  jury  enjoyed 
i  place  before  the  public  eye.  The  judge  and  the  counsel 

1  See  Collins's  Kentucky,  Putnam's  MiidU    Tennwee,   an4 
Kendall's  Jackson,  74. 


FRONTIER  SOCIETY.  1 

made  reputation  day  by  day.  The  lawyers,  as  actual 
or  prospective  candidates  for  office,  were  directly  and 
constantly  winning  strength  with  the  electors.  They 
passed  from  the  bar  to  the  stump  or  the  tavern  parlor, 
and  employed  the  influence  which  their  eloquence  had 
won  in  the  court  room  to  advance  the  interests  which 
they  favored  in  the  election.  There  are  features  of 
American  democracy  which  are  inexplicable  unless  one 
understands  this  frontier  society.  Some  of  our  greatest 
political  abuses  have  come  from  transferring  to  our  now 
large  and  crowded  cities  maxims  and  usages  which  were 
convenient  and  harmless  in  backwoods  county  towns. 

Another  feature  of  the  frontier  society  which  it  is 
important  to  notice  is,  that  in  it  the  lack  of  capital  and 
the  intimacy  of  personal  relations  led  to  great  abuses 
of  credit.  Idleness,  drink,  debt,  and  quarrels  produced 
by  gossip  have  been  the  curses  of  such  society.  The 
courts  and  the  lawyers  were  always  busy  with  the  per 
sonal  collisions  which  arose  where  no  one  was  allowed 
to  practise  any  personal  reserve,  where  each  one's  busi 
ness  was  everybody's  business,  where  gossip  never  rested, 
and  where  each  one  was  in  debt  to  some  others. 

In  such  a  state  of  society  the  public  prosecutor  is  the 
general  of  the  advancing  army  of  civilization.  He  has 
to  try  to  introduce  law  and  order,  the  fulfilment  of  con 
tracts,  and  the  recognition  of  rights  into  the  infant  so 
ciety.  This  was  the  task  which  Jackson  undertook  in 
Tennessee.  It  required  nerve  and  vigor.  The  westerr. 
counties  of  North  Carolina  were  in  a  state  of  anarchy 
resulting  from  the  attempt  to  set  up  the  state  of  Frank 
tin,  and  the  population  were  so  turbulent  and  lawless 
that  the  representative  of  legal  order  was  at  open  wai 
with  them.  The  Indians  and  Whites  were  also  engaged 


8  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

in  the  final  struggle  of  the  former  before  yielding  theil 
hunting-grounds  to  the  cultivation  of  the  white  man. 
Jackson  had  to  travel  up  and  down  the  country  in  the 
discharge  of  his  duties,  when  he  was  in  danger  of  his 
life  upon  the  road.  He  brought  all  the  required  force 
and  virtue  to  the  discharge  of  the  duties  of  this  office. 
He  pursued  his  way  without  fear  and  without  relenting. 
He  made  strong  enemies,  and  he  won  strong  friends. 
Kendall  says  that  Jackson  settled  at  Nashville,  because 
the  debtors  there  tried  to  drive  him  away,  he  having 
taken  some  collection  cases.1  His  merits  as  prosecutor  i 
are  vouched  for  by  the  fact  that  Governor  Blount  said 
of  him,  in  reference  to  certain  intruders  on  Indian  lands 
who  were  giving  trouble,  "Let  the  District  Attorney, 
Mr.  Jackson,  be  informed.  He  will  be  certain  to  do 
his  duty,  and  the  offenders  will  be  punished."  8 

Among  the  earlier  settlers  of  Tennessee  was  John 
Donelson,  who  had  been  killed  by  the  Indians  before 
Jackson  migrated  to  Tennessee.4  Jackson  boarded  with 
the  widow  Donelson.  In  the  family  there  were  also 
Mrs.  Donelson's  daughter,  Rachel,  and  the  latter's  hus 
band,  Lewis  Robards.  Robards,  who  seems  to  have 
been  of  a  violent  and  jealous  disposition,  had  made  in 
jurious  charges  against  his  wife  with  reference  to  other 
persons,  and  he  now  made  such  charges  with  reference 
to  Jackson.  Robards  had  been  married  in  Kentucky 
Under  Virginia  law.  There  was  no  law  of  divorce  in 
Virginia.  Robards,  in  1791,  petitioned  the  Legislature 

1  Kendall's  Jackson,  90. 

2  He  was  appointed  district  attomey  by  Washington  in  179". 
rfter  the  western  counties  of  ftorth  Carolina  were  ceded. 

•  Putnam,  351. 
«  Putnam,  613  fg. 


JACKSON'S  MARRIAGS.  9 

Df  Virginia  to  pass  an  act  of  divorce  in  his  favor,  mak 
ing  an  affidavit  that  his  wife  had  deserted  him,  and  wa*. 
living  in  adultery  with  Jackson.  The  Legislature  of  Vir 
ginia  passed  an  act  authorizing  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Kentucky  to  try  the  case  with  a  jury,  and,  if  the  facts 
proved  to  be  as  alleged,  to  grant  a  divorce.  Robarda 
fcook  no  action  for  two  years.  September  27,  1793,  he 
obtained  a  divorce  from  the  Court  of  Quarter  Sessions  of 
Mercer  County,  Kentucky.  In  the  mean  time,  Jackson 
and  Mrs.  Robards,  upon  information  of  the  legislative  act 
of  1791,  which  they  assumed,  or  were  informed,  to  be 
an  act  of  divorce,  were  married  at  Natchez,  in  July  or 
August,  1791.  In  January,  1794,  upon  hearing  of  the 
action  of  the  Mercer  County  Court,  they  were  married 
again.1  The  circumstances  of  this  marriage  were  such 
as  to  provoke  scandal  at  the  time,  and  the  scandal, 
which  in  the  case  of  a  more  obscure  man  would  have 
died  out  during  thirty  years  of  honorable  wedlock,  came 
up  over  and  over  again  during  Jackson's  career.  It 
is  plain  that  Jackson  himself  was  to  blame  for  contract 
ing  a  marriage  under  ambiguous  circumstances,  and 
for  not  protecting  his  own  wife's  honor  by  proper  pre 
cautions,  such  as  finding  out  the  exact  terms  of  the  act 
of  the  Legislature  of  Virginia.  He  clung  to  this  lady 
until  her  death,  with  rare  single-mindedness  and  devo 
tion,  although  she  was  not  at  all  fitted  to  share  the  des 
tiny  which  befell  him.  He  cherished  her  memory  until 
his  own  death  in  a  fashion  of  high  romance.  An  im 
putation  upon  her,  or  a  reflection  upon  the  regularity  of 
lis  marriage,  always  incensed  nim  more  than  any  other 
personal  attack.  Having  put  her  in  a  false  position, 
1  Telegraph  Extra,  p.  33.  Report  of  a  Jackson  committee  ii 


10  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

against  which,  as  man  and  lawyer,  he  should  Lave  pro 
tected  her,  he  was  afterward  led  by  his  education  and 
the  current  ways  of  thinking  in  the  society  about  him 
to  try  to  heal  the  defects  in  his  marriage  certificate  by 
shooting  any  man  who  dared  to  state  the  truth,  that 
Raid  certificate  was  irregular. 

Jackson  was  a  member  of  the  convention  which  met 
at  Knoxville,  January  11,  1796,  and  framed  a  Constitu 
tion  for  the  State  of  Tennessee.  There  is  a  tradition 
that  he  proposed  the  name  of  the  river  as  the  name  of 
the  State.1  This  Constitution  established  a  freehold 
qualification  for  voting  and  holding  the  chief  offices,  and 
declared  that  the  people  of  Tennessee  had  an  inalien 
able  right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi  river  to  its  mouth, 
The  federalists  in  Congress  opposed  the  admission  of 
Tennessee,  because  it  was  a  raw  frontier  community; 
but  it  was  admitted  June  1, 1796.  In  the  autumn  Jack 
son  was  elected  the  first  federal  representative.  A  year 
later,  Blount,  one  of  the  senators  from  Tennessee,  hav 
ing  been  expelled,  Jackson  was  appointed  senator  in  his 
place.  He  held  this  position  only  until  April,  1798, 
when  he  resigned. 

In  December,  1796,  therefore,  at  the  age  of  thirty, 
.  ackson  first  came  in  contact  with  a  society  as  cultivated 
as  that  of  Philadelphia  then  was.  Except  for  the  brief 
visit  to  Charleston  in  1783,  above  referred  to,  he  had 
Been  no  society  but  that  of  Western  North  Carolina  and 
Tennessee.  He  came  to  Philadelphia  just  as  the  presi 
dential  election  of  1796  was  being  decided.  Tennessee 
voted  for  Jefferson,  and  we  may  believe  that  whatever 
political  notions  Jackson  had  were  Jeffersonian.  He 
identified  himself  with  the  opposition  to  Washington* 
1  Ramsey,  655. 


IN  CONGRESS.  11 

idministration  in  the  most  factious  and  malicious  act 
Which  it  perpetrated,  namely,  the  vote  against  the  ad 
dress  to  Washington  at  the  close  of  his  administration, 
He  and  Edward  Livingston  were  two  out  of  twelve  in 
the  House  who  refused  to  vote  for  the  address.  It  is 
not  known  what  Jackson's  reasons  were.  Some  refused 
to  vote  that  Washington's  administration  had  been  wisa 
Others  objected  to  the  hope  that  Washington's  example 
would  guide  his  successors.1  The  grounds  of  objection 
to  the  administration  were  Jay's  treaty  and  Hamilton's 
financial  measures.  In  the  light  of  history  the  "  irrec 
oncilable"  minority  which  opposed  these  measures  to 
the  bitter  end  must  stand  condemned.  The  republican 
party,  in  1796,  was  filled  with  ill-informed  and  ill-regu 
lated  sympathy  for  the  French  Revolutionists,  and,  if  it 
could  have  had  its  way,  it  would,  under  the  lead  of  ref 
ugee  editors  filled  with  rancor  and  ignorant  zeal,  have 
committed  this  country  to  close  relations  with  France, 
and  would,  by  importing  Jacobinism  into  this  country, 
have  overthrown  constitutional  liberty  here.  The  feder 
alists,  on  the  other  hand,  fell  into  a  panic  about  sedition 
and  sans-culottism  quite  similar  to  that  which  prevailed 
in  England  at  the  same  time.  Washington's  adminis 
tration  had  the  hard  task  of  maintaining  statesman-like 
steadiness  and  wisdom  between  these  two  tendencies, 
and  of  establishing  sound  precedents  for  the  details  of 
the  government  under  the  Constitution.  It  succeeded 
BO  well  in  this  task  that  the  wider  the  perspective  of 
history  in  which  it  is  regarded  the  more  clearly  does  the 

1  In  1830  Livingston  attempted  an  elaborate  defence  of  hig 
rote.  He  tried  to  distinguish  between  Washington  and  his  ad 
teinistration,  a  vicious  and  untenable  distinction.  Hunt's  IA» 
.  340. 


12  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

moderation,  wisdom,  and  statesmanship  of  that  admiiib 
tration  appear.  Jay's  treaty  was  a  masterpiece  of  di 
plomacy,  considering  the  time  and  the  circumstances  of 
this  country.  Those  who  objected  to  it  could  propose 
nothing  but  a  policy  of  bluster,  which  the  country  was 
not  prepared  to  follow  up,  or  the  imbecile  device  of  a 
commercial  war.  Jefferson,  in  1806,  had  a  renewal  of 
this  treaty  offered  to  him.  He  took  the  opposite  course 
from  that  which  Washington  had  taken  :  he  rejected  it. 
He  tried  the  commercial  war;  adopting  legislation  as 
tyrannical  as  any  that  ever  stained  a  statute-book  in  the 
effort  to  carry  it  out,  subjecting  the  Union  to  the  sever 
est  strain,  accomplishing  nothing,  and  finally  leading  to 
a  fruitless  war. 

As  for  Hamilton's  funding  scheme,  few  will  now  be 
found,  whether  lawyers,  statesmen,  or  financiers,  to  ques 
tion  its  propriety  or  the  ingenuity  and  skill  with  which 
it  was  carried  out.  His  bank  is  open  to  more  question. 
He  and  the  other  federalists  had  too  much  of  a  feeling 
that  they  must  invent  artificial  bonds  and  clamps  to  hold 
the  Union  together.  They  did  not  sufficiently  perceive 
that  the  Union  must  consolidate  itself  in  time  by  the  ex 
perience  which  the  people  would  win  of  its  inestimable 
value  and  political  necessity.  Public  credit  and  Union, 
however,  were  then,  as  they  always  have  been,  insepa 
rably  bound  up  with  each  other.  The  history  of  the 
old  bank  is  so  obscure  that  it  is  difficult  to  form  a  judg 
ment  about  it.  In  making  any  attempt  to  do  so,  it  is 
necessary  to  bear  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  currencies  of 
Europe  were  nearly  all  confused  and  depreciated  during 
Ihe  existence  of  this  bank,  and  that  this  fact  acted  as 
protection  to  save  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  fro» 
&e  ordinary  penalties  of  a  certain  measure  of  bad  bank 


EARL1  POLITICAL  OPINIONS.  18 

l'ng.  It  is  certain  that  there  was  a  great  deal  of  job 
bing  in  the  shares  of  the  bank  when  it  was  first  founded, 
and  it  very  probably  over-issued  its  notes.  It  did  not 
publish  statements  of  its  affairs.  After  1793  the  risks 
of  neutral  commerce  and  its  gains  were  both  very  great. 
American  merchants  made  and  lost  fortunes  by  violat 
ing  belligerent  regulations.  In  1797  and  1798  these 
transactions  culminated  in  a  crisis  and  commercial  panic 
here,  connected,  to  judge  from"  all  the  information  we 
can  obtain,  with  the  crisis  of  1797  and  the  bank  re 
striction  in  England.  All  this  trouble  was  charged, 
without  further  discussion,  to  the  bank.  Every  time  N 
since  the  formation  of  the  Union,  when  the  strain  on  the 
national  finances  has  been  great,  we  have  been  forced 
to  have  recourse  to  national  banks  ;  — 1781, 1792, 1816, ) 
1863. 

History  has  not,  therefore,  justified  the  position  on 
these  great  political  questions  taken  by  the  party  with 
which  Jackson  allied  himself  while  he  was  in  the  na 
tional  legislature. 

In  the  Senate,  Jackson  voted,  with  only  two  others, 
against  a  bill  to  authorize  the  President  to  buy  or  lease 
cannon  foundries,  in  view  of  possible  war  with  France. 
He  voted  against  a  bill  to  authorize  the  arming  of  mer 
chant  ships,  in  favor  of  an  embargo,  and  against  a  pro 
viso  that  the  United  States  should  not  be  bound  to 
cancel  the  Indian  title  to  land  on  behalf  of  any  State.1 

We  know  nothing  of  any  activity  or  interest  shown 
by  Jackson  in  any  measure  save  a  claim  of  Hugh  L. 
White,  and  an  act  to  reimburse  Tennessee  for  expenses 
incurred  in  an  Indian  war.  Tke  latter  case  was  one 
vhieh  lias  been  constantly  renewed  Li  the  frontier  States 
1  Annals  of  Congress ;  5th  Congt  <iss,  I.  485-583 


14  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Tennessee  thought  that  the  federal  government  was  slo\» 
Mid  negligent  about  defending  her  against  the  Indians, 
The  federal  government  thought  that  Tennessee  was 
hasty  and  aggressive  towards  the  Indians.  Jackson 
gained  this  point  on  the  claim  of  Tennessee  while  he 
was  in  the  House,  to  the  great  advantage  of  his  popu 
larity  at  home. 

We  must  infer  from  his  conduct  that  he  did  not  enjoy 
political  life  and  did  not  care  for  it.  He  certainly  did 
not  become  engaged  in  it  at  all,  and  he  formed  no  ties 
which  he  found  it  hard  to  break  at  a  moment's  warn 
ing.  He  does  not  appear  to  have  made  much  impres 
sion  upon  anybody  at  Philadelphia.  \  Gallatin  recalled 
him  years  afterwards  as  "  a  tall,  lank,  uncouth-looking 
personage,  with  long  locks  of  hair  hanging  over  his 
face,  and  a  cue  down  his  back  tied  in  an  eel-skin ;  his 
dress  singular,  his  manners  and  deportment  that  of  a 
rough  backwoodsman."  *  There  is,  however,  ample  tes 
timony  that  Jackson,  later  in  life,  was  distinguished  and 
elegant  in  his  bearing  when  he  did  not  affect  roughness 
and  inelegance,  and  that  he  was  able  to  command  enco> 
miums  upon  his  manners  from  the  best  bred  ladies  in 
the  country.  Jefferson  said  of  him,  in  1824 :  "  When  I 
was  President  of  the  Senate  he  was  a  senator,  and  he 
could  never  speak  on  account  of  the  rashness  of  his  feel 
ings.  I  have  seen  him  attempt  it  repeatedly,  and  as 
often  choke  with  rage."  a 

Ir  1798  Jackson  was  made  judge  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Tennessee.  Nothing  is  known  of  his  conduct 
in  this  position.  No  records  or  decisions  of  the  cour* 
from  that  period  remain. 

1  4  Hildreth,  692. 

2  1  Webster's  CVr.  371. 


MAJOR-GENERAL  OF  MILITIA.  16 

While  Jackson  was  on  the  bench  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  he  and  ex-Governor  Sevier  were  in  feud  with  each 
other.  The  origin  of  the  quarrel  is  obscure  and  not 
worth  picking  out  from  the  contradictory  backwoods 
gossip  in  which  it  probably  originated.  It  is  enough  to 
notice  that  the  two  men  were  too  much  alike  in  temper 
to  be  pleased  with  each  other.  Sevier  was  fifty-seven 
years  old  in  1801,  and  had  been  a  leading  man  in  the 
country  for  years.  Jackson  was  only  thirty-four  in  that 
year,  and  a  rising  man,  whose  success  interfered  with 
Sevier's  plans  for  himself.  In  1801  the  field  officers  of 
the  militia  tried  to  elect  a  major-general.  Sevier  and 
Jackson  were  the  candidates.  The  election  resulted  in 
a  tie.  The  governor,  Archibald  Roane,  who  had  the 
casting  vote,  threw  it  for  Jackson.  Jackson  had  not 
taken  part  in  the  Nickajack  expedition,  or  otherwise 
done  military  service,  so  far  as  is  known,  except  as  a 
private  in  an  Indian  fight  in  1789.  On  that  occasion 
one  of  his  comrades  described  him  as  "bold,  dashing, 
fearless,  and  mad  upon  his  enemies."  1  In  1803  Sevier 
was  elected  governor,  and  he  and  the  judge-major- 
general  drew  their  weapons  on  each  other  when  they 
met.  Each  had  his  faction  of  adherents,-  and  it  was 
only  by  the  strenuous  efforts  of  these  persons  that  they 
were  prevented  from  doing  violence  to  each  other.  Ken 
dall  says  that  Jackson's  popularity  was  increased  by  his 
quarrel  with  Sevier.2  In  1804  Jackson  resigned  his 
position  as  judge.  Parton  gives  letters  of  Jackson  from 
this  period  which  are  astonishingly  illiterate  for  a  man 
in  his  position,  even  when  all  the  circumstances  are 
kaken  into  consideration.  Jackson  was  made  a  trustet 
»f  the  Nashville  Academy  in  1793.8 

1  Putnam,  318.  2  Kendall'*  Jackson,  10*. 

a  D~*. «i« 


16  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

In  1804  Jackson  was  once  more  a  private  citizen,  a 
planter,  and  a  store-keeper.  Neither  politics  nor  law  had 
apparently  touched  any  chord  of  interest  in  him.  The 
turning  point  in  his  career  was  the  vote  which  made 
him  major-general  of  militia,  hut  the  time  had  not  yet 
arrived  for  him  to  show  that  all  there  was  in  him  could 
be  aroused  when  there  were  public  enemies  to  be  crushed. 
He  had  been  engaged  in  trade  for  six  years  or  more 
before  1804,  and  was  now  embarrassed.  He  devoted 
bimself  to  business  for  several  years. 

Mention  has  already  been  made  of  the  general  abuse 
of  credit  in  the  frontier  communities.  Money  is  scarce 
because  capital  is  scarce,  and  is  so  much  needed  that 
the  community  is  unwilling  to  employ  any  of  it  in  secur 
ing  a  value  currency.  It  is  true  that  the  people  always 
have  to  pay  for  a  value  currency,  whether  they  get  it  or 
not,  but  they  always  cheat  themselves  with  the  notion 
that  cheap  money  is  cheap.  Food  and  fuel  are  abun 
dant,  but  everything  else  is  scarce  and  hard  to  get. 
Hopes  are  strong  and  expectations  are  great.  Each 
man  gives  his  note,  which  is  a  draft  on  the  glorious 
future ;  that  is,  every  man  makes  his  own  currency  aa 
he  wants  it,  and  the  freedom  with  which  he  draws  hia 
drafts  is  as  unlimited  as  his  own  sanguine  hopes.  The 
hopes  are  not  unfounded,  but  their  fruition  is  often  de 
layed.  Continued  renewals  become  necessary,  and  liqui 
dation  is  put  off  until  no  man  knows  where  he  stands. 
A  general  liquidation,  with  a  period  of  reaction  and 
stagnation,  therefore,  ensues  upon  any  shock  to  credit. 
In  Tennessee,  between  1790  and  1798,  land  was  used  as 
a  kind  ox  currency ;  prices  were  set  in  it,  and  it  was 
transferred  in  payment  for  goods  and  services.  During 
ihe  same  period  there  was  a  great  speculation  in  ne^i 


FRONTIER  CODE.  17 

land  throughout  the  country.  Prices  of  land  were  in 
flated,  and  extravagant  notions  of  the  value  of  raw  lan<? 
prevailed.1  After  the  crisis  of  1798  land  fell  in  value  all 
over  the  country,  to  the  ruin  of  thousands  of  speculator 
Values  measured  in  land  all  collapsed  at  the  same  time. 
Jackson  was  entangled  in  the  system  of  credit  and 
land  investments,  bat  he  seems  to  have  worked  out  ol 
his  embarrassments  during  the  next  three  or  four  years, 
after  which  he  abandoned  trade  and  became  a  planter 
only. 

Another  feature  of  this  early  southwestern  frontier 
society  which  excites  the  surprise  and  contempt  of  the 
modern  reader  is,  that  store-keepers  and  farmers  and 
lawyers,  who  lived  by  their  labor,  and  had  wives  and 
children  dependent  on  them,  are  found  constantly  quar 
relling,  and  in  all  their  quarrels  are  found  mouthing  the 
"  code  of  honor."  The  earlier  backwoodsmen  quarrelled 
and  fought  as  above  described,  but  they  fought  with  fists 
and  knives,  on  the  spur  of  the  moment,  as  the  quarrel 
arose.  It  was  a  genteel  step  in  advance,  and  marked 
a  new  phase  of  society,  when  the  code  of  the  pistol  came 
into  use,  and  the  new  higher  social  caste  prided  itself 
not  a  little  on  being  "  gentlemen,"  because  they  kept  up 
in  the  backwoods  a  caricature  drawn  by  tradition  and 
hearsay  from  the  manners  of  the  swaggerers  about  the 
courts  of  France  and  England  a  century  before.  An 
drew  Jackson  was  a  child  of  this  society,  an  adherent 
of  its  doctrines,  and  in  his  turn  a  propagandist  and  ex 
pounder  of  them.  He  proved  himself  a  quarrelsome 
paan.  Instead  of  making  Deace  he  exhausted  all  the 
ehances  of  conflict  which  offered  themselves.  He  was 
remarkably  genial  and  gentle  when  things  went  on  t* 

*  On  the  fallacies  about  the  value  of  land,  see  p. 
2 


18  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

suit  him,  and  when  he  was  satisfied  with  his  companions, 
fle  was  very  chivalrous  about  taking  up  the  cause  ol 
any  one  who  was  unjustly  treated  and  was  dependent. 
Yet  he  was  combative  and  pugnacious  and  over-ready 
to  adjust  himself  for  a  hostile  collision  whenever  there 
was  any  real  or  fancied  occasion.  The  society  in  which 
he  lived  developed,  by  its  fashions,  some  of  his  natural 
faults. 

In  1795  he  fought  a  duel  with  a  fellow  lawyer  named 
Avery,  over  some  sparring  which  had  taken  place  be 
tween  them  in  a  court  room,  when  they  were  opposing 
counsel.  His  quarrel  with  Sevier  has  been  mentioned. 
While  on  the  bench  he  also  quarrelled  with  his  old  friend 
Judge  McNairy,  on  account  of  an  appointment  made  by 
the  judge  which  injured  an  old  friend  of  both.1  In 
1806  he  fought  a  duel  with  Charles  Dickinson,  who  had 
spoken  disparagingly  of  Mrs.  Jackson  in  the  course  of 
a  long  quarrel  which  involved,  besides  Jackson,  three 
or  four  others,  and  which  was  a  capital  specimen  of  the 
quarrels  stirred  up  by  the  gossip  and  backbiting  of  men 
who  had  too  much  leisure.  This  was  the  real  cause  of 
Jackson's  anger,  although  on  the  surface  the  quarrel 
was  about  a  strained  and  artificial  question  of  veracity 
concerning  a  bet  on  a  horse-race,  and  it  was  inflamed 
by  some  sarcastic  letter-writing  in  the  local  newspaper, 
and  by  some  insulting  epithets.  Jackson's  friends  de 
clared  that  there  was  a  plot  to  drive  Jackson  out  of  the 
country.  Each  man  meant  to  kill  the  other.  They 
met  May  30,  1806.  Jackson  was  wounded  by  a  bullet 
vrhich  grazed  his  breast  and  weakened  him  for  life. 
Dickinson  was  mortally  wounded,  and  died  the  sam« 
ivening. 

Kendall's  Jackson.  105. 


WESTERN  FEELING  ABOUT  LOUISIANA.         39 

Jackson  had  made  the  acquaintance  of  Burr  when  in 
Congress.  In  1805  Burr  visited  Jackson,  and  made  a 
contract  with  him  for  boats  for  the  expedition  down  the 
Mississippi.  The  people  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee 
had  always  regarded  it  as  a  vital  interest  of  theirs  to 
have  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  So  long  as 
a  foreign  power  held  the  mouth  of  the  river,  plots  were 
formed  for  separating  the  trans-Alleghany  country  from 
the  Atlantic  States,  the  strength  of  which  plots  lay  in  the 
fact  that  the  tie  of  interest  which  made  the  basis  of  a 
union  with  the  holder  of  New  Orleans  was  stronger  than 
the  tie  of  interest  which  united  the  two  sides  of  the 
Alleghanies.  In  1795  the  United  States  by  treaty  with 
Spain  secured  a  right  of  deposit  at  New  Orleans  for 
three  years,  and  these  separation  plots  lost  all  theii 
strength.  The  "Annual  Register"  for  1796  (anti-fed 
eralist)  very  pertinently  pointed  out  to  the  Western 
people  the  advantages  they  enjoyed  from  the  Union. 
"  If  they  had  been  formed  into  an  independent  republic, 
the  court  of  Madrid  would  have  scorned  to  grant  such 
a  free  navigation  "  *  (i.  e.,  as  it  granted  in  the  treaty  of 
1795).  Spain  ceded  Louisiana  to  France  by  the  secret 
treaty  of  St.  Udefonso,  October  1,  1800.  This  treaty 
>ecame  known  in  1802  after  the  peace  of  Amiens.  In 
the  same  year  Spain,  which  still  held  possession  of 
Louisiana,  withdrew  the  right  of  deposit,  and  the  West 
ern  country  was  thrown  into  great  excitement.  In  1803 
the  whole  matter  of  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi 
was  settled  by  the  purchase  of  Louisiana  by  the  United 
States,  but  then  a  new  set  of  questions  was  opened.  In 
the  treaty  of  1795  Spain  had  acknowledged  the  parallel 
of  31°  as  the  boundary  of  Florida  from  the  Mississippi 
*  Ann.  Reg.  (1796)  p.  83. 


£0  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

to  the  Chattahoochee,  although  she  had  been  slow  about 
surrendering  posts  held  by  her  north  of  this  line  and 
east  of  the  Mississippi.  Hence  there  had  been  com 
plaints  and  bad  feeling.  Now  a  new  question  arose  aa 
to  how  far  Louisiana  extended  east  of  the  Mississippi 
river,  and  this  question  was  of  great  importance  to  the 
Gulf  territories,  because  if,  by  the  Louisiana  purchase, 
the  United  States  had  become  owner  of  the  territory  east 
as  far  as  the  Perdido,  then  the  Gulf  coast  with  the  valu 
able  harbor  of  Mobile  was  available  for  the  whole  South 
west.  Spain  denied  that  Louisiana  included  anything 
east  of  the  Mississippi  except  the  city  of  New  Orleans, 
and  the  bit  of  territory  south  and  west  of  the  Iberville 
and  the  two  lakes.1  The  territory  remained  in  dispute, 
and  the  relations  between  the  two  countries  continued  to 
be  bad,  until  Florida  was  purchased  in  1819.  In  1802 
a  treaty  was  made  with  Spain  for  the  payment  by  he*- 
of  claims  held  by  American  citizens,  but  Spain  did  not 
ratify  the  treaty  until  1818.  She  had  her  grievances 
also,  at  first  about  Miranda's  expedition,  and  afterwards 
about  aid  to  her  revolted  colonies.  In  1810  the  Presi 
dent  ordered  the  Governor  of  Orleans  to  occupy  the 
territory  as  far  as  the  Perdido,  and  to  hold  it  in  peace 
and  order,  subject -to  the  final  decision  of  the  pending 
controversy  with  Spain.  In  1812,  Congress,  by  two 
acts,  divided  the  country  east  as  far  as  the  Perdido  into 
two  parts,  and  added  one  part  to  Louisiana,  which  was 
udmitted  as  a  State,  and  the  other  part  to  the  Missis 
sippi  territory. 

It  has  seemed  convenient  to  pursue  these  proceedings 
»p  to  this  point,  because  future  reference  to  them  wil 

1  See  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  State* 
a  Foster  v.  Neilson,  2  Peters,  253 


BURRS  SCHEMES.  21 

be  necessary.  To  return  now  to  Burr  and  his  expe 
dition  :  —  It  will  be  understood  what  were  the  relations 
of  the  United  States  to  Spain  in  1805  and  1806,  and 
especially  what  part  of  those  relations  peculiarly  affected 
the  people  of  the  Southwest  at  that  time.  Their  col 
lisions  with  Spain  no  longer  concerned  New  Orleans, 
but  West  Florida  and  Mobile.  It  is  still  a  mystery 
what  Burr  really  intended.  Napoleon's  career  had  fired 
the  imagination  of  men  of  a  military  and  romantic  turn 
all  over  the  world.  It  is  quite  as  reasonable  an  expla 
nation  of  Burr's  scheme  as  any  other  that  he  was  re 
serving  all  his  chances,  and  meant  to  do  much  or  little, 
according  to  the  turn  of  events,  and  that  he  did  not 
himself  define  to  himself  what  he  was  aiming  at.  His 
project  had  an  unmistakable  kinship  with  the  old  plans 
for  setting  up  a  republic  of  the  Mississippi,  with  its 
capital  at  New  Orleans.  For  that,  however,  he  was  ten 
years  too  late.  If  he  had  intended  to  go  on  a  filibus 
tering  expedition  against  the  Spaniards  in  Mexico,  he 
would  have  obtained  secret  aid  and  sympathy  in  Ken 
tucky  and  Tennessee,  and  the  aid  which  he  did  get  was 
given  under  that  belief.1  If  his  scheme  was  aimed  in 
any  manner  against  the  United  States  he  could  not  find 
any  aid  for  it.  Since  the  purchase  of  Louisiana,  and 
the  accession  to  power  in  the  Union  of  the  party  to 
which  the  great  majority  of  the  Western  people  be 
longed,  there  was  no  feeling  for  Burr  to  work  on.2 

In  1805  Burr  found  a  cordial  welcome  and  aid.  He 
was  evidently  trying  to  use  Jackson  without  startling 
him.  His  letter  of  March  24  1806,  which  Parton 
gives,*  is  a  very  crafty  letter,  for  the  purpose  of  engig* 

1  2  Amer.  Reg.  (^801)  103,  note. 

2  Cf.  Jefferson's  Message  of  January  22,  1807. 
8  1  Parton,  313. 


£2  ANDREW  JACKSUll. 

ing  Jackson's  name  and  influence  to  raise  troops  for 
his  enterprise  without  defining  it.  In  1806  Burr  was 
again  in  Nashville.  His  proceedings  then  aroused  sus 
picion.  It  appears  that  Jackson  was  mystified.  He  did 
not  know  whether  he  ought  to  aid  Burr  or  oppose  him, 
or  aid  him  secretly  and  oppose  him  openly.  It  seems 
to  be  very  clear,  however,  that  he  took  sides  against 
Burr,  if  Burr  was  against  the  United  States.  January 
15th  he  wrote  to  Campbell,  member  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  gave  November  as  the  time  when 
he  first  heard  of  a  plan  to  seiafe  New  Orleans,  conquer 
Mexico,  carry  away  the  Western  States,  and  set  up  a 
great  empire.1  He  says  that  he  was  indignant  at  being 
the  dupe  of  such  an  enterprise,  and  that  he  called  Burr 
to  account.  Burr  denounced  and  ridiculed  the  notion 
that  he  intended  anything  hostile  to  the  United  States.8 
He  claimed  to  have  the  secret  countenance  of  the  Sec 
retary  of  War.  It  seems  that  Jackson  must  have  been 
convinced  afterwards  that  Burr  had  been  calumniated 
and  unjustly  treated.  He  was  at  Richmond  as  a  witness 
in  Burr's  trial.  He  there  made  a  public  speech  against 
Jefferson.  Jackson  had  previously  been  ill-disposed  to 
wards  Jefferson  because  Jefferson  did  not  give  him  the 
office  of  Governor  ot  Orleans,  for  which  he  had  applied. 
Jackson's  strong  personal  contempt  and  dislike  for  Gen 
eral  Wilkinson,  the  commander  at  New  Orleans,  who 
appeared  as  Burr's  accuser,  also  influenced  his  judg 
ment.8  Throughout  his  life  he  was  unable  to  form  an 

1  Telegraph  Extra,  481  fg. 

2  When  Burr  was  arrested  in  Kentucky  he  gave  his  wo^  o. 
honor  to  his  counsel  that  he  intended  nothing  against  the  United 
States.     (Kendall's  Jackson,  120.) 

3  His  hatred  of  Wilkinson  was  greatly  strengthened  after 
wards,  but  he  shows  it,  and  the  influence  of  it,  in  his  letter  * 
Oampbeli. 


SILAS  DINSMORE.  23 

Unbiassed  opinion  on  a  question  of  fact  or  law,  if  he 
had  any  personal  relations  of  friendship  or  enmity  with 
the  parties.1 

From  1806  to  1811  Jackson  appears  to  have  led  the 
life  of  a  planter  without  any  noticeable  incident.  The 
next  we  hear  of  him,  however,  he  is  committing  another 
act  of  violence.  Silas  Dinsmore,  the  Indian  agent,  re 
fused  to  allow  persons  to  pass  through  the  Indian  coim- 
try  with  negroes  unless  they  had  passports  for  the  ne 
groes.  It  was  his  duty  by  law  to  enforce  this  rule. 
There  were  complaints  that  negroes  ran  away  or  were 
stolen.  His  regulation,*"  however,  interfered  with  the 
trade  in  negroes.  This  trade  was  then  regarded  as  dis 
honorable.  It  has  been  charged  that  Jackson  was  en 
gaged  in  it,  and  the  facts  very  easily  bear  that  color. 
He  passed  through  the  Indian  country  with  some  ne 
groes  without  hindrance,  because  Dinsmore  was  away, 
but  he  took  up  the  quarrel  with  the  agent,  and  wrote  to 
Campbell  to  tell  the  Secretary  of  War  that,  if  Dinsmore 
was  not  removed,  the  people  of  West  Tennessee  would 
burn  him  in  his  own  agency.  There  is  a  great  deal  of 
fire  in  the  letter,  and  not  a  little  about  liberty  and  free 
government.2  Dinsmore  was  suspended,  and  things  took 
-uch  a  turn  that  he  lost  his  position  and  was  reduced  to 
poverty.  Parton  gives  a  story  of  an  attempt  by  Dins- 
more,  eight  years  later,  to  conciliate  Jackson.  This  at 
tempt  was  dignified,  yet  courteous  and  becoming.  Jack- 
Bon  repelled  it  in  a  very  brutal  and  low-bred  manner, 
Dinsmore  did  not  know  until  1828,  when  he  was  a  pe 
titioner  at  Washington,  and  the  papers  were  called  for 
frat  Jackson  had  been  the  cause  of  his  ruin.8 

«  On  Burr,  see  2  Pickett,  chau  xxix. 

*  4*  Niles,  110.  *  8  Adams.  61. 


24  ANDREW  JACKSOfl. 

The  time  was  now  at  hand,  however,  when  Andrew 
Jackson  would  have  a  chance  to  show  how  he  could 
serve  his  country.  At  the  age  of  forty-five  he  had  com' 
menced  no  career.  He  was  a  prominent  man  in  his 
State,  but  he  had  held  no  political  offices  in  it,  and  had 
not,  so  far  as  we  know,  been  active  in  any  kind  of  pub 
lic  affairs,  although  we  infer  that  he  had  discharged  all 
his  duties  as  general  of  militia.  He  had  shown  himself 
a  faithful  friend  and  an  implacable  enemy.  Every  man 
who  has  this  character  is  self-centred.  He  need  -not 
be  vain  or  conceited.  Jackson  was  not  vain  or  con 
ceited.  He  never  showed  any  marked  selfishness.  He 
had  a  great  deal  of  amour  propre.  All  things  which 
interested  him  at  all  took  on  some  relation  to  his  person, 
and  he  engaged  his  personality  in  everything  which  in 
terested  him.  An  opinion  or  a  prejudice  became  at 
once  for  him  a  personal  right  and  interest.  To  approve 
it  and  further  it  was  to  win  his  gratitude  and  friend 
ship.  To  refute  or  oppose  it  was  to  excite  his  animos 
ity.  There  was  an  intensity  and  vigor  about  him  which 
showed^  lack  of  training.  His  character  had  never  been 
cultivated  by  the  precepts  and  discipline  of  home,  or  by 
the  discipline  of  a  strict  and  close  society,  in  which 
extravagances  of  behavior  and  excess  of  amour  propre 
are  promptly  and  severely  restrained  by  harsh  social 
penalties.  There  is,  to  be  sure,  a  popular  philosophy 
that  home  breeding  and  culture  are  of  no  importance. 
The  fact,  however,  is  not  to  be  gainsaid  that  true  honor 
truthfulness,  suppression  of  undue  personal  feeling,  self 
control,  and  courtesy  are  inculcated  best,  if  not  exclu 
sively,  by  the  constant  precept  and  example,  in  earlies* 
fhildhood,  of  high-bred  parents  and  relatives.  There 
fe  nothing  on  earth  which  it  costs  more  labor  to  produce 


STRONG  PERSONAL  FEELING.        25 

jhan  a  high-bred  man.  It  is  also  indisputable  that  home 
discipline  and  training  ingrain  into  the  character  of 
men  the  most  solid  and  valuable  elements,  and  that, 
without  such  training,  more  civilization  means  better 
food  and  clothes  rather  than  better  men.  It  is  charac 
teristic  of  barbarians  to  put  their  personality  always  at 
Btake,  and  not  to  distinguish  the  man  who  disputes  their 
notions  from  the  man  who  violates  their  rights.  It  is 
possible,  however,  that  the  military  virtues  may  flourish 
where  moral  and  social  training  are  lacking.  Jackson 
was  unfortunate  in  that  the  force  of  his  will  and  the  en 
ergy  of  his  executive  powers  had  never  been  disciplined, 
but  the  outbreak  of  the  second  war  with  England  af 
forded  him  an  arena  on  which  his  faults  became  vii" 


CHAPTER  H. 

THE  CREEK  WAR  AND  THE  WAR  WITH  RNGLA1TD. 

IN  no  place  in  the  world  was  Napoleon  more  ardently 
admired  than  in  the  new  States  of  this  country.  The 
popular  enthusiasm  about  him  in  those  States  lasted 
long  after  he  was  rated  much  more  nearly  at  his  true 
value  everywhere  else  in  the  world.  The  second  war 
with  England  was  brought  on  by  the  policy,  the  opin 
ions,  and  the  feelings  of  the  South  and  West,  repre 
sented  by  a  young  and  radical  element  in  the  Jeffer- 
Bonian  party.  The  opinion  in  the  South  and  West, 
in  1811  and  1812,  was  that  Napoleon  was  about  to 
unite  the  Continent  for  an  attack  on  England,  in  which 
he  was  sure  to  succeed,  and  that  he  would  thus  become 
master  of  Europe  and  the  world.  It  was  thought  that 
it  would  be  well  to  be  in  at  the  death  on  his  side.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  point  out  in  any  detail  the  grounds  for 
tins  opinion  which  might  have  been  put  forward  at  that 
time,  or  to  show  the  partial  and  distorted  information 
on  which  it  was  founded.  ,Jt  is  certain  that  the  persons 
who  held  this  notion  were  very  ill-informed  on  Euro 
pean  politics,  and  their  opinions  were  strongly  biassed 
by  party  conflicts  at  home.  For  twenty  years  the  do 
mestic  politics  of  the  United  States  had  been  organized 
on  sympathy  with  one  or  the  other  of  the  belligerent 
parties  in  Europe.  This  country  was  weak  in  a  military 
point  of  view,  but  commercially  it  would  have  been  a 


JEFFERSON'S  POLICY.  27 

great  advantage  to  either  belligerent  to  have  free  inter 
course  with  the  United  States,  and  to  keep  his  enemy 
from  it.  The  English  policy  towards  the  United  States 
was  arrogant  and  insolent.  That  of  France  was  marked 
by  duplicity  and  chicanery.  Party  spirit  here  took  pos 
session  of  the  people  to  such  an  extent  that  the  federal 
ists  made  apology  for  any  injury  from  England,  no  mat 
ter  how  insolent,  and  the  democrats  could  not  see  any 
wrong  in  the  acts  of  Napoleon,  in  spite  of  the  evident 
fact  that  he  was  using  this  country  for  his  own  selfish 
purposes  while  cajoling  it  with  shameless  lies.  The 
course  of  the  weak  neutral  between  two  such  belligerents 
was  very  difficult. 

Washington  succeeded  in  maintaining  neutrality  br 
Jay's  treaty,  but  at  the  cost  of  bitter  hostility  at  home. 
Adams  was  driven  to  the  verge  of  war  with  France  by 
his  party,  but  succeeded  in  averting  war,  although  his 
party  was  destroyed  by  the  reaction.  Jefferson  cannot 
be  said  to  have  had  any  plan.  The  statesmen  of  his 
party  tried  to  act  on  the  belligerents'  by  destructive 
measures  against  domestic  commerce  and  industry,  chas 
tising  ourselves,  as  Plumer  said,  with  scorpions,  in  order 
to  beat  the  enemy  with  whips.  They  tried  one  measure 
after  another.  No  measure  had  a  rational  origin  or 
effect  calculated  and  adjusted  to  the  circumstances  of 
.He  case.  Each  was  a  new  blunder.  The  republican 
-ulers  in  France  in  1792  could  do  nothing  better  for  a 
man  who  claimed  protection  from  the  Jacobin  mobs 
than  to  put  him  in  prison,  so  that  the  mob  could  not  get 
at  him.  Jefferson's  embargo  offered  the  same  kind  of 
protection  to  American  shipping.  Before  the  embargo, 
merchants  and  ship-owners  went  to  sea  at  great  risk  of 
tapture  and  destruction ;  after  if,  they  stayed  at  home 


28  ANDREW   J ALISON. 

and  were  sure  of  ruin.  Jefferson  has  remained  a  popu> 
lar  idol,  and  has  never  been  held  to  the  responsibility 
which  belonged  to  him  for  his  measures.  The  alien  and 
sedition  laws  were  not  nearly  so  unjust  and  tyrannical  * 
as  the  laws  for  enforcing  the  embargo,  and  they  did  not 
touch  one  man  where  the  embargo  laws  touched  hun 
dreds.  The  commercial  war  was  a  device  which,  if  it 
had  been  sensible  and  practical,  would  have  attained 
national  ends  by  sacrificing  one  group  of  interests  and 
laying  a  much  inferior  burden  on  others.  New  England 
was  denounced  for  want  of  patriotism  because  it  re 
sisted  the  use  of  its  interests  for  national  purposes,  but 
as  soon  as  the  secondary  effects  of  the  embargo  on  agri 
culture  began  to  be  felt,  the  agricultural  States  raised 
a  cry  which  overthrew  the  device.  Yet  criticisms  which 
are  justified  by  the  most  conclusive  testimony  of  history 
fall  harmlessly  from  Jefferson's  armor  of  popular  plati 
tudes  and  democratic  sentiments.  He  showed  the  traits 
which  we  call  womanish.  He  took  counsel  of  his  feel 
ings  and  imagination;  he  planned  measures  like  the 
embargo,  whose  scope  and  effect  he  did  not  understand. 
He  was  fiery  when  deciding  initiatory  steps,  like  the  re 
jection  of  the  English  treaty ;  vacillating  and  timid 
when  he  had  to  adopt  measures  for  going  forward  in 
the  path  which  he  had  chosen.  His  diplomacy,  besides 
being  open  to  the  charge  that  it  was  irregular  and  un 
usual,  was  transparent  and  easily  turned  to  ridicule.  It 
was  a  diplomacy  without  lines  of  reserve  .or  alternatives, 
BO  that,  in  a  certain  very  possible  contingency  it  had  no 
course  open  to  it.  Jefferson  finally  dropped  the  reins  of 
government  in  despair,  and,  on  a  theory  which  would 

1  See  Carey's  Olive  Branch,  page  50  for  the  opinion  of  a  den» 
•erat  on  these  laws  after  party  spirit  had  cooled  down. 


CAUSES  OF  THE  SECOND  WAR.  29 

wake  each  presidential  term  last  for  three  years  and 
tight  months,  with  an  interregnum  of  four  months,  ha 
left  the  task  to  his  successor.  He  had  succeeded  in 
keeping  out  of  war  with  either  belligerent,  but  he  had 
shaken  the  Union  to  its  foundations.  The  extremists  in 
the  democratic  party  now  came  forward,  and  began  to 
push  Madison  into  a  war  with  England,  as  the  extreme 
federalists  had  pushed  Adams  into  war  with  France. 
Madison,  therefore,  had  to  inherit  the  consequences  of 
Jefferson's  policy.  An  adherent  of  Jefferson  describes 
the  bequest  as  follows  :  "  Jefferson's  honest  experiment, 
bequeathed  to  Madison,  to  govern  without  army  or 
wavy,  and  resist  foreign  enemies  without  war,  proved 
>otal  failures,  more  costly  than  war  and  much  more 
odious  to  the  people,  and  dangerous  to  the  Union."  l 

The  young  and  radical  democrats,  amongst  whom 
Clay  was  prominent,  were  restive  under  the  predomi 
nance  of  the  older  generation  of  democrats  of  revolu 
tionary  fame,  and  their  favorites.  The  young  democrats 
wanted  to  come  forward  without  the  patronage  of  the 
Virginia  leaders.  The  presidential  election  of  1812  was 
the  immediate  occasion  of  their  action.  The  Jefferso- 
nian  policy  had  produced  irritation  at  home  and  humili 
ation  abroad.  The  natural  consequence  was  a  strong 
\var  spirit.  It  was  believed  that  the  country  would  not 
eally  be  engaged  in  military  operations,  because  Eng- 
jand  would  be  fully  occupied  in  Europe ;  that  Canada 
toOuld  be  conquered ;  tbat  we  should  come  in  on  the  win 
ning  side  at  the  catastrophe  of  the  great  conflict  in 
Europe ;  and  that  all  this  would  be  very  popular  in  the 
South  and  West.  Madison  was  compelled  greatly  against 
sis  will  to  yield  to  the  war  party,  as  a  condition  of  hii 
1  Ingersoll,  70  :  —  grammar  of  the  original. 


50  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

reelection.1  England  pointed  out  that  Najx>leon  had 
not  complied  with  the  terms  of  the  American  demands 
on  both  belligerents,  but  had  falsified  a  date  and  told  a 
lie.  She  withdrew  her  orders  in  council,  and  there  re 
mained  only  impressment  as  the  ostensible  cause  of  war. 
September  12,  1812,  Admiral  Warren  offered  an  armis 
tice.  Madison  refused  it  unless  the  practice  of  impress 
ment  was  suspended.  "Warren  had  not  power  to  agree 
to  this.  For  purposes  of  redress  the  war  was,  therefore, 
unnecessary,  and  the  United  States  was  duped  into  it  by 
Napoleon,  so  far  as  its  avowed  causes  were  concerned.2 

General  Jackson  offered  his  services,  with  those  of 
2,500  volunteers,  as  soon  as  he  heard  of  the  declaration 
of  war.  January  7,  1813,  he  set  out  under  orders  for 
New  Orleans,  an  attack  on  that  place  being  regarded  as 
a  probable  movement  of  the  enemy.  Jackson  threw 
himself  into  the  business  with  all  his  might,  and  at  once 
displayed  activity,  vigilance,  and  skill.  His  letter  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  when  he  started  shows  with  what  en 
thusiasm  he  set  to  work.  He  assured  the  Secretary 
that  his  men  had  no  "  constitutional  scruples,"  but 
would,  if  so  directed,  plant  the  American  eagle  on  the 
walls  of  Mobile,  Pensacola,  and  St.  Augustine.  In 
March  he  was  at  Natchez  engaged  in  organizing  his 
force,  and  waiting  for  orders.  While  there  he  had  a 
quarrel  with  General  Wilkinson  on  a  question  of  rank. 
Thomas  H.  Benton,  who  was  serving  under  Jackson, 
thought  Jackson  wrong  on  the  point  in  question.  This 
produced  discord  between  him  and  Jackson. 

Suddenly  Jackson  received  orders  to  dismiss  hit 
troops,  as  it  did  not  appear  that  the  enemy  were  intend 

1  1  Statesman's  Manual.  348.     1  Colton's  Clay,  161. 
*  Sea  1  Gallatin's  Writings,  517  ;  2  ditto,  196,  211,  4W. 


QUARREL    WITH  THE  BE  XT  ON  S.  31 

mg  to  attack  New  Orleans.  He  was,  of  course,  greatly 
chagrined  at  this  order.  He  was  also  enraged  at  the 
idea  of  disbanding  his  men,  without  pay  or  rations,  five 
hundred  miles  from  home,  to  find  their  way  back  as 
best  they  could.  A  subsequent  order  repaired  part  of 
this  error  by  ordering  pay  and  rations,  but  Jackson  hired 
transportation  on  his  own  responsibility,  and  marched 
his  men  home  in  a  body.  Thomas  H.  Benton,  in  Juno 
following,  succeeded  in  obtaining  from  the  federal  au 
thorities  reimbursement  of  the  expenses  which  Jackson 
had  incurred. 

This  act  of  Benton  would  perhaps  have  extinguished 
the  memory  of  the  trouble  about  rank  at  Natchez,  but, 
in  the  mean  time,  Jackson  had  stood  second  to  another 
man  in  a  duel  with  Jesse  Benton,  brother  of  Thomas. 
A  feud  was  speedily  created  out  of  this  by  the  gossip 
and  tale-bearing  already  described.  Up  to  this  time 
Jackson  had  had  as  many  enemies  as  friends,  but  his 
course  in  leading  home  the  troops  from  Natchez  had 
made  him  very  popular,  and  his  conduct  in  acting  as 
second  in  the  duel,  although  chivalrous  in  one  point  of 
view,  was  overbearing  in  another.  He  threatened  to 
horsewhip  Thomas  Benton,  and  a  rencontre  between 
him  and  the  two  brothers  took  place  in  a  tavern  at 
Nashville.  Blows  and  shots  were  exchanged,  and  Jack- 
xm  came  away  with  a  ball  in  his  shoulder,  which  he  car- 
i-ied  for  twenty  years.  This  affair  occurred  September 
4,  1813. 

The  great  Indian  chief  Tecumseh  had  been  trying  for 

years   to   unite    all   the   red   men   against  the  whites.1 

There  would   have   been    an  Indian  war  if   there  had 

jeen  no  war  with  England,  out  the  latter  war  seemed 

1  Drake's  Tecumseh. 


82  AM  DREW  JACKSON. 

U>  be  Tecumseh's  opportunity.  Among  the  southwest 
ern  Indians  he  found  acceptance  only  with  the  Creeks, 
vrho  were  already  on  the  verge  of  civil  war,  because 
Borne  wanted  to  adopt  civilized  life,  and  others  refused. 
The  latter  became  the  war  party,  under  Weatherford, 
a  very  able  half-breed  chief.  The  first  outbreak  in  the 
Southwest,  although  there  had  been  some  earlier  hos 
tilities,  was  the  massacre  of  the  garrison  and  refugees 
at  Fort  Mims,  at  the  junction  of  the  Alabama  and  Tom- 
bigbee  rivers,  August  30,  1813.  There  were  553  per 
sons  in  the  fort,  of  whom  only  five  or  six  escaped.2  If 
Tecumseh  had  lived,  and  if  the  English  had  been  able 
to  give  their  attention  to  an  alliance  with  him,  he  would 
have  united  the  Indians  from  the  Lakes  to  the  Gulf, 
and  the  "  young  democrats  "  would  have  found  out  what 
sort  of  a  business  it  may  be  to  start  a  war  for  party 
effect.  The  result  of  the  massacre  at  Fort  Mims  was 
that  Alabama  was  almost  abandoned  by  whites.  Terror 
and  desire  for  revenge  took  possession  of  Georgia  and 
Tennessee.  September  25th  the  Tennessee  Legislature 
voted  to  raise  men  and  money  to  aid  the  people  of  the 
Mississippi  territory  against  the  Creeks.  Jackson  was 
Btill  confined  to  his  bed  by  the  wound  which  Benton  had 
given  him.  He  and  Cocke  were  the  two  major-generals 
of  the  militia  of  Tennessee.  They  concerted  measures. 
As  soon  as  he  possibly  could,  Jackson  took  the  field. 
Georgia  had  a  force  in  the  field  under  General  Floyd. 
General  Claiborne  was  acting  at  the  head  of  troops  from 
Louisiana  and  Mississippi  This  Indian  war  had  a 
,ocal  character  and  was  outside  the  federal  operations. 
Jthrcgh  in  the  end  it  had  a  great  effect  upon  them 

1  Folio  State  Papers,  1  Indian  Affairs,  845  fg. 
8  3  Pickett,  266. 


ANNOYANCES  IN  THE  FIELD.  33 

Up  to  this  time  little  had  oeen  known  at  Washington  oi 
Jackson,  save  that  he  had  been  a  friend  of  Burr,  an 
enemy  of  Jefferson,  and  that  he  had  just  acted  in  a 
somewhat  insuoordinate  manner  at  Natchez,  reflecting 
on  the  administration  and  winning  popularity  for  him- 
self. 

The  Creek  war1  was  remarkable  for  three  things: 
(1)  the  quarrels  between  the  generals,  and  the  want  of 
concert  of  action ;  (2)  lack  of  provisions  ;  (3)  insubor 
dination  in  the  ranks.  Partly  on  account  of  the  lack 
of  provisions,  for  which  he  blamed  General  Cocke  (as 
it  appears,  unjustly),  Jackson  fell  into  a  bitter  quarrel 
with  his  colleague  and  junior  officer.  The  lack  of  pro 
visions,  and  consequent  suffering  of  the  men,  was  one 
cause  of  insubordination  in  the  ranks',  but  the  chief 
cause  was  differences  as  to  the  term  of  enlistment.  The 
enlistment  was  generally  for  three  months,  and  constant 
recruiting  was  necessary  to  keep  up  the  army  in  the 
field.  A  great  deal  of  nonsense  has  been  written  and 
spoken  about  pioneer  troops.  Such  troops  were  always 
insubordinate  2  and  homesick,  and  very  dependent  for 
success  on  enthusiasm  for  their  leader  and  a  prosperous 
•course  of  affairs.  For  these  reasons  the  character  of 
the  commander  was  all-important  to  such  an  army.  On 
three  occasions  Jackson  had  to  use  one  part  of  his  army 
to  prevent  another  part  from  marching  home,  he  and 
they  differing  on  the  construction  of  the  terms  of  enlist 
ment.  He  showed  very  strong  qualities  under  these 
trying  circumstances.  He  endured  delay  with  impa- 
>ience,  but  with  fortitude,  and  without  a  suggestion  of 

See  Eaton's  Jackson  and  Pickett's  Alabama. 
2  See  descriptions  of  Kentucky  militia  in  Kendall's 
aj%,  124,  131. 


34  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

abandoning  the  enterprise,1  although  he  was  in  wretched 
health  all  the  time.  He  managed  his  soldiers  with  en« 
ergy  and  tact.  He  understood  their  dispositions.  He 
knew  how  to  be  severe  with  them  without  bringing  them 
to  open  revolt,  and  he  knew  how  to  make  the  most  effi 
cacious  appeals  to  them. 

In  the  conduct  of  the  movements  against  the  enemy 
his  energy  was  very  remarkable.  So  long  as  there  was 
an  enemy  unsubdued  Jackson  could  not  rest,  and  could 
not  give  heed  to  anything  else.  Obstacles  which  lay  in 
the  way  between  him  and  such  unsubdued  enemy  were 
not  allowed  to  deter  him.  This  restless  and  absorb 
ing  determination  to  reach  and  crush  anything  which 
was  hostile  was  one  of  the  most  marked  traits  in  Jack 
son's  character.  It  appeared  in  all  his  military  opera 
tions,  and  he  carried  it  afterwards  into  his  civil  activity. 
He  succeeded  in  his  military  movements.  This  gave 
him  the  confidence  and  adherence  of  his  men.  The 
young  men  of  the  State  then  hastened  to  enlist  with  him, 
and  his  ranks  were  kept  well  filled,  because  one  who 
had  fought  a  campaign  with  him,  and  had  a  story  to  tell, 
became  a  hero  in  the  settlement.  Jackson's  military 
career  and  his  popularity  thus  rapidly  acquired  mo 
mentum  from  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  and  all 
the  forces  at  work.  He  was  then  able  to  enforce  disci 
pline  and  obedience,  by  measures  which,  as  it  seems,  no 
other  frontier  commander  would  have  dared  to  use. 

On  the  14th  of  March,  1814,  he  ordered  John  Wood 
to  be  shot  for  insubordination  and  assault  on  an  officer 
This  was  the  first  of  the  acts  of  severity  committed  by 

1  To  Governor  Blount,  who  proposed  that  he  should  retire  front 
Y»C  expedition,  Jackson  wrote  a  strenuous  remonstrance,  even  aa 
ddmonition.  (Eaton's  Jackson,  101.) 


EXECUTION  OF  WOOD.  35 

Jackson  as  a  commanding  officer,  which  were  brought 
up  against  him  in  the  presidential  campaigns.  Wood 
was  technically  guilty.  He  acted  just  as  any  man  in 
the  frontier  army,  taught  to  reverence  nobody  and  sul> 
mit  to  no  authority,  would  have  acted  under  the  cir 
eumstances.  If  it  had  not  been  for  the  great  need  of 
enforcing  discipline,  extenuating  circumstances  which 
existed  would  have  demanded  a  mitigation  of  the  sen 
tence.  Party  newspapers  during  a  presidential  cam 
paign  are  not  a  fair  court  of  appeal  to  review  the  acts 
which  a  military  commander  in  the  field  may  think 
necessary  to  maintain  discipline.  Jackson  showed  in 
this  case  that  he  was  not  afraid  to  do  his  duty,  and  that 
he  would  not  sacrifice  the  public  service  to  curry  popu 
larity. 

At  the  end  of  March  Jackson  destroyed  a  body  of 
the  Creeks  at  Tohopeka,  or  Horse-Shoe  Bend,  in  the 
northeast  corner  of  the  present  Tallapoosa  County,  Ala 
bama.    With  the  least  possible  delay  he  pushed  on  to  the 
last   refuge  of  the  Creeks,  the  Hickory  Ground,  at  the 
confluence  of  the  Coosa  and  Tallapoosa,  and  the  Holy 
Ground  a  few  miles  distant.     The   medicine  men,  ap 
pealing  to  the  superstition  of  the  Indians,  had  taught 
Vhem  to  believe  that  no  white  man  could  tread  the  latter 
ground  and  live.     In  April  the  remnant  of  the  Creeks 
surrendered  or  fled  to  Florida,  overcome  as  much  by 
Jie  impetuous  and  relentless  character  of  the  campaign 
against  them  as   by  actual  blows.     Fort   Jackson  was 
built  on  the  Hickory  Ground.    The  march  down  through 
AJabama  was  a  great  achievement,  considering  the  cir 
cumstances  of  the  country  at  the  time.     Major-General 
Thomas  Pinckney,  of  the  regular  army,  came  to  Fort 
lackson,  April  20th,  and  took  command.     He  gave  U 


36  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Jackson's  achievements  the  most  generous  recognition 
both  on  the  spot  and  in  his  reports.  April  21,  1814 
the  "West  Tennessee  militia  were  dismissed,  and  they 
marched  home. 

The  Creek  campaign  lasted  only  seven  months.  In 
itself  considered,  it  was  by  no  means  an  important  In 
dian  war,  but  in  its  connection  with  other  military 
movements  it  was  very  important.  Tecumseh  had  been 
killed  at  the  battle  of  the  Thames  in  Canada,  October 
5,  1813.  His  scheme  of  a  race  war  died  with  him. 
The  Creek  campaign  put  an  end  to  any  danger  of  hos 
tilities  from  the  southwestern  Indians,  in  alliance  either 
with  other  Indians  or  with  the  English.  It  was  hence 
forth  possible  to  plan  military  operations  and  pass 
through  the  Indian  territory  without  regard  to  the  dis 
position  of  the  Indians.  This  state  of  things  had  been 
brought  about  very  summarily,  while  military  events 
elsewhere  had  been  discouraging. 

This  campaign,  therefore,  was  the  beginning  of  Jack- 
Bon's  fame  and  popularity,  and  from  it  dates  his  career. 
He  was  forty-seven  years  old.  On  the  31st  of  May  he 
was  appointed  a  major-general  in  the  army  of  the  United 
States,  and  was  given  command  of  the  department  of 
the  South.  He  established  his  headquarters  at  Mobile 
in  August,  1814.  That  town  had  been  occupied  by 
Wilkinson,  April  13,  1813.  There  were  fears  of  an  at 
tack  either  on  Mobile  or  New  Orleans.  English  forces 
Appeared,  and  took  post  at  Pensacola.  Jackson  natu 
rally  desired  to  attack  the  enemy  where  he  found  him 
The  relations  of  the  parties  must  be  borne  in  inind. 
Spain  was  a  neutral  and  owned  Florida,  but  the  boun 
daries  of  Florida  were  in  dispute  between  Spain  and  th« 
1  See  page  20 


CAPTURE   OF  PENSACOLA.  37 

United  States.  Jackson  would  not  have  been  a  South 
western  man  if  he  had  not  felt  strongly  about  that 
dispute.  We  have  seen1  that  one  of  Jackson's  first 
thoughts  when  war  with  England  broke  out,  was  that 
Florida  might  be  conquered.  Now  Spain  aUowed  Eng 
land  to  use  Florida  as  a  base  of  operations.  Jackson 
wrote  to  Washington  for  leave  to  attack  Pensacola.  Ii 
did  not  suit  his  temper  to  sit  still  under  a  great  anxiety 
as  to  which  spot  on  a  long  coast  might  be  chosen  by  the 
enemy  as  the  point  of  attack.  The  Secretary  of  War 
(Armstrong)  replied  to  Jackson's  application  that  it 
was  necessary,  before  invading  Spanish  territory,  to 
know  certainly  whether  Spain  voluntarily  yielded  the 
use  of  her  territory  to  England.  This  letter  did  not 
reach  Jackson  until  the  war  was  over.  All  Jackson's 
letters  of  this  period  to  the  state  and  federal  authori 
ties  have  a  tone  of  lecturing  which  gives  deep  insight 
into  the  character  of  the  man.  He  meant  no  disre 
spect,  but  the  case  seemed  so  clear  to  him  that  he  set 
it  forth  with  an  unconscious  directness  of  language. 

Jackson  had  but  a  very  small  force  at  Mobile,  very 
inadequately  provided  with  any  of  the  necessaries  of  war. 
The  government  at  Washington  was  falling  to  pieces. 
On  the  24th  of  August  the,  English  captured  Washing 
ton  and  burned  the  public  buildings.  Jackson  could  not 
)btain  either  assistance  or  orders.  September  14th  the 
English  attacked  Fort  Bowyer,  on  Mobile  Point,  and 
were  repulsed  with  energy  and  good  fortune.  They 
retired  to  Pensacola.  Jackso^  advanced  against  Pen 
sacola  without  orders  from  Washington,  and  reached 
that  place  November  6th,  with  5,000  men.  He  easily 
Itonned  the  town.  The  Spaniards  surrendered  the  forfc 
*  See  p*ge  30. 


38  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Hear  the  town.  The  English  blew  up  the  fort  at  Bar* 
rancas  and  departed.1  Jackson  immediately  returned 
to  Mobile,  fearing  a  new  attack  there.  This  energetic  ac 
tion  against  Pensacola,  which  a  timid  commander  would 
have  hesitated  to  take,  although  the  propriety  of  it  could 
not  be  seriously  questioned,  was  the  second  great  step 
in  the  war  in  the  Southwest.\  If  the  Creeks  had  not 
been  subdued,  Mobile  could  not  have  been  defended. 
If  Pensacola  had  not  been  captured,  New  Orleans  could 
not  have  been  defended  three  months  later.  Jackson 
had  extraordinary  luck.  All  the  accidents  fell  out  in  his 
favor,  and  all  contributed  to  his  final  success. 

On  the  2d  of  December,  1814,  Jackson  reached  New 
Orleans,  where  he  expected  the  next  blow  to  fall.  Noth 
ing  had  been  done  there  to  prepare  for  defence,  and  no 
supplies  were  there,  —  not  even  arms.  Edward  Liv 
ingston  and  a  Frenchman  named  Louaillier  were  alone 
active  in  preparing  even  the  minds  of  the  people  for 
defence.  Jackson  declared  martial  law  as  a  means  of 
impressing  soldiers  and  sailors,  and  began  preparations 
for  defending  the  city,  in  spite  of  discouragements  and 
the  lack  of  all  proper  means.  He  seemed  to  be  pos 
sessed  by  a  kind  of  frenzy  or  fanaticism  at  the  idea 
of  any  one  "  invading "  American  territory.  As  soon 
as  he  heard  of  the  landing  effected  by  the  English 
tfter  they  had  destroyed  the  flotilla  on  the  lakes,  he  set 
out  to  meet  them  with  such  forces  as  he  had.  He  ar 
rested  their  advance  as  far  from  the  city  as  possible, 
pushed  on  his  preparations  with  redoubled  energy  and 
activity,  and  was  indefatigable  in  devising  and  combin- 
kng  means  of  defence.  ".The  energy  manifested  by 
General  Jackson  spread,  as  it  were,  by  contagion,  ano 
1  7  Niles,  271.  •  Latour,  44  fg. 


BATTLE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS.  39 

tommunicated  itself  to  the  whole  army.  I  shall  addf 
that  there  was  nothing  which  those  who  composed  it  did 
not  feel  themselves  capable  of  performing,  if  he  ordered 
it  to  be  done.  It  was  enough  that  he  expressed  a  wish, 
or  threw  out  the  slightest  intimation,  and  immediately 
a  crowd  of  volunteers  offered  themselves  to  carry  his 
views  into  execution."  *  He  made  the  utmost  of  all  the 
means  he  possessed  and  devised  substitutes  for  what  he 
lacked.  Thus,  with  every  day  that  passed,  his  position 
became  stronger.  The  enemy  were  veteran  troops, 
amply  provided  with  all  the  best  appliances  of  war,  but, 
as  it  appears,  not  well  commanded.  An  energetic  ad 
vance  on  their  part,  at  the  first  moment,  would  have  won 
the  city.  It  was,  however,  Jackson  who  made  the  en 
ergetic  advance  at  the  first  moment,  and  he  never  let 
them  get  any  farther.  The  story  of  the  battle  which 
took  place  is  a  strange  one.  Everything  fell  out  favor 
ably  for  Jackson  as  if  by  magic.  The  English  lost  their 
way,  fired  into  each  other,  adopted  foolish  rumors,  dis 
obeyed  orders,  neglected  precautions.  The  two  parties 
built  redoubts  out  of  the  same  mud,  and  cannonaded 
each  other  all  day  through  a  dense  smoke.  At  night  the 
American  works  were  hardly  damaged,  while  the  Eng 
lish  works  were  battered  to  pieces  and  the  cannon  dis 
mounted.  On  the  8th  of  January,  1815,  the  English 
made  their  grand  assault  on  Jackson's  works.  Latour 
Bays  that  they  were  over-confident,  and  that  they  disre 
garded  the  obstacles.  They  were  repulsed  with  great 
slaughter.  Their  loss  in  general  and  field  officers  was 
tspecially  remarkable.  Only  on  the  west  bank  of  the 
river  did  the  English  gain  some  advantage.  General 
Jackson  said  then  —  and  he  always  afterwards  refused 
1  Latour,  Preface,  p.  17t 


40  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

to  withdraw  the  assertion,  in  spite  of  the  remonstrances 
of  General  Adair,  and  in  spite  of  a  long  controversy  — 
that  the  Kentucky  troops  on  the  west  side  "  ingloriously 
fled."  1  This  is  worth  noticing  only  because  it  shows 
that  Jackson  would  not  recede  from  what  he  thought 
true,  either  to  soothe  wounded  pride  or  to  win  popular 
ity.  If  the  English  had  had  a  little  larger  force  on  the 
west  side,  they  would  have  won  that  position,  and  would 
have  more  than  counterbalanced  all  Jackson's  success 
on  the  east  bank,  for  the  batteries  on  the  west  bank 
could  easily  have  been  made  to  command  Jackson's 
camp  and  works.  The  English  withdrew  after  their 
repulse.  Their  loss,  January  8th,  was  over  2,000  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing ;  Jackson's  was  seven  killed  and 
six  wounded.2  The  treaty  of  peace  had  been  signed  at 
Ghent  December  24,  1814,  two  weeks  before  the  battle 
took  place.  Before  the  English  attempted  any  further 
operations  in  Louisiana,  the  news  of  the  peace  was  re 
ceived.  They  captured  Fort  Bowyer  in  a  second  attack, 
February  12,  1815. 

A  brilliant  victory  was  the  last  thing  any  one  in  the 
United  States  had  expected  to  hear  of  from  New  Or 
leans.  The  expectations  under  which  the  war  had  been 
undertaken  had  all  been  disappointed.  Canada  had  not 
been  conquered.  The  United  States  had  ranged  itself 
with  the  defeated,  and  not  with  the  successful  party  in 
Europe.  The  war  had  been  more  than  nominal,  but 
on  land  it  had  been  anything  but  glorious.  Only  on  the 
sea  did  the  few  frigates  which  the  federalists  had  built, 
while  they  controlled  the  federal  government,  vindicate 

1  7  Niles,  373.    Latour,  App.  52.    Latour  makes  an  apologi 
•r  the  Kentnckiaus,  p.  1 74. 
8  Latour,  App.  55,  153. 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  WAR  PARTY.      41 

she  national  honor  by  brilliant  successes.  Jefferson'a 
a  priori  navy  of  gunboats  had  disappeared  and  been  for 
gotten.  The  war  party  had  looked  upon  Gallatin  aa 
their  financier.  He  had  told  them  in  1809  that  war 
could  be  carried  on  without  taxes,  but  they  had  squan 
dered,  against  his  remonstrances,  resources  on  which 
he  relied  when  he  so  declared,  and  they  had  refused  to 
re-charter  the  bank  as  he  desired.  When  the  war  broke 
out  he  went  out  to  Russia  as  one  of  the  peace  commis 
sioners.  There  was  no  one  competent  to  succeed  him, 
and  the  democrats  never  forgave  him  for  the  embar 
rassments  which  they  suffered  in  trying  to  manage  the 
finances.1  He  did  not  resign  his  secretaryship,  bu 
was  superseded  February  9,  1814.  Good  democrats 
thought  that  sending  him  abroad  was  a  repetition  of 
the  course  they  had  blamed  in  Jay's  case.2  It  certainly 
was  a  very  strange  policy  to  leave  the  treasury  without 
a  regular  head  in  war-time.  The  banks  suspended,  the 
currency  fell  into  confusion,  heavy  taxation  became  nec 
essary,  and  the  public  finances  were  brought  to  the  verge 
of  bankruptcy.  The  party  which  had  made  such  an 
outcry  about  direct  taxes,  national  bank,  and  eight  per 
cent  loans  imitated  Hamilton's  system  of  direct  taxes 
and  excise  throughout.  They  were  discussing  a  big 
paper-money  bank  on  the  day  (February  13th)  when 
news  of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  reached  Washington,  and 
they  would  have  adopted  it  if  the  war  had  continued. 
They  sold  six  per  cent  bonds  for  eighty  and  eighty-five 
ii  a  currency  of  bank  rags  depreciated  twenty  or  twenty- 
five  per  cent.  A  grand  conscription  bill  was  also  ir 
preparation,  and  the  Hartford  convention  had  just  ad 

1  See  Ingersoll,  74. 

8  Carey's  Olive  Branch  63. 


*2  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

jjourned,  having  done  much  or  little  according  as.  peae* 
or  war  might  make  it  expedient  to  put  one  sense  o? 
another  on  ambiguous  phrases.  When  Napoleon  fell, 
and  England  was  left  free  to  devote  her  attention  to 
this  country  as  her  only  remaining  foe,  the  war  took  on 
a  new  aspect.  June  13,  1814,  Gallatin  wrote  home  that 
i  large  force  was  fitting  out  in  England  against  Amer 
ica.  Admiral  Cochrane  wrote  to  Monroe  that  he  had 
orders  to  devastate  the  coasts  of  the  United  States. 
The  first  conditions  of  peace  talked  of  by  England  in 
volved  cession  of  territory  in  Michigan  and  the  Oliio 
territory,  as  well  as  concessions  of  trading  privileges 
and  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  —  terms  which  could 
not  be  accepted  until  after  a  great  deal  more  hard 
lighting.  The  feeling  here  in  the  autumn  of  1814  was 
one  of  deep  despondency  and  gloom.1  The  victory  of 
New  Orleans  was  the  cause  of  boundless  delight,  espec 
ially  because  the  news  of  it  reached  the  North  at  just 
about  the  same  time  as  the  news  of  peace,  and  there 
was  no  anxiety  about  the  future  to  mar  the  exultation. 
The  victory  was  a  great  consolation  to  the  national 
prido,  which  had  been  sorely  wounded  by  military  fail 
ures,  and  by  the  capture  of  Washington.  The  power 
of  Great  Britain  had  been  met  and  repulsed  when  put 
forth  at  its  best,  and  when  the  American  resources 
were  scanty  and  poor.  To  the  administration  and  the 
war  party  the  victory  was  political  salvation.  The  pub 
lic  plainly  saw,  however,  that  the  federal  administration 
had  done  nothing  for  the  victory.  Jackson  had  been 

1  See  Niles's  Register,  vol.  7  ;  Pres.  Message,  1 814 ;  1  Goodrich 
Letter  xxx. ;  Carey's  Olive  Branch,  preface  4th  and  6th  ed.  In 
gersoll  find]  room  for  the  opinion  that  the  prospects  for  1815  wen 


RESULTS   OF  THE    WAR.  43 

the  soul  of  the  defence  from  the  beginning,  and  to  hia 
energy  and  perseverance  success  was  due.  He  therefore 
got  all  the  credit  of  it,  and  the  administration  was  only 
too  glad  to  join  in  the  plaudits,  since  attention  was 
thereby  diverted  from  its  blunders  and  failure.  These 
facts  explain  Jackson's  popularity.  In  the  space  of 
time  between  September,  1813,  and  January,  1815,  he 
had  passed  from  the  status  of  an  obscure  Tennessee 
planter  to  that  of  the  most  distinguished  and  popular 
man  in  the  country.  - 

In  the  treaty  of  peace  nothing  was  said  about  im 
pressment,  the  "  principle "  of  which  was  what  the 
United  States  had  been  striving  about  ever  since  1806, 
and  which  was  the  only  cause  of  the  war.  The  war 
was  therefore  entirely  fruitless  as  to  the  causes  which 
were  alleged  for  it  at  the  outset.  Nevertheless,  the 
second  war  with  England  was  a  great  and  beneficial 
event  in  our  history.  What  the  course  of  things  might 
have  been,  if  a  wiser  statesmanship  had  adopted  Monroe 
and  Pinkney's  treaty,  and  pursued  a  steady  course  of 
peace  and  industrial  growth,  so  far  as  the  state  of  the 
world  would  allow,  is  a  matter  of  speculation  ;  but,  in 
the  course  which  things  did  take,  there  are  especial  and 
valuable  features  of  our  history  which  are  to  be  traced 
to  the  second  war  with  England  as  their  originA  The 
discontent  of  New  England  faded  away  at  once,  and 
there  was  a  stronger  feeling  of  nationality  and  confi 
dence  throughout  the  country  than  there  ever  had  been 
before.1  From  that  time  on  the  Union  had  less  of  the 
character  of  a  temporary  experiment.  The  country  had 
also  won  respect  abroad,  and  was  r3cognized  in  the 
Jamily  of  nations  as  it  had  not  oeen  oefore.  From  1789 

1  Gallatin  expressed  this  opinion.     1  Gallatin's  Writings,  700. 


44  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

to  1815  the  European  nations  were  absorbed  by  Euro 
pean  politics  and  war.  At  the  end  of  this  period  they 
turned  to  find  that  a  new  nation  had  begun  to  grow  up 
on  the  Western  continent.  The  Americans  had  shown 
that  they  could  build  ships  of  war,  and  sail  them,  and 
fight  them,  on  an  equal  footing.  To  the  military  states 
of  Europe  this  was  a  fact  which  inspired  respect. 

To  return  to  our  more  immediate  subject :  There  had 
been  another  dispute  about  terms  of  enlistment  at  Fort 
Jackson  in  September,  1814.  About  200  men,  some  of 
whom  broke  open  a  store-house  to  get  supplies,  marched 
home  without  the  consent  of  their  commanding  officer. 
Most  of  them  came  back :  some  being  compelled,  others 
thinking  better  of  it,  and  others  after  assuaging  their 
homesickness.  Six  were  put  under  arrest  and  tried  by 
court-martial.  They  were  condemned  to  death,  and, 
by  Jackson's  orders,  were  executed  at  Mobile,  February 
21,  1815.1  The  question  of  law  involved  was  a  difficult 
one.  The  men  took  the  risk  of  acting  on  their  own 
view  of  that  question,  while  they  were  under  military 
law.  Jackson's  reason  for  his  course  was  to  enforce 
discipline.  There  had  never  been  such  discipline  in  an 
American  army,2  least  of  all  in  the  West ;  but  that  was 
just  his  contention.  He  said  that  there  must  be  disci 
pline,  and  that  this  was  the  only  way  to  establish  it. 
Some  of  the  cases  were  very  sad,  and  a  less  penalty 
would  probably  have  accomplished  all  the  purpose. 

After  the  English  departed  from  New  Orleans  Jack- 
Bon  relaxed  none  of  his  vigilance,  but  continued  to 
Btrengthen  his  force  by  all  the  means  at  his  command, 

1  The  documents  are  given  in  34  Niles,  55. 
3  Jackson's  apologists  made  much  of  an  alleged  parallel  caw 
tcdei  Washington. 


MARTIAL  LAW  AT  NEW  ORLEANS.  45 

fn  this  he  acted  like  a  good  and  wise  commander,  who 
iid  not  mean  to  be  caught.  He  could  not  assume  that 
the  enemy  would  not  make  another  attack,  and  he  kne\? 
nothing  yet  of  the  peace.  He  maintained  the  attitude 
of  alert  preparation  until  he  was  sure  that  the  war  was 
at  an  end.  He  maintained  martial  law  in  the  city,  and 
ue  administered  it  with  rigor.  The  possession  of  abso 
lute  and  arbitrary  power  did  not  have  a  good  effect  on 
him.  The  exhilaration  and  self-confidence  of  success 
and  flattery  affected  his  acts.  It  appears  that  he  did  not 
thoroughly  respect  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  city.  They 
were  a  motley  crowd,  and  he  thought  that  some  of  them 
were  not  ready  to  do  what  he  thought  they  ought  to  do 
to  defend  the  city.1  Any  one  who  would  not  go  to  the 
last  extreme  for  that  object  could  count  on  Jackson's 
contempt.  He  meant  to  hold  the  city  in  guch  shape  that 
he  could  make  every  man  in  it  contribute  to  its  defence, 
if  the  occasion  should  arise.  Frenchmen  had  certain 
privileges  for  twelve  years,  under  the  treaty  of  1803. 
They  had  generally  cooperated  in  the  defence,  but,  after 
the  English  departed,  they  sought  certificates  of  nation 
ality  in  order  to  secure  the  privileges  and  exemptions  to 
which  they  were  entitled.  To  Jackson  this  seemed  like 
shirking  a  share  of  the  common  burdens.  Livingston, 
who  had  been  on  an  embassy  to  the  English  fleet, 
brought  back  news  on  the  18th  of  February 2  of  the 
peace.  Jackson  would  not  alter  his  attitude  or  proceed 
ings  on  account  of  this  intelligence,  which  came  through 

1  See  his  defence  in  reply  tr  Hall's  writ,  8  Niles,  246. 

2  Latour  says  on  the  10th.      This  date  is  important  for  the 
fuestion  whether  Jackson   *new,  at  least  unofficially,  before  he 
tllowed  the  six  militiamen  to  be*  ixectited,  that  peace  had  b«e« 
Hide. 


46  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

uhe  enemy.  On  February  28th  he  ordered  all  who  had 
certificates  of  French  nationality  to  go  to  Baton  Rouge 
before  March  3d,  on  the  ground  that  he  would  have  no 
man  in  the  city  who  was  not  bound  to  help  defend  it 
March  8th  he  suspended  this  order,  except  as  to  the 
French  consul.  March  3d  the  same  Louaillier  who 
had  been  conspicuous  as  an  advocate  of  energetic  de 
fence,  wrote  an  article  for  a  local  paper,  criticising  the 
order  of  February  28th,  and  urging  that  martial  law 
should  be  abolished.  The  editor,  when  called  to  ac 
count  for  this  article,  gave  up  his  contributor.  Louail 
lier  was  arrested  March  5th.  Judge  Hall,  of  the  United 
States  District  Court,  issued  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  for 
him.  Jackson  received  news  of  the  peace  from  Wash 
ington  on  March  6th,  but  by  some  blunder  the  courier 
did  not  bring  the  document  containing  the  official  notifi 
cation.  On  that  day  Jackson  convened  a  court-martial 
to  try  Louaillier.  He  sent  an  officer  to  arrest  Judge 
Hall,  and  to  obtain  from  the  clerk  of  the  court  the  orig 
inal  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  On  the  8th  he  disbanded 
the  militia.  The  court-martial  struck  out  all  the  charges 
against  Louaillier  except  one  (illegal  and  improper  con 
duct),  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  and  acquitted  him  on 
lhat.  Jackson  disapproved  of  this  finding,  and  defended 
his  own  proceedings.  On  the  llth  of  March  he  sent 
Hall  four  miles  out  of  the  city  and  released  him.  Lou 
aillier  was  kept  in  prison  until  the  official  document  an 
nouncing  the  peace  was  received.  On  the  22d  of  March 
the  United  States  District  Court  ordered  Jackson  to 
show  cause  why  an  attachment  should  not  issue  against 
iflim  for  contempt  of  court  in  wresting  an  original  docu 
jient  from  the  court,  disobeying  the  writ  of  habeas  cor 
pus,  and  imprisoning  the  judge.  Jackson  refused  t* 


JACKSON'S  FINE.  47 

answer  save  by  a  general  vindication  of  his  proceedings. 
This  the  judge  refused  to  hear,  and  fined  him  Sl.,000.1 
In  1842  Tyler  recommended  Congress  to  refund  this 
fine  without  reflecting  on  the  court.  J.  Q.  Adams  said 
in  a  speech,  January  6, 1843,  that  this  was  auctioneering 
for  the  presidency,  all  the  factions  desiring  Jackson's 
support.2  In  1844  Congress  refunded  the  fine  with 
interest, — total  $2,700.  In  a  letter  to  L.  F.  Linn, 
March  14,  1842,8  Jackson  refers  to  the  fine  as  having 
been  laid  because  he  declared  martial  law. 

In  this  incident  Jackson  displayed  some  of  the  faults 
of  which  he  afterwards  showed  many  instances.  He 
spoiled  his  military  success  by  this  unnecessary  collision 
with  the  civil  authority.  He  proved  himself  wrong- 
headed  and  persistent  in  a  course  in  which  every  step 
would  have  warned  him  of  his  error,  if  he  had  been 
willing  to  learn.  Being  committed  by  his  first  passion 
ate  and  hasty  step,  he  was  determined  to  push  through 
on  the  course  he  had  adopted.  He  knew  to  a  mora 
certainty  from  the  6th  of  March  that  the  war  was  at  an 
end.  All  these  mischievous  proceedings  took  place  on 
and  after  that  date.  A  very  little  concession  and  good 
will  at  any  time  would  have  avoided  the  whole  trouble, 
but  Jackson  acted  as  if  he  was  determined  to  grind  out 
of  the  opposing  opinions  all  the  friction  of  which  they 
were  capable. 

April  12th,  Dallas,  acting  Secretary  of  "War,  wrote  a 

1  Report  of  a  committee  of  the  House  of  Representatives ;  64 
fifties,  61  (1843).  Cf.  the  account  in  8  Niles,  246,  and  Judge 
Hall's  response,  Ibid.  272(1815). 

a63  Niles,  312. 

8  62  Niles,  212.  For  Jackson's  own  story  of  the  fine,  see  68 
Silos,  326. 


48  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

dispatch  to  Jackson,  expressing  the  President's  "sur 
prise  and  solicitude,"  and  asking  for  explanations  of  the 
proceedings  of  which  reports  had  reached  Washington ; 
but  as  the  matter  was  all  past  and  dead,  and  no  one 
desired  to  mar  the  exultation  of  the  public  or  the  per 
sonal  satisfaction  of  Jackson,  it  was  allowed  to  drop. 

In  the  autumn  of  1815  Jackson  was  in  Washington ; 
conferring  with  the  War  Department  about  the  peace 
footing  of  the  army.  In  the  spring  of  1816  he  was  at 
New  Orleans  on  business  of  his  military  department. 


CHAPTER 

JACKSON   IN   FLORIDA. 

ANDREW  JACKSON  took  no  important  part  in  the  elec* 
Son  of  1816.  He  had  favored  Monroe  in  1808,  and  he 
preferred  him  to  the  other  candidates  in  1816.  Craw 
ford  was,  at  this  time,  Jackson's  pet  dislike.  The 
reason  for  this  was  that  Crawford,  as  Secretary  of  War, 
had  modified  Jackson's  treaty  with  the  Creeks,  about 
which  the  Cherokees,  deeming  the  terms  unjust  to  them, 
had  appealed  to  the  President.  Jackson  resumed  the 
negotiation,  and  bought  again  the  lands  ceded  before. 
As  the  people  of  Tennessee,  Georgia,  and  Alabama  were 
interested  in  the  cession,  Jackson,  by  re-obtaining  it 
after  it  had  been  given  back,  greatly  increased  liis  pop 
ularity.1 

In  October,  1816,  a  letter,  signed  by  Jackson,  was  ad 
dressed  to  Monroe,  in  anticipation  of  his  election  to  the 
presidency,  urging  the  appointment  of  Wm.  Drayton, 
of  South  Carolina,  as  Secretary  of  War.  Wm.  B.  Lewis, 
Jackson's  neighbor  and  confidential  friend,  husband  of 
one  of  Mrs.  Jackson's  nieces,  wrote  this  letter.  As  Par- 
ton  says,  one  has  no  trouble  in  distinguishing  those  let 
ters  signed  Jackson  which  have  been  copied  and  revised 
by  Lewis,  Lee,  Livingston,  and  others,  from  those  which 
have  not  been  through  that  process.2  It  is  difficult  to 

1  11  Niles,  14S. 

8  A  specimen  of  an  unpolished  Jackson  letter  may  be  Men  la 
the  extract  on  page  384 
4 


50  AtfEKEW  JACKSON. 

lee  the  significance  of  this  letter  and  others  which  Jack- 
Bon  wrote  during  this  winter  (1816—17),  unless  he  was 
being  used  to  advance  an  intrigue  on  behalf  of  Drayton. 
Drayton  had  been  a  federalist.  He  belonged  to  the 
South  Carolina  aristocracy.  No  ties  of  any  kind  are 
known  to  have  existed  between  him  and  Jackson,  either 
before  or  after  this  time.  Jackson  said  (in  1824)  that 
he  did  not  know  Drayton  in  1816.1  Drayton  was  not 
appointed.  These  well-composed  letters  failed  entirely 
of  their  immediate  object ;  and  they  reposed  in  obscu 
rity  for  seven  years.  Lewis  was  an  astonishingly  far- 
sighted  man.  We  shall  see  abundant  proofs,  hereafter, 
of  his  power  to  put  down  a  stake  where  he  foresaw  that 
it  would  be  needed  a  little  later,  but  it  does  not  seem 
credible  that  he  can  have  foreseen  and  prepared  for  the 
ultimate  purpose  which  these  letters  served.  In  the 
course  of  his  argument  on  behalf  of  Drayton,  Jackson 
was  led  (in  the  letters)  to  discuss  the  general  theory  of 
appointments,  and  to  urge  Monroe  to  abandon  the  pro 
scription  of  the  federalists,  to  appoint  them  to  office, 
and  to  promote  reconciliation  and  good  will.  In  the 
same  letter  he  declared  that  he  would  have  hung  the 
leaders  of  the  Hartford  convention,  if  he  had  been  in 
command  in  the  eastern  department  in  1815.  In  1823 
and  1824  the  letters  were  used  with  great  effect  to  draw 
federalists  to  the  support  of  Jackson.  They  were  de 
lighted  with  the  tone  and  sentiment  of  them,2  although 
a  few  winced  at  the  reference  to  the  Hartford  conven 
lion.  In  1828  the  other  aspect  of  the  letters  rathei 
predominated.  The  democrats  were  not  quite  pleased 
that  Jackson  should  have  urged  Monroe  to  appoint  fed 
sralists  and  disregard  party.8 

1  26  Niles,  162.  a  Binns,  249. 

*  The  whole  correspondence,  26  Niles.  163  fg.    See  comment! 


INSUBORDINATION.  51 

Monroe  was  being  acted  upon,  when  Jackson  wrote  to 
him,  from  the  other  side,  by  those  who  wanted  him  to 
favor  the  Monroe  faction  in  the  republican  party.  He 
had  enough  to  do  to  maintain  himself  between  the  two 
demands.  He  answered  Jackson,  admitting  the  high 
principle  of  the  course  Jackson  advocated,  but  setting 
forth  a  theory  of  appointments  more  conformable  to  the 
exigencies  of  party  politics. 

April  22,  1817,  Jackson  published  an  order  to  his 
department  forbidding  his  subordinates  to  obey  any  or 
der  from  the  War  Department  not  issued  through  him. 
He  had  been  much  and  justly  annoyed  at  incidents  in 
the  service  under  him,  of  which  he  had  not  been  in 
formed  beforehand,  and  also  by  direct  orders  issued  from 
Washington,  which  interfered  with  his  arrangements  and 
frustrated  them  without  his  knowledge.  On  the  merits 
of  the  question  he  was  in  the  right,  but  his  public  "  or 
der  "  produced  an  unnecessary  scandal  and  public  col 
lision  in  a  case  where  a  proper  private  representation  to 
the  department  would  have  answered  every  purpose. 
Crawford  was  transferred  to  the  treasury  in  October, 

1816.  There  was  difficulty  in  filling  the   position  of 
Secretary  of  War.     Calhoun  was  appointed  October  8, 

1817.  He  conceded  the  point  claimed  by  Jackson,  re 
serving  only  the  cases  of  emergency. 

Some  persons  informed  Jackson  that  General  Scott 
had  animadverted  upon  his  action  in  the  matter  just 
mentioned,  and  had  characterized  ft  as  mutiny.  Sep 
tember  8,  1817,  Jackson  vrote  a  fiery  letter  to  Scott, 
tailing  him  to  account.  Scott  replied  that,  in  private 
lonversation,  he  had  said  that  the  order  of  April  22d 

fnoted,  Ibid.  p.  219.     For  th<3  disapproval  of  the  democrats,  M* 
Binnb,  246. 


52  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

was  glutinous  as  to  the  future,  and  a  reflection  on  the 
President,  the  Commander-in-Chief ,  as  to  the  past.  He 
disclaimed  any  personal  feeling.  Jackson  replied  in  a 
very  insulting  letter,  in  which  the  well-battered  question, 
Who  of  us  two  is  the  gentleman  ?  did  good  service 
again,  and  wound  up  with  a  challenge  to  a  duel.  Scott 
declined  the  challenge  on  the  ground  of  religious  scru 
ples  and  patriotic  duty.  The  correspondence  was  almost 
immediately  published.  It  created  another  scandal,  for 
the  public  was  not  edified  to  see  two  of  the  first  officers 
of  the  army  engaged  in  such  a  quarrel.1  Niles,  who 
at  this  time  greatly  admired  Jackson,  and  who  is  al 
ways  a  good  representative  of  the  average  citizens  of 
his  time,  refrained  from  publishing  the  correspondence 
until  April,  1819.2  In  this  case,  again,  Jackson  showed 
evidence  of  an  ungovernable  temper  and  a  willingness 
to  profit  by  every  opportunity  for  a  quarrel. 

There  was,  however,  more  public  fighting  at  hand. 

There  were  in  Florida  many  refugee  Indians  of  the 
Creek  nation,  who  were  hostile  to  the  United  States,  and 
many  runaway  negroes.  During  the  war  the  English 
had  sought  such  aid  as  they  could  get  from  these  per 
sons  in  their  operations  against  the  United  States.  They 
had  built  a  fort  on  the  Appalachicola  River,  about  fif 
teen  miles  from  its  mouth,  and  had  collected  there  an 
immense  amount  of  arms  and  ammunition.  The  Eng 
lish  officers  who  were  operating  in  Florida  acted  with  a 
great  deal  of  arbitrary  self-wiU.  They  were  not  under 
gtrict  responsibility  to  their  own  government.  They 
•rere  operating  on  Spanish  territory.  They  were  stirring 
ip  Indians  and  negroes,  and  were  not  commanding  i 

1  14  Niles,  295 ;  4  Adams,  323. 

2  16  Niles,  121. 


THE  NEGRO  FOR'i\  58 

regular  or  civilized  force.  It  is  difficult  to  understand 
Borne  of  their  proceedings  in  any  point  of  view,  and 
other  of  their  doings  certainly  would  not  have  been 
sanctioned  by  the  English  government,  if  known.  The 
officers  were  able  to  gratify  their  own  malice  without 
responsibility. 

When  the  war  ended,  the  English  left  the  arms  and 
ammunition  in  the  fort.  The  negroes  seized  the  fort, 
and  it  became  known  as  the  "  Negro  Fort."  The  au 
thorities  of  the  United  States  sent  General  Gaines  to  the 
Florida  frontier  with  troops,  to  establish  peace  on  the 
border.  The  Negro  Fort  was  a  source  of  anxiety  both 
to  the  military  authorities  and  to  the  slave-owners  of 
Georgia,  and,  according  to  some  accounts,  the  first  step 
was  its  investment.  It  is  otherwise  stated  that  the 
American  authorities  undertook  to  bring  supplies  up  the 
Appalachicola  for  a  fort  which  they  were  building  in 
Georgia,  and  that  the  boats  were  fired  on,  after  which 
the  troops  marched  down  from  Georgia  and  invested  the 
fort,  having  received  permission  to  do  so  from  the 
Spanish  authorities  at  Pensacola,  who  also  very  un#ill- 
ingly  saw  a  great  fortress  established  in  their  territory, 
and  held  by  negroes  and  Indians.1  The  fort  was  bom 
barded.  A  hot  shot  penetrated  one  of  the  magazines, 
and  the  whole  fort  was  blown  to  pieces,  J?ily  27,  1816. 
There  were  three  hundred  negro  men,  women,  and  chil 
dren  and  twenty  Choctaws  in  the  fort ;  two  hundred  and 
seventy  were  killed.  Only  three  came  out  unhurt,2  and 
these  were  killed  by  the  allied  Indians. 

Spain  was  engaged  in  hostilities  with  her  revolted  colo 
nies  in  America.  Filibusters  and  privateers  took  advan 
tage  of  this  state  of  things  to  carrv  on  a  certain  grade  ot 
1  Document  A,  55.  a  Document  A,  69. 


64  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

piracy  and  the  slave-trade.  Amelia  Island,  on  the  north- 
east  coast  of  Florida,  had  been  infested  by  smugglers, 
slavers,  and  freebooters  ever  since  the  war  with  England. 
In  1817  the  island  was  occupied  by  a  filibuster  named 
McGregor,  and  later  by  another  named  Aury.  They 
pretended  to  desire  to  render  Florida  independent,  and 
there  was  a  measure  of  honest  intention  in  their  plane, 
but  the  island  was  a  nest  of  outlaws  and  a  nuisance. 
The  troops  of  the  United  States  took  possession  of  the 
island  and  drove  the  freebooters  out,  because  Spain  was 
not  able  to  do  so.  Old  causes  of  annoyance  have  been 
described  above.1  The  hostile  Indians  and  the  free 
booters  were  new  causes  of  annoyance.  The  Georgians 
were  also  annoyed  that  their  slaves  found  an  easy  ref 
uge  in  Florida.  It  had  been  amply  proven  that  Spain 
could  not  fulfil  the  duties  which  devolved  upon  her  as 
owner  of  Florida.  Yet  she  strenuously  insisted  that 
her  sovereignty  should  be  respected.2  For  all  these 
reasons  the  United  States  was  very  anxious  to  buy 
Florida. 

During  1817  there  were  frequent  collisions  on  the 
frontiers  between  Whites  and  Indians.  Ex-Governor 
Mitchell  of  Georgia,  the  Indian  agent,  the  fairest  and 
best  informed  witness  who  appeared  before  the  com- 
nittee  of  Congress  in  1818—19,  deposed  that  the  blame 
or  these  collisions  was  equal,  that  one  party  was  as 
often  the  aggressor  as  the  other,  and  that  the  lawless 
persons  in  Florida  were  especially  to  blame  for  acts  of 
injury  which  provoked  retaliation.8  When  Gaines  wrote 
ko  the  chief  Kenhigee  that  his  Indians  had  killed  Whites; 
tiie  chief  replied  that  four  Indians  had  been  killed  foi 

i  See  page  20.  a  Document  A,  55. 

*  16  Nile*  85. 


AfTACK  ON  FOWLTOWN.  55 

every  White.1  The  reports  which  were  sent  North  were, 
as  usual  in  such  cases,  only  such  as  tended  to  show  an 
aggressive  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  Indians.2 

On  the  20th  of  November,  General  Gaines  sent  a 
force  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  men  to  Fowltown,  the 
headquarters  of  the  chief  of  the  "  Redsticks,"  or  hos 
tile  Creeks.  They  approached  the  town  in  the  early 
morning,  and  were  fired  on.  An  engagement  followed. 
The  town  was  taken  and  burned.  Gaines's  dispatch  to 
the  Governor  of  Georgia  puts  the  number  of  Indians 
killed  at  four.3  Ex-Governor  Mitchell  of  Georgia, 
quoted  above,  said,  "  This  fact  was,  I  conceive,  the 
cause  of  the  Seminole  war."  It  is,  however,  fair  to  say 
that  Mitchell  was  unfriendly  to  Gaines  and  to  Jackson.4 
The  Indians  of  that  section,  after  this,  began  general 
hostilities,  attacked  the  boats  which  were  ascending  the 
Appalachicola,  and  massacred  the  persons  in  them. 
Gaines  states  no  reason  at  all  for  sending  a  force  against 
Fowltown,  except  that  he  had  invited  the  chief  to  visit 
him,  in  order  to  find  out  "  whether  his  hostile  temper 
had  abated."  The  chief  refused  to  come.  The  friendly 
Indians  said  that  the  Fowltown  Indians  had  been  hos 
tile  ever  since  the  last  war.  Therefore  Gaines  sent  a 
force  equal  to  the  number  of  Indians  in  the  town  "  to 
bring  the  chief  and  warriors,  and,  in  the  event  of  re 
sistance,  to  treat  them  as  enemies."  When  the  Indians 
saw  this  force  approaching  they  fired  on  it,  stood  fire 
once,  and  then  ran  away.  Their  property  was  then  all 
destroyed,  and  the  United  States  had  an  Indian  war  oa 
tfcs  hands. 

1  Document  A,  140. 

2  See  the  items  of  news  *rom  Florida  in  1 3  Nilea, 
•  13  Nileg,  296  ,*  43  Nilea,  «O. 


56  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

In  December,  on  receipt  of  intelligence  of  the  battle 
»t  Fowltown  and  tlie  attack  on  the  boats,  Jackson  was 
ordered  to  take  command  in  Georgia.  He  wrote  to 
President  Monroe  :  "  Let  it  be  signified  to  me  through 
any  channel  (say  Mr.  J.  Rhea)  that  the  possession  of 
the  Floridas  would  be  desirable  to  the  United  States, 
and  in  sixty  days  it  will  be  accomplished."  Much  was 
afterwards  made  to  depend  on  this  letter.  Monroe  waa 
ill  when  it  reached  Washington,  and  he  did  not  see  01 
read  it  until  a  year  afterward?,  when  some  reference 
was  made  to  it.  Jackson  construed  the  orders  which 
he  received  from  Calhoun  with  reference  to  this  letter. 
He  also  afterwards  affirmed  •  that  Bhea  wrote  to  him 
'hat  the  President  approved  of  his  suggestions,1  but  he 
could  not  produce  that  letter.  He  had  burned  it.  He 
certainly  supposed,  however,  that  he  had  the  secret  con 
currence  of  the  administration  in  conquering  Florida. 

When  the  orders  to  take  command  reached  Jackson, 
the  Governor  of  Tennessee  was  absent  from  Nashville. 
Jackson  proceeded  to  raise  troops  in  Tennessee  on  his 
own  responsibility ;  he  being  authorized  to  call  on  the 
Governors  of  the  States  which  were  neighbors  to  the 
scene  of  war.  He  pushed  on  his  preparations  with  great 
energy  and  celerity.  His  acts  were  approved  both  by 
the  state  and  federal  authorities.  He  advanced  through 
Georgia  with  great  haste,  and  was  on  the  Florida  fron* 
tier  in  March,  1818.  He  ordered  part  of  his  provisions 
Bent  to  Fort  Scott  by  the  Appalachicola,  on  which  the 
Spaniards  had  no  fort,  and  he  sent  word  to  the  Spanish 
pommander  at  Pensacola  that  if  the  fort  at  Barrancas 
sundered  his  supply  boats  from  ascending  the  Escambi? 
la  should  consider  it  an  act  of  hostility  to  the  United 
i  8  Adams,  404. 


NOTIONS  ABOUT  SPANIARD*.  57 

States.  These  were,  to  say  the  least,  very  aggressive 
proceedings  against  a  nation  with  which  we  were  at 
pea^o,  for  a  man  who  had  been  thrown  into  paroxysms 
of  rage  and  energy  at  the  idea  of  a  redcoat  resting  on 
the  soil  of  Louisiana  during  a  public  war.  Jackson  im 
mediately  advanced  to  St.  Mark's,  which  place  he  cap 
tured.  On  his  way  down  the  Appalachicola  he  found 
the  Indians  and  negroes  at  work  in  the  fields,  and  un 
conscious  of  any  impending  attack.  Some  of  them  tied 
to  St.  Mark's.  His  theory,  in  which  he  supposed  that 
he  was  supported  by  the  administration,  was  that  he  was 
to  pursue  the  Indians  until  he  caught  them,  wherever 
they  might  go  ;  that  he  was  to  respect  Spanish  rights  as 
far  as  he  could  consistently  with  that  purpose  ;  and  that 
the  excuse  for  his  proceedings  was  that  Spain  could  not 
police  her  own  territory,  or  restrain  the  Indians.  Jack 
son's  proceedings  were  based  on  two  positive  but  arbi 
trary  assumptions :  (1)  That  the  Indians  got  aid  and 
encouragement  from  St.  Mark's  and  Pensacola.  (This 
the  Spaniards  always  denied,  but  perhaps  a  third  as 
sumption  of  Jackson  might  be  mentioned  :  that  the  word 
of  a  Spanish  official  was  of  no  value.)  (2)  That  Great 
Britain  kept  paid  emissaries  employed  in  Florida  to  stir 
up  trouble  for  the  United  States.  This  latter  assump 
tion  was  a  matter  of  profound  belief  generally  in  the 
United  States.  Niles's  reports  and  criticisms  of  events 
in  Florida  all  proceed  from  that  assumption.1  The 
English  government  disavowed  every  act  of  Colonel 
Nichols  with  the  Indians  which  took  definite  shape  and 
»ould  be  dealt  with  at  all.  The  Indians  whom  he  took 
fc>  England  were  kindly  treated,  but  were  not  encouraged 
10  look  to  England  for  any  assistance  or  countena»»<»«*, 
1  14  Niles  ;  all  the  articles  on  Florida. 


58  ANDREW  JACKSOX. 

Ti  was  not  easy  to  break  off  the  connections  which  had 
been  established,  and  destroy  the  hopes  which  had  been 
raised,  during  the  war,  but  there  is  not  the  slightest 
evidence  that  the  English  government  did  not  act  in 
good  faith,  or  that  it  was  busy  in  such  contemptible 
business  as  employing  emissaries  to  stir  up  some  2,000 
savages  to  wage  a  frontier  war  on  the  United  States. 
Jackson's  assumption,  however,  had  serious  import  for 
two  unfortunate  individuals. 

A  Scotchman,  Alexander  Arbuthnot,  was  found  by 
Jackson  in  St.  Mark's.  When  the  fort  was  taken  Ar- 
buthnot  mounted  his  horse  to  ride  away,  but  he  was 
seized,  and  put  in  confinement.  He  was  an  Indian 
trader,  who  had  been  in  Florida  for  many  years.  He 
had  established  as  intimate  and  friendly  relations  as 
possible  with  the  Indians  for  his  own  security  and  ad 
vantage  in  trade.  He  had  also  sympathized  with  the 
Indians,  and  had  exerted  himself  in  their  behalf  in  many 
quarters. 

Several  American  vessels  of  war  lay  in  the  bay  of  St. 
Mark's  to  cooperate  with  the  land  forces.  By  display 
ing  English  colors  on  these  ships,  two  Indian  chiefs, 
Hillis  Hajo  (or  Francis)  and  Himollemico,  were  enticed 
on  board  and  made  prisoners.  They  were  hung  by 
Jackson's  order.  They  had  tortured  and  massacred 
prisoners  after  the  Indian  fashion,  but  no  one  has  ever 
explained  by  what  law  or  usage  known  in  the  service  of 
the  United  States  they  were  put  to  death,  when  thus 
captured  by  stratagem,  and  not  even  on  the  field  of  bat 
tle. 

Jackson  pushed  on  with  the  least  possible  delay  to  the 
Suwanee  River,  where  were  the  headquarters  of  Boleck 
(Billy  Bowlegs),  the  Seminole  chief-  Arbuthnot  liao 


ARBUTHNOT  AND  AMBR1STE*.  59 

«  trading-post  there.  When  he  had  heard  of  Jackson'a 
advance,  he  had  written  to  nis  son,  who  was  his  agent 
at  Boleck's  village,  to  carry  the  goods  across  the  river. 
Through  tliis  letter  the  Indians  got  warning  in  time  to 
cross  the  river  and  take  to  the  swamps.  Their  escape 
enraged  Jackson.  He  had  already  regarded  Arbuthnot 
as  one  of  the  British  emissaries.  He  now  considered 
Arhuthnot's  letter  an  overt  act  of  interference  in  the 
war.  The  town  was  burned  by  Jackson.  In  its  neigh 
borhood  he  captured  an  Englishman  named  Robert  Am- 
brister,  an  ex-lieutenant  in  the  British  marines,  and 
nephew  of  the  Governor  of  New  Providence.  This  man 
was  taken  prisoner  to  St.  Mark's,  the  troops  being  on 
their  way  homewards,  and  the  war  being  over.  A 
court-martial  was  convened  at  St.  Marks.  Arbuthnot 
was  tried  for  (1)  inciting  the  Creek  Indians  to  war 
against  the  United  States ;  (2)  being  a  spy  and  aiding 
the  enemy;  (3)  inciting  the  Indians  to  murder  two 
white  men  named.  The  court  found  him  guilty  of  the 
first  charge  and  of  the  second  except  of  being  a  spy,  and 
condemned  him  to  be  hung.  There  was  no  evidence  at 
all  against  him  on  any  charge.1  HIE  business  in  Florida 
was  open  and  obvious.  He  had  always  advised  the  In 
dians  to  peace  and  submission.  His  letter  to  his  son 
was  not  open  to  censure.  Can  traders  be  executed  if 
their  information,  not  transmitted  through  the  lines, 
frustrates  military  purposes  ?  As  Arbuthnot  construed 
the  Treaty  of  Ghent  the  Indians  were  to  have  their 
lands  restored,  and  he  told  them  so.  There  was  so 
much  room  for  this  construction  that  diplomatic  meas 

1  Report  of  the  trial  in  full,  '.5  Niles,  270.  All  the  documenti 
«uout  the  Negro  Fort  and  the  nvasioo  oi  Florida  are  in  Docn 
nent  A. 


60  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

ores  were  necessary  to  set  it  aside.  Peace  had  been 
made  with  the  Creeks  before  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  wa» 
made. 

Ambrister  was  tried  for  inciting  the  Indians  and 
levying  war.  His  case  was  different.  He  had  no  osten 
sible  business  in  Florida.  He  was  an  adventurer,  and  it 
is  not  clear  what  he  hoped  or  intended.  He  threw  him 
self  on  the  mercy  of  the  court.  He  was  condemned  to  be 
shot.  This  sentence  was  reconsidered,  and  he  was  then 
condemned  to  fifty  lashes  and  a  year  of  hard  labor. 
Jackson  disapproved  of  the  reconsideration,  revived  the 
first  sentence,  and  ordered  both  men  to  be  executed, 
April  29,  1818,  he  left  St.  Mark's,  having  detached  a 
force  to  hold  that  place  and  to  execute  the  sentence. 
The  same  day  both  men  were  executed.  Arbuthnot 
was  seventy  years  old  ;  Ambrister  was  thirty-three. 

It  was  as  a  mere  incident  of  his  homeward  march 
that  Jackson  turned  aside  and  captured  Pensacola,  May 
24,  1818,  because  he  was  told  that  some  Indians  had 
taken  refuge  there.  He  deposed  the  Spanish  govern 
ment,  set  up  a  new  one,  and  established  a  garrison.  He 
then  continued  his  march  homewards.  On  his  way  he 
heard  of  an  attack  by  Georgia  militia  on  the  villages  of 
friendly  and  allied  Indians,  and  he  became  engaged  in  a 
fiery  correspondence  with  Governor  Rabun  of  Georgia 
about  that  affair.  He  was  in  the  right,  but  it  was  an 
other  case  in  which  by  violence  he  provoked  anger  and 
discord,  when  he  might  have  accomplished  much  more 
by  a  temperate  remonstrance. 

In  the  whole  Florida  matter  we  see  Jackson  proceed 
ing  to  summary  measures  on  inadequate  facts  and  in 
formation.  He  "  knew  "  how  the  matter  stood  by  th» 
current  prejudices  and  assumptions,  not  by  evidence  an< 


THE  SEMINOLE   CAMPAIGN.  61 

information.  This  was  the  tone  of  his  mind.  Notions 
•nd  prepossessions  which  once  effected  a  lodgment  in  hie 
mind,  because  circumstances  gave  them  a  certain  plausi 
bility,  or  because  they  fell  in  with  some  general  preju 
dice  or  personal  bias  of  his,  immediately  gained  for  him 
the  character  of  obvious  facts  or  self-evident  truths.  He 
then  pursued  such  notions  and  prepossessions  to  their 
last  consequences,  and  woe  to  any  one  who  stood  in  the 
way. 

General  Jackson  had,  in  five  months,  broken  the  In 
dian  power,  established  peace  on  the  border,  and  sub 
stantially  conquered  Florida.  This  five  months  and  the 
eighteen  months  service  in  1813-15  is  all  the  actual 
service  he  ever  saw.  The  Seminole  war  was  in  its  re 
lations  and  effects  one  of  the  most  important  events  in 
our  history,  but  in  itself  it  was  one  of  the  most  insignifi 
cant  of  our  Indian  campaigns.  Jackson  had  an  over 
whelming  force.  The  report  of  the  Senate  committee  of 
1819  puts  his  force  at  1,800  whites  and  1,500  friendly 
Indians.  The  hostile  Indians  were  never  put  by  any 
body  at  a  higher  number  than  2,000.  This  committee 
put  them  at  1,000,  not  over  half  of  whom,  at  any  one 
time,  were  in  front  of  Jackson.  The  allied  Indians  did  / 
•H  the  fighting.  They  lost  twenty  men  in  the  campaign. 
Not  one  white  man  was  killed.  The  number  of  hostile 
Indians  killed  is  put  at  sixty.1 

The  trouble  with  Jackson's  achievements  was  that  he    / 
had  done   too  much.     The  statesmen  and  diplomatists  / 
could  not  keep  up  with  him,  and  the  tasks  he  threw  on  S 
them  were  harder  than  those  h*  performed  in  the  field,    j 
The  administration  was  not  aware  that  it  had  authorized    \ 
him  to  violate  neutral  territory.    Federal  administrations 
1  Perkins.  113. 


82  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

in  those  days  were  always  timid.  They  did  not  know  th« 
limits  of  their  power,  or  what  they  dared  do.  Monroe 
was  especially  timid.  His  administration  wanted  to  buy 
Florida,  not  conquer  it.  They  did  not  thank  Jackson 
for  plunging  them  into  such  a  difficulty  with  Congress 
and  with  England  and  Spain  all  at  once.  The  two  In 
dian  captives  who  had  been  hung  had  no  friends,  but 
their  execution  was  an  awkward  thing  to  justify  bo- 
fore  the  civilized  world.  The  execution  of  the  two 
Englishmen  was  likely  to  provoke  a  great  deal  of  diplo 
matic  trouble.  Jackson  had  been  perfectly  sure  about 
the  law.  He  laid  it  down  in  the  order  for  the  execu 
tion.  "It  is  an  established  principle  of  the  law  of 
nations  that  any  individual  of  a  nation  making  war 
against  the  citizens  of  any  other  nation,  they  being  at 
peace,  forfeits  his  allegiance,  and  becomes  an  outlaw  and 
a  pirate."  If  the  facts  are  admitted,  such  a  person  un 
doubtedly  forfeits  his  allegiance,  and  cannot  demand  the 
protection  of  his  sovereign,  whatever  may  happen  to 
him.  On  this  ground  the  English  government  took  no 
steps  in  relation  to  the  execution  of  Arbuthnot  and  Am. 
brister,  beyond  an  inquiry  into  the  facts  of  their  alleged 
complicity  in  the  war,1  and  that  inquiry  was  not  pushed 
as  we  may  hope  that  the  government  of  the  United 
States  will  push  the  inquiry,  if  an  American  citizen  is 
•aver  executed  as  Arbuthnot  was.  The  doctrine  of  Jack- 
i  on's  order,  that  a  person  who  engages  in  a  war  to  which 
Bs  country  is  not  a  party  becomes  an  outlaw  and  pirate 
will  not  stand.  As  has  been  well  said,  there  were  a  large 
number  of  foreigners  in  the  American  army  during  the 
Revolution,  who,  on  this  doctrine,  would,  if  captured  by 

1  1  Rush,  473.     "  War  might  have  been  produced  on  thia  CM 
Jasion  '  if  the  ministry  had  but  held  up  a  finger/  "     (488.) 


JACKSON d  INTERNATIONAL  LAW.  63 

jhe  English,  have  forfeited  their  lives.  The  United 
States  would  have  protected  any  such  persons  by  retalia 
tion  or  otherwise.  The  Creeks  were  not  a  nation  in  in 
ternational  law,  they  were  not  the  possessory  of  the  soil 
on  which  they  lived  and  fought ;  there  had  never  been 
a  declaration  of  war ;  yet  they  were  not  rebels  against 
the  United  States,  and  it  could  not  be  denied  that  they 
had  some  belligerent  rights.  Whatever  rights  they  had, 
the  Englishmen,  even  if  they  had  been  complete  and  un 
questioned  allies,  must  also  have  been  entitled  to  from 
the  American  authorities.  If,  then,  the  Indians  were  not 
to  be  hunted  down  like  wild  beasts,  or  executed  by  court- 
martial,  if  captured,  for  levying  war  on  the  United 
States,  the  Englishmen  were  executed  without  right  or 
law.  There  never  was  any  proof  that  anybody  incited 
the  Indians.  The  attack  on  Fowltown  precipitated  hos 
tilities  in  a  situation  where  lawless  men  and  savages,  by 
mutual  annoyance,  outrage,  and  retaliation,  had  prepared 
the  warlike  temper.  When  the  matter  was  investigated 
this  appeared,  and  it  was  seen  that  Jackson  had  acted 
unjustifiably,  because  without  evidence  or  law.  The 
popular  feeling,  however,  would  not  allow  him  to  be 
censured.  Niles,  who  well  represents  the  popular  tem 
per,  believed  in  the  emissary  theory,  and  when  that 
theory  broke  down  he  became  angry.1  He  also  ex 
pressed  the  popular  feeling  with  great  exactness  in  this 
paragraph  :  "  The  fact  is  that  ninety-nine  in  a  hundred 
of  the  people  believe  that  General  Jackson  acted  on 
every  occasion  for  the  good  of  his  country,  and  succesa 
universally  crowned  his  efforts.  He  has  suffered  more 
hardships  and  encountered  higher  responsibilities  than 
iny  man  living  in  the  United  States  to  serve  us,  and  haa 
i  8ee  his  editorial.,  16  Nile/*.  25. 


64  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

his  reward  in  the  sanction  of  his  government  and  the 
approbation  of  the  people."  With  this  dictum  the  case 
was  dismissed,  and  the  matter  stood  so  that  General 
Jackson,  having  done  important  public  service,  could 
not  be  called  to  account,  although  he  had  hung  four 
persons  without  warrant  of  law.  His  popularity  had 
already  begun  to  exercise  a  dispensing  power  in  bis 
favor.  A  committee  of  the  House  of  Representatives,1 
at  the  next  session,  reported  a  vote  of  censure  -m  him 
for  the  execution  of  the  Englishmen,  but  thft  House, 
after  a  long  debate,  refused  to  pass  it. 

Jackson's  proceedings  came  up  in  Monroe's  cabinet 
on  the  question  what  to  do  with  him  and  his  conquests. 
Calhoun  was  vexed  at  Jackson's  insubordination  to  the 
War  Department.  He  wanted  Jackson  censured.  The 
President  and  the  whole  cabinet,  with  the  exception  of 
Adams,  disapproved  of  Jackson's  conduct  in  invading 
Florida,  and  were  ready  to  disavow  his  proceedings  and 
•I  make  reparation.  On  Adams  would  fall  the  labor  of 
vindicating  Jackson's  proceedings  diplomatically,  if  the 
administration  should  assume  the  responsibility  for  them. 
He  avowed  himself  ready  to  undertake  the  task,  and  to 
perform  it  substantially  on  the  grounds  on  which  Jackson 
justified  himself.  It  was  agreed  that  Pensacola  and  St. 
Mark's  should  be  restored  to  Spain,  but  that  Jackson's 
course  should  be  approved  and  defended  on  the  grounds 
that  he  pursued  his  enemy  to  his  refuge,  and  that  Spain 
could  not  do  the  duty  which  devolved  on  her.  The 
President,  however,  countermanded  an  order  which 
Jacksoi?  had  given  to  Gaines  to  seize  St.  Augustine  be 
cause  some  Indians  had  taken  refuge  there.  All  thi 
members  of  the  cabinet  agreed  to  the  policy  decided 
1  15  Niles,  394. 


8EMINOLE  WAR  IN  CONGRESS.  65 

ML,  and  all  loyally  adhered  to  it,  the  secret  of  their  first 
opinion  being  preserved  for  ten  years.  Calhoun  wrote 
to  Jackson  in  accordance  with  the  agreement,  congratu 
lating  and  approving.  Jackson  inferred  that  Calhoun 
had  been  his  friend  in  the  cabinet  all  the  time,  and  that 
his  old  enemy,  Crawford,  had  been  the  head  of  the  hos 
tile  party.  The  political  history  of  this  country  was 
permanently  affected  by  the  personal  relations  of  Jack 
son  to  Calhoun  and  Crawford  on  that  matter.  Monroe 
had  a  long  correspondence  with  Jackson  to  try  to  rec 
oncile  him  to  the  surrender  of  the  forts  to  Spain.  In 
that  correspondence  Jackson  did  not  mention  the  Khea 
letter. 

At  the  next  session  of  Congress  (1818-19)  the  pro 
ceedings  in  Florida  were  made  the  subject  of  inquiry, 
and  were  at  once  involved  in  the  politics  of  the  day. 
Clay  was  in  opposition  to  the  administration  because  he 
had  not  been  made  Secretary  of  State.  He  refused  the 
War  Department  and  the  mission  to  England.  His 
opposition  was  factious.  After  the  administration  as 
sumed  the  responsibility  for  Jackson's  doings,  Clay 
opened  the  attack  on  them.  Here  began  the  feud  be 
tween  Clay  and  Jackson.  The  latter  was  in  a  doubly 
irritable  state  of  mind  between  the  flatterers  on  one  side 
and  the  critics  on  the  other.  The  personal  element 
came  to  the  front.  Any  one  who  approved  of  his  acts 
was  his  friend  ;  any  one  who  criticised  was  his  enemy  ; 
•vhether  any  personal  feeling  was  brought  to  the  dis 
cussion  of  a  question  of  law  and  fact  or  not.  There  are 
some  facts  which  look  as  if  Clay  and  Crawford  had  be 
gun  to  regard  Jackson  as  a  possible  competitor  for  the 
presidency.  Crawford  was  in  communication  with  the 
lommittees  on  the  Seminole  war,  apparently  instigating 
I 


66  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

action,  while  Calhoun  tried  to  quell  the  excitement  and 
avert  action,  out  of  loyalty  to  the  decision  adopted  by 
the  administration  of  which  he  was  a  member.1  The 
Georgian  friends  of  Crawford  in  Congress  led  the  attack 
on  Jackson.2  Crawford  and  Calhoun  were  enemies* 
Adams  was  writing  dispatches  and  preparing  instniC1 
tions,  by  which,  both  with  England  and  Spain,  he  BUO- 
coeded  in  vindicating  Jackson's  proceedings.  He  and 
Jackson  were,  at  this  time,  friends,  and  one  scheme  was 
to  make  Jackson  Vice-President  on  a  ticket  with  Adams.8 
Adams's  defence  of  Jackson  was  very  plausible,  and  it 
was  fortified  line  by  line  with  references  to  the  docu 
mentary  proofs,  yet  if  it  had  been  worth  any  one's  while, 
either  in  England  or  this  country,  to  examine  the  al 
leged  proofs,  all  the  case  against  Arbuthnot  would  have 
been  found  baseless.  Adams  quotes  a  certain  letter  as 
proof  that  Arbuthnot  was  not  truly  a  trader,  but  had 
concealed  purposes.  The  letter  bears  no  testimony  at 
all  to  the  fact  alleged.4  Rush  cited  to  the  English 
minister  another  proof  of  this,  which  is  equally  frail,  and 
only  proves  that  Arbuthnot  had  taken  trouble  to  try  to 
serve  the  Indians  out  of  pity  for  them.5  His  letter  to  his 
Bon,  besides  warning  him  to  save  as  much  as  possible  of 
their  property,  contained  a  message  to  Boleck  not  to 

1  See  Lacock's  letter  of  June  25,  1 832,  in  answer  to  Jackson  s 
interrogatories.     (43  Niles,  79.) 

2  8  Adams,  240. 

3  Adams  said  (in  1824)  that  the  vice-presidency  would  be  a 
nice  place  for  Jackson's  old  age.    Jackson  was  four  months  older 
khan  Adams.     This  is  not  so  ridiculous  as  it  would  be  if  Jacksoi? 
bad  not  pleaded  old  age  and  illness  as  a  reason  why  he  shouli 
•ot  go  to  the  Senate  in  1823.     (See  6  Adams,  633.) 

*  Document  A,  20,  cf.  147. 

«  2  Hugh,  52,  cf.  Document  A,  815. 


PURCHASE   OF  FLORIDA.  67 

resist  the  Americans.1  The  Senate  committee  reported 
February  24,  1819  (Lacock's  Report),  strongly  against 
Jackson  on  all  the  points  from  the  independent  recruit 
ing  down  to  the  taking  of  Pensacola.2  No  action  was 
taken.  Jackson  had  been  in  "Washington  during  the 
winter  watching  the  proceedings.  In  February  he  made 
an  excursion  as  far  north  as  New  York.  He  was  re 
ceived  everywhere  with  enthusiasm.  There  was  a  story 
that  he  was  so  angry  at  some  of  the  proceedings  in 
censure  of  him  that  he  went  to  the  Senate  chamber 
to  waylay  some  persons  who  had  displeased  him.  He 
denied  this. 

In  1819  the  purchase  of  Florida  was  effected,  al 
though  the  treaty  was  not  ratified  until  February  22, 
1821.  In  this  treaty  the  western  boundary  of  the 
Louisiana  purchase  was  for  the  first  time  defined. 
Adams,  while  the  negotiations  were  pending,  called  on 
Jackson,  and  consulted  him  about  the  boundary  to  be 
contended  for.3  Jackson's  interest  then  centred  in 
Florida,  and  he  cared  comparatively  little  for  the  wilder 
ness  of  Texas.  He  thought  that  the  line  of  the  Sabine 
might  well  be  accepted,  if  Florida  could  thereby  be 
secured.  Monroe  and  his  cabinet  seem  to  have  cared 
just  as  little  for  Texas.  Adams's  diary  shows  that  he 
was  not  heartily  supported  in  the  efforts  he  was  willing 
to  make  to  push  the  line  westward.  Jackson's  opinion 
about  claiming  Texas  was  of  no  value,  but  the  fact  that 
he  was  consulted  showed  the  amount  of  respect  and  con 
sideration  which  the  administration  was  willing  to  pay 
Him  In  1836,  and  again  in.  1843,  Adams,  citing  his 
jiary,  declared  that  Jackson  had  been  consulted,  and 
had  approved  the  Florida  treaty.  Jackson  contradicted 
Wid  denied  it  in  a  violent  and  insulting  manner 

1  Document  A.  137,        2  16  Niles,  33.     /»  8  Adams,  238-ft 


88  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

In  the  spring  of  1821  Jackson  was  appointed  Gov 
ernor  of  Florida,  under  the  belief  that  the  public  would 
be  glad  to  see  him  so  honored.  On  July  21st  of  the 
game  year  he  published  general  orders,1  taking  leave  of 
his  army,  a  reduction  having  been  made  by  which  he 
had  been  thrown  out.  In  these  orders,  or  in  a  post 
script  to  them,  he  managed  to  come  into  collision  with 
his  colleague  and  senior,  Major-General  Brown,  then 
chief  in  command  of  the  army  of  the  United  States,  by 
taking  up  and  criticising  an  order  "  signed  Jacob 
Brown,"  especially  in  regard  to  the  punishment  foi 
desertion.  Brown  was  a  New  York  militia  general, 
some  eight  years  younger  than  Jackson,  who  had  dis 
tinguished  himself,  in  the  general  ill-success  of  the  war, 
by  some  small  successes  on  the  northern  frontier.  He 
seemed  to  be  the  coming  military  hero  of  the  war  until 
he  was  eclipsed  by  Jackson.  He  took  precedence  of 
Jackson  by  seniority  of  appointment,  and  so  became 
chief  in  command.  It  had  become  evident  now  that 
Jackson  needed  much  room  in  the  world  for  all  his 
jealousies  and  animosities,  and  that  his  fellow-men  must 
put  up  with  a  great  deal  of  arrogance  and  misbehavior 
on  his  part.  His  popularity  shielded  him.  He  had 
become  a  privileged  person,  like  a  great  nobleman  of 
the  last  century.  To  offend  him  was  to  incur  extraor 
dinary  penalties.-  To  get  in  his  way  was  to  expose 
one's  self  to  assaults  which  could  not  be  resented  as 
they  would  be  if  they  came  from  another  man.  All 
this  he  had  won  by  military  success.  One  is  led,  then, 
to  inquire,  what  was  the  measure  of  this  military  ser- 
riflo  ?  It  was  but  a  little  over  two  years  of  India* 
fighting,  with  only  one  battle  against  a  civilized  foe 
v  i  31  Nilea,  53. 


GOVERNOR   OF  FLORIDA.  69 

At  least  it  seemed  fair  to  expect  that  he  would  observe 
military  discipline  and  decorum.  Bat  he  did  not  do  so^, 
and  no  one  dared  call  him  to  account. 

mf  Congress  did  not  have  time  to  legislate  for  the  terri 
tory  of  Florida,  after  the  treaty  was  ratified,  before  the 
end  of  the  session.  An  act  was  passed  extending  to  the 
new  territory  only  the  revenue  laws  and  the  law  against 
the  slave-trade.  Jackson  was  appointed  Governor  in 
April,  with  all  the  powers  of  the  Captain-General  of 
Cuba  and  the  Spanish  Governors  of  Florida,  except  that 
he  could  not  lay  taxes  or  grant  land.  His  position  was 
therefore  a  very  anomalous  one,  —  an  American  Gov 
ernor,  under  Spanish  law,  of  an  American  territory  not 
yet  under  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United 
States.  Long  delays,  due  to  dilatoriness  and  inef 
ficiency,  postponed  the  actual  cession  until  July  17th. 
Meanwhile  Jackson  was  chafing  and  fuming,  and 
strengthening  his  detestation  of  all  Spaniards. 

In  September  certain  persons  represented  to  Jackson 
that  papers  which  were  necessary  for  the  protection  of 
their  interests  were  being  packed  up,  and  would  be  car 
ried  away  by  the  Spanish  ex-Governor,  contrary  to  the 
treaty.  There  were  five  or  six  sets  of  papers  about 
property  and  land  grants 1  which  were  in  demand. 
There  had  been  complaints  against  the  Spaniards  for 

.  granting  lands  belonging  to  the  crown  between  the 
making  and  the  ratification  of  the  treaty.  Jackson  no 
doubt  believed  the  worst  against  them.  The  persons 
who  claimed  his  aid  were  weak  and  poor.  With  charac 
teristic  chivalry  and  impetuosity  he  sent  an  officer  to 
ieize  the  papers.  The  ex-Goyer~or,  Callava,  refused 
U>  give  up  any  papers  unless  they  werfc  described,  and 
1  21  Nilea,  '50. 


70  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

»  demand  for  them  was  addressed  to  him  as  Spanish 
2ommissioner.  He  and  Jackson  seem  to  have  worked 
at  cross-purposes  unnecessarily.  It  is  hard  to  make 
out  what  the  misunderstanding  was  (although  the  use 
of  two  languages  might  partly  account  for  it),  unless 
Jackson  was  acting  under  his  anti-Spanish  bias.  Jack 
son  ended  by  sending  Callava  to  the  calaboose.  Parton, 
who  gives  some  special  and  interesting  details  derived 
from  Brackenridge,  the  alcalde  and  interpreter,  says  that 
Callava  saw  the  ridiculous  side  of  the  affair,  and  that 
he  and  his  friends  "  made  a  night  of  it "  in  the  calaboose. 
Jackson  sent  an  officer  to  Callava's  house  to  take  the 
papers,  and  then  ordered  Callava  to  be  discharged. 

Eligius  Fromentin,  of  Louisiana,  had  been  appointed 
judge  of  the  western  district  of  Florida.  He,  upon 
application,  issued  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  for  Callava. 
Jackson  summoned  Fromentin  before  him  to  show  cause 
why  he  had  interfered  with  Jackson's  authority  as  Gov 
ernor  of  the  Floridas  with  the  powers  of  the  Captain- 
General  of  Cuba,  as  "  Supreme  Judge,"  and  as  "  Chan 
cellor."  Fromentin  sent  an  excuse  on  the  ground  of 
illness.  The  next  day  he  went  to  see  Jackson,  and  after 
a  fierce  interview  each  prepared  a  "  statement "  to  send 
to  Washington.  Callava  went  to  Washington  to  seek 
satisfaction.  Some  of  his  friends  published,  at  Pensa 
cola,  a  statement  in  his  defence.  Thereupon  Jackson 
ordered  them  out  of  Florida  at  four  days'  notice,  on 
pain  of  arrest  for  contempt  and  disobedience,  if  they 
"vere  found  there  later.  After  all,  the  heirs  of  Vidal, 
\vho  stirred  up  the  whole  trouble,  were,  according  to 
Parton,  indebted  to  the  Forbes  firm,  against  which  they 
ranted  to  protect  themselves.1  This  would  not  affec* 
1  2  Parton,  638 


AFFAIR  OF  CALLAVA.  71 

their  right  and  interest  in  securing  papers  properly 
kheirs.  Whether  the  papers  were  being  carried  away> 
and  did  properly  belong  to  the  claimants,  is  not  known.1 

About  the  time  of  the  trouble  with  Callava,  Worth- 
ington,  the  Secretary  and  acting  Governor  of  East  Flor 
ida,  was  having  a  contest  with  Coppinger,  the  Spanish 
Governor  of  East  Florida,  about  papers  which  the  former 
seized  under  Jackson's  orders. 

Here,  then,  was  another  trouble  which  Jackson  had 
prepared  in  about  six  months'  service  for  his  unhappy 
superiors.  He  was  ill  and  disgusted  with  his  office. 
He  resigned  and  went  home  in  October.  It  is  plain 
that  he  had  acted  from  a  good  motive  against  Callava, 
and,  being  sure  of  his  motive,  he  had  disregarded  diplo 
matic  obligations,  evidence,  law,  propriety,  and  forms 
of  procedure.  Those  things  only  enraged  him  because 
they  balked  him  of  the  quick  purpose,  born  of  his  sense 
of  justice  and  of  his  sympathy  with  an  ex  parte  appeal 
to  his  power.  Such  a  man  is  a  dangerous  person  to  be 
endowed  with  civil  power.  As  to  his  quarrel  with  Fro- 
mentin,  it  was  a  farce.  If  Jackson  had  been  a  man  of 
any  introspection,  he  must  have  had,  ever  after,  more 
charity  for  the  whole  class  of  Spanish  governors,  when 
he  saw  what  an  arrogant  fool  he  had  made  of  himself 
while  endowed  with  indefinite  and  irresponsible  power. 

Monroe's  cabinet  unanimously  agreed  that,  as  the  only 
laws  which  had  been  extended  to  Florida  were  the  rev 
enue  laws  and  those  against  the  slave-trade,  Fromentin's 
jurisdiction  was  limited  to  those  laws,2  and  he  could  not 

1  All  the  documents  are  in  Folio  State  Papers,  2  Miscellan 
T99.  The  important  papers  are  in  21  Niles. 

'*  For  Fromentin's  own  theory  of  tis  action,  which  was  plainly 
irroneous,  see  21  Niles,  252. 


72  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Issue  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  The  President,  Calhoun, 
and  Wirt  thought  that  he  was  not  amenable  for  his  er 
ror  to  Jackson.  Adams  took  Jackson's  part  in  this 
matter  also.  He  said  that  Fromentin  had  violated  Jack 
son's  authority.1  The  cabinet  discussed  the  subject  foi 
three  days  without  reaching  a  decision.  They  were 
greatly  perplexed  as  to  the  law  and  justice  of  the  mat 
ter,  and  also  as  to  its  political  effect.  Congress  took  iS 
up,  and  the  newspapers  were  filled  with  it.  At  first  the 
tide  of  opinion  was  against  Jackson,  but  his  popularity 
reacted  against  it,  and  the  affair  did  not  hurt  him. 

In  1823  Jackson  was  offered  the  mission  to  Mexico. 
He  declined  it.  Soon  afterwards  he  published  in  the 
Mobile  "  Register  "  a  letter  stating  his  reasons  for  de 
clining.  These  reasons  were  a  reflection  on  the  adminis 
tration,  because  they  showed  cause  why  no  mission  ought 
to  be  sent.  The  letter  was  calculated  to  win  capital  out 
of  the  appointment  at  the  expense  of  the  administra 
tion  which  had  made  it.2  Monroe  must  have  been  often 
reminded  of  what  Jefferson  said  to  him,  in  1818,  when 
he  asked  whether  it  would  not  be  wise  to  give  Jackson 
the  mission  to  Russia :  "  Why,  good  G — d,  he  would 
breed  you  a  quarrel  before  he  had  been  there  a  month ! "  * 

i  5  Adams,  359,  c'68  to  380.  *  24  Nile»,  28* 

9  4  Adams,  76. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

ELECTION    OF   1824. 

THE  congressional  caucus  met  April  8,  1820.  The 
question  was  whether  to  nominate  any  candidates  for 
President  and  Vice-President.  Adams  says  that  the 
caucus  was  called  as  part  of  a  plan  to  nominate  Clay 
for  Vice-President.  About  forty  members  of  Congress 
attended.  R.  M.  Johnson  offered  a  resolution  that  it 
was  inexpedient  to  nominate  candidates.  This  resolu 
tion  was  adopted,  and  the  caucus  adjourned.1  Monroe 
received,  at  the  election,  every  electoral  vote  save  one, 
which  was  cast  by  Plumer,  in  New  Hampshire,  for 
Adams.  Tomkins  was  reelected  Vice-President,  but  he 
received  fourteen  less  votes  than  Monroe.  His  repu 
tation  was  declining.  In  raising  money  for  the  pub 
lic  service  during  the  war  he  had  engaged  his  own 
security.  His  book-keeping  was  bad,  and  his  accounts 
and  the  public  accounts  became  so  entangled  that  he 
could  not  separate  them.2  On  the  one  hand,  he  claimed 
that  he  was  a  creditor  and  heavy  loser  by  the  steps 
which  he  had  taken  out  of  patriotic  zeal  for  the  pub 
lic  service,  which  steps  had  been  of  great  benefit  to 
the  country.  On  the  other  hand,  the  controller  of  the 
State  of  New  York  found  that  Tomkins  could  not  ac 
count  for  all  the  money  which  had  passed  through  his 
bands,  and  which  amounted  to  over  three  million  dot 
•  5  Adams,  £8,  60.  2  1  Hammond,  508  fg. 


74  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

lars.  The  affair  was  immediately  entangled  la  the  fac 
tion  fights  of  New  York,  the  Bucktails  teLing  sides  with 
Tomkins,  and  the  Clintonians  agair^c  him.  The  con 
troller  of  the  State  and  the  Vice-president  of  the  United 
States  were  engaged,  in  1818  and  1819,  in  a  bitter  cor 
respondence.1  Tomkins  became  bankrupt,  and  acquired 
the  reputation  of  a  defaulter.  Finally,  in  1821,  an  act 
was  passed  by  the  state  Legislature  to  balance  his  ac 
counts  without  payment  either  way.2  He  was  not  able 
for  some  years  to  draw  his  salary  as  Vice-President, 
because  he  stood  a  defaulter  also  on  the  books  of  the 
federal  treasury.  He  stood  a  suit  in  1822  in  the  United 
States  District  Court  and  won  it.8  In  1823  a  committee 
of  the  House  reported  in  his  favor,4  and  an  act  appropri 
ating  $35,190  for  his  relief  was  passed.  In  April,  1824, 
Monroe  sent  in  a  message,  the  matter  having  been  re 
ferred  to  him,  in  which  he  found  $60,239 5  due  Tom 
kins.  The  trouble  was  that,  in  order  to  show  himself  a 
creditor,  Tomkins  had  to  include  in  his  accounts  interest, 
commissions,  damages,  allowances,  etc.,  with  interest  on 
them  all ;  that  is,  all  the  ordinary  and  extraordinary 
charges  which  a  broker  would  make  for  finding  funds 
lor  an  embarrassed  client.  If  these  charges  were  all 
allowed,  Tomkins  could  claim  no  credit  for  patriotism. 
If  he  was  to  keep  the  credit  of  extraordinary  patriotism, 
he  was  a  debtor.  In  1816  he  was  very  popular  and  had 
high  hopes  of  the  presidency.  In  1825  he  retired  neg 
lected  and  forgotten.  He  died  in  June,  1825. 

During  Monroe's  second  term  each  of  the  persona 
factions  was  intriguing  on  behalf  of  its  chief,  and  striv 

1  15  Niles,  425 ;  17  Niles,  21.  2  1  Hammond,  542. 

8  22  Niles,  242.  *  23  Niles,  406. 

•  26  Niles,  168. 


TARIFF  IN  1820.  75 

ing  to  kill  off  all  the  others.  There  were  no  real  issues. 
On  the  return  of  peace  in  1815,  the  industries  which  had 
grown  up  here  during  the  war  to  supply  needs,  which 
could  not,  under  the  then  existing  laws,  be  supplied 
by  importation,  found  themselves  threatened  with  ruin. 
The  tariff  of  1816,  although  its  rates  were  of  course  far 
below  the  "  double  duties  "  which  had  been  levied  dur 
ing  the  war,  was  supposed  at  the  time  to  be  amply  pro 
tective.  It  had  been  planned  to  that  end.  The  embargo, 
non-intercourse,  and  war  had  created  entirely  artificial 
circumstances,  which  were  a  heavy  burden  on  the  na 
tion  as  a  whole,  but  which  had  given  security  and  favor 
to  certain  manufacturing  industries.  There  was  no  way 
to  "  protect "  the  industries  after  peace  returned  except 
to  reproduce  by  taxes  the  same  hardship  for  everybody 
else,  and  the  same  special  circumstances  for  the  favored 
industries,  as  had  been  produced  by  embargo  and  war. 
In  1819  a  great  commercial  crisis  occurred,  which  pros 
trated  all  the  industry  of  the  country  for  four  or  five 
years.  So  long  as  vicious  and  depreciated  currencies 
existed  in  Europe,  there  was  less  penalty  for  a  vicious 
currency  here  ;  but  as  fast  as  European  currencies  im 
proved  after  the  return  of  peace,  gold  and  silver  began 
to  go  to  the  countries  of  improving  currency,  and  away 
from  the  countries  where  the  currency  still  remained 
bad.  The  "  hard  times "  were  made  an  argument  to 
show  that  more  protection  was  needed  ;  that  is,  that  the 
country  had  been  prosperous  during  war,  and  that  the 
return  of  peace  had  ruined  it,  unless  taxes  could  be  de 
vised  which  should  press  as  hard  as  the  war  had  done. 
The  taxes  had  not  indeed  been  made  so  heavy  as  that, 
*nd  so  more  were  needed.  Currency  theorists  also  arose 
k>  anticipate  all  the  wisdom  of  xater  days.  Thfey  proved 


76  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Jbat  Ae  people  of  the  United  States,  with  a  great  conl* 
nent  at  their  disposal,  could  not  get  out  of  the  continent 
an  abundance  of  food,  clothing,  shelter,  and  fuel  he- 
cause  they  had  not  enough  bits  of  paper  stamped  "  one 
dollar"  at  their  disposal.  The  currency  whims,  how 
ever,  hardly  got  into  politics  at  that  period. 

In  1820  a  strong  attempt  was  made  to  increase  the 
tariff,  to  do  away  with  credit  for  duties,  and  to  put  a 
check  on  sales  at  auction.  As  the  presidential  election 
was  uncontested,  power  to  carry  these  bills  could  not  be 
concentrated.  In  1824  the  case  was  different.  No  fao« 
tion  dared  vote  against  the  higher  tariff  for  fear  of  losing 
support.1  The  tariff  was  not,  therefore,  a  party  ques 
tion.  The  act  was  passed  May  22,  1824,  by  a  combi 
nation  of  Middle  and  Western  States  against  New  Eng 
land,  and  on  a  combination  of  the  iron,  wool,  hemp, 
whiskey,  and  sugar  interests.  New  England,  as  the 
commercial  district,  was  then  for  free  trade. 

Jackson  had  been  elected  to  the  Senate  in  the  winter 
of  1823-24.  Parton  brings  the  invaluable  testimony  of 
William  B.  Lewis  as  to  the  reason  why  and  the  way  in 
which  Jackson  was  elected.2  John  Williams  had  been 
senator.  His  term  expired.  He  was  an  opponent  of 
Jackson.  He  was  a  candidate  for  reelection,  and  was 
so  strong  that  no  Jackson  man  but  Jackson  himself 
could  defeat  him.  Hence  the  men  who  were  planning 
to  make  Jackson  President,  of  whom  Lewis  was  the 
chief,  secured  Jackson's  election  to  the  Senate.  While 
the  tariff  question  was  pending,  a  convenient  person 
—  Dr.  Coleman,  of  Warrenton,  Va.  —  was  found  to  in 
terrogate  Jackson  about  it.  His  letter  in  reply  was  thf 
first  of  the  adroit  letters  or  manifestoes  by  means  v 
i  «4  Niles.  324.  2  3  Parton,  81. 


WIRE-PULLING  77 

rhich  the  Jackson  managers  carried  on  the  campaign  in 
Jackson's  favor.  They  developed  this  art  of  electioneer 
ing  in  a  way  then  not  conceived  of  by  other  factions. 
The  Coleman  letter  was  a  model  letter  of  its  kind.  It 
paid  nothing  clear  or  to  the  point  on  the  matter  in  ques 
tion.  It  used  some  ambiguous  phrases  which  the  readei 
could  interpret  to  suit  his  own  taste.  It  muddled  the 
question  by  contradictory  suggestions,  bearing  upon  it 
from  a  greater  or  less  distance,  and  from  all  points  of 
view,  and  it  failed  not  to  introduce  enough  glittering 
platitudes  to  make  the  whole  pass  current.  Jackson 
voted  for  the  tariff  and  for  a  number  of  internal  im 
provement  schemes,  which  votes  were  afterwards  quoted 
against  him.1 

Jackson  was  therefore  fairly  started  as  a  candidate 
for  the  presidency.  Among  all  the  remarkable  acci 
dents  which  opened  his  way  to  the  first  position  in  the 
country,  it  was  not  the  least  that  he  had  William  B. 
Lewis  for  a  neighbor  and  friend.  Lewis  was  the  greatN 
father  of  the  wire-pullers.  He  first  practised  in  a  mas 
terly  and  scientific  way  the  art  of  starting  movements, 
apparently  spontaneous,  at  a  distance,  and  in  a  quarter 
from  which  they  win  prestige  or  popularity,  in  order 
that  these  movements  may  produce,  at  the  proper  time 
and  place,  the  effects  intended  by  the  true  agent,  who, 
in  the  mean  time,  prepares  to  be  acted  on  by  the  move 
ment  in  the  direction  in  which,  from  the  beginning,  he 
desired  to  go.  On  this  system  political  activity  is  ren 
dered  theatrical.  The  personal  initiative  is  concealed. 
There  is  an  adjustment  of  roles,  a  mise  en  scene,  and 
ft  constant  consideration  of  effect.  Each  person  acts  on 
Ihe  other  in  prearranged  wavs.  Cues  are  given  and 
1  38  Nile*  985. 


78  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

taken,  and  the  effect  depends  on  the  fidelity  of  eack 
to  his  part.  The  perfection  of  the  representation  is 
reached  when  the  audience  or  spectators  are  disre 
garded  until  the  finale,  when  the  chief  actor,  having 
reached  the  denoument  towards  which  he  and  his  com 
rades  have  so  long  been  laboring,  comes  to  the  foot- 
Alights  and  bows  to  the  "will  of  the  people."  Lewis 
showed  great  astuteness  in  his  mano3uvres.  There  was 
nothing  vulgar  about  him.  There  was  a  certain  breadth 
of  generalship  about  his  proceedings.  He  was  very  far- 
sighted  and  prudent.  He  had  the  great  knowledge  re 
quired  by  the  wire-puller,  —  knowledge  of  men.  He 
knew  the  class  amongst  whom  Jackson's  popularity  was 
strongest.  He  knew  their  notions,  prejudices,  tastes, 
and  instincts.  He  knew  what  motives  to  appeal  to.  He 
wrote  very  well.  When  he  wanted  to  go  straight  to  a 
point  he  could  do  so.  When  he  wanted  to  produce 
effects  or  suggest  adroitly,  without  coming  to  the  point, 
he  could  do  that  too.  He  also  knew  Jackson  well.  He 
no  doubt  sincerely  loved  and  admired  Jackson.  He 
threw  his  whole  soul  into  the  undertaking  to  elect  Jack 
son,  but  he  never  showed  any  selfish  or  interested  pur 
poses  in  that  connection.  So  long  as  Jackson  was  unin 
formed  or  unprejudiced  on  any  matter  he  was  at  the 
disposition  of  any  one  who  had  won  his  confidence,  and 
who  desired  to  influence  him  on  that  matter.  He  could 
then  be  led  to  accept  any  view  of  it  which  was  put  be 
fore  him  in  a  way  to  strike  his  mind.  Lewis  knew  how 
to  put  a  thing  before  Jackson's  mind.  However,  when 
Jackson  had  adopted  any  view  or  notion,  his  mind  be 
came  set  or  biassed,  and  it  was  not  easy,  even  for  those 
who  first  influenced  him,  to  deflect  his  mind  from  rigid 
ky  of  inference,  or  his  conduct  from  direct  deduction 


PROJECT  TO  NOMINATE  JACKS  OX.  78 

fie  often  outstripped  the  wishes  and  intentions  of  those 
who  had  moved  him  first.  To  contradict  him,  at  that 
itage,  would  have  been  to  break  friendship.  Lewis 
treated  him  with  great  tact  and  influenced  him  very 
often,  but  he  did  not  control  him  or  manage  him.  If 
would  have  been  a  good  thing  for  the  country  if  no 
worse  man  than  Lewis  had  ever  gained  influence  over 
Jackson. 

Parton  obtained  from  Lewis  a  description  of  the  first 
steps  towards  Jackson's  nomination.  Lewis  tells  how 
he  used  Jackson's  letters  to  Monroe  to  win  influential 
federalists  to  Jackson's  support.  It  was  after  Jack 
son's  return  from  Florida,  in  1821,  that  the  project  waa 
definitely  decided  upon.  At  first  Jackson  rejected,  with 
some  temper,  the  suggestion  that  he  could  or  would  run 
for  President.  He  did  not  consider  himself  the  right 
sort  of  man,  and  he  felt  old  and  ill.  In  the  spring  of 
1822  Lewis  went  to  North  Carolina,  and  worked  up  his 
connections  there  for  Jackson.  On  the  20th  of  July, 
1822,  the  Tennessee  Legislature  made  the  formal  nom 
ination.  During  the  next  two  years  Jackson's  sup 
porters  were  gaining  connections  and  undermining  the 
caucus,  for  he  was  an  independent  candidate  and  a 
"  disorganizer,"  because  he  was  raised  up  outside  of 
the  machine,  and  without  any  consultation  with  the  es 
tablished  party  authorities. 

Certain  features  of  Jackson's  character  have  appeared 
already.  We  have  seen  some  of  his  elements  of  strength 
and  some  of  his  faults.  The  nation  wanted  to  reward 
him  for  military  achievements  and  for  a  display  of  mil- 
>tary  virtues.  They  had  discarded  dukedoms,  pensions, 
ribbons,  and  orders,  and  they  had  no  sign  of  national 
(pratitade  to  employ  but  election  to  civil  office.  So  fai 


BO  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Jackson  had  not  made  public  display  of  any  qualities  but 
fchose  of  a  military  man,  and  violence,  indiscretion,  obsti« 
nacy,  and  quarrelsomeness.  In  the  campaign,  those  who 
opposed  him  called  him  a  "  murderer."  The  only  in 
cidents  of  his  life  which  the  biographer  can  note,  aside 
from  his  military  service,  are  successive  acts  of  impro 
priety  and  bad  judgment.  Negatively,  however,  there 
was  more  to  be  said  for  Jackson.  He  was  above  every 
species  of  money  vice ;  he  was  chaste  and  domestic  in 
his  habits ; l  he  was  temperate  in  every  way ;  he  was 
not  ambitious  in  the  bad  sense. 

There  were  already  four  other  candidates  in  the  field, 
who  all  belonged  to  the  democratic-republican  partv. 
Niles  gives  an  instance  in  which  seven  democrats  met 
at  Philadelphia,  who  all  were  for  Schulze,  the  democratic 
candidate  for  Governor.  Each  candidate  for  President 
had  a  supporter  among  them,  and  no  candidate  had 
over  two.2  De  Witt  Clinton  was  not  altogether  out  of 
consideration.  A  caucus  of  the  South  Carolina  Legisla 
ture  nominated  Lowndes.8 

John  Quincy  Adams  stood  first  among  the  candi 
dates  by  his  public  services  and  experience.  He  was 
fifty-seven  years  old.  He  went  to  Europe  with  hi? 
father  when  he  was  eleven  years  old,  and  studied  there 
for  several  years.  He  was,  through  his  father,  intimate 
from  his  earliest  youth  with  public  and  diplomatic  af 
fairs.  As  far  as  education  and  early  training  could  go, 
he  had  the  best  outfit  for  a  statesman  and  diplomat.  He 
enjoyed  great  respect.  Those  who  thought  that  a  man 
CPght  to  advance  to  the  presidency  through  lower  gradei 
•f  public  employment  looked  upon  him  as  the  most  suifr 

»  The  only  contrary  suggestion  known  is  in  Binus,  245. 
*  24  Niles,  369.  8  &  Adams,  468. 


JOHN   QUINCY  ADAMS.  81 

able  candidate.  He  was  not  a  man  of  genius,  but  one 
of  wide  interests,  methodical  habits,  and  indefatigable 
industry.  It  is  hard  to  see  what  he  ever  did,  from  hia 
earliest  youth,  for  amusement  and  entertainment.  He 
would  have  been  a  better  statesman  if  he  had  oet,n  mort, 
frivolous.  He  was  unsocial  in  his  manners,  h<Ml  few 
friends,  and  repelled  those  who  would  have  been  hie 
friends.  So  far  as  we  can  learn,  he  engaged  in  no  in 
trigues  for  the  presidency.  He  certainly  had  the  small 
est  and  least  zealous  corps  of  workers.  His  weakness 
was  that  the  great  body  of  the  voters  did  not  have  any 
feeling  that  a  man  with  the  qualifications  which  he  pos 
sessed  was  needed  for  the  presidential  office.  He  had 
been  a  democrat  since  1807,  when  he  went  over  to  the 
administration  party  because  he  believed  that  the  New 
England  federalists  were  plotting  secession.  His  sound 
ness  in  "  democratic  principles "  was  doubted.  He 
was  earnestly  disliked  by  all  the  active  politicians.  In 
the  campaign  he  was  called  a  "  tory."  Adams  was 
charged  with  offering,  at  Ghent,  to  yield  to  the  English 
the  right  of  navigating  the  Mississippi,  if  they  would 
renew  the  rights  to  fish  in  Canadian  waters  ;  that  is, 
with  offering  to  sacrifice  a  Western  interest  to  serve  an 
Eastern  one.  He  published  a  small  volume  to  expose 
the  untruth  of  this  charge  and.  the  character  of  the  evi 
dence  by  which  it  was  supported.1  In  his  own  opinion, 
this  attack  helped  him.2  He  was  in  favor  of  the  tar 
iff  as  it  stood  in  1824.  He  thought  that  it  gave  enough 
protection.  He  was  also  in  favor  of  internal  improve 
ments,  but  thought  they  might  be  abused.8  He  was  ao 

1  The  Duplicate  Letters,  Ae  Fisheries  and  the  Mississippi. 
«  6  Adams,  263. 
•  6  Adams,  353,  451 


82  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

rused  of   undemocratic  care  for  etiquette,  and  also  of 
slovenliness  in  dress. 

Calhoun  enjoyed  great  popularity  in  New  England, 
in  New  York  city,  and  in  Pennsylvania,  as  well  as  at 
home.  He  was  forty-two  years  old,  and  was  the  "  young 
men's  candidate."  He  had  actively  favored  the  tariff  of 
1816  and  the  bank,  and  also  plans  for  internal  improve 
ments.  In  October,  1822,  Adams  wrote  :  "  Calhoun 
has  no  petty  scruples  about  constructive  powers  and 
state  rights."  l  Calhoun  and  Adams  had  been  strong 
friends,  and  there  was  some  idea  of  putting  Calhoun  on 
the  ticket  with  Adams  until  1822,  when  some  members 
of  Congress  nominated  Calhoun  for  President.2  Web 
ster  preferred  Calhoun  to  all  the  other  candidates.3  His 
brother  wrote  that  Calhoun  was  the  second  choice  of 
New  Hampshire.4  Calhoun  took  the  War  Department 
in  1817,  when  it  was  in  great  disorder.  He  had  to  bear 
a  great  deal  of  abuse  before  he  got  it  in  order,  but  later 
he  was  much  praised  for  the  system  he  had  introduced.6 
He  and  Crawford  were  especial  rivals,  because  Crawford 
was  the  "  regular "  Virginia  and  Southern  candidate. 
In  1822  attempts  were  made  to  injure  Calhoun  by  an 
investigation  of  a  contract  for  building  the  Kip  Raps  at 
Old  Point  Comfort.  The  contract  was  private,  not  com 
petitive.  He  was  exonerated  by  a  committee  of  the 
House.6  As  we  shall  see,  Calhoun  withdrew  his  name 
before  the  election. 

i  6  Adams,  75.  2  6  Adams,  42. 

8  I  Curtis's  Webster,  218,  236. 
4  I  Webster's  Correspondence,  323. 

*  26  Niles,  5C.    Adams  thought  this  praise  undeserved.    (7  Ad 
Fms,  446.) 
«  23  NUeg,  251. 


WILLIAM  HARRIS   CRAWFORD.  83 

Crawford  was  the  regular  candidate.  He  was  fifty- 
kwo  years  old.  In  1798  he  had  been  an  "  Addresser/1 
that  is,  an  orthodox  federalist.1  He  had  also  been  a 
supporter  of  the  old  bank,  and  had  been  the  leader  in 
the  Senate  for  the  renewal  of  its  charter.  He  had  also 
opposed  the  embargo.2  He  had  been  very  eagerly  work 
ing  for  eight  years  to  reach  the  presidency.  In  the 
campaign  he  was  called  an  "  intriguer."  As  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  during  the  crisis  of  1819,  he  had  a  very 
difficult  task  to  perform.  He  had  undertaken  even 
more  than  his  duty  required,  for  he  had  aimed  to  "do 
justice  "  between  the  banks,  and  to  keep  them  from  en 
croaching  upon  each  other.  To  this  end  he  distributed 
his  deposits,  and  in  some  cases  favored  certain  banks. 
When  the  crash  came  his  funds  were  locked  up  in  some 
of  these  banks.  He  was  then  open  to  the  charge,  which 
Ninian  Edwards  made  over  the  signature  "  A.  B.," 
that  he  had  used  the  treasury  funds  to  win  political 
capital,  and  had  corruptly  put  the  funds  in  unsound 
banks.  Crawford  was  exonerated  by  a  committee  of  the 
House,  but  he  barely  escaped  ruin.8  He  introduced  the 
limited  period  of  service,  by  the  Act  of  May  15,  1820, 
into  the  Treasury  Department.  This  act  limits  the  pe 
riod  of  office  of  all  persons  engaged  in  collecting  the  rev 
enue  to  four  years,  at  the  expiration  of  which  time  they 
go  out  of  office  or  come  up  for  reappointment.4  It  is 
one  of  the  most  important  steps  in  the  history  of  the 
abuse  of  the  civil  service.  Crawford  was  believed  by 
his  colleagues  to  have  sacrificed  the  administration  to 
make  capital  for  himself.  Adams  says  that  Crawford 

1  24  Niles,  132.  2  Cobb,  143. 

Folio  State  Papers  ;  5  Finance,  . 
•  f  Adains,  424. 


84  ANDREW  JACKSON, 

and  Monroe  quarrelled  to  the  verge  of  violence  during 
the  last  months  of  the  administration.1  In  order  to  win 
strength  for  Crawford,  Van  Buren  was  nominated  for 
Vice-President  by  the  Legislature  of  Georgia.  This 
proposition  was  overwhelmed  by  ridicule.2  Crawford 
was  physically  disabled  from  September,  1823,  to  Sep 
tember,  1824.  He  could  not  sign  his  name,  and  was 
apparently  a  wieck.  He  used  a  fac-simile  stamp  on 
public  papers,  or  it  was  used  by  a  member  of  his  family 
under  his  direction. 

Clay  had  already  assumed  the  championship  of  the 
protective  system.  He  had  been  one  of  the  strongest  op 
ponents  of  the  re-charter  of  the  first  bank.  He  had  also 
made  "  sympathy  with  nations  struggling  for  liberty  " 
one  of  his  points,  and  had  been  zealous  for  the  recog 
nition  of  the  South  American  republics.  He  was  a 
great  party  leader.  He  had  just  the  power  to  win  men 
to  him  and  to  inspire  personal  loyalty  which  Adams 
had  not.  On  the  other  hand  he  lacked  industry.  He 
was  eloquent,  but  he  never  mastered  any  subject  which 
required  study.  His  strength  lay  in  facility  and  practical 
tact.  He  was  forty-seven  years  old.  He  was  stigma 
tized  as  a  "  gambler  "  by  his  opponents  in  the  campaign. 
From  1820  to  1823  he  was  not  in  public  life,  but  was 
retrieving  his  private  fortunes.  His  enemies  said  that 
his  affairs  had  been  embarrassed  by  gambling.  He  was 
Speaker  from  1815  to  1820,  and  again  from  1823  to 
1825.  He  was  one  of  the  commissioners  who  made  the 
treaty  of  Ghent. 

The  Crawford  men  wanted  a  congressional  caucus  in 
J824,  because  they  had  control  of  the  machine.  Tin 
oppo'ters  of  the  other  candidates  opposed  any  caucus 
*  7  Adams,  81.  2  Cobb,  209. 


CAUCUS    OF  1824.  85 

but  secretly,  because  the  caucus  was  now  an  established 
institution.  The  opponents  of  the  caucus  found  a  strong 
ally  in  Niles,  who  opened  fire  on  the  caucus  in  his 
"  Register  "  without  any  reserve.  His  sincerity  and 
singleness  of  purpose  are  beyond  question.  He  did  not 
use  his  paper  to  support  any  candidate.  He  was  an  old 
Jeffersonian  republican  of  1798,  and  he  believed  sin 
cerely  in  all  the  "principles."  He  assailed  the  caucus, 
because  in  his  view  it  usurped  the  right  of  the  people  to 
govern  themselves.  He  denounced  it  steadily  for  more 
than  a  year,  and  he  succeeded  in  casting  odium  upon  it. 
The  Legislatures  of  New  York  and  Virginia  passed  reso 
lutions  in  favor  of  a  caucus,  because  these  two  States, 
while  united,  could  control  the  presidency  through  the 
caucus.  New  York  being  rent  by  democratic  faction 
fights,  and  Virginia  being  led  by  a  close  oligarchy,  New 
York  became  an  appendage  to  Virginia  in  their  co 
alition.  Tennessee,  South  Carolina,  Alabama,  and  Ma 
ryland  adopted  resolutions  against  the  caucus.  The 
Legislature  of  Pennsylvania  declared  against  a  "  partial 
caucus."  *  As  the  time  for  the  caucus  approached,  ne 
gotiations  for  bargains  between  the  candidates  became 
active,  but  it  would  be  tedious  to  gather  the  recorded 
reports  and  rumors  of  such  transactions. 

The  caucus  met  in  the  chamber  of  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives  February  14,  1824.2  Of  216  democrats  in 
Congress,  66  were  present.  Two,  who  were  ill  at  home, 
sent  proxies.  If  proxies  were  allowable,  the  members 
of  Congress,  when  assembled  in  presidential  caucus, 
ttmst  have  been  regarded  as  independent  powers,  pos 
sessed  of  a  prerogative,  like  peers  or  sovereigns.  The 
*ote  was :  Crawford,  64 ;  A  Jams,  2  ;  Jackson,  1 ;  Macon, 
i  6  Aoams,  232.  »  25  Nile*.  388. 


86  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

1 :  i.  e.9  all  but  the  Crawford  men  stayed  away.  Gat 
latin  was  nominated  for  Vice-President  by  57  votes 
An  address  was  published,  defending  the  caucus,  and 
arguing  its  indispensability  to  the  party.1  Some  ques 
tion  was  raised  about  Gallatin's  eligibility  on  account  of 
his  foreign  birth,  but  he  possessed  the  alternative  quali 
fication  allowed  by  the  Constitution.  He  had  been  a 
commissioner  at  Ghent  and  a  friend  of  Crawford.  His 
nomination  did  not  strengthen  the  ticket.  There  was 
still  a  great  deal  of  rancor  against  him  for  forsaking  the 
Treasury  Department  when  the  war  broke  out.  He 
soon  withdrew  his  name  because  the  caucus  was  so  un 
popular. 

Martin  Van  Buren  was  chief  engineer  of  this  last  con 
gressional  caucus.  He  was  senator  from  New  York 
He  and  his  friends,  under  the  new  Constitution  of  1821, 
had  established  a  very  efficient  party  organization,  which 
they  had  well  in  hand.  They  were  known  as  the 
Regency,  and  they  had  renewed  the  alliance  with  Vir 
ginia  to  control  the  machine  and  elect  Crawford.  A 
project  which  threatened  to  mar  their  scheme  was  the 
proposition,  in  1823,  to  take  the  election  of  presidential 
electors  from  the  Legislature  of  New  York  and  .give  it 
to  the  people.  The  Regency-Tammany  party  opposed 
this,  as  it  would  render  useless  all  their  machinery. 
The  advocates  of  the  change  (being  the  opponents  of 
Crawford,  Tammany,  and  the  Regency),  formed  the 
"  people's  party."  Clinton  was  for  Jackson,  so  he  was 
allied  with  the  people's  party  against  Crawford.  Al 
though  Clinton  was  the  soul  of  the  canal  enterprise,  h« 
•vas  removed  from  his  office  of  canal  commissioner  to 
\ty  to  break  up  this  combination.  It  would  never  dti 
1  25  Nilee,  391. 


INTRIGUES  IN  NEW  YORK.  87 

for  the  Regency  to  oppose  directly  and  openly  a  propo 
gition  to  give  the  election  to  the  people.  When  the  law 
was  proposed,  the  Regency  managed  to  twist  it  into  such 
preposterous  shape  that  a  general  ticket  was  to  be  voted 
for,  and  if  there  should  not  be  a  majority  (which,  with 
four  in  the  field,  was  a  very  probable  result)  the  State 
would  lose  its  vote.  The  bill  passed  the  House,  but  was 
defeated  in  the  Senate.1  The  popular  indignation  was 
BO  great  that  the  next  Legislature  was  carried  by  the 
people's  party,  and  a  joint  ticket  of  electors  was  elected, 
on  which  were  25  Adams  men,  1  Clay  men,  and  4 
Crawford  men.2  Some  of  them  must  have  changed 
their  votes  before  the  election. 

A  federalist  convention  at  Harrisburg,  Pennsylvania, 
February  22, 1824,  nominated  Jackson.8  At  a  primary 
meeting  at  Philadelphia,  Dallas  withdrew  Calhoun's 
name  from  the  first  place  and  nominated  him  for  the 
second.  Calhoun  was  strong  in  Pennsylvania,  but  Jack 
son  had  superseded  him.  This  move  was  a  coalition  of 
Jackson  and  Calhoun.  The  democratic  convention  at 
Harrisburg,  Marcir->4th,  was  stampeded  for  Jackson. 
Only  one  vote  was  given  against  him.4  Another  demo 
cratic  convention,  called  "  regular,"  was  convened  Au 
gust  9th.  It  repudiated  Jackson  and  adhered  to  Craw 
ford.8  Jackson  and  his  followers  were  denounced  as 
"  disorganizes."  The  Albany  "  Argus  "  said  of  Jackson, 
"  It  is  idle  in  this  State,  however  it  may  be  in  others,  to 
strive  even  for  a  moderate  support  of  Mr.  Jackson.  He 
is  wholly  out  of  the  question  as  far  as  the  votes  of  New 

1  2  Hammond,  1£2. 

2  27  Niles,  186.     Hammond  •  statement  is  obscure.     (See  I 
Hammond,  177.)  8  1  Sargent,  41. 

4  26  Niles.  20.  6  1  Sargent,  48. 


88  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

York  are  in  it.  Independently  of  the  disclosures  of  hii 
political  opinions,  he  could  not  be  the  republican  candi 
date.  He  is  respected  as  a  gallant  soldier,  but  he  stands, 
in  the  minds  of  the  people  of  this  State,  at  an  immeasur 
able  distance  from  the  executive  chair."  1  After  the 
"  Argus  "  changed  its  mind  about  Jackson,  any  one  who 
held  the  very  judicious  opinion  embodied  in  this  para 
graph  was  regarded  by  it  as  a  "  federalist,"  which  was 
M  much  as  to  say,  an  enemy  of  the  American  people. 
Niles  says  that  John  Randolph  opposed  Jackson  in  a 
public  speech  in  1822  because  he  was  the  candidate  of 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  and  his  election  would 
unite  "  the  purse  and  the  sword."  2  Jefferson  said,  "  I 
feel  very  much  alarmed  at  the  prospect  of  seeing  Gen 
eral  Jackson  President.  He  is  one  of  the  most  unfit 
men  I  know  of  for  the  place.  He  has  had  very  little 
respect  for  laws  or  constitutions,  and  is,  in  fact,  an  able 
military  chief.  His  passions  are  terrible.  .  .  .  He 
has  been  much  tried  since  I  knew  him,  but  he  is  a  dan 
gerous  man." 8  On  the  contrary,  Jackson's  courtly 
bearing  won  for  him  all  the  ladies.  Webster  wrote, 
"  General  Jackson's  manners  are  more  presidential  than 
those  of  any  of  the  candidates.  He  is  grave,  mild,  and 
reserved.  My  wife  is  for  him  decidedly."  4  Jackson's 
friends  induced  him  to  have  a  kind  of  reconciliation 
with  Scott,  Clay,  and  Benton.  The  last  was  a  supporter 
of  Clay,  but  when  Clay  was  out  of  the  contest  he  turned 
to  Jackson.5  Adams  says  that  Benton  joined  Jackson 
nfter  Jackson's  friends  obtained  for  him  the  nominatior 

Quoted  49  Niles,  188.  2  22  Niles,  73. 

*  1  Webster's  Correspondence,  371. 

*  1  Webster's  Correspondence,  346. 

He  went  first  to  Crawford,  then  to  Jackson.     (Cobb,  815., 


VOTE  OF  1824.  89 

»s  minister  to  Mexico.  When  Adams  came  in  he  would 
not  ratify  the  appointment.1  During  the  winter  some 
sort  of  a  peace  was  made  between  Jackson  and  Craw 
ford.2 

The  result  of  the  electoral  vote  was :  Jackson,  93 ; 
Adams,  84  ;  Crawford,  41 ;  Clay,  37.  For  Vice-Presi 
dent  the  vote  was  :  Calhoun,  182  ;  Sanford,  30  ;  M'icon, 
24  ;  Jackson,  13 ;  Van  Buren,  9 ;  Clay,  2  ;  blank,  1. 
New  York  voted :  Jackson,  1 ;  Adams,  26  ;  Crawford, 
5  ;  Clay,  4.  The  electors  were  chosen  by  the  Legislature 
in  Delaware,  Georgia,  Louisiana,  New  York,  South 
Carolina,  and  Vermont.  In  the  other  States  the  popular 
vote  stood  (in  round  numbers) :  Jackson,  155,800 , 
Adams,  105,300;  Crawford,  44,200;  Clay,  46,500. 
The  second  choice  of  Clay's  States  (Ohio,  Kentucky, 
and  Missouri)  was  Jackson.  In  Pennsylvania  Jackson 
had  36,000  votes,  and  all  the  others  together  had  less 
than  12,000.  Only  about  one  third  of  the  vote  of  the 
State  was  polled,  because  it  was  known  that  Jackson 
would  carry  it  overwhelmingly.3 

The  intriguing  for  the  election  now  entered  on  a  new 
stage.  Clay  was  out  of  the  contest  in  the  House,  but 
he  had  great  influence  there,  and  it  has  often  been  as 
serted  that  the  House  would  have  elected  him  if  his 
name  had  come  before  it  as  one  of  the  three  highest. 
He  was  courted  by  all  parties.  It  would  be  tedious  to 
collect  the  traces  of  various  efforts  to  form  combinations. 
The  truth  seems  to  be  this  :  Washington  was  filled  dur 
ing  the  winter  with  persons^  members  of  Congress  and 
others,  who  were  under  great  excitement  about  the 
Election.  All  sorts  of  busybodbs  were  running  about 

1  6  Adams,  522.  2  6  Adams,  478,  485. 

18C. 


90  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

talking  and  planning,  and  proposing  what  seemed  to 
each  to  be  good.  Persons  who  were  in  Washington, 
and  were  cognizant  of  some  one  line  of  intrigue,  01 
of  the  activity  of  some  one  person,  have  left  records  oi 
what  they  saw  or  heard,  and  have  vehemently  main 
tained  each  that  his  evidence  gives  the  only  correct 
clew  to  the  result.  Every  candidate's  name  is  connected 
with  some  intrigue,  or  some  proposition  for  a  coalition. 
In  no  case  is  the  proposition  or  intrigue  brought  home 
to  the  principal  party  as  a  conscious  or  responsible  par 
ticipator,  and  yet  it  appears  that  the  negotiations  were 
often  of  such  a  character  that  they  could  have  been 
taken  up  and  adopted  if  they  had  proved  satisfactory. 

The  election  in  the  House  took  place  February  9, 
1825.  On  the  first  ballot,  Adams  obtained  the  votes  of 
thirteen  States,  Jackson  of  seven,  and  Crawford  of  four. 
For  the  first  few  days  Jackson  seemed  to  bear  his  defeat 
good-naturedly.  He  met  Adams  on  the  evening  of  the 
election  at  the  President's  reception,  and  bore  himself 
much  the  better  of  the  two.1 

It  was  soon  rumored  that  Clay  was  to  be  Secretary  of 
State.  After  a  few  days  Clay  accepted  that  post.  The 
charge  of  a  corrupt  bargain  between  Clay  and  Adams 
was  then  started.  It  was  an  inference  from  Clay's  ap 
pointment,  and  nothing  more.  Any  man  can  judge  to 
day  as  well  as  any  one  could  in  1824  whether  that  fact 
leads  straight  and  necessarily  to  that  inference.  Not  a 
particle  of  other  evidence  ever  was  alleged.  We  have 
n»ver  had  any  definition  of  the  proper  limits  of  combi 
nations,  bargains,  and  pledges  in  politics,  but  an  agree 
ment  to  make  Clay  Secretary  of  State,  if  made,  could 
not  be  called  a  corrupt  bargain.  He  was  such  a  ma* 
1  Cobb,  226. 


CHARGE  OF  CORRUPT  BARGAIN.  91 

that  he  was  a  fit  and  proper  person  for  the  place.  No 
one  would  deny  that.  Therefore  no  public  interest 
would  be  sacrificed  or  abused  by  his  appointment.  A 
corrupt  bargain  must  be  one  in  which  there  is  collusion 
for  private  gain  at  the  expense  of  the  public  welfare. 
Bargains  which  avoid  this  definition  must  yet  be  toler 
ated  in  all  political  systems,  although  they  impair  the 
purity  of  any  system. 

The  men  around  Jackson  —  Eaton,  Lewis,  Livingston, 
Lee,  Swartwout  —  knew  the  value  of  the  charge  of 
corrupt  bargain  for  electioneering  purposes,  and  the 
political  value  of  the  appeal  to  Jackson's  supporters 
on  the  ground  that  he  had  been  cheated  out  of  his 
election.  Did  not  they  first  put  the  idea  into  Jackson's 
head  that  he  had  been  cheated  by  a  corrupt  bargain  ? 
Is  not  that  the  explanation  of  his  change  of  tone  from 
the  lofty  urbanity  of  the  President's  assembly  to  the 
rancorous  animosity  of  a  few  days  afterwards  ?  Such  a 
conjecture  fits  all  the  circumstances  and  all  the  charac 
ters.  The  men  around  Jackson  might  see  the  value  of 
the  charge,  and  use  it,  without  ever  troubling  themselves 
to  define  just  how  far  they  believed  in  it ;  but  Jackson 
would  not  do  that.  Such  a  suggestion  would  come  to 
him  like  a  revelation,  and  his  mind  would  close  on  it 
Trith  a  solidity  of  conviction  which  nothing  ever  could 
shake. 

Benton  always  scouted  the  notion  of  the  bargain.1 
He  says  that  he  knew  before  Adams  did,  that  Clay  in 
tended  to  vote  for  Adams.  Benton  would  not  follow 
Clay.  Clay's  reason  for  voting  for  Adams  was  that 
Crawford  was  incapacitated  by  his  broken  health,2  and 

1  1  Benton,  48. 

f  Crawford  was  taken  to  «he  Capitol  for  a  few  hours,  a  day  or 


92  ANDREW  JACKSON 

that  a  military  hero  was  not  a  fit  person  to  be  President 
January  8th  Clay  wrote  to  F.  P.  Blair1  that  the  friends 
of  all  the  candidates  were  courting  him,  but  that  he 
sh  Duld  vote  for  Adams.  January  24th  Clay  and  the  ma 
jority  of  the  Ohio  and  Kentucky  delegations  declared 
that  they  would  vote  for  Adams.  In  a  letter  to  F. 
Brooke,  January  28,  1825,  Clay  stated  that  he  would 
vote  for  Adams  for  the  reasons  given.2  The  Clay  men 
generally  argued  that  if  Jackson  was  elected  he  would 
keep  Adams  in  the  State  Department.  It  would  thei 
be  difficult,  in  1828,  to  elect  Clay,  another  Westerr 
man ;  but  Adams  would  have  more  strength.  If  Adama 
should  be  elected  in  1824,  the  election  of  Clay,  as  a 
Western  man,  in  1828,  would  be  easier,  especially  if  Ad 
ams  would  give  him  the  Secretaryship.8  On  the  25th  of 
January,  the  day  after  the  Western  delegations  came  out 
for  Adams,  an  anonymous  letter  appeared  in  the  "  Co 
lumbian  Observer,"  of  Philadelphia,  predicting  a  bar 
gain  between  Adams  and  Clay.  Kremer,  member  of 
the  House  from  Pennsylvania,  avowed  his  responsibility 
for  the  letter,  although  it  has  generally  been  believed 
that  he  could  not  have  written  it.  Clay  demanded  an 
investigation  in  the  House,  and  a  committee  was  raised, 
but  Kremer  declined  to  answer  them.  The  letter  was 
Another  case  of  the  general  device  of  laying  down  anch 
ors  for  strains  which  would  probably  need  to  be  ex 
erted  later.  It  would  not  do  for  Kremer  to  admit  that 

two  before  the  election,  but  he  was  apparently  a  wreck.  (Cobb 
818.) 

1  Blair  and  Kendall,  in  1824,  were  Clay  men.  They  were  botl 
,%ctive,  in  1825,  in  urging  Clay  men  to  vote  for  Adams.  (40  Nile* 
73;  Telegraph  Extra,  300  fg.) 

•  *7  Nifcg,  386.  »  Telegraph  Es*r*.  til. 


ADAMS  AND   CLAY.  98 

the  assertion  in  the  letter  was  only  a  surmise  of  Jus,  It 
Bertainly  was  a  clever  trick.  The  charge  would  either 
prevent  Clay  from  going  into  Adams's  cabinet,  lest  he 
should  give  proofs  of  the  truth  of  the  imputation,  or,  if 
he  did  go  into  the  cabinet,  this  letter  would  serve  as  a 
kind  of  evidence  of  a  bargain.  Immediately  after  the 
inauguration  Kremer  made  this  latter  use  of  it  in  an 
address  to  his  constituents.1  On  the  20th  of  February 
Jackson  wrote  a  letter  to  Lewis,  in  which  he  affirmed 
and  condemned  the  bargain.  Lewis  published  this  letter 
in  Tennessee.  February  22d  Jackson  wrote  a  letter  to 
Swartwout,  in  which  he  spoke  very  bitterly  of  Clay,  and 
resented  Clay's  criticism  of  him  as  a  "  military  chief 
tain."  He  sneered  at  Clay  as  not  a  military  chieftain. 
But  he  did  not  allege  any  bargain.  Swartwout  published 
this  letter  in  New  York.2  Both  letters  were  plainly  pre 
pared  by  Jackson's  followers  for  publication.  Clay  re 
plied  at  the  end  of  March  in  a  long  statement.8 

Jackson  remained  in  Washington  until  the  middle  of 
March.  He  was  present  at  the  inauguration,  and  pre 
served  all  the  forms  in  his  public  demeanor  towards 
A.dams.4  His  rage  was  all  directed  against  Clay.  In 
the  Senate  there  were  fifteen  votes  against  Clay's  con 
firmation,  but  no  charges  were  made  there,5  On  his  way 
home  Jackson  scattered  the  charge  as  he  went.  It  is  to 
his  own  lips  that  it  is  always  traceable  when  it  can  be 
brought  home  to  anybody.  Up  to  this  time  it  is  ques 
tionable  whether  Jackson  was  more  annoyed  or  pleased 
pit  being  run  for  President.  Now  that  the  element  of 

1  28  Niles,  21  2  28  Niles,  20. 

«  38  Niles,  71  *  28  Niles,  19. 

*  Branch  made  some  allusions  anl  vague  ccmmeite.    (33  Nileo 


94  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

personal  contest  was  imported  into  the  enterprise  hi* 
whole  being  became  absorbed  in  the  determination  to 
Achieve  a  victory.  There  was  now  a  foe  to  be  crushed, 
a  revenge  to  be  obtained  for  an  injury  endured.  He 
did  not  measure  his  words,  and  the  charge  gained  ampli 
tude  and  definiteness  as  he  repeated  it.  In  March,  1827, 
Carter  Beverly,  of  North  Carolina,  wrote  to  a  friend  an 
account  of  a  visit  to  Jackson,  and  a  report  of  Jackson's 
circumstantial  assertion,  at  his  own  table,  that  Clay's 
friends  offered  to  support  Jackson  if  Jackson  would 
promise  not  to  continue  Adams  as  Secretary  of  State. 
Beverly's  letter  was  published  at  Fayetteville,  North 
Carolina.1  In  June  Jackson  wrote  to  Beverly  an  explicit 
repetition  over  his  own  signature.2  The  charge  had  now 
a  name  and  a  responsible  person  behind  it,  —  Jackson 
himself.  Clay  at  once  called  on  him  for  his  authorities 
,and  proofs.  Jackson  named  Buchanan  as  his  authority.8 
Buchanan  had  been  one  of  the  active  ones  4  that  win 
ter,  but  he  had  blundered.  He  now  made  a  statement 
which  was  not  straightforward  either  way,  but  it  did  not 
support  Jackson's  statement.  He  distinctly  said  that  he 
had  never  been  commissioned  by  the  Clay  men  for  any 
thing  he  said  to  Jackson  about  appointing  Adams.r 
Clay  then  called  on  Jackson  to  retract,  since  his  only 
authority  had  failed.  Jackson  made  no  answer.  He 
never  forgave  Buchanan.  In  1842  Carter  Beverly 
wrote  to  Clay  that  the  charge  had  never  been  substan 
fciated,  and  that  he  regretted  having  helped  to  spread  it.* 
4t  Maysville,  in  1843,  Adams  made  a  solemn  denial  oj 

l  32  Niles,  162.  2  32  Niles,  315. 

*  &2  Niles,  415. 

*  Markley's  Letter,  33  Niles,  167. 

*  32  Nil*?,  416.  °  61  Nile*,  408. 


ADAMS  AND  CLA  Y.  95 

Jie  charge.1  May  3,  1844,  Jackson  reiterated  the 
eharge  in  a  letter  to  the  "  Nashville  Union."  He  said : 
"  Of  the  charges  brought  against  Mr.  Adams  and  Mr. 
Clay  at  that  time  I  formed  my  opinions,  as  the  country 
at  large  did,  from  facts  and  circumstances  which  were 
indisputable  and  conclusive,  and  I  may  add  that  this 
opinion  has  undergone  no  change."2  Of  course  thia 
means  that  he  inferred  the  charge  from  Clay's  appoint 
ment,  never  had  any  other  ground  for  it,  and  therefore 
had  as  much  ground  in  1844  as  in  1825.  Clay  never 
escaped  the  odium  of  this  charge  while  he  lived.  At 
Lexington,  Ky.,  in  1842,  he  said  that  he  thought  he 
would  have  been  wiser  if  he  had  not  taken  office  under 
Adams.3 

On  the  publication  of  Adams's  "Diary,"  probably  all 
students  of  American  political  history  turned  to  see 
what  relations  with  Clay  were  noted  in  the  winter  of 
1824-25.  Clay  and  Adams  had  never  been  intimate. 
Their  tastes  were  by  no  means  congenial.  There  was 
an  "adjourned  question  of  veracity"  outstanding  be 
tween  them,  because  Clay  had  given  vague  support  to 
the  charge  against  Adams  about  the  fisheries  and  the 
Mississippi,  and  Adams  had  challenged  him  to  produce 
the  proof  which  would  impeach  Adams's  own  story  of 
.he  negotiations  at  Ghent.  Clay  had  never  answered. 
December  17,  1824,  Letcher,  as  one  of  Clay's  nearest 
friends,  called  on  Adams.  "  The  drift  of  all  Letcher's 
discourse  was  .  .  .  that  Clay  would  willingly  support 
ine,  if  he  could  thereby  serve  himself,  and  the  substance 
t»f  his  meaning  was  that  if  Clay's  friends  could  knyio 
that  he  would  have  a  prominent  s^are  in  the  admiiustr* 

l  11  Adams,  431.  •*  fS  NUw,  247. 

«*  Nilea,  »l. 


96  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

tion,  that  might  induce  them  to  vote  for  me,  even  in  thf 
face  of  instructions.  But  Letcher  did  not  profess  to 
have  any  authority  from  Clay  for  what  he  said,  and  he 
made  no  definite  propositions."  ]L  January  1, 1825,  Clay 
and  Adams  met  by  Letcher's  intervention.  Adams  re 
corded  in  1828  2  that  Letcher  told  him,  January  2, 1825, 
that  Kentucky  would  vote  for  him.  January  9th  Clay 
told  Adams  that  he  should  vote  for  him,  and  said  that 
Crawford's  friends  and  Adams's  friends  had  approached 
him  with  personal  considerations.  January  21st  Scott, 
of  Missouri,  who  held  the  vote  of  that  State,  told  Ad 
ams  that  he  wanted  Clay  to  be  in  the  administration. 
Adams  replied  that  he  could  give  no  assurances,  but 
that,  in  looking  for  a  Western  man,  he  could  not  over 
look  Clay.  On  the  same  day,  in  answer  to  fears  that 
he  would  proscribe  the  federalists,  he  answered  that  he 
would  try  to  break  up  the  old  parties.  February  3d  Web 
ster  called  on  Adams  about  the  proscription  of  the  feder 
alists.8  Adams  said  that  he  could  give  no  assurances 
about  his  cabinet,  but  would  try  to  harmonize  parties.4 

The  Jackson  men  found  another  grievance  in  the  elec 
tion  of  Adams.  They  revived  a  doctrine  which  had 
been  advocated  in  1801,  to  the  effect  that  the  House  of 
Representatives  ought  simply  to  carry  out  "  the  will  of 
the  people,"  as  indicated  by  the  plurality  vote.  Benton 
is  the  chief  advocate  of  this  doctrine.5  He  faces  all 

l  6  Adams,  447.  2  7  Adams,  462. 

The  federalists  all  hated  Adams  for  "ratting."  In  1828 
Timothy  Pickering  was  a  Jackson  man ;  not  that  he  loved  de 
li  ocracy  more,  out  that  he  hated  Jackson  less.  (34  Niles,  246. ) 

4  1  Ourtis's  Webster,  237. 

§  31  Niles,  98,  gives  a  homely  but  very  pungent  criticism  o 
|Jen  tea's  doctrine.  It  consists  in  showing  what  the  "  will  of  th* 
people  "  is,  when  the  state  divisions,  Senate  equality,  and  negi • 
•^presentation  are  talc  an  into  account. 


DEMOCRACY   VERSUS    THE   CONSTITUTION        9? 

Jhe  consequences  of  it  without  flinching.  He  saya 
plainly  that  there  was  a  struggle  "  between  the  theory 
of  the  Constitution  and  the  democratic  principle."  The 
Constitution  gives  to  the  House  of  Representatives  the 
right  and  power  to  elect  the  President  in  a  certain  con 
tingency.  There  is  no  provision  at  all  in  the  Constitu 
tion  for  the  election  of  President  by  a  great  national 
democratic  majority.  The  elected  President  is  the  per 
son  who  gets  a  majority  of  the  votes  constitutionally 
described  and  cast,  and  the  power  and  right  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  in  the  contingency  which  the  Consti 
tution  provides  for  is  just  as  complete  as  that  of  the 
electoral  college  in  all  other  cases.  But  the  electoral 
college  by  no  means  necessarily  produces  the  selection 
which  accords  with  the  majority  of  the  popular  vote. 
The  issue  raised  by  Benton  and  his  friends  was  there 
fore  nothing  less  than  constitutional  government  versus 
democracy.  The  Constitution  does  not  put  upon  the 
House  the  function  of  raising  a  plurality  vote  to  a  ma 
jority,  for  the  obvious  reason  that  it  would  be  simpler 
to  let  a  plurality  elect.  The  Constitution  provides  only 
specified  ways  for  ascertaining  "  the  will  of  the  people," 
and  that  will  does  not  rule  unless  it  is  constitutionally 
expressed.  That  is  why  we  are,  fortunately,  under  a 
sonstitutional  system,  and  not  under  an  unlimited  and 
ever-changing  democracy.  Benson  and  those  who  agreed 
with  him  weie,  as  he  avows,  making  an  assault  on  the 
Constitution,  when  they  put  forward  their  doctrine  of  the 
'unction  of  the  House.  On  that  doctrine  the  Constitu- 
>ion  is  every  one's  too\  while  it  answers  his  purposes,  and 
the  sport  of  every  faction  which  finds  it  an  obstacle,  if 
they  can  only  manage  to  carry  an  election.  Their  might 
tnd  their  right  become  one  and  the  same  thing,-— 

7 


98  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

guarantees  of  each  other.  Such  a  doctrine  is  one  of  the 
most  pernicious  political  heresies.  A  constitution  is  to 
a  nation  what  self-control  under  established  rules  of  con 
duct  is  to  a  man.  The  only  time  when  it  is  of  value  ft 
just  the  time  when  the  temptation  to  violate  it  is  strong, 
and  that  is  the  time  when  it  contravenes  temporary  and 
party  interests. 

In  its  practical  aspects,  also,  the  election  of  1824 
showed  how  pernicious  and  false  Benton's  doctrine  is. 
"  The  will  of  the  people,"  to  which  he  referred  as  par 
amount,  was  an  inference  only.  The  moment  we  de 
part  from  constitutional  methods  of  ascertaining  the  will 
of  the  people,  we  shall  always  be  driven  to  inferences 
which  will,  in  the  last  analysis,  be  found  to  rest  upon 
nothing  but  party  prejudices  and  party  hopes.  In  the 
vote  of  1824  the  facts  were  as  follows :  Clay's  states 
indicated,  as  their  second  choice,  Jackson.  Jackson's 
friends  inferred  that,  if  Clay  had  not  been  running, 
Jackson  would  have  carried  those  States  and  would 
have  been  elected.  Going  farther,  however,  we  find 
that  in  New  Jersey  and  Maryland  the  Crawford  men 
supported  Jackson  to  weaken  Adams.  In  North  Car 
olina  Adams  men  supported  Jackson  to  weaken  Craw 
ford.  In  Louisiana,  Adams  men  and  Jackson  men 
combined  to  weaken  Clay.1  Hence  Jackson  got  the 
whole  or  a  part  of  the  vote  of  these  four  States  by  bar 
gain  and  combination.  How  many  more  undercurrents 
of  combination  and  secondary  intention  there  may  hav« 
been  is  left  to  conjecture.  What  then  becomes  of  the 
notion  of  "  the  will  of  the  people,"  as  some  pure  and 
sacred  emanation,  only  to  be  heard  and  obeyed  ?  No 
election  produces  any  such  pure  and  sacred  product,  bi» 
1  1  Annual  Register,  40. 


DEMOCRACY  VERSUS  THE  CONSTITUTION.      99 

mly  a  practical,  most  limited,  imperfect,  and  approxi 
mate  expression  of  public  opinion,  by  which  we  manage 
to  carry  on  public  affairs.  The  "  demos  krateo  princi 
ple,"  to  use  Benton's  jargon,  belongs  in  the  same  cate 
gory  with  Louis  Fourteenth's  saying :  L'etat  c'est  moi. 
One  is  as  far  removed  from  constitutional  liberty  as 
the  other. 

Crawford  went  home  to  Georgia,  disappointed,  broken 
in  health,  his  political  career  entirely  ended.  He  re 
covered  his  health  to  some  extent.  He  became  a  cir 
cuit  judge,  and  gave  to  Calhoun,  five  years  later,  very 
positive  evidence  that  he  was  still  alive.  He  died  in 
1834. 


CHAPTER  V. 

ADAMS'S  ADMINISTRATION. 

THE  presidency  underwent  a  great  change  at  the  elec 
tion  of  1824.  The  congressional  caucus  had,  up  to  that 
time,  proceeded  on  the  theory  that  the  President  was  to 
be  a  great  national  statesman  who  stood  at  the  head 
of  his  party,  or  among  the  leaders  of  it.  There  were 
enthusiastic  rejoicings  that  "  King  Caucus "  was  de 
throned  and  dead.  What  killed  the  congressional  cau 
cus  was  the  fact  that,  with  four  men  running,  the  ad 
herents  of  three  of  them  were  sure  to  combine  against 
the  caucus,  on  account  of  the  advantage  which  it  would 
give  to  the  one  who  was  expected  to  get  its  nomination. 
However,  it  was  a  great  error  to  say  that  King  Caucus 
was  dead.  Looking  back  on  it  now,  we  see  that  the 
caucus  had  only  burst  the  bonds  of  the  chrysalis  state 
and  entered  on  a  new  stage  of  life  and  growth. 

Jackson  was  fully  recognized  as  the  coming  man. 
There  was  no  fighting  against  his  popularity.  The 
shrewdest  politician  was  he  who  should  seize  upon  that 
popularity  as  an  available  force,  and  prove  capable  of 
controlling  it  for  his  purposes.  Van  Buren  proved  him- 
fie]f  to  be  the  man  for  this  function.  He  usurped  the 
position  of  Jackson  leader  in  New  York,  which  seemed  by 
priority  to  bolong  to  Clinton.  He  and  the  other  Crawford 
leaders  had  had  a  hard  task  to  run  a  man  who  seemed 
to  be  physically  incapacitated  for  the  duties  of  the  presi 


THE  OPPOSITION.  101 

dency,  but  when  Crawford's  health  broke  down  it  was 
too  late  for  them  to  change  the  whole  plan  of  their 
2ampaign.  After  the  election  they  joined  the  Jackson 
party.  The  "  era  of  good  feeling  "  had  brought  into 
politics  a  large  number  of  men,1  products  of  the  con 
tinually  advancing  political  activity  amongst  the  least 
educated  classes,  who  were  eager  for  notoriety  and 
spoils,  for  genteel  living  without  work,  and  for  public 
position.  These  men  were  ready  to  be  the  janissaries 
of  any  party  which  would  pay  well.  They  all  joined  the 
opposition  because  they  had  nothing  to  expect  from  the 
administration.  All  the  factions  except  the  Adams  fac 
tion,  that  is  to  say,  all  the  federalists,  and  all  the  non- 
Adams  personal  factions  of  the  old  republican  party 
went  into  opposition.  These  elements  were  very  inco 
herent  in  their  political  creeds  and  their  political  codes, 
but  they  made  common  cause.2  They  organized  at  once 
an  opposition  of  the  most  violent  and  factious  kind. 
Long  before  any  political  questions  arose,  they  devel 
oped  a  determination  to  oppose  to  the  last  whatever 
the  administration  should  favor.  They  fought  for  four 
years  to  make  capital  for  the  next  election,  as  the  chief 
business  of  Congress.  John  Randolph,  who  by  long 
practice  had  become  a  virtuoso  in  abuse,  exhausted  his 
powers  in  long  tirades  of  sarcasm  and  sensational  denun 
ciations,  chiefly  against  Clay.  The  style  of  smartness 
which  he  was  practising  reached  its  climax  when  he 
called  the  administration  an  alliance  of  Blifil  and  Black 
George,  the  Puritan  and  the  Black-leg.  He  and  Clay 
fought  a  duel,  on  which  occasion,  however,  Randolph 

1  3  Ann.  Reg.  10 

2  The  new  groupings  caused  ictense  astonishment  to  simple 
minded  observers.    ( See  32  Niles,  339. ) 


102  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

fired  in  the  air.  After  Jackson's  election,  Randolph 
vras  given  the  mission  to  Russia,  and  was  guilty  of  a 
number  of  the  abuses  which  he  had  scourged  most  freely. 
He  had  to  endure  hostile  criticism,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
and  he  learned  the  misery  of  a  public  man  forced  to 
make  "  explanations "  under  malignant  charges.  He 
proved  to  be  as  thin-skinned  as  most  men  of  his  stamp 
are  when  their  turn  comes.1 

Van  Buren  initiated  the  opposition  into  the  methods 
and  doctrines  of  New  York  politics.  Ever  since  the 
republicans  wrested  the  State  from  the  federalists  in 
1800,  they  had  been  working  out  the  methods  by  which 
an  oligarchy  of  a  half  dozen  leaders  could,  under  the 
forms  of  democratic-republican  self-government,  control 
the  State.  As  soon  as  the  federalists  were  defeated,  the 
republicans  broke  up  into  factions.  Each  faction,  when 
it  gained  power,  proscribed  the  others.  Until  1821  the 
patronage,  which  was  the  cohesive  material  by  which 
party  organization  was  cemented,  was  in  the  hands  of  a 
fi  council  "  at  Albany.  After  1821  the  patronage,  by 
way  of  reform,  was  converted  into  elective  offices.  It 
then  became  necessary  to  devise  a  new  system  adapted 
to  this  new  arrangement,  and  all  the  arts  by  which  the 
results  of  primaries,  conventions,  committees,  and  cau 
cuses,  while  following  all  the  forms  of  spontaneous  ac 
tion,  can  be  made  to  conform  to  the  programme  of  the 
oligarchy  or  the  Boss,  were  speedily  developed.  If  now 
the  presidency  was  no  longer  to  be  the  crown  of  public 
service,  and  the  prize  of  a  very  limited  number  of  states 
men  of  national  reputation,  —  if  it  was  conceivable  that 
an  Indian  fighter  like  Jackson  could  come  within  the 
of  choice,  —  then  the  presidency  must  be  evel 
1  2  Garland's  Randolph,  339. 

I 


THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM.  103 

after  the  position  reserved  for  popular  heroes,  or,  in  the 
absence  of  such,  for  "  available "  men,  as  the  figure 
heads  with  and  around  whom  a  faction  of  party  leaders 
eould  come  to  power.  King  Caucus  was  not  dead,  then. 
He  had  lost  a  town  and  gained  an  empire.  It  remained 
to  develop  and  extend  over  the  whole  country  an  or 
ganization  of  which  the  public  service  should  constitute 
the  network.  There  would  be  agents  everywhere  to  re 
ceive  and  execute  orders,  to  keep  watch,  and  to  make 
reports.  The  central  authority  would  dispose  of  the 
whole  as  a  general  disposes  of  his  army.  The  general 
of  the  "  outs  "  recruited  his  forces  from  those  who  hoped 
for  places  when  the  opposition  should  come  in.  As 
there  were  two  or  three  "  outs  "  who  wanted  each  place 
held  by  those  who  were  "  in,"  recruits  were  not  lacking. 
It  was  during  Adams's  administration  that  the  opposition 
introduced  on  the  federal  arena  the  method  of  organiz 
ing  federal  parties  by  the  use  of  the  spoils,  which  method 
had  been  previously  perfected  in  the  state  politics  of 
New  York. 

The  opposition  invented  and  set  in  action  two  or  three 
new  institutions.  They  organized  local  Jackson  com 
mittees  up  and  down  the  country,  somewhat  on  the  plan 
if  the  old  revolutionary  committees  of  correspondence 
iind  safety.  It  was  the  duty  of  these  committees  to 
carry  on  a  propaganda  for  Jackson,  to  contradict  and 
refute  charges  against  him,  to  make  known  his  services, 
to  assail  the  administration,  and  to  communicate  facts, 
arguments,  reports,  etc.,  to  each  other.  Partisan  news- 
Daper  writing  was  also  employed  to  an  unprecedented 
extent.  The  partisan  editor,  who  uses  his  paper  to 
reiterate  and  inculcate  statements  of  fact  and  doctrine 
designed  to  affect  the  mind  of  the  voter,  was  not  a  new 


104  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

figure  in  politics,  but  now  there  appeared  all  over  the 
country  small  local  newspapers,  edited  by  men  who  as 
sumed  the  attitude  of  party  advocates,  and  pursued  one 
side  only  of  all  public  questions,  disregarding  truth, 
right,  and  justice,  determined  only  to  win.  In  1826,  ai 
Calhoun's  suggestion,  an  "  organ  "  was  started  at  Wash 
ington,  the  "  Telegraph,"  edited  by  Duff  Green,  of  Mis 
souri.  The  organ  gave  the  key  to  all  the  local  party 
newspapers. 

Adams  showed,  in  his  inaugural,  some  feeling  of  the 
unfortunate  and  unfair  circumstances  of  his  position.  He 
gaid,  "  Less  possessed  of  your  confidence  in  advance 
than  any  of  my  predecessors,  I  am  deeply  conscious  of 
the  prospect  that  I  shall  stand  more  and  oftener  in  need 
of  your  indulgence."  In  October  the  Legislature  of 
Tennessee  nominated  Jackson  for  1828,  and  he  ap 
peared  before  the  Legislature  to  receive  an  address  and 
to  make  a  reply.  He  resigned  the  senatorship  in  a  very 
careful  and  well-written  letter,1  in  which  he  urged  (re 
ferring,  as  everybody  understood,  to  Clay's  appointment) 
that  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  should  be  adopted 
forbidding  the  appointment  to  an  office  in  the  gift  of  the 
President  of  any  member  of  Congress  during,  or  for  two 
years  after,  his  term  of  office  in  Congress.2  In  this  let- 

1  29  Niles,  156. 

2  Robert  G.  Harper  once  testified  in  a  court  of  law  his  personal 
belief,  founded  on  general  knowledge  and  inference,  that  Bun 
could  have  been  elected  in  1801  if  he  would  have  used  "certain 
means,"  and  his  belief  that  Jefferson  did  use  those  means.     (23 
Niles,  282.)     He  referred  to  the  appointment  by  Jefferson  to  lu- 
wrative  offices  of  Linn,  of  New  Jersey,  and  Claiborne,  of  Ten 
lessee  (each  of  whom  controlled  the  vote  of  a  State),  and  also 
if  Livingston,  who  could  have  divided  the  vote  of  New  York 
!&  Niles,  197.)     According  to  a  return  made  to  a  call  by  Coa 


METHODS  OF  THE  OPPOSITION.  105 

ter  he  said  that  the  senatorship  had  been  given  to  him 
ji  1823  without  effort  or  solicitation ;  also  that  he  made 
it  a  rule  neither  to  seek  nor  decline  office.  In  his  speech 
before  the  Legislature  he  spoke  more  freely  of  the  cor 
ruption  at  Washington,  from  which  he  sought  to  escape 
by  resigning.1  He  now  had  Livingston,  Eaton,  Lee, 
Van  Buren,  Benton,  Swartwout,  Duff  Green,  and  Lewis 
iinanagin2  his  canvass,  some  of  them  at  Washington  and 
some  in  Tennessee.  They  kept  close  watch  over  him, 
and  maintained  constant  communication  with  each  other. 
The  first  overt  acts  of  the  opposition  were  the  objec 
tion  to  Clay's  confirmation  and  the  rejection  of  the 
treaty  with  Colombia.  Clay  had  been  a  champion  of 
the  South  American  republics,  and  everything  in  the 
way  of  intimacy  with  them  was  capital  for  him.  These 
votes  occurred  in  March,  1825.  The  "  Annual  Regis 
ter,"  commenting,  over  a  year  later,  on  these  votes,  said : 
"  The  divisions  which  had  been  taken  on  the  foregoing 
questions  [those  mentioned]  left  little  doubt  that  the 
new  administration  was  destined  to  meet  with  a  sys 
tematic  and  organized  opposition,  and,  previous  to  the 
next  meeting  of  Congress,  the  ostensible  grounds  of  op 
position  were  set  forth  at  public  dinners  and  meetings, 
BO  as  to  prepare  the  community  for  a  warm  political 
contest  until  the  next  election."  2  The  public  was 
greatly  astonished  at  the  uproar  among  the  politicians. 
The  nation  acquiesced  in  the  result  of  the  election  as 
perfectly  constitutional  and  regular,  and  it  cost  great  ef- 

gress  in  1826,  the  number  of  members  of  Congress  appointed  to 
sffice  by  the  Presidents  down  to  that  time  was,  by  Washington, 
>0,  by  Adams,  13;  by  Jefferson,  25;  by  Madison,  29;  by  Mon 
roe,  35  ;  by  J.  Q.  Adams,  in  his  first  year,  5.     (36  Niles,  267.) 
1  1  Ann.  Reg.  21.  2  1  Ann.  heg.  38. 


106  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

fort  to  6tlr  up  an  artificial  heat  and  indignation  about  it 
The  "  bargain  "  formed  the  first  stock  or  capital  of  the 
opposition.  The  claim  that  Jackson  had  been  cheated 
out  of  his  election  was  the  second.  Some  attempt  was 
made  to  get  up  a  cry  about  "  family  influence,"  but  thia 
did  not  take.  The  charge  of  bargain  and  fraud  was  so 
assiduously  reiterated  that,  in  1827,  there  were  six  sena 
tors  and  forty  representatives  who  would  not  call  on  the 
President.1  It  was  during  the  session  of  1825-26  that 
the  discordant  elements  of  the  opposition  coalesced  into 
a  party,2  the  modern  democratic  party.  Near  the  end 
of  the  session  a  prominent  Virginia  politician  declared 
that  the  combinations  for  electing  Jackson  were  already 
formed.8 

It  was  proposed  to  adopt  a  constitutional  amendment 
taking  away  the  contingent  power  of  the  House  to  elect 
a  President,  but  no  agreement  could  be  reached.  A 
committee  on  executive  patronage  was  raised,  in  reality 
to  provide  electioneering  material.  This  committee  re 
ported  six  bills,  the  most  important  of  which  provided 
that  the  President  might  not  appoint  to  office  any  person 
who  had  been  a  member  of  Congress  during  his  own 
term  in  the  presidential  office,  and  that  the  President,  if 
he  should  remove  any  officer,  should  state  his  reasons 
to  the  Senate  on  the  appointment  of  a  successor.  No 
action  was  taken. 

The  topic,  however,  on  which  the  opposition  most  di» 
tinctly  showed  their  spirit  was  the  Panama  mission 
Benton  misrepresents  that  affair  more  grossly  than  any 
ether  on  which  he  touches.  The  fact  is  that  the  opposi 

*  7  Adams,  374.      The  federal  members  of  Congress  womk 
&ot  TWit  Madison  in  1815.     (1  Curtis's  Webster,  135.) 
«  1  AHH.  Reg.  22.  *  Ibid 


THE  PANAMA  MISSION.  107 

aon  were  forced  by  their  political  programme  to  oppose 
a  measure  which  it  was  very  awkward  for  them  to  op 
pose,  and  they  were  compelled  to  ridicule  and  misrepre 
sent  the  matter  in  order  to  cover  their  position.  Sar 
gent  l  tells  a  story  of  an  opposition  senator,  who,  when 
rallied  on  the  defeat  of  the  opposition  in  the  vote  on 
confirming  the  commissioners,  replied,  "  Yes,  they  have 
beaten  us  by  a  few  votes  after  a  hard  battle ;  but  if  they 
had  only  taken  the  other  side  and  refused  the  mission, 
we  should  have  had  them !  " 

When  the  Spaniards  withdrew  from  South  America, 
in  1824,  the  newly  independent  States  of  South  America 
and  Mexico  drew  together  by  natural  instinct,  and  hav 
ing  borrowed  their  new  political  institutions  from  the 
United  States,  which  institutions  were  for  them  exotic 
and  ill-understood,  they  sought  friendly  intercourse  with 
the  Northern  Union.  There  were  then  questions  of  in 
ternational  law  pending,  in  which  the  new  continent 
needed  to  make  a  stand  against  the  old.  The  United 
States,  on  its  part,  wanted  commercial  intercourse  with 
the  states  of  Central  and  South  America.  It  was  pro 
posed  by  the  Central  American  states  to  hold  a  Con 
gress  for  consultation.  This  scheme  grew  into  one  of  a 
general  American  Congress,  in  which  the  United  States 
was  asked  to  join.  Adams  accepted  the  invitation  and 
appointed  two  commissioners.  The  question  on  the  con 
firmation  of  these  commissioners,  and  on  appropriating 
money  for  their  salaries,  gave  rise  to  wordy  and  violent 
debates  in  Congress,  in  which  very  extraordinary  doc 
trines  were  laid  down  aoout  the  power  of  the  Executive 
in  diplomatic  affairs.  It  was  declared  that  the  mission 
tteant  a  general  policy  of  foreign  interference  and  "  en- 
1  Sargent,  117. 


108  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

tangling  alliances."  The  Monroe  doctrine  was  vehe 
mently  denounced.  The  commissioners  were  finally  con 
firmed.  One  died  on  the  way;  the  other  arrived  too 
ate  for  the  meeting,  which  took  place  June  22,  1826. 
The  Congress  adjourned  to  meet  again,  but,  political 
troubles  breaking  out,  nothing  came  of  it.  Benton  saya 
that  the  result  proved  the  folly  of  the  original  plan.  ID 
order  to  judge  of  that,  it  is  necessary  to  form  some 
opinion  as  to  what  would  have  been  the  advantage  polit 
ically  to  the  South  American  republics  of  a  close  and 
friendly  relation  with  us,  and  what  would  have  been  the 
advantage  commercially  to  us  of  a  close  and  friendly 
relation  with  them.  It  is  not  at  all  improbable  that  a 
grand  chance  for  good  to  all  concerned  was  lost.  As  to 
"entangling  alliances,"  the  Congress  was  no  doubt  a 
grand  chance  for  a  "  jingo  "  policy.  Everything  de 
pended  on  the  instructions  with  which  the  commis 
sioners  were  sent.  The  opposition  would  not  print  the 
instructions,  because  they  plainly  refuted  all  the  in 
flated  denunciations.  It  was  not  until  1829  that  public 
opinion  forced  the  printing  of  the  instructions,1  but  then 
the  whole  matter  was  dead.  It  has  passed  into  history 
and  popular  tradition  under  a  very  false  light. 

Adams  had  strong  convictions  about  points  of  public 
policy.  He  held  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  President 
to  advise  and  recommend  to  Congress  such  measures  as 
he  thought  desirable  in  the  public  interest,  and  then  to 
leave  to  Congress  the  responsibility  if  nothing  was  done. 
He  therefore  set  out  in  his  messages  series  of  acts  and 
measures  which  he  thought  should  be  adopted.  Ha 
thereby  played  directly  into  the  hands  of  the  opposition 
for  they  then  had  a  complete  programme  before  them  of 
They  are  to  be  found  4  Ann.  Reg.  29. 


ADAMS'S  POLICY.  10V* 

nrhat  they  had  to  attack.  Adams  held  the  active  theory 
of  statesmanship.  He  was  not  content  to  let  the  people 
alone.  He  thought  that  a  statesman  could  foresee,  plan, 
prepare,  open  the  way,  set  in  action,  encourage,  ancj 
otherwise  care  for  the  people.  To  him  the  doctrine  of 
implied  powers  meant  only  that  the  Constitution  had 
created  a  government  complete  and  adequate  for  all  the 
functions  which  devolved  upon  it  in  caring  for  all  the 
interests  which  were  confided  to  it.  He  regarded  the 
new  land  as  a  joint  possession  of  all  the  States,  the  sale 
of  which  would  provide  funds  which  ought  to  be  used  to 
build  roads,  bridges,  and  canals,  and  to  carry  out  other 
works  of  internal  improvement,  which,  as  he  thought, 
would  open  up  the  continent  to  civilization.1  He  cared 
more  for  internal  improvements  than  for  a  protective 
tariff.2  He  wanted  a  national  university  and  a  naval 
school.  He  favored  expenditures  on  fortifications  and  a 
navy  and  an  adequate  army.  He  wanted  the  federal 
judiciary  enlarged  and  a  bankruptcy  law  passed.  Some 
of  the  opposition  found  the  party  exigency  severe  which 
forced  them  to  oppose  all  the  points  in  this  programme. 
In  1824  Crawford  had  been  the  only  stickler  for  state 
rights  and  strict  construction.  Men  of  that  stamp  were 
How  called  "  radicals."  Calhoun  and  his  friends  had 
been  on  the  other  side.  The  old-fashioned  pettifogging 
of  the  strict  constructionists,  and  the  cast-iron  dogma 
tism  of  the  state-rights  men,  were  developed  in  the  heat 
or  the  factious  opposition  of  1825—29.  All  that,  how 
ever,  was  at  that  time  considered  extreme  or  "  radical." 
Van  Buren,  on  his  reelecticc  tc  the  Senate  in  1827, 
Jvrote  a  letter  in  which  he  promised,  co  recover  for  the 
States  the  "  rights  of  which  they  had  been  deprived  by 
l  9  Adams,  162.  »  8  Adams,  444. 


110  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

construction,"  and  to  save  what  rights  remained.1  Ham 
tnond  expresses  the  quiet  astonishment  which  this  cre» 
ated  in  the  minds  of  the  people,  even  democrats  like 
himself,  who  were  not  aware  that  the  States  had  suf 
fered  any  wrong,  especially  at  the  hands  of  the  exist 
ing  administration.  The  country  was  in  profound  peace 
and  stupid  prosperity,  and  the  rancor  of  the  politicians 
seemed  inexplicable.  The  public  debt  was  being  re 
funded  advantageously.  Immigration  was  large  and 
growing.  The  completion  of  the  Erie  Canal  in  1825 
opened  up  the  great  lakes  to  navigation,  and  the  adja 
cent  country  to  settlement.  Public  affairs  were  in  fact 
dull.  The  following  passage  from  the  "  Annual  Reg 
ister  "  shows  the  impression  made  by  the  agitation  at 
Washington  :  z  — 

"  Nearly  all  the  propositions  which  were  called  for  by 
the  popular  voice  were  defeated,  either  from  want  of 
time  for  their  consideration,  or  by  an  influence  which 
Beemed  to  exert  itself  for  the  sole  purpose  of  rendering 
those  who  administered  the  government  unpopular.  The 
community  was  generally  disappointed  as  to  the  results 
of  the  session.  .  .  .  Many  of  the  members  were  new  to 
political  life.  .  .  .  Others  were  predetermined  to  oppo 
sition,  and  from  the  first  assembling  of  Congress  devoted 
themselves  to  thwarting  the  measures  which  its  [the  ad 
ministration's]  friends  urged  upon  the  consideration  of 
Congress.  The  Vice-President  and  his  friends  were  most 
prominent  in  this  class  of  politicians.  .  .  .  The  manner, 
too,  in  which  the  opposition  attacked  the  administration 
displayed  an  exasperated  feeling,  in  which  the  commu 
nity  did  not  sympathize,  and  a  general  suspicion  was 
felt  that  its  leaders  were  actuated  by  private  griefs,  anc 
l  2  Hammond,  246.  a  1  Ann.  Reg.  149. 


V 

ADAMS  AND  THE   CIVIL  SERVICE.  HI 

Jiat  the  public  interests  were  neglected  in  their  earnest 
Itruggle  for  power.  The  pride  of  the  country,  too,  had 
received  a  deep  wound  in  the  prostration  of  the  dignity 
of  the  Senate." 

Calhoun  appointed  committees  hostile  to  the  adminis 
tration,  which  could  not  bring  their  own  party  to  tb© 
support  of  their  reports.  Calhoun  also  ruled  that  it  was 
not  the  duty  of  the  Vice-President  to  preserve  order 
save  upon  the  initiative  of  some  senator  on  the  floor. 
Great  disorder  occurred,  and  John  Randolph  especially 
took  advantage  of  this  license.  The  Senate  was  led  at 
the  end  of  the  session  of  1825-26  to  take  from  the 
Vice-President  the  duty  of  appointing  the  committees  of 
the  Senate.  Letters  which  appeared  in  one  of  the  Wash 
ington  newspapers,  signed  "  Patrick  Henry,"  criticising 
Calhoun's  course,  were  ascribed  to  the  President.  An 
swering  letters,  signed  "  Onslow,"  were  ascribed  to  the 
Vice-President.1 

Adams  took  no  steps  to  create  an  administration 
party.  He  offered  the  Treasury  to  Crawford,  who  re 
fused  it.  He  then  gave  it  to  Rush,  who  had  voted 
against  him.  The  Secretaries  of  War  and  of  the  Navy 
had  likewise  supported  other  candidates.2  Adams  re 
fused  to  try  to  secure  the  election  of  Jeremiah  Mason, 
an  administration  man,  to  the  Senate.8  He  had  de 
clared,  before  the  election,  that  he  should  reward  no 
one,  and  proscribe  no  one.  He  adhered  to  this  faith 
fully.  Clay  urged  him  to  avoid  pusillanimity  on  the 
one  hand,  and  persecution  on  the  otker,4  The  election 
being  over,  Clay  said  that  no  officer  ought  to  be  allowed 
uto  hold  a  conduct  in  opea  and  continual  disparage- 

1  Harper's  Ualhoun,  3!  2  Perkins,  289. 

8  7  AtlaMiS,  14.  *  6  Adaits,  546. 


112  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

ment  of  the  administration  and  its  head."  Adams  re 
plied  that,  in  the  particular  case  under  discussion  (col 
lector  at  New  Orleans),  there  had  been  no  overt  act 
that  four  fifths  of  all  the  custom-house  officers  had  been 
unfavorable  to  his  (Adams's)  election,  and  were  now  in 
his  power ;  that  he  had  been  urged  to  sweep  them  all 
away ;  that  he  could  not  do  this  as  to  one  without  open 
ing  the  question  as  to  all,  and  that  he  would  enter  on  no 
such  policy.  In  1826  Clay  urged  Adams  to  remove 
the  custom-house  officers  at  Charleston  and  Philadelphia. 
Adams  refused,  although  he  thought  that  these  officers 
were  using  the  subordinate  offices  in  their  control  against 
the  administration.1  He  appointed  federalists  when  he 
thought  that  they  were  better  qualified  than  other  can 
didates.  This  did  not  conciliate  the  federalists,  and  it 
aroused  all  "  the  wormwood  and  the  gall "  of  the  old 
party  hatred.2  In  1827  Clay  and  others  urged  him  to 
confine  appointments  to  friends.  He  refused  to  adopt 
that  rule.8  He  expressed  the  belief  that  the  opposition 
were  spending  money  to  poison  public  opinion  through 
the  press,  but  he  would  not  do  anything  for  Binns,  an 
administration  editor.4  In  June,  1827,  he  refused  to 
go  to  Philadelphia,  to  make  a  speech  in  German  to  the 
farmers  at  the  opening  of  the  canal,  because  he  objected 
to  this  style  of  electioneering.6  In  October,  1827,  Clay 
made  a  warm  protest  against  Adams's  action  in  retain 
ing  McLean,  the  Postmaster-General.  Clay  alleged  that 
McLean  was  using  the  post-office  patronage  actively 
against  the  administration.  McLean  hated  Clay  and 
loved  Calhoun,6  but  he  claimed  to  be  a  loyal  friend  oj 

1  7  Adams,  163.  2  7  Adams,  207. 

«  7  Adams,  257.  *  7  Adams,  262. 

•  1  Adams,  297.  6  7  Adams,  364. 


ADAMS  ON  ELECTIONEERING.  HE 

the  administration.  Adams  would  not  believe  him  a 
traitor.1  A  campaign  story  was  started  that  Adams's 
accounts  with  the  Treasury  were  not  in  order.  Clay 
desired  that  Adams  would  correspond  with  an  election 
committee  in  Kentucky,  and  refute  the  charge.  Adams 
refused,  because  he  disapproved  of  the  Western  style 
of  electioneering  and  stump-speaking.2  Binns,  an  Irish 
refugee,  editor  of  the  "  Democratic  Press  "  of  Phila 
delphia,  ought  by  all  affinities  to  have  been  a  supporter 
of  Jackson,  but  he  took  the  wrong  turning  after  Craw 
ford's  disappearance,  and  became  a  supporter  of  Adams. 
He  plaintively  describes  the  results.  He  tried  to  talk 
to  Adams  about  appointments.  "  I  was  promptly  told 
that  Mr.  President  Adams  did  not  intend  to  make  any 
removals.  I  bowed  respectfully,  assuring  the  President 
that  I  had  no  doubt  the  consequence  would  be  that  he 
would  himself  be  removed  so  .soon  as  the  term  for  which 
he  had  been  elected  had  expired.  This  intimation  gave 
the  President  no  concern,  and  assuredly  did  in  no  wise 
affect  his  previous  determination." 8  Binns,  however, 
was  wise  in  his  generation. 

Adams's  administration  had  a  majority  in  the  Senate 
until  the  20th  Congress  met  in  1827,  when  both  Houses 
had  opposition  majorities.  Adams  says  this  was  the 
first  time  in  the  history  of  the  country  that  such  had 
been  the  case.4  The  session  of  1827-28  was  almost  en 
tirely  occupied  in  manufacturing  political  capital.  A 
committee  on  retrenchment  and  reform  presented  a 
majority  and  a  minority  report.  The  majority  ex 
pressed  alarm  at  the  increasing  expenditures  of  the 
federal  government  and  tire  extravagance  of  the  ad 

1  7  Adams,  343.  2  7  Adams,  347. 

*  Binns,  250.  *  7  Adams,  367 

o 


114  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

ministration.  The  minority  said  that  no  expenditure* 
had  been  made  which  Congress  had  not  ordered,  and 
that  the  expenditures  had  not  increased  unduly,  when 
the  size  and  population  of  the  countiy  were  considered. 
It  was  charged  that  large  sums  had  been  spent  in  dee- 
orating  the  President's  house,  especially  the  "East 
Room."  Congress  had  appropriated  $25,000  for  the 
White  House,  of  which  $6,000  had  been  spent.  The 
rest  was  returned  to  the  Treasury.  As  soon  as  Jack- 
Bon  was  elected,  the  "  Courier  and  Enquirer  "  said  that 
the  "  East  Room  "  was  very  shabby,  and  would  at  once 
be  made  decent.1  There  was  no  attempt  to  be  fair  or 
truthful  in  these  charges.  They  were  made  solely 
with  a  view  to  effect.  Clamor  and  reiteration  availed 
to  spread  an  opinion  that  the  administration  had  been 
extravagant. 

The  campaign  was  conducted,  on  both  sides,  on  very 
ruthless  methods.  Niles  said  it  was  worse  than  the  cam 
paign  of  1798.2  Campaign  extras  of  the  "  Telegraph  " 
were  issued  weekly,  containing  partisan  material,  ref 
utations  of  charges  against  Jackson,  and  slanders  on 
Adams  and  Clay.  The  Adams  party  also  published  a 
monthly  of  a  similar  character.  The  country  was  del 
uged  with  pamphlets  on  both  sides.  These  pamphlets 
were  very  poor  stuff,  and  contain  nothing  important  on 
any  of  the  issues.  They  all  appeal  to  low  tastes  and 
motives,  prejudices  and  jealousies.  Binns  issued  a 
number  of  hand-bills,  each  with  a  coffin  at  the  head, 
known  as  "  coffin  hand-bills,"  setting  forth  Jackson's 
bloody  and  lawless  deeds.8  One  Jackson  hand-bill  hat, 

i  Quoted  37  Niles,  229.  2  35  Niles,  33. 

8  Binns  says  he  issued  these  hand-bills  and  was  mobbed  in  1824 
It  aeems  that  his  memory  failed  him. 


TONE  OF  THE   CAMPAIGN.  115 

ft  broad-axe  cut  of  John  Quincy  Adams  driving  off  with 
a  horsewhip  a  crippled  old  soldier  who  dared  to  speak 
to  him,  to  ask  an  alms.  In  short,  campaign  literature 
took  on  a  new  and  special  development  in  this  cam 
paign,  and  one  is  driven  to  wonder  whether  the  Ameri 
can  people  of  that  day  were  such  that  all  this  drivel  and 
vulgarity  could  affect  their  votes.  It  appears  certain 
that  they  had  not  yet  learned  the  art  of  reading  news 
papers,  more  especially  campaign  literature ;  an  art  in 
which  the  average  American  citizen  has  since  become  a 
great  adept.  It  requires  a  very  active  party  interest 
now  to  break  down  the  cynicism  and  skepticism  with 
which  everything  in  a  partisan  newspaper  is  read  by  an 
educated  man  of  forty. 

Against  Jackson  was  brought  up  his  marriage,  and 
all  the  facts  of  his  career  which  could  be  made  the  sub 
ject  of  unfavorable  comment.  Against  Adams  were 
brought  charges  that  he  gave  to  Webster  and  the  fed 
eralists,  in  1824,  a  corrupt  promise ;  that  he  was  a 
monarchist  and  aristocrat ;  that  he  refused  to  pay  a  sub 
scription  to  turnpike  stock  on  a  legal  quibble ;  that  his 
wife  was  an  Englishwoman ;  that  he  wrote  a  scurrilous 
poem  against  Jefferson  in  1802  ;  that  he  surrendered  a 
young  American  servant-woman  to  the  Emperor  of 
Russia  ;  that  he  was  rich ;  that  he  was  in  debt ;  that  he 
had  long  enjoyed  public  office;  that  he  had  received 
immense  amounts  of  public  money,  namely,  the  aggre 
gate  of  all  the  salaries,  outfits,  and  allowances  he  had 
ever  received  ;  that  his  accounts  with  the  Treasury  were 
not  in  order ;  that  he  had  charged  for  constructive 
journeys ;  that  he  had  put  a  billiard-table  in  the  White 
House  at  the  public  expense  ; 1  thai  he  patronized  duel- 

1  Levi  Wooibury  was  especially  snocked  at  this.  (Plumer'f 
P^roer,  513.) 


116  ANDRUW  JACKSON. 

lists  (Clay)  ;  that  he  had  had  a  quarrel  with  his  father 
who  had  disinherited  him ;  that  he  had  sent  out  men  in 
the  pay  of  the  government  to  electioneer  for  him ;  that 
he  had  corrupted  the  civil  service ;  that  he  had  used 
the  federal  patronage  to  influence  elections.  The  fed 
eralists,  in  their  turn,  charged  him  with  not  having  kept 
his  promise  to  Webster. 

McLean's  conduct  towards  the  end  of  Adams's  term 
caused  more  and  more  complaint.  He  had  been  a 
Methodist  minister,  and  some  administration  men  did 
not  want  him  dismissed  lest  the  Methodists  should  be 
offended.1  Bache,  the  postmaster  at  Philadelphia,  was 
a  defaulter.  McLean  had  known  it  for  eighteen  months. 
Finally  he  removed  Bache,  and  appointed  Thomas  Sar 
gent,  who  had  been  allied  with  Ingham,  Dallas,  and 
other  Jackson  men.  Adams  would  not  remove  McLean.3 

In  October,  just  before  the  election,  but  too  short  a 
time  before  it  to  have  any  effect  on  it,  Adams  became 
involved  in  a  controversy  with  William  B.  Giles  about 
the  circumstances  and  motives  of  his  (Adams's)  going 
over  to  the  administration  in  1807.  On  account  of  reve 
lations  which  were  made  in  this  controversy,  Adams  was 
involved  in  another  with  the  descendants  of  the  old  high 
federalists,  who  called  him  to  account  for  allegations 
that  the  federalists  of  1803-1809  were  secessionists. 
The  controversy  developed  all  the  acrimony  of  the  old 
quarrel  between  the  Adamses  and  the  high  federalists. 
John  Quincy  Adams  prepared  a  full  statement  of  tho 
facts  on  which  he  based  his  opinions  and  statements,  but 
it  was  not  published  until  1877.8 

l  7  Adams,  540.  2  8  Adams,  8,  25,  51. 

8  New  England  Federalism,  by  Henry  Adams.  See  alao  Ph» 
Bier's  Plumcr,  and  Lodge's  Cabot 


THE   VOTE  IN  1828.  117 

In  September,  1827,  the  Tammany  General  Commit 
tee  and  the  Albany  "  Argus ''  caine  out  for  Jackson,1  as 
it  had  been  determined,  in  the  programme,  that  they 
should  do.  A  law  was  passed  for  casting  the  vote  of  New 
York  in  1828  by  districts.  The  days  of  voting  through 
out  the  country  ranged  from  October  31st  to  November 
19th.2  The  votes  were  cast  by  the  Legislature  in  Dela 
ware  and  South  Carolina ;  by  districts  in  Maine,  New 
York,  Maryland,  Tennessee ;  elsewhere,  by  general 
ticket.  Jackson  got  178  votes  to  83  for  Adams.  The 
popular  vote  was  648,273  for  Jackson;  508,064  for 
Adams.8  Jackson  got  only  one  vote  in  New  England, 
namely,  in  a  district  of  Maine,  where  the  vote  was,  Jack 
son,  4,223 ;  Adams,  4,028.4  New  York  gave  Jackson 
20  ;  Adams,  16.  New  Jersey  and  Delaware  voted  for 
Adams.  Maryland  gave  him  6,  and  Jackson  5.  Adams 
got  not  a  single  vote  south  of  the  Potomac  or  west  of 
the  Alleghanies.  In  Georgia  no  Adams  ticket  was 
nominated.5  Tennessee  gave  Jackson  44,293  votes, 
and  Adams  2,240.  Parton  has  a  story  of  an  attempt, 
in  a  Tennessee  village,  to  tar  and  feather  two  men  who 
dared  to  vote  for  Adams.8  Pennsylvania  gave  Jackson 
101,652  votes ;  Adams,  50,848.  For  Vice-President, 
Richard  Rush  got  all  the  Adams  votes  ;  Calhoun  got  all 
the  Jackson  votes  except  7  of  Georgia,  which  were  given 
to  William  Smith,  of  South  Carolina. 

General  Jackson  was  therefore  triumphantly  elected 
President  of  the  United  States,  in  the  name  of  reform, 

1  2  Hammond,  258  2  Telegraph  Extra,  565. 

8  3  Ann.  Reg.  31.  Tha  fig  ires  for  the  popular  vote  varj  in 
Jifferent  authorities. 

*  35  Niles,  177.  6  See  page  179. 

•  3  Parton,  151. 


118  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

and  as  the  standard-bearer  of  the  people,  rising  in  theil 
might  to  overthrow  an  extravagant,  corrupt,  aristocratic, 
federalist  administration,  which  had  encroached  on  the 
liberties  of  the  people,  and  had  aimed  to  corrupt  elec 
tions  by  an  abuse  of  federal  patronage.  Many  people 
believed  this  picture  of  Adams's  administration  to  bo 
true.  Andrew  Jackson  no  doubt  believed  it.  Many 
people  believe  it  yet.  Perhaps  no  administration,  ex 
cept  that  of  the  elder  Adams,  is  under  such  odium. 
There  is  not,  however,  in  our  history  any  administration 
which,  upon  a  severe  and  impartial  scrutiny,  appears 
more  worthy  of  respectful  and  honorable  memory.1  Its 
chief  fault  was  that  it  was  too  good  for  the  wicked  world 
in  which  it  found  itself.  In  1836  Adams  said,  in  the 
House,  that  he  had  never  removed  one  person  from 
office  for  political  causes,  and  that  he  thought  that  was 
one  of  the  principal  reasons  why  he  was  not  reflected.2 
The  "  Annual  Register "  8  aptly  quotes,  in  regard  to 
Adams,  a  remark  of  Burke  on  Lord  Chatham  :  "  For  a 
wise  man  he  seemed  to  me,  at  that  time,  to  be  governed 
too  much  by  general  maxims.  In  consequence  of  having 
put  so  much  the  larger  part  of  his  opposers  into  power, 
his  own  principles  could  not  have  any  effect  or  influence 
in  the  conduct  of  affairs.  When  he  had  executed  hia 
plan  he  had  not  an  inch  of  ground  to  stand  upon.  When 
he  had  accomplished  his  scheme  of  administration  h« 
iras  no  longer  a  minister." 

1  See  Morse's  Adams  2  50  Nile*,  104. 

*  *  Ann.  Reo.  34. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  u BELIEF"  SYSTEM  OF  KENTUCKY. 

BEFORE  entering  upon  the  history  of  Jackson's  ad« 
ministration  it  is  necessary  to  notice  a  piece  of  local 
history,  to  which  frequent  subsequent  reference  must  be 
made,  on  account  of  influences  exerted  on  national  poli 
tics.  A  great  abuse  of  paper  money  and  banking  took 
place  in  the  Mississippi  Valley  between  1818  and  1828. 
It  was  an  outcome  of  the  application  of  political  forces  to 
the  relations  of  debtor  and  creditor.  It  necessarily  fol 
lowed  that  political  measures  were  brought  into  collision 
with  constitutional  provisions,  and  with  judicial  insti 
tutions  as  the  interpreters  and  administrators  of  the 
game,  in  such  points  as  the  public  credit,  the  security 
of  contracts,  the  sanctity  of  vested  rights,  the  indepen 
dence  of  the  judiciary,  and  its  power  to  pass  on  the  con 
stitutionality  of  laws.  Kentucky  was  the  scene  of  the 
strongest  and  longest  conflict  between  the  constitutional 
guarantees  of  vested  rights  and  the  legislative  measures 
for  relieving  persons  from  contract  obligations,  when  the 
hopes  under  which  those  obligations  were  undertaken 
had  been  disappointed  by  actual  experience.  It  was 
from  Kentucky,  also,  that  the  influe.i^es  arose  which  were 
brought  to  bear  on  national  politics.  ^ 

Some  very  early  incidents  in  the  history  of  Kentucky 
tnow  the  spirit  which  was  at  work  m  the  later  troubles. 
&n  insurance  company  was  chartered  in  1801,  an  oi> 


l20  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

icure  clause  in  whose  charter  gave  the  power  to  issue 
currency.  At  that  time  the  Jeffersonian  party  was 
ander  its  anti-bank  impulse,  and, 'that  party  then  being 
in  control,  the  power  to  issue  currency  would  not  have 
been  given  intentionally.1  In  1803,  Judge  Muter,  of 
the  Court  of  Appeals,  "  being  very  poor  and  rather  supep 
annuated,"  was  induced  to  resign  by  a  pension  of  $300 
guaranteed  by  the  Legislature.  The  following  year 
the  pension  was  repealed,  as  being  unconstitutional.  In 
1809  the  Bank  of  Kentucky  was  founded,  with  a  capital 
of  a  million.  The  State  owned  part  of  the  capital  stock. 
In  1816  great  popular  hostility  was  manifested  to  the 
practice  of  quoting  English  decisions  in  the  courts. 
This  was  one  of  Duane's  2  pet  points  of  hostility  to  the 
judiciary.  Of  course  it  appealed  to  popular  prejudice. 
All  the  English  decisions  breathed  the  spirit  of  perma 
nent  institutions  and  traditions  established  to  control 
moving  interests  and  wishes.  A  law  was  passed  in 
Kentucky  forbidding  the  citation  of  any  English  cases 
since  July  4,  1776.  The  negative  was  left  out  of  this 
law.  The  cases  were  cited  in  the  reports,  but  were  not 
read  in  court.  The  law  fell  into  disuse. 

During  the  period  of  inflation  east  of  the  Alleghanies 
(1812-18), 8  the  States  west  of  the  Alleghanies  had 
plenty  of  silver,  and  were  free  from  financial  disturbance. 
At  the  session  of  1817-18,  the  Legislature  of  Kentucky 
plunged  that  State  into  the  inflation  system  by  charter 
ing  forty  banks,  which  were  to  issue  notes  redeemable 
in  Bank  of  Kentucky  notes.  The  popular  party  was 
&g£r  under  the  dominion  of  a  mania  for  banks,  as  th« 
Institutions  for  making  the  poor  rich.  Clamorous,  (ie 

l  Collins,  56.  >5  See  page  389, 

«  See  page  229. 


BANK  MANIA.  121 

Inands  were,  at  the  same  time,  made  for  a  share  in  the 
blessings  wliich  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  was  to 
shower  over  the  country,  and  two  branches  were  es 
tablished,  one  at  Lexington  and  one  at  Louisville. 
Prices  immediately  began  to  rise,  specie  was  exported, 
contracts  were  entered  into,  in  the  expectation  of  a  con 
stant  advance  of  the  "  wave  of  prosperity."  All  has 
tened  to  get  into  debt,  because  to  do  so  was  not  only  the 
way  to  get  rich,  but  the  only  way  to  save  one's  self  from 
ruin.  In  June,  1819,  it  is  reported  :  "  The  whole  State 
is  in  considerable  commotion.  The  gross  amount  of 
debts  due  the  banks  is  estimated  at  ten  millions  of 
dollars.  .  .  .  Several  county  meetings  have  been  held. 
Their  purpose  is  :  (1)  a  suspension  of  specie  payments  ; 
(2)  more  paper  money;  (3)  an  extra  session  of  the 
Legislature  to  pass  some  laws  on  this  emergency.  What 
did  we  tell  the  people  of  Kentucky  when  they  littered 
their  banks  ?  "  l 

In  1819  the  banks  of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  and 
nearly  all  in  Ohio  suspended  specie  payments.  They 
generally  ascribed  their  ruin  to  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States.  They  overissued  their  notes,  which  accumulated 
in  the  branch  of  the  bank,  that  being  the  strongest 
holder.  These  notes  were  presented  for  redemption. 
The  local  banks  construed  that  as  "  oppression,"  and 
eagerly  warded  off  all  responsibility  from  themselves  by 
representing  themselves  as  the  victims  of  an  alien  mon 
ster,  which  crushed  them  white  they  were  trying  to  con 
fer  blessings  on  the  people  about  them.  The  big  bank 
was  bad  enough,  but  the  plea  of  the  local  banks  was  in 
geniously  false.  It  availed,  however,  to  turn  the  popu- 
iar  indignation  altogether  against  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States. 


122  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Illinois  chartered  the  Bank  of  Illinois,  a  private  insti 
hition,  in  1816 ;  also  the  City  and  Bank  of  Cairo,  tc 
build  a  city,  and  to  issue  notes  as  a  means  of  getting 
other  people's  capital  to  do  it  with.  In  1819  the  State 
Bank  of  Illinois  was  founded,1  but  its  charter  was  soon 
repealed,  because  it  was  too  preposterous  to  stand.  An 
other  State  Bank  was  founded  in  1821,  which  was  a 
great  paper-money  machine,  and  produced  ten  years  of 
confusion  and  loss.2  As  early  as  1816,  Illinois  had  an 
endorsement  and  replevin  law. 

July  26, 1820,  the  Bank  of  Tennessee  was  established, 
to  last  until  1843,  with  a  branch  at  Knoxville.  Its 
amount  of  issue  was  a  million.  Its  notes  were  to  be 
leaned  on  mortgage  security  under  an  apportionment  be 
tween  the  counties,  according  to  the  taxable  property 
in  1819.8  There  was  already  a  Bank  of  Tennessee, 
which  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  new  "  bank." 
The  Legislature  of  Tennessee  also  passed  a  law  that  both 
real  and  personal  property  sold  under  execution  should 
be  redeemable  within  two  years  by  paying  the  purchaser 
ten  per  cent  advance.  Jackson  is  mentioned  as  having 
been  a  prominent  and  energetic  opponent  of  the  relief 
system.4  In  June,  1821,  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  Ten 
nessee  pronounced  the  replevin  law  unconstitutional,  and 
the  relief  system  in  that  State  came  to  an  end.6 

Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Missouri  were,  at  the  same  period, 
more  or  less  entangled  in  the  same  system. 

In  1817  the  circulation  of  the  Bank  of  Kentucky  was 
$417,000.  The  forty  banks  and  the  two  branches  ol 
the  national  bank  went  into  operation  in  that  year 

1  16  Niles,  208  2  Edwards,  165.  174,  204. 

«  18  Niles,  452  ;  Gouge,  39.  «  Ibid. 

•  21  Niles,  402. 


FORCED  LIQUIDATION:  128 

The  Bank  of  Kentucky  could  not  therefore  sustain  its 
former  circulation.  It  imported  $240,000  in  silver,  and 
reduced  its  circulation,  November,  1818,  to  $195,000. 
Nevertheless,  it  fell  neavily  in  debt  during  1818  and 
1819  to  the  branches  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.* 
In  November,  1819,  the  latter  bank  ordered  the  debt  to 
be  collected.  The  Bank  of  Kentucky  suspended  and 
compromised.  Its  notes  were  at  fifteen  per  cent  dis 
count.  A  great  reduction  of  the  paper  was  forced,  be 
cause  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  came  in  to  demand 
payment.  Where  any  one  strong  creditor  did  that  the 
credit  system  fell.  May  4,  1820,  the  stockholders  of 
the  Bank  of  Kentucky  voted  to  suspend  specie  payments. 
This  suspension  became  permanent.  Intense  rage  wag 
excited  against  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  but  if  the 
facts  are  as  alleged  the  Bank  of  Kentucky  must  have 
been  extending  its  loans,  and  if  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States  had  not  called  for  payment  it  would  have  been 
forced  to  stand  back,  and  see  the  Bank  of  Kentucky  use 
the  capital  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  as  a  means 
of  profit.  Kentucky  had  laid  a  tax  of  $60,000  on  each 
of  the  branches  of  the  national  bank,  in  January,  1819. 
At  the  same  time  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  declared  the  bank  constitutional.2  In  December 
the  Kentucky  Court  of  Appeals  unanimously  sustained 
the  state  tax,  on  the  ground  that  the  bank  was  uncon 
stitutional.  Two  judges  thought  they  must  yield  to  the 
.Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.  The  third,  Rowan, 
thought  they  ought  to  stand  out  and  force  further  trial 
in  the  interest  of  state  rights.8 

December   15.   1879,   the   Legislature    of   Kentucky 

Kendall's  Autobiography,  203.  2  See  page  128. 

8  Kendall's  Autobiography,  20? 


124  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

passed,  over  a  veto,  a  law  *  to  suspend  for  sixty  day* 
sales  under  executions,  if  the  defendant  gave  bonda 
that  the  goods  levied  on  should  be  forthcoming  at  the 
end  of  that  time.  The  Bank  of  the  Commonwealth  of 
Kentucky  was  established  November  29,  1820,  as  a 
further  "  relief  "  measure  for  the  benefit  of  the  debtors, 
victims  of  the  forty  kanks  of  1818.  As  a  further  meas 
ure  of  relief  a  replevin  law  was  passed,  December  25, 
1820,  according  to  which  the  debtor  was  to  have  two 
years  in  which  to  redeem,  under  an  execution,  unless 
the  creditor  should  endorse  on  the  note  that  he  would 
take  notes  of  the  Bank  of  the  Commonwealth,  if  the 
debtor  could  pay  them.  Another  act  was  passed,  De 
cember  21,  1821,  which  forbade  the  sale  of  land  on 
execution,  unless  it  should  bring  three  fourths  of  its 
value  as  appraised  by  a  jury  of  neighbors.  The  Bank 
of  the  Commonwealth  was  authorized  to  issue  notes  for 
three  millions  of  dollars.  It  had  no  stockholders.  The 
president  and  directors  were  elected  annually  by  the 
Legislature.  Their  salaries  were  paid  by  the  State. 
They  were  incorporated.  The  notes  were  issued  in 
loans  on  mortgage  security,  and  were  apportioned  be 
tween  the  counties  in  proportion  to  the  taxable  property 
in  each  in  1820.  Loans  were  to  be  made,  in  1820,  only 
to  those  who  needed  them,  "  for  the  purpose  of  paying 
his,  her,  or  their  just  debts,"  or  to  purchase  the  products 
of  the  country  for  exportation.  The  bank  had  twelve 
branches.  Its  funds  were  to  be :  all  money  thereafter 
paid  in  for  land  warrants,  or  land  west  of  the  Tennessee 
river ;  the  produce  of  the  stock  owned  by  the  State  in 
the  Bank  of  Kentucky  after  that  bank  should  be  wound 
Op  j  the  unexpended  balances  in  the  treasury  at  the  end 
1  Kendall's  Autobiography,  227. 


JUDGE-BREAKING:  125 

ti  the  year.  The  profits  of  the  bank  were  to  go  to  the 
State.  Stripped  of  all  pretence,  therefore,  the  bank  waa 
the  state  treasury,  put  into  the  hands  of  a  commission 
elected  by  the  Legislature,  and  incorporated.  Its  funds 
were  the  current  receipts  of  the  treasury  from  land, 
and  its  current  balance,  if  it  had  one ;  also  the  capital 
already  invested  in  the  old  bank,  whenever  that  should 
be  released,  which  never  was  done.  The  notes  of  the 
bank  were  legal  tender  to  and  from  the  State.  The 
Legislature  appropriated  $7,000  to  buy  books,  paper, 
and  plates  for  printing  the  notes.  This  is  all  the  real 
capital  the  bank  ever  had.  It  was,  therefore,  just  one 
of  the  grand  swindling  concerns  common  at  that  period, 
BO  many  of  which  are  described  in  the  pages  of  Niles 
and  Gouge.1  \ 

In  1822  Judge  Clark,  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  Ken 
tucky,  declared  the  replevin,  law  of  that  State  unconsti 
tutional.2  He  was  cited  before  the  House  of  Represen 
tatives  of  the  State,  and  an  effort  was  made  to  have  him 
removed  by  the  Governor  on  the  resolution  of  the  Legis 
lature.  The  vote  was  59  to  35 ;  not  two  thirds,  as  re 
quired  by  the  Constitution  for  this  method  of  removal. 
In  this  year  the  Legislature  used  its  power  in  the  election 
of  directors  of  the  old  Bank  of  Kentucky  to  put  in  "  re 
lief  "  men  who  would  make  that  bank  accept  Common 
wealth  notes.  The  effect  was  that  the  stock  of  the  old 
bank  at  once  fell  to  fifty,  ami  it  suspended.8  In  Oc 
tober,  1822,  a  specie  dollar  was  worth  $2.05  in  Com- 

1  See  8  Peters,  118;  11  Peters..  257. 

2  23   Niles,  Supp.   153  ;  i,supple2nen*  io  the  22d  vol.).     Thfl 
fudge's  decision,  the  legislative  proceeding*1,  and  tb«3  judge's  de 
fence  are  there  given. 

•  Collins,  89. 


126  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

monwealth  notes.1  A  Kentucky  correspondent  writes, 
February,  1823 :  The  Bank  of  the  Commonwealth  "  hai 
nearly  destroyed  all  commerce  or  trade,  extinguished 
personal  credit,  and  broken  down  confidence  between 
man  and  man,  as  well  as  damped  and  depressed  the 
industry  of  the  State  ;  but  the  people  are  beginning  to  get 
tired  of  its  blessings,  and  its  paper-mill  will  soon  cease 
working,  leaving  a  debt,  however,  due  to  it  from  the 
poorest  of  the  people  to  the  amount  of  two  and  a  half 
or  three  millions  of  dollars."  2 

In  1823  the  notes  of  the  Bank  of  the  Commonwealth 
began  to  be  withdrawn  and  burned.  Governor  Adair,  in 
his  message  of  that  year,  approved  of  the  relief  system, 
and  denounced  the  courts  for  deciding  the  replevin  laws 
unconstitutional.  This  proceeding  of  the  courts  seems 
to  have  been  then  regarded  very  generally  by  the  people 
of  Kentucky  as  a  usurpation  by  the  judges,  and  an  as 
sault  on  the  liberties  of  the  people.  After  Adair's  term 
expired,  he  petitioned  for  redress,  on  account  of  the 
payment  of  his  salary  in  depreciated  paper. 

In  1823  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  Kentucky  declared 
the  relief  laws  unconstitutional.  The  Legislature,  in 
January,  1824,  affirmed  the  constitutionality  of  said 
laws,  and  an  issue  was  made  up  on  the  right  and  power 
of  courts  to  annul,  on  the  ground  of  unconstitutionality, 
laws  passed  by  the  representatives  of  the  people.  Tha 
relief  system  thus  brought  directly  to  the  test  the  power 
of  a  system  of  constitutional  guarantees,  administered 
by  an  independent  judiciary,  to  protect  rights  against  an 
interested  and  corrupt  majority  of  debtors,  which  wai 

l  2,3  Niles,  96. 

a  2.1  Niles,  337.    Kendall  justly  described  the  relief  system  ii 
1821,    ( Autobiography,  246.) 


OLD  COURT  AND  NEW  COURT.  127 

using  its  power,  under  democratic-republican  self-govern 
ment,  to  rob  the  minority  of  creditors.  The  state  elec 
tion  of  1824  was  fought  on  the  effort  to  elect  a  Legis 
lature  two  thirds  of  which  would  memorialize  the  Gov 
ernor  for  the  removal  of  the  judges  who  had  decided  the 
relief  laws  unconstitutional.  A  majority  was  obtained, 
but  not  two  thirds.  Another  course  was  then  taken. 
The  legislative  act  by  which  the  state  judLiary  was 
organized  and  the  Court  of  Appeals  created  was  re 
pealed.  Reference  was  made,  in  defence  of  this  action, 
to  the  repeal  of  the  federal  judiciary  act,  at  the  begin 
ning  of  Jefferson's  administration.1  A  new  Court  of  Ap 
peals  was  constituted  by  a  new  act.  William  T.  Barry 
was  appointed  chief  justice.  The  old  court  denied  the 
constitutionality  of  the  repeal  and  of  the  new  court,  antf 
continued  its  existence,  so  that  there  were  two  courts. 
In  1825  the  parties  in  the  State  were  "  Old  Court  "  and 
"  New  Court."  2  The  new  court  party  affirmed,  some 
times  with  vehemence,  sometimes  with  solemnity,  that 
liberty  and  republicanism  were  at  stake,  and  that  the 
contest  was  to  see  whether  the  judges  should  be  above 
the  law.  The  old  court  party  won  a  majority  in  the 
lower  House.  The  Senate,  which  held  over,  was  still  of 
the  new  court  party.  The  House  voted  to  abolish  the 
new  court,  but  the  Senate  did  not  agree.  By  this  time 
the  contest  had  developed  a  whole  school  of  ambitious, 
rising  politicians,  who  appealed  with  demagogical  ad 
dress  to  the  passions  and  distress  of  the  embarrassed 
debtors.  In  November,  1825,  Niles  quotes  a  Ken 
tucky  paper  that  more  persons  had  left  that  State  than 
Bad  come  to  it  for  many  years.  It  is  plain  that  two 
llasses  of  persons  were  driven  away  by  the  relisf  system 
Collins,  90.  2  28  Niles,  277. 


128  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

(1)  those  who  wanted,  by  steady  industry  and  accumula 
tion  without  borrowing,  to  acquire  capital  and  to  be  se 
cure  in  the  possession  of  it ;  and  (2)  those  who  could  not, 
under  the  prevailing  depression,  work  off  the  mortgages 
which  they  had  eagerly  given  to  the  Bank  of  the  Com 
monwealth  for  its  notes,  in  the  hope  of  thus  escaping 
from  old  embarrassments.  After  five  years  their  con 
dition  was  hopeless,  and  if  they  had  any  energy  they 
started  westward  to  begin  again. 

In  the  mean  time  there  had  been  a  number  of  decisions 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  which  irri 
tated  the  people  of  Kentucky,  and  enhanced  their  alarm 
about  the  assaults  of  the  judiciary  on  liberty.  We  have 
seen  how  the  state  banks  used  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States  as  a  scapegoat  for  all  their  sins,  and  for  all  the 
bad  legislation  of  the  States.  The  next  swing  of  the 
pendulum  of  popular  feeling  was  over  into  hatred  of  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States.  Several  States,  of  which 
Kentucky  was  one,  tried  to  tax  the  branches  out  of  ex 
istence.  In  McCulloch  vs.  Maryland  (1819), l  and  in 
Osborn  vs.  Bank  of  the  United  States  (1824), 2  the  Su 
preme  Court  of  the  United  States  declared  that  the 
States  could  not  tax  the  bank.  In  Sturges  vs.  Crowiiin- 
shield  (1819), 8  the  same  court  set  limits  to  the  state  in 
solvent  laws  and  thereby  prevented  the  favor  to  debtors 
which  the  embarrassed  States  desired  to  provide.  R.  M. 
Johnson,  of  Kentucky,  proposed  an  amendment  to  the 
Constitution,  January  14,  1822,  giving  appellate  juris 
diction  to  the  Senate  in  any  case  to  which  a  State  was  a 
party,  arising  under  the  laws,  treaties,  etc.,  of  the  United 
States.4  In  Bank  of  the  United  States  vs.  Halstea^ 

i  4  Wheaton,  316.  2  9  Wheaton,  739. 

•  4  Wbeaton.  122.  *  7  Benton's  Abridgment,  145. 


ALLEGED  FEDEPAL  ENCROACHMENTS.        129 

(1825), l  the  Supreme  Court  decided  that  it  had  juris 
diction  in  suits  to  which  the  Bank  of  the  United  States 
Was  a  party,  and  that  a  law  which  forbade  sales  of  land 
Under  execution  for  less  than  three  fourths  of  the  ap 
praised  value  did  not  apply  to  writs  of  execution  issued 
b}  federal  courts.  The  question  of  the  constitutionality 
of  such  a  law  was  avoided.  In  Wayman  vs.  Southard 
(1825), 2  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  decided 
that  the  replevin  and  endorsement  law  of  Kentucky  did 
not  apply  to  a  writ  of  execution  issued  from  a  federal 
court.  In  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  vs.  the  Plant 
ers'  Bank  of  Georgia  (1824), 3  it  decided  that  if  a  State 
became  a  party  to  a  banking  or  commercial  enterprise 
the  State  could  be  sued  in  the  course  of  the  business. 
This  decision  seemed  to  threaten  the  Bank  of  the  Com 
mon wealth  of  Kentucky.  In  Green  vs.  Biddle  (1823), 4 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  decided  that 
the  laws  of  Kentucky  of  1797  and  1812,  which  reduced 
the  liability  of  the  occupying  claimant  of  land  to  the 
successful  contestant,  on  account  of  rent  and  profits,  as 
compared  with  the  same  liability  under  the  law  of  Vir 
ginia  at  the  time  of  the  separation,  and  which  in  a  cor 
responding  manner  increased  the  claims  of  the  occupying 
claimant  for  improvements,  were  null  and  void,  being  in 
violation  of  the  contract  between  Kentucky  and  Virginia 
at  the  time  of  separation.5  In  Dartmouth  College  vs. 

1  10  Wheaton,  51.  2  10  Wheaton,  1. 

8  9  Wheaton,  904.  8  Wheaton,  1. 

5  Kentucky  sent  to  Congress,  May  S,  1824,  a  remonstrance 
against  this  decision.  Letcher,  of  Kentucky,  introduced  a  reso 
lution  to  amend  the  law,  so  that  more  than  a  majority  of  judgei 
iho^.d  be  necessary  to  declare  a  state  law  void.  (8  Beutou'f 
Abridgment,  51.) 

9 


130  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Woodward  (1819),1  the  Supreme  Court  had  decided 
that  the  charter  of  a  private  corporation  was  a  contract 
which  a  state  Legislature  might  not  violate,  and  had  thus 
put  certain  vested  rights  beyond  legislative  caprice.2 

Other  decisions  had  also  been  made,  bearing  on  state 
rights  and  the  powers  of  the  federal  judiciary  in  a  more 
general  way.  In  Martin  vs.  Hunter's  Lessee  (1816),* 
the  constitutionality  of  the  25th  section  of  the  judi 
ciary  act  (power  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  pass  upon 
the  constitutionality  of  state  laws)  was  affirmed,  and 
the  authority  of  the  court  in  a  case  under  a  federal 
treaty  was  maintained  against  the  Court  of  Appeals  of 
Virginia.  In  Gibbons  vs.  Ogden  (1824)  ,4  the  court 
overruled  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  York,  and  declared 
an  act  of  the  Legislature  giving  exclusive  privileges  in 
the  waters  of  New  York  unconstitutional  and  void.  In 
Cohens  vs.  Virginia  (1821), 5  it  was  decided  that,  if  9 
citizen  of  a  State  pleads  against  a  statute  of  his  own 
State  an  act  of  Congress  as  defence,  the  25th  section 
of  the  judiciary  act  gives  the  federal  Supreme  Court 
jurisdiction  to  test  whether  that  defence  be  good.  In 
the  case  of  the  "Marmion"  (1823),  the  Attorney-Gen- 
eral  of  the  United  States  (Wirt)  had  rendered  an  opin 
ion  6  (1824)  that  a  law  of  South  Carolina  (1822), 
according  to  which  any  free  negro  sailors  who  should 
?ome  into  that  State  on  board  a  ship  should  be  impris 
oned  until  the  ship  sailed  again,  was  incompatible  with 
fche  Constitution  and  with  the  international  obligations 
of  the  United  States.  The  District  Court  of  the  Unite* 
States  had  decided  (1823)  to  the  same  effect.7 

1  4  Wheaton,  518.  2  1  Webster's  Correspondence,  283. 

1  1  Wheaton,  304.        *  9  Wheaton,  1.        6  6  Wheaton,  264. 
6  1  Opinions  of  the  Attorneys-General,  659. 
»  25  Niles,  12. 


GROWTH  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW,         131 

From  our  present  stand-point  of  established  doctrine 
»n  the  points  of  constitutional  law  above  enumerated, 
it  is  difficult  to  understand  the  shocks  which  many  or 
all  of  these  decisions  gave  to  the  Jeffersonian  school  of 
politicians.  The  assertion  that  the  reserved  rights  of 
the  States  had  been  invaded 1  is  to  be  referred  to  these 
judicial  decisions,  not  to  executive  acts.  The  strict- 
construction,  state-rights  school  felt  every  one  of  these 
decisions  as  a  blow  from  an  adversary  against  whom 
there  was  no  striking  back,  and  the  fact  undoubtedly  is 
that  the  Supreme  Court,  under  the  lead  of  Marshall  and 
Story,  was  consolidating  the  federal  system,  and  secur 
ing  it  against  fanciful  dogmas  and  exaggerated  theories 
which  would  have  made  the  federal  government  as 
ridiculous  as  the  German  Bund.  Readers  of  to-day  are 
surprised  to  find  that  a  great  many  people  were  alarmed 
about  their  liberties  under  the  mild  and  timid  rule  of 
Monroe.2  It  was,  however,  by  no  means  the  scholastic 
hair-splitters  and  hobby-riders  in  constitutional  law 
alone  who  were  astonished  and  bewildered  by  the  course 
of  the  decisions.  It  needs  to  be  remembered  that  the 
system  of  the  Constitution,  even  after  the  second  war, 
was  yet,  to  a  great  degree,  unestablished  and  unformed. 
Actual  experience  of  any  legislative  act  or  constitutional 
provision  is  needed  to  find  out  how  it  will  work,  and 
what  interpretation  its  terms  will  take  on  from  the 
growth  of  institutions  and  from  their  inter-action.  It  is 
impossible,  upon  reading  a  constitutional  provision,  to 
figure  to  one's  self,  save  in  the  vaguest  way,  what  will 
be  the  character  and  working  of  the  institution  which  it 

1  See  page  109-10. 

a  See  Garland's  Randolph  especially  IL  211,  on  Giobous  r* 
Ogden. 


182  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

creates.  It  was  one  of  the  most  fortunate  circumstances 
in  the  history  of  the  United  States  that  the  judicial  in 
terpretation  and  administration  of  the  Constitution  was^ 
during  its  formative  period,  for  a  long  time  in  the  hands 
of  men  who  shaped  the  Constitution  in  fidelity  to  its 
original  meaning  and  spirit,  to  secure  at  once  dignity 
and  strength  to  the  federal  system,  and  constitutional 
liberty  to  the  nation.  It  is  fortunate  that  they  were 
men  of  profound  legal  attainments  and  historic  sense, 
and  neither  abstractionists  of  the  French  school,  nor 
dialecticians  under  the  state-rights  and  strict-construc 
tion  dogmas.  The  history  of  the  country  has  proved 
the  soundness  and  wisdom  of  the  constitutional  princi 
ples  they  established,  but  while  they  were  doing  this 
they  had  to  meet  with  a  great  deal  of  criticism  and 
abuse.  Kentucky  had  furnished  a  number  of  the  cases, 
and  at  least  two  important  interests  of  hers  (relief  sys 
tem  and  contested  land  titles)  had  been  decided  ad 
versely  to  the  interests  of  the  classes  which  had  least 
education  and  property. 

The  message  of  Governor  Desha  of  Kentucky,  No 
vember  7,  1825,1  deserves  attentive  reading  from  any 
one  who  seeks  to  trace  the  movement  of  decisive  forces 
.  n  American  political  history.  The  Governor  denounces 
all  banks,  and  especially  the  Bank  of  the  United  States, 
because  they  are  all  hostile  to  the  power  and  rights 
of  the  States.  He  says  that  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States  has  been  taken  under  the  protection  of  the  federal 
Supreme  Court,  and  that  these  two  foreign  powers,  sot 
allied,  have  overthrown  the  sovereignty  of  Kentucky 
He  complains  of  the  State  Court  of  Appeals,  which  had 
declared  the  law  taxing  the  Bank  of  the  United  Statei 
1  29  Niles,  219. 


DESHAS  MESSAGE   OF  1825.  13ft 

U>  be  constitutional,  for  not  maintaining  its  ground,  but 
receding,  and  deferring  to  the  contrary  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.  He  congratulates 
the  State,  however,  that  the  abolition  of  the  old  court 
has  removed  the  compliant  head  from  the  state  judiciary, 
and  that  the  new  court  will  maintain  the  sovereignty  of 
the  State  against  federal  encroachments.  He  declares 
that  the  emigration  from  the  State  was  due  to  the  de 
cision  about  the  occupying  claimant  law.  He  denounces 
the  federal  courts  for  not  recognizing  the  state  relief  laws 
in  regard  to  writs  issued  by  themselves,  and  he  regards 
the  State  as  robbed  of  self-government  by  this  intrusion 
of  foreign  courts,  which  bring  with  them  an  independent 
code  of  procedure.  He  defends  the  relief  system,  and, 
although  he  does  not  distinctly  say  so,  what  he  means  is 
that  the  federal  courts,  by  their  intrusion,  enable  foreign 
creditors  to  escape  the  treatment  which  Kentucky  cred 
itors  have  to  submit  to  under  the  laws  of  their  country. 
This  was  the  invasion  of  the  "sovereignty"  of  Ken 
tucky  which  was  resented  most. 

In  the  same  message  Desha  suggested  that  the  Legis 
lature  should  abolish  both  the  Courts  of  Appeals,  and  he 
promised  that,  if  this  should  be  done,  and  a  new  court 
should  be  established,  he  would  select  the  judges  for  it 
equally  from  the  two  existing  ones.  In  1826  the  state 
election  was  again  a  contest  between  old  court  and  new 
court.  The  old  court  carried  both  Houses.1  The  re 
plevin  laws  were  repealed.  The  acts  of  the  new  court 
were  treated  as  null.  The  new  court  seized  the  records, 
and  held  them  by  military  force.  Civ'l  war  was  avoided 
•mly  by  the  moderation  of  the  old  court  party.  The 
Legislature  repealed  the  law  constituting  the  new  court 
i  Collins,  93. 


134  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

but  the  Governor  vetoed  the  repeal.1  It  was  passed 
over  his  veto  December  30,  1826.  By  resignations 
and  new  appointments  among  the  judges,  the  court  was 
reconstituted  as  a  single  anti-relief  body  in  the  years 
1828-9. 

In  1827  the  currency  of  the  States  in  the  Mississippi 
Valley  was  fairly  good.  There  remained  only  $800,000 
of  Commonwealth  paper  out,  and  this  was  merchandise, 
not  currency.2  The  bank  held  notes  of  individuals  to 
the  amount  of  one  and  a  half  millions,  and  real  estate 
worth  $30,592.  Hence  there  was  due  to  it  a  balance 
from  the  public,  after  all  its  notes  should  be  paid  in,  of 
$600,000.  Its  debtors  had  this  to  pay  in  specie  or  its 
equivalent,  or  else  the  bank  would  get  their  property. 
This  sum,  therefore,  fairly  represents  the  net  final  swin 
dle  which  the  relief  system  perpetrated  on  its  dupes,  to 
say  nothing  of  its  effects  on  creditors  and  on  the  general 
prosperity  of  the  State.  The  bank  never  had  over 
$7,000  capital  even  spent  upon  it.  Its  total  issue  of 
bits  of  paper  was  printed  with  the  denomination  dollars 
up  to  three  millions.  By  this  issue  it  had  won  $600,000 
worth  of  real  property,  or  twenty  per  cent  in  five  years. 
Who  got  this  gain  ?  It  seems  that  there  must  have  been 
private  and  personal  interests  at  stake  to  account  for 
the  rage  which  was  excited  by  the  decisions  which 
touched  this  bank,  and  by  the  intensity  of  friendship 
.  or  it  which  was  manifested  by  a  leading  political  clique. 

In  1828  the  parties  were  still  relief  and  anti-relief . 
the  former  for  Jackson,  the  latter  for  Adams.  The 
ideas,  however,  had  changed  somewhat.  A  "  relief ' 
man,  in  1828,  meant  a  state-rights  man  and  strict  con* 
itructionist,  who  wanted  to  put  bounds  to  the  supposed 
1  31  Nilee  310.  2  32  Niles,  37. 


OTHER  DECISIONS.  135 

encroachments  of  the  federal  power,  especially  the 
judiciary,  and  indeed  to  the  constitutional  functions 
of  the  judiciary  in  general.  Metcalf,  the  anti-relief 
candidate  for  Governor,  in  1828,  defeated  Barry,  the 
relief  candidate,  after  a  very  hard  fight,1  but  the  State 
gave  7,912  majority  for  Jackson. 

Two  later  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  may  here 
be  mentioned,  because  they  carried  forward  the  same 
constitutional  tendency  which  has  been  described. 
They  were  connected  with  the  political  movements 
which  have  been  mentioned,  and  with  those  which  came 
later. 

In  the  Bank  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Kentucky  vs. 
Wister  et  al.  (1829), 2  it  was  held  that  the  bank  must 
pay  specie  on  demand  in  return  for  a  deposit  which  had 
been  made  with  it  of  its  own  notes,  although  these  notes 
were,  when  deposited,  worth  only  fifty  cents  on  the 
dollar.  It  had  been  provided  in  the  act  establishing  the 
bank  that  it  should  pay  specie.  The  bank  tried  to  plead 
the  non-suability  of  a  State,  but  it  was  held  that,  if  the 
State  was  sole  owner  and  issued  as  a  sovereign,  it  would 
be  non-suable.  Then,  however,  the  notes  would  be  bills 
of  credit.  If  the  State  issued  as  a  banker,  not  a  sover 
eign,  then  it  was  suable  under  the  decision  in  the  case 
of  the  Planter's  Bank  of  Georgia.  In  Craig  vs.  Mis 
souri  (1830), 8  a  law  of  Missouri  (1821)  establishing 
loan  offices  to  loan  state  currency  issues  on  mortgages 
was  declared  unconstitutional  as  to  the  notes  issued, 
tfhich  were  bills  of'  credit  In  this  decision  bills  of 
sredit  were  denned. 

i  Collins,  93.  2  2  *aten,  SI  8. 

*  4  Peters,  410. 


CHAPTER  VH. 

PTTRRNAL    HISTORY   OF   JACKSON'S    FIRST    ADMENTSTILA 
TION. 

JACKSON  came  to  power  as  the  standard-bearer  of  a 
irew  upheaval  of  democracy,  and  under  a  profession  of 
new  and  fuller  realization  of  the  Jeffersonian  demo 
cratic  republican  principles.  The  causes  of  the  new 
strength  of  democracy  were  economic.  It  gained 
strength  every  year.  Everything  in  the  situation  of  the 
country  favored  it.  The  cotton  culture  advanced  with 
great  rapidity,  and  led  to  a  rapid  settlement  of  the 
Southwestern  States.  The  Ohio  States  filled  up  with  a 
very  strong  population.  Steamboats  came  into  common 
use,  and  they  had  a  value  for  this  country,  with  its  poor 
roads,  but  grand  rivers,  bays,  sounds,  and  lakes,  such  as 
they  had  for  no  other  country.  Other  forces  have  al 
ready  been  mentioned.  Railroads  began  to  be  built 
just  after  Jackson's  election.  The  accumulation  of 
capital  in  the  country  was  not  yet  great.  It  was  inade 
quate  for  the  chances  which  were  offered  by  the  opening 
up  of  the  continent.  Hence  the  industrial  organization 
did  not  take  the  form  of  a  wages  organization.  Indi 
viduals,  however,  found  the  chances  of  very  free  and 
independent  activity,  which  easily  produced  a  simplt 
abundance.  The  conditions  were  such  as  to  give  to  eaclr 
i  sense  of  room  and  power.  Individual  energy  an<* 
witerprige  were  greatly  favored.  Of  course,  the  effecl 


SOCIAL  NOTIONS  AND   CHANGES.  137 

an  the  character  of  the  people  was  certain.  They  be 
came  bold,  independent,  energetic,  and  enterprising 
They  were  versatile,  and  adapted  themselves  easily  to 
circumstances.  They  were  not  disturbed  in  an  emer 
gency  ;  and  they  were  shrewd  in  dealing  with  difficul 
ties  of  every  kind.  The  state  constitutions  became  more 
and  more  purely  democratic,  under  the  influence  of  this 
character  of  the  people.  Social  usages  threw  off  all  tho 
forms  which  had  been  inherited  from  colonial  days. 
The  tone  of  mind  was  developed  which  now  marks  the 
true,  unspoiled  American,  as  distinguished  from  all 
Europeans,  although  it  has  scarcely  been  noticed  by  the 
critics  who  have  compared  the  two  :  namely,  the  tone  of 
mind  which  has  no  understanding  at  all  of  the  notion 
that  A  could  demean  himself  by  talking  to  B,  or  that  B 
could  be  raised  in  his  own  estimation  or  that  of  other 
people  by  being  spoken  to  by,  A,  no  matter  who  A  and 
B  might  be.  Ceremonies,  titles,  forms  of  courtesy  and 
etiquette,  were  distasteful.  Niles  did  not  like  it  that 
members  of  Congress-  were  called  "  honorable."  *  He 
criticised  diplomatic  usages.  He  devoted  a  paragraph 
to  denunciation  of  a  fashionable  marriage  in  Boston, 
which  took  place  in  King's  (!)  Chapel,  and  at  which  the 
people  cheered  the  groom.  He  objected  to  the  term 
"  cabinet," 2  and  said,  very  truly,  that  there  is  no 
cabinet  in  our  system.  He  was  displeased  by  public 
honors  to  the  President  (Monroe). 

The  people  of  the  period  found  themselves  happy  and 
prosperous.  Their  lives  were  easy;  free  from  gross 
eares,  and  free  from  great  political  anxieties.  They 
knew  little  and  cared  less  about  other  countries.  They 
were  generally  satisfied  with  some  crude  notions  and 
l  37  Niles.  378.  2  40  Niles.  145. 


138  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

easy  prejudices  about  institutions  and  social  states  of 
which  they  really  had  no  knowledge.  Niles  knew  no 
more  of  the  English  Constitution  and  English  politics 
than  a  Cherokee  Indian  knew  of  the  politics  of  the 
United  States.  The  American  people  did  not  think  of 
their  economic  and  social  condition  as  peculiar  or  ex 
ceptional.  They  supposed  that  any  other  nation  could 
be  just  like  the  United  States  if  it  chose.  They 
thought  the  political  institutions,  or,  more  strictly,  the 
political  "  principles,"  of  this  country  made  all  the 
difference.  They  gave  their  confidence  to  the  great 
principles,  accordingly,  all  the  more  because  those  prin 
ciples  flatter  human  nature.  One  can  easily  discern  in 
Jackson's  popularity  an  element  of  instinct  and  personal 
recognition  by  the  mass  of  the  people.  They  felt,  "  He 
is  one  of  us."  "  He  stands  by  us."  "  He  is  not  proud, 
and  does  not  care  for  style,  but  only  for  plenty  of  what 
is  sound,  strong,  and  good."  "  He  thinks  just  as  we  do 
about  this."  The  anecdotes  about  him  which  had  the 
greatest  currency  were  those  which  showed  him  tramp 
ling  on  some  conventionality  of  polite  society,  or  shock 
ing  the  tastes  and  prejudices  of  people  from  "  abroad/' 
In  truth  Jackson  never  did  these  things  except  for  effect, 
or  when  carried  away  by  his  feelings. 

The  Jackson  party  flocked  to  Washington  to  attend 
the  inauguration.  "  They  really  seem,"  said  Webster,1 
"  to  think  that  the  country  has  been  rescued  from  some 
^reat  danger."  There  was  evidently  a  personal  and 
class  feeling  involved  in  their  triumph.  At  the  in 
auguration  ball  a  great  crowd  of  people  assembled  wha 
had  not  been  accustomed  to  such  festivities.  Jacksos 

1  I  Curtis's  WebKter,  340.     On  the  crowd,  see  Webster's  Cor 
,  470,  473. 


JACKSON*  S  INAUGURATION. 

refused  to  call  on  Adams,  partly  because,  as  he  said, 
Adams  got  his  office  by  a  bargain,  and  partly  because  he 
thought  that  Adams  could  have  stopped  the  campaign 
references  to  Mrs.  Jackson.  That  lady  had  died  in  the 
previous  December,  and  Jackson  was  in  a  very  tender 
frame  of  mind  in  regard  to  her  memory.1  Adams  was 
hurt  at  the  slight  put  upon  him,  and  thought  that  he  had 
deserved  other  treatment  from  Jackson.2  In  March, 
1832,  R.  M.  Johnson  came  to  Adams  to  try  to  bring 
about  a  reconciliation  with  Jackson.  Nothing  came  of 
it.8 

The  inaugural  address  contained  nothing  of  any  im 
portance.  There  was  a  disposition  to  give  Jackson  a 
fair  chance.  Every  one  was  tired  of  party  strife,4  and 
there  was  no  disposition  in  any  quarter  to  make  factious 
opposition.  The  opposition  had  taken  the  name  of 
national  republicans.  They  never  acknowledged  any 
succession  to  the  federalists.  They  claimed  to  belong 
to  the  true  republican  party,  but  to  hold  national  theo 
ries  instead  of  state-rights  theories.  The  Jackson  party 
was  heterogeneous.  In  opposition  it  had  been  held  to 
gether  by  the  hope  of  success,  but  it  had  not  been 
welded  together  into  any  true  party.  No  one  yet 
knew  what  Jackson  thought  about  any  political  question. 
It  had  been  an  unfortunate  necessity  to  send  him  to  the 
Senate  in  1823.  He  had  made  a  record  on  tariff  and 
internal  improvements.  His  Coleman  letter,  it  is  true, 
left  him  safely  vague  on  tariff,  but  he  could  only  lose, 
he  could  not  possibly  gain,  by  making  a  record  on  any- 

1  The    New  York  Ameri-an  followed  her  even  beyond  the 
grave  with  a  scurrilous  epitaph 

2  8  Adams,  128.  J  A  lams,  484. 
*  5  Ann.  Reg.  1. 


140  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

thing.  His  advantage  over  the  "  statesmen  "  was  tnat 
every  one  of  them  was  on  record  a  dozen  times  on  every 
public  question. 

Calhoun  had  been  reflected  Vice-President.  He  now 
understood  that  Jackson  would  take  only  one  term,  and 
that  he  (Calhoun)  would  have  all  Jackson's  support  in 
1832.  Van  Buren,  however,  who  had  come  into 
Jackson's  political  family  at  a  late  date,  had  views  and 
ambitions  which  crossed  this  programme  of  Calhoun. 
These  two  men  came  into  collision  in  the  formation  of 
the  cabinet.  Jackson  introduced  two  innovations.  He 
put  the  Secretaries  back  more  nearly  into  the  place  in 
which  they  belong  by  the  original  theory  of  the  law. 
He  made  them  executive  clerks  or  staff  officers.  The 
fashion  has  grown  up  of  calling  the  Secretaries  the 
President's  "  constitutional  advisers."  It  is  plain  that 
they  are  not  anything  of  the  kind.  He  is  not  bound  to 
consult  them,  and,  if  he  does,  it  does  not  detract  from 
his  responsibility.  Jackson,  by  the  necessity  of  his 
character  and  preparation,  and  by  the  nature  of  the 
position  to  which  he  had  been  elected,  must  lean  on 
somebody.  He  had  a  number  of  intimate  friends 
and  companions  on  whom  he  relied.  They  did  not 
hold  important  public  positions.  They  came  to  be  called 
the  "  Kitchen  Cabinet."  The  men  were  William  B. 
Lewis,  Amos  Kendall,  Duff  Green,  and  Isaac  Hill. 
If  the  Secretaries  had  been  the  "  constitutional  advisers  " 
of  the  President,  their  first  right  and  duty  would  have 
been  to  break  off  the  intimacy  with  these  irresponsible 
persons,  and  to  prevent  their  influence.  Jackson'5 
second  innovation  was  that  he  did  not  hold  cabinet 
councils.  Hence  his  administration  lacked  unity  ancj 
discipline.  It  did  not  have  the  strength  of  hearty  an? 


JACKSON'S   CABINET.  141 

> 

jonscious  cooperation.  Each  Secretary  went  his  way,, 
jtnd  gossip  and  ntewsmongering  had  a  special  field  of 
Activity  open  to  them.  The  cabinet  was  not  a  strong 
one.  Van  Buren  was  Secretary  of  State.  S.  D.  Ing. 
ham  was  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  He  had  been  an 
jictive  Pennsylvania  politician,  and  a  member  of  the 
House  for  the  last  seven  years.  John  H.  Eaton,  of 
Kentucky,  was  Secretary  of  War.  He  had  married,  for 
his  first  wife,  one  of  Mrs.  Jackson's  nieces,  and  had  been 
an  intimate  friend  of  Jackson.  He  was  brother-in-law 
of  Lewis.  He  finished,  in  1817,  a  life  of  Jackson,  which 
had  been  begun  by  Major  John  Reid.  He  had  been  in 
the  Senate  since  1818.  John  Branch,  of  North  Caro 
lina,  was  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  He  had  been  in  the 
Senate  since  1823.1  John  M.  Berrien,  of  Georgia,  was 
Attorney-General.  He  had  been  in  the  Senate  since 
1824.  William  T.  Barry,  of  Kentucky,  was  Postmaster- 
General,  with  a  seat  in  the  cabinet,  a  privilege  to  which 
that  officer  had  not  previously  been  admitted.  McLean 
passed  into  high  favor  with  the  new  administration,  and 
was  asked  to  keep  the  postmaster-generalship  with  its 
new  rank.  When  the  general  proscription  began  he 
would  not  admit  it  as  to  his  department.  He  was  trans 
ferred  to  the  bench  of  the  Supreme  Court.2  Ingham, 
Branch,  and  Berrien  were  understood  to  be  the  Calhoun 
paen  in  the  cabinet. 

The  men  who  controlled  the  administration  were  the 
members  of  the  kitchen  cabinet.  Lewis  does  not  ap 
pear  to  have  had  any  personal  ambition.  He  wanted 
ko  return  to  Tennessee,  but  Jackson  remonstrated  thai 
Lewis  must  not  abandon  him  in  the  positi  in  to  which  h« 

1  See  page  93   and  note  5. 
a  8  Aiams,  112. 


142  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

had  been  elevated.1  Lewis  was  made  Second  Auditoi 
of  the  Treasury.  He  only  asked  for  an  office  with 
little  work  to  be  done.2  His  character  and  antecedents 
.have  already  been  noticed.  Amos  Kendall  was  born  in 
Massachusetts  in  1789.  He  was  a  graduate  of  Dart 
mouth  College.  In  1814  he  went  to  Washington.  In 
1815  he  was  a  tutor  in  Henry  Clay's  family.  He 
edited  a  newspaper,  the  "  Frankfort  Argus,"  and  prac 
tised  law,  and  was  postmaster  at  Georgetown,  Kentucky. 
He  became  a  leading  "relief"  man,  director  in  the 
Bank  of  the  Commonwealth,  and  as  such  an  enemy  of 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  Many  of  Clay's  old 
supporters,  who  became  relief  men,  were  carried  over  to 
Jackson  between  1824  and  1828.  Kendall  was  one  of 
these.  He  had  expected  an  office  from  Clay,  and  was 
offered  one,  but  it  did  not  satisfy  him.  He  had  an 
acrimonious  correspondence  with  Clay  in  1828.8  He 
was  in  debt.  Clay  was  one  of  his  creditors.  His  war 
with  Clay  won  him  Jackson's  favor.  Kendall  was  an 
enigmatical  combination  of  good  and  bad,  great  and 
small  traits.  His  ability  to  handle  important  state  ques 
tions  and  his  skill  as  a  politician  are  both  beyond  ques 
tion.  He  prostituted  his  talents  to  partisan  purposes, 
and  was  responsible  for  the  bad  measures  adopted  by 
Jackson  as  much  as  any  other  one  man.  In  his  private 
character  he  showed  admirable  traits  of  family  devotion 
and  generosity.  As  a  public  man  he  belonged  to  the 
worst  school  of  American  politicians.  He  brought  the 
vote  of  Kentucky  to  Washington,  and  was  appointed 
Fourth  Auditor  of  the  Treasury.  As  time  went  on  he 
proved  more  and  more  the  master  spirit  of  the  adminis- 

1  3  Parton,  180.  2  Kendall's  Autobiography,  308. 

«  Telegraph  Extra,  305. 


THE  KITCHEN  CABINET.  143 

Iration.  Harriet  Martineau  wrote  of  him,  in  1836,  as 
follows :  "  I  was  fortunate  enough  once  to  catch  a 
glimpse  of  the  invisible  Amos  Kendall,  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  men  in  America.  He  is  supposed  to  be  the 
moving  spring  of  the  whole  administration,  the  thinker, 
planner,  and  doer ;  but  it  is  all  in  the  dark.  Documents 
are  issued  of  an  excellence  which  prevents  their  being 
attributed  to  persons  who  take  the  responsibility  of 
them ;  a  correspondence  is  kept  up  all  over  the  country 
for  which  no  one  seems  to  be  answerable ;  work  is  done, 
of  goblin  extent  and  with  goblin  speed,  which  makes 
men  look  about  them  with  a  superstitious  wonder  ;  and 
the  invisible  Amos  Kendall  has  the  credit  of  it  all. 
.  .  .  He  is  undoubtedly  a  great  genius.  He  unites 
with  his  '  great  talent  for  silence  '  a  splendid  audac 
ity."  *  She  goes  on  to  say  that  he  rarely  appeared  in 
public,  and  seemed  to  keep  up  the  mystery.  She  at- 
a*ibutes  some  of  Lewis's  work  to  Kendall,  but  the  pas 
sage  is  a  very  fair  representation  of  the  opinions  of 
Washington  society  about  Kendall.  He  had  very  great 
executive  and  literary  ability.  Duff  Green  was  a  fight 
ing  partisan  editor.  He  had  the  virtue  of  his  trade. 
He  was  loyal  to  the  standard  to  which  he  had  once 
sworn.  He  was  a  Calhoun  man,  and  he  continued  to  be 
a  retainer  of  the  most  unflinching  loyalty.  For  the 
first  years  of  Jackson's  administration,  Green,  as  editor 
of  the  "  organ,"  stood  on  guard  all  the  time  to  advance 
the  cause  of  the  administration.  Isaac  Hill  was  born  in 
Massachusetts  in  1788.  His  education  was  picked  up 
vn  a  printing-office.  In  1810  he  bought  and  began  to 
udit  the  "  Patriot,"  published  at  Concord,  New  Hamp 

1  1  Marfciueau's  Western  Travt*,  155.      Cf,  also  1  Society  in 
,  45. 


144  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

shire.  He  edited  his  paper  with  skill  and  ability,  prop 
agating  "  true  republicanism "  in  partibus  infideliun^ 
for  the  people  about  him  were  almost  all  federalists. 
He  gained  adherents.  His  paper  became  influential, 
and  he  built  up  a  democratic  party  in  New  Hampshire.1 
He  had  long  favored  strict  party  proscription.  In  1818 
he  remonstrated  with  Governor  Plumer  for  appointing 
a  federalist  sheriff.2  He  had  the  rancorous  malignity 
of  those  men  who  have  been  in  a  contest  with  persons 
who  have  treated  them  from  above  downwards.  He 
was  not  able  to  carry  New  Hampshire  for  Jackson  in 
1828,  but  the  vote  was  24,000  for  Adams  to  20,600  for 
Jackson.  Hill  was  immediately  taken  into  the  inner 
most  circle  at  Washington.  The  election  of  Jackson 
meant  that  an  uneducated  Indian  fighter  had  been 
charged  with  the  power  of  the  presidency,  and  that 
these  four  men  wielded  it  through  and  for  him.  Van 
Buren  followed,  in  order  to  win  the  aid  of  Jackson 
for  the  succession.  He  did  not  put  forth  any  guiding 
force.  Eaton  had  some  share  in  the  kitchen  cabinet. 
No  other  member  of  the  cabinet  had  any  influence. 
Barry,  another  relief  man,  but  personally  quite  insignifi 
cant,  was  at  the  disposal  of  the  kitchen  cabinet.  Henry 
Lee  had  made  himself  "  impossible "  by  an  infamous 
domestic  crime.  He  was  offended  at  the  poor  share  in 

1  He  had  kept  a  boarding-house,  at  which  members  of  the 
Legislature,  etc.,  boarded.  In  1823  he  is  referred  to  as  a  power. 
(1  Webster's  Correspondence,  324.)  During  the  New  Hampshire 
election  of  1830,  forged  documents  were  sent  on  from  Washing 
ton  to  prove  Upham,  the  anti-Jackson  candidate  for  Governor 
guilty  of  smuggling  under  the  embargo.  (39  Niles,  156.)  Masoif 
oarged  Hill  with  having  sent  the  papers  ' .  Webster's  Corre 
spondence,  495.) 

«  Plumer  *s  Plumer,  471. 


THE  VICTORS  AND   THE  SPOILS.  14£ 

the  spoils  offered  to  him,  and  withdrew,  relieving  the 
administration  of  a  load.  Edward  Livingston  was  in 
the  Senate,  but  no  direct  influence  by  him  on  the  ad 
ministration,  during  the  first  two  years,  is  discernible. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  Benton. 

Some  vague  expressions  in  the  inaugural  about  "  re 
form  "  and  the  civil  service  frightened  the  office-holders, 
who  had  already  been  alarmed  by  rumors  of  coming 
proscription.  There  was  an  army  of  office-seekers  and 
editors  in  Washington,  who  had  a  very  clear  and  posi 
tive  theory  that  the  victory  which  they  had  won,  under 
Jackson's  name,  meant  the  acquisition  and  distribution 
amongst  them  of  all  the  honors  and  emoluments  of  the 
federal  government.  They  descended  on  the  federal 
administration  as  if  upon  a  conquered  domain.  The 
office-holders  of  that  day  had  generally  staked  their  ex 
istence  on  the  mode  of  getting  a  living  which  the  civil 
service  offered.  It  did  not  pay  well,  but  it  was  supposed 
to  be  easy,  tranquil,  and  secure.  All  these  persons  who 
were  over  forty  years  of  age  saw  ruin  staring  them  in 
the  face.  It  was  too  late  for  them  to  change  their 
habits  or  acquire  new  trades.1  All  the  stories  by  eye 
witnesses  testify  to  the  distress  and  terror  of  the  "  ins," 
and  the  rapacity  of  the  "  outs,"  at  that  time.  It  is  cer 
tain  that  the  public  service  lost  greatly  by  the  changes. 
Sometimes  they  were  made  on  account  of  trivial  dis 
respect  to  Jackson.2  It  is  not  clear  who  was  the  author 
or  instigator  of  the  policy.  Lewis  is  said  to  have  op- 

1  Washington,  removed  nine  persons,  one  a  defaulter ;  Adams, 
USE,  bne  a  defaulter ;  Jefferson,  thirty-nine  ;  Madison,  five,  thre« 
defaulters;  Monroe,  nine ;  Adams,  two,  both  for  cause.  (5  ,4hn, 
Keg.  19.) 

•  I  CurtVs  Webster,  348. 
10 


146  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

posed  it.  Kendall  does  not  appear  to  have  started  with 
the  intention  of  proscription.  March  24,  1829,  h« 
wrote  to  the  editor  of  the  Baltimore  "  Patriot "  l :  "  The 
interests  of  the  country  demand  that  the  [Fourth  Audit- 
or's]  office  shall  be  filled  with  men  of  business,  and  not 
with  babbling  politicians.  Partisan  feelings  shall  not 
enter  here,  if  I  can  keep  them  out.  To  others  belongs  the 
whole  business  of  electioneering."  Probably  Jackson 
believed  that  the  departments  were  full  of  corrupt  per 
sons,  and  that  Adams  and  Clay  had  demoralized  the 
whole  civil  service,  so  that  a  complete  change  was 
necessary.  It  would  be  quite  in  character  for  Jackson 
to  take  all  the  campaign  declamation  literally.  One 
man,  Tobias  Watkins,  Fourth  Auditor,  was  found  short 
in  his  accounts.2  This  seemed  to  offer  proof  of  all  that 
had  been  affirmed.  The  proscription  was  really  en 
forced  by  the  logic  of  the  methods  and  teachings  of  the 
party  while  in  opposition.  The  leaders  had  been  taken 
literally  by  the  party  behind  them,  and  by  the  workers, 
writers,  and  speakers  who  had  enlisted  under  them.  If 
they  had  failed  to  reward  their  adherents  by  the  spoils, 
or  if  they  had  avowed  the  hollowness  and  artificiality  of 
their  charges  against  the  last  administration,  they  would 

1  49  Niles,  43.     Cf.  Kendall's  Autobiography,  292. 

2  Adams  calls  this  "  the  bitterest  drop  in  the  cup  of  my  afflic 
tions  "  (8  Adams,  144) ;  and  again  he  says,  "  The  wrong  done  to 
me  and  my  administration  by  the  misconduct  of  Watkins  de« 
serves  a  severer  animadversion  from  me  than  from  Jackson.' 

S  Adams,  290.)  He  there  depicts  Jackson's  rancor  agains* 
Watkins.  Niles  describes  the  virulent  political  animus  of  th« 
prosecution.  (36  Niles  421.)  After  Watldns's  term  of  imprison 
ment  was  over,  he  was  detained  on  account  of  an  unpaid  fine 
By  Jackson's  personal  order  a  label,  "  Criminal's  Apartment, 
ira«  put  over  the  door  of  the  room  in  which  he  was  kept. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 


14  i 


have  thrown  their  party  into  confusion,  and  would  have 
destroyed  their  power.  It  has  been  shown  above  how 
the  spoils  system  had  been  developed,  since  the  begin 
ning  of  the  century,  in  Pennsylvania  and  New  York.1 
It  is  a  crude  and  incorrect  notion  that  Andrew  Jackson 
corrupted  the  civil  service.  His  administration  is  only 
the  date  at  which  a  corrupt  use  of  the  spoils  of  the  pub 
lic  service  as  a  cement  for  party  organization  under 
democratic-republican  self-government,  having  been  per 
fected  into  a  highly  finished  system  in  New  York  and 
Pennsylvania,  was  first  employed  on  the  federal  arena. 
The  student  who  seeks  to  penetrate  the  causes  of  the 
corruption  of  the  civil  service  must  go  back  to  study  the 
play  of  human  nature  under  the  political  dogmas  and 
institutions  of  the  States  named.  He  cannot  rest  satis 
fied  with  the  explanation  that  "  Andrew  Jackson  did  it." 
Thirty-eight  of  Adams's  nominations  had  been  posV 
poned  by  the  Senate,  so  as  to  give  that  patronage  to 
Jackson.  Between  March  4, 1829,  and  March  22, 1830, 
491  postmasters  and  239  other  officers  were  removed, 
and  as  the  new  appointees  changed  all  their  clerks,  dep 
uties,  etc.,  it  was  estimated  that  2,000  changes  in  the 
civil  service  took  place.2  Jackson,  as  we  have  seen,  had 
made  a  strong  point  against  the  appointment  of  mem 
bers  of  Congress  to  offices  in  the  gift  of  the  President. 
In  one  year  he  appointed  more  members  of  Congress  to 
office  than  any  one  of  his  predecessors  in  his  whole 
term.8  The  Senate,  although  democratic,  refused  to 
confirm  many  of  the  nominations  made.  Henry  Lee, 
Appointed  consul  to  Algiers,  and  James  B.  Gardner, 

1  Page  102. 

2  Holmes's  speech  in  the  Seaate,  April  28,  "830. 
»  5  Ann.  Reg.  20. 


148  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

register  of  the  land  office,  were  unanimously  rejected 
Others  were  rejected  by  large  votes.1  Isaac  Hill  wac 
one  of  these.  Webster  said  that,  but  for  the  fear  oi 
Jackson's  popularity  out-of-doors,  the  Senate  would 
have  rejected  half  his  appointments.2  The  Senate  ob 
jected  to  the  obvious  distribution  of  rewards  among  the 
partisan  editors  who  had  run  country  newspapers  in 
Jackson's  influence.8  Eaton  had  visited  Binns,  and  had 
made  to  him  a  distinctly  corrupt  proposition  to  reward 
him  with  public  printing,4  il*  he  would  turn  to  Jackson. 
The  rejection  of  the  editors  was  construed  by  the  Jack 
son  men  as  a  proscription  of  "  printers  "  by  the  "  aristo 
cratic  "  Senate.6  Kendall  was  confirmed  by  the  casting 
vote  of  Calhoun,  for  fear  that  he  would,  if  not  confirmed, 
set  up  a  newspaper  in  competition  with  Green's  "  Tele 
graph  "  for  the  position  of  administration  organ.6  On 
subsequent  votes  some  of  the  appointments  were  con 
firmed,  for  it  was  found  that  Jackson  was  thrown  into  a 
great  rage  against  the  Senate  which  dared  reject  his 
appointments.  He  was  delighted  when  Hill,  in  1831, 
was  elected  by  the  Legislature  of  New  Hampshire  a 
member  of  the  Senate  which  had  refused  to  confirm 
him  as  Second  Comptroller  of  the  Treasury.  Jackson 
threw  all  the  administration  influence  in  favor  of  Hill's 
election.  Here  we  have  an  illustration  of  a  method 
of  his  of  which  we  shall  have  many  illustrations  here 
after,  When  he  was  crossed  by  any  one  in  a  course  in 
which  he  was  engaged,  he  drew  back  to  gather  force 
with  which  to  carry  his  point  in  some  mode  so  much 
cnore  distasteful  to  his  opponents  than  his  first  enterprisi 

1  5  Ann.  Reg.  21.  *  1  Webster's  Correspondence,  501. 

*  1  Webster's  Correspondence,  488.  *  Binu%  S5S. 

*  Kendall's  Autobiography,  370. 

*  Kendall's  Autobiography,  371. 


THE  EATON  AFFAIR.  149 

that  it  would  be  a  kind  of  punishment  to  them  and  a  re 
dress  to  him. 

Van  Buren  and  Calhoun  at  once  began  to  struggle 
for  the  control  of  the  patronage  which  was  made  dis 
posable  by  the  system  of  proscription.  Their  contest 
for  the  succession  rent  the  administration. 

It  was  a  very  noteworthy  fact  that  this  administra 
tion,  which  represented  a  certain  contempt  for  social 
forms  and  etiquette,  should  immediately  go  to  pieces  on 
a  question  of  that  kind.  '  So  true  is  it  that  etiquette  is 
never  burdensome  until  we  try  to  dispense  with  it. 

In  January,  1829,  John  H.  Eaton  married  Mrs.  Tim- 
berlake,  widow  of  a  purser  in  the  navy,  who  had,  a 
short  time  before,  committed  suicide,  while  on  service 
in  the  Mediterranean,  because  he  could  not  conquer 
habits  of  excessive  drinking.  Mrs.  Timberlake  was  the 
daughter  of  a  Washington  tavern  keeper.  As  Peggy 
O'Neil  she  had  been  well  known  about  Washington. 
Eaton  had  paid  her  such  attention,  before  her  husband's 
death,  as  to  provoke  gossip.  He  consulted  Jackson  be 
fore  the  marriage.  Jackson,  having  in  mind  the  case  of 
his  own  wife,  was  chivalrously  ready  to  take  sides  with 
any  woman  whose  reputation  was  assailed.  He  made 
no  objection  to  the  marriage.  When  it  occurred,  several 
persons  remonstrated  with  Jackson  about  it,  on  the 
ground  that  Eaton  was  to  be  in  the  cabinet,  and  that  it 
would  hurt  the  administration.  Jackson  replied  with 
ipirit  to  tEe  effect  that  Mrs.  Eaton  was  not  to  be  in  the 
cabinet.  If  he  had  kept  that  attitude  towards  the  matter 
rfcere  might  have  been  110  trouble.  By  Eaton's  appoint 
ment  his  wife  was  introduced  to  the  first  circle  in  Wash 
ington  The  wives  of  the  other  Secretaries  and  the  wife 
•rf  the  Vice-President  did  not  recognize  her.  She  tried 


150  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

to  force  her  way,  and  General  Jackson  tried  to  help  her 
He  made  a  political  question  of  it.  R.  M.  Johnson  war 
the  agent  for  conferring  with  the  Secretaries  to  prevail 
on  them  to  persuade  their  wives  to  recognize  Mrs.  Eaton. 
The  gentlemen  were  approached  individually.  Each  said 
that  he  left  such  matters  to  his  wife,  and  could  not  un 
dertake  to  overrule  her  judgment.  This  answer  had  no 
effect  on  Jackson.  Mrs.  Donelson,  wife  of  Jackson's 
nephew  and  private  secretary,  and  presiding  lady  at  the 
White  House,  was  as  recalcitrant  as  any  one.  She  was 
banished  to  Tennessee  for  some  months.  Mrs.  Huyghens, 
wife  of  the  Dutch  minister,  refused  to  sit  by  Mrs.  Eaton 
at  a  public  ball.  Jackson  threatened  to  send  her  hus 
band  home.  September  10,  1829,  lie  held  a  meeting  of 
his  cabinet,  before  which  Ely  and  Campbell,  two  clergy 
men  who  were  held  by  Jackson  partly  responsible  for  the 
stories  about  Mrs.  Eaton,  were  called  to  appear.  Jack 
son  interrogated  them,  argued  with  them,  and  strove 
to  refute  their  statements,  as  a  means  of  convincing  the 
members  of  the  cabinet  that  there  was  no  ground  for 
the  position  their  wives  had  taken.  Of  course  this  fool 
ish  and  unbecoming  proceeding  had  no  result. 

Van  Buren,  being  a  widower,  was  in  a  certain  posi 
tion  of  advantage,  which  he  used  by  showing  Mrs.  Eaton 
public  and  private  courtesies.  In  this  way  he  won  Jack 
son's  heart,  for  as  the  matter  went  on  Jackson  became 
more  and  more  engaged  in  it.  On  the  other  hand, 
Calhoun  suffered  in  Jackson's .  good  graces  by  the  fault 
of  Mrs.  Calhoun,  who  had  been  conspicuous  for  dis 
approval  of  Mrs.  Eaton.  Jackson  had  been  growing 
eold  towards  Calhoun  for  some  time.  He  doubted  if 
Ualhoun  was  thoroughly  loyal  to  him  in  1825  *  or  in 

1  Wise  (p.  82)  says  that  Jackson  was  very  angry  with  Calhoni 
after  the  election  in  1825. 


JACKSON'S  RELATIONS    WITH  CALIIOUN.      15 1 

L828.  He  thought  that  Calhoun,  in  1825,  would  have 
made  other  arrangements  than  those  with  Jackson,  if 
any  more  convenient  ones  had  been  offered  him.  Cal 
houn  did,  in  fact,  declare,  in  1825,  that  he  was  quite 
neutral  as  between  Adams  and  Jackson.  He  did  not 
interfere  at  all  with  the  election.1  The  Eaton  affair 
was  either  a  pretext  or  a  cause  of  widening  the  breach 
between  them.  The  factions  opposed  to  Calhoun  tried 
to  increase  the  bad  feeling.  Jackson  was  led  to  believe, 
and  he  often  affirmed,  that  the  attack  on  Mrs.  Eaton 
was  a  plot  to  drive  Eaton  out  of  the  cabinet.  When 
forced  to  justify  his  own  interference,  he  put  it  on  this 
ground.  He  said  that  Clay  was  at  the  bottom  of  the 
attack  on  Mrs.  Eaton.  All  this  trouble  in  the  cabinet 
remained  for  the  time  unknown  to  the  public. 

Lewis's  statement,  given  by  Parton,2  covers  the  his 
tory  of  all  Jackson's  relations  with  Calhoun.  Lewis  had 
an  inkling,  in  1819,  that  Calhoun  had  not,  as  Jackson 
supposed,  been  Jackson's  friend  in  Monroe's  cabinet,  in 
the  Seminole  war  affair.  Lewis  wrote  to  the  "  Aurora," 
suggesting  that  opinion,  but  Jackson  wrote  to  him  from 
Washington  to  dismiss  any  suspicion  as  to  Calhoun's  un 
friendliness  in  that  matter.  It  seems  to  be  necessary  to 
read  between  the  lines  of  Lewis's  statement,  on  pages 
315-30.  Did  he  not  always  retain  his  suspicion  of  Cal 
houn  ?  Was  he  not  on  the  watch  for  any  evidence  to 
confirm  it  ?  He  speaks  as  if  he  had  rested  content  with 
Jackson's  assurance,  and  Lad  been  corrected  later  by  ac- 
eident  or  entirely  on  the  initiative  of  otners.  He  does 
not  mention  the  first  attempt  made  by  the  old  Crawford 
toen  to  get  over  into  the  Jackson  camp.  It  was  not  au 
aasy  march,  for  in  1824  the  Crawford  men,  as  the  "reg 

1  Cobb.  219.  -  S  Parton,  310. 


152  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

alars,"  hated  intensely  the  Jackson  men,  as  upstart* 
and  disorganizers.  Crawford  had  carried  into  his  re 
tirement  a  venomous  and  rancorous  spirit,  the  chief  ol> 
ject  of  which  was  Calhoun.  He  could  join  any  one  to 
hurt  Calhoun.  In  1828  there  was  a  project  to  run 
Crawford  for  Vice-President  with  Adams.1  Adams  re 
fused.2  Crawford  also,  in  1828,  by  private  letters  to  the 
Georgia  electors,  tried  to  persuade  them  not  to  vote  for 
Calhoun.3  In  the  same  year  he  made  friends  with  Clay, 
writing  to  him  that  the  charge  of  bargain  was  absurd. 
In  April,  1827,  Van  Buren  and  Cambreleng  visited  Craw 
ford,  and  first  established  ties  between  him  and  Jackson. 
The  first  effect  was  a  letter  from  Crawford  to  Balch,  a 
neighbor  of  Jackson,  December  14,  1827,  stating  that 
Calhoun  and  his  friends  bandied  about  the  epithet  "  mili 
tary  chieftain ;  "  also  that  Calhoun  favored  Auams  until 
Clay  came  out  for  Adams  ; 4  and  adding  that  it  would  do 
Jackson  a  service  to  obtain  assurances  for  Crawford  that 
Jackson's  advancement  would  not  benefit  Calhoun.6  This 
letter  was  meant  to  separate  Jackson  and  Calhoun,  and 
it  may  have  had  a  general  effect.  Specific  consequences 
cannot  be  traced  to  it. 

According  to  Lewis's  story,  James  A.  Hamilton,  on  a 
Jackson  electioneering  tour,  went  to  see  Crawford,  in 
January,  1828,  in  order  to  reconcile  him  with  Jackson. 
Lewis  instructed  Hamilton  what  to  say  to  Crawford  on 
Jackson's  part.  Hamilton  did  not  see  Crawford.  He 
left  the  business  in  the  hands  of  Forsyth.  Forsyth  soot 
wrote  to  Hamilton  that  Crawford  affirmed  that  Jackson'* 

1  33  Niles,  315.  2  7  Adams,  390.  8  Cobb,  240. 

4  Cf.  Lewis,  in  3  Parton,  315,  on  the  allusion  to  Banquo's  ghosd 
c  Webster's  reply  to  Hayne. 
6  40  Niles,  12. 


CRAWFORD'S  REVELATION.  153 

enmity  against  him  was  groundless,  since  it  was  not  he, 
but  Calhoun,  in  Monroe's  cabinet,  who  had  tried  to  have 
Jackson  censured  for  his  proceedings  in  Florida  in  1818, 
In  April  or  May  Lewis  was  in  New  York.  Hamilton 
showed  him  Forsyth's  letter.  For  the  time,  Lewis  kept 
this  information  quite  to  himself.  He  was  too  clever  to 
epoil  the  force  of  it  by  using  it  too  soon,  and  he  well  un 
derstood  how,  in  the  changes  and  chances  of  politics,  a 
conjuncture  might  arise  in  which  such  a  fact  would  gain 
tenfold  force. 

In  April,  1828,  Henry  Lee  tried  to  draw  Calhoun  into 
a  correspondence  about  the  construction  of  the  orders  to 
Jackson  in  1818.  Calhoun  offered  to  give  Jackson  any 
statements  or  explanations,  but  declined  to  correspond 
with  any  one  else.1 

In  November,  1829,  at  the  height  of  the  Peggy 
O'Neil  affair,  Jackson  gave  a  dinner  to  Monroe.  At 
this  dinner  Bingold  affirmed  that  Monroe  alone  stood 
by  Jackson  in  1818.  If  Kingold  did  not  have  his  cue, 
he  was  by  chance  contributing  astonishingly  to  Lewis's 
plans.  After  dinner  Lewis  and  Eaton  kept  up  a  con 
versation,  within  ear-shot  of  Jackson,  about  what  Kingold 
had  said.  Of  course  Jackson's  attention  was  soon  ar 
rested,  and  he  began  to  ask  questions.  Lewis  then  told 
him  that  he  had  seen,  eighteen  months  before,  the  above- 
mentioned  letter  of  Forsyth  to  Hamilton.  Jackson 
dispatched  Lewis  to  New  York  the  next  morning  to  get 
that  letter.  In  all  this  story,  it  is  plain  how  adroitly 
these  men  managed  the  General,  and  how  skilful  they 
vrere  in  producing  "  accidents."  It  is  evident  that  they 
did  not  think  it  was  time  yet  to  bring  about  the  explo- 
lion  Lewis  came  back  from  New  York  without  For- 
a  40  Nile*,  14. 


ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Byth's  letter,  and  said  that  it  was  thought  best  to  get  a 
letter  directly  from  Crawford,  containing  an  explicit 
statement.  In  this  position  the  matter  rested  all  winter. 
It  is  perfectly  clear  that  the  Jackson  managers  lost  iaith 
in  Calhoun's  loyalty  to  Jackson  and  the  Jackson  party, 
and  that  they  were  hostile  to  him  in  1827-28,  but  could 
not  yet  afford  to  break  with  him.  Jackson  clung  to  his 
friendships  and  alliances  with  a  certain  tenacity.  As 
Calhoun  was  drawn  more  and  more  into  nullification, 
the  Jackson  clique  took  a  positive  attitude  in  opposition 
to  it. 

In  the  autumn  of  1829  the  clique  around  Jackson  had 
decided  that  he  must  run  again,  if  he  should  live,  in 
1832,  in  order  to  consolidate  the  party,  which  no  one 
else  could  lead  to  victory  at  that  time,  and  that  Van 
Buren  must  succeed  him  in  1836.1  Lewis  was  already 
committed  to  Van  Buren,  and  Parton  brings  us  some 
more  of  Lewis's  invaluable  testimony  as  to  this  arrange 
ment.2  Here,  for  once,  a  wire-puller  put  on  paper  a 
clear  description  of  his  proceedings  in  a  typical  case. 
There  was  fear  in  the  Jackson  camp,  in  1829,  on  ac 
count  of  Jackson's  very  bad  health,  that  he  might  not 
Live  through  his  term.  Lewis  says  that  he  and  Jackson 
were  both  anxious  that  Van  Buren  should  succeed  Jack- 
Bon,  and  they  believed  that,  if  Jackson  should  die,  a  po- 
•  litical  testament  left  by  him  would  have  great  influence. 
Cjj  Accordingly,  Jackson  wrote  a  letter  to  his  old  iriend, 
^N  Judge  Overton,  of  Tennessee,  dated  December  31, 1829, 
praising  Van  Buren,  and  expressing  grave  doubts  about 
Calhoun.  A  copy  was  duly  kept,  for  Judge  Overtoil 

1  Farton  says  that  Benton  was  booked  for  the  period  1844-53 
r3  Parton,  297.) 

2  3  Parton,  293,  297. 


PLOTS  FOR  1832.  155 

uras  not  informed  of  the  contingent  use  for  which  the 
letter  was  intended,  and  no  risk  -was  taken  as  to  hia 
care  in  preserving  the  letter.  This  provision  having 
been  made  for  the  case  that  Jackson  should  die,  the 
next  thing  was  to  provide  for  his  reelection,  in  case  he 
should!  live. 

December  19,  1829,  the  "  Courier  and  Enquirer ;' 
came  out  in  favor  of  Van  Buren  for  the  succession,  if 
Jackson  should  not  stand  for  reelection.  The  "  Tele 
graph  "  was  annoyed  at  this,  called  it  "  premature,"  and 
likely  to  produce  division.1  These  two  papers,  repre 
senting  the  Van  Buren  and  Calhoun  factions  in  the  ad 
ministration  party,  were  engaged,  during  the  winter,  in 
acrimonious  strife.2  Niles  no  doubt  expressed  the  senti 
ment  of  sensible  people  when  he  said,  April,  1830,  that 
he  did  not  see  the  necessity  of  action  on  the  subject  at 
that  tune.  His  statement,  however,  only  showed  how 
little  he  understood  the  processes  by  which  the  people 
manifest  their  power  of  self-government. 

March  11, 1830,  Lewis  wrote  to  Colonel  Stanbaugh,  of 
Pennsylvania,  suggesting  that  the  Pennsylvania  Legis 
lature  should  address  to  Jackson  an  appeal  to  stand  for 
reelection.  To  the  end  that  they  might  send  just  the 
proper  appeal,  Lewis  inclosed  it  to  them,  already  pre 
pared  for  their  signatures.  Lewis  wrote  to  Stanbaugh 
that  he  did  not  think  it  would  be  wise  for  Jackson's 
friends  in  Washington  to  [be  known  to]  lead  in  the 
movement  for  his  reelection,  and  Pennsylvania,  the 
stronghold  of  his  popularity,  seemed  to  be  the  most  ad 
vantageous  place  from  which  the  movement  might  [ap 
pear  to]  start.  The  address  came  back  duly  signed 
with  sixty-eight  names.  It  w*s  published  in  the  "  Perm- 
1  37  Nilea,  300.  2  38  Niles  16Q 


156  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Bylvania  Reporter,"  and  copied  all  over  the  country  as  a 
spontaneous  and  irrepressible  call  of  the  people  to  the 
f<  old  hero  "  not  to  desert  his  country.  The  enterprise 
did  not  run  off  quite  so  smoothly  as  Lewis's  narrative 
would  imply.  There  was  .strong  opposition  by  the  Cal- 
houn  faction  to  Jackson's  renomination,  and  a  distinct 
renomination  could  not  be  carried.1  In  April  a  caucus 
of  the  New  York  Legislature  declared  that  it  responded 
"  to  the  sentiment  of  the  Legislature  of  Pennsylvania." 
This  caucus  was  prompted  from  Washington,  and  man 
aged  by  the  editor  of  the  "  Courier."  2  As  soon  as  the 
example  was  set,  other  Legislatures  followed  it.  In 
January,  1831,  the  "  Globe  "  said  that  General  Jackson 
might  be  regarded  as  before  the  country  for  reelection.8 
April  13,  1830  (Jefferson's  birthday),  while  still  the 
letter  from  Crawford  was  not  received,  but  while  Jack 
son's  mind  was  full  of  suspicion  against  Calhoun,  a 
banquet  was  prepared  at  Washington,  which  was  in 
tended  to  be  a  nullification  demonstration.4  Jackson 
gave  as  a  toast,  "  Our  federal  Union :  It  must  be  pre 
served."  This  was  a  bomb-shell  to  the  nullifiers,  and 
a  declaration  of  war  against  Calhoun,  who  at  the  same 
banquet  offered  a  toast  and  made  a  speech,  the  point  of 
which  was  that  liberty  was  worth  more  than  union. 
How  much  the  personal  element  of  growing  suspicion 
and  ill-will  towards  Calhoun  had  to  do  with  the  attitude 
which  Jackson  took  up  towards  nullification  is  a  matter 
of  conjecture  and  inference.  His  opinions,  however, 
deduced  from  hatred  of  the  Hartford  convention,  had 
Always  been  strongly  favorable  to  the  Union,  and  the 
tnen  in  the  kitchen  cabinet,  except  Green,  were  strong 

JSXiles,  170.  2  Ibid. 

1  S9  Niles,  385  *  1  Benton,  148- 


TEE  JEFFERSOWS  BIRTHDAY  BANQUET.      157 


although  Jackson  and  they  all  were  likewise 
itrong  state-rights  men.  Ten  years  earlier  Kendall 
had  maintained  the  major  premiss  of  nullification  with 
great  zeal.1 

At  the  same  banquet  Isaac  Hill  offered  the  following 
toast  and  "  sentiment  :  '  *  "  Democracy  :  '  Wherefore  do 
I  take  my  flesh  in  my  teeth,  and  put  my  life  in  mine 
hand  ?  Though  he  slay  me,  yet  will  I  trust  in  him.'  ;' 
The  quotation  is  from  Job  xiii.  14,  and  "  he  "  is  usually 
interpreted  as  referring  to  God.  This  "  sentiment  " 
therefore  exalts  democracy  higher  than  any  other  known 
expression,  but  it  is  best  worth  remembering  as  an  il 
lustration  of  the  slave-like  spirit  which  is  bred  by  ad 
herence  to  absolutist  doctrines,  whether  the  absolute 
sovereign  be  an  autocrat  or  a  popular  majority.  All 
together,  the  Jefferson's  birthday  banquet  was  a  mem 
orable  occasion. 

A  letter  from  Crawford's  own  hand,  disclosing  the 
attitude  of  Calhoun  in  Monroe's  cabinet  towards  Jack 
son  and  his  proceedings  in  Florida  in  1818,  was  at  last 
received  about  May  1,  1830.  In  this  letter  the  John 
Rhea  letter  from  Jackson  to  Monroe  first  comes  into 
history,  and  is  the  pivot  on  which  the  whole  Seminole 
war  question,  in  its  revived  form,  is  made  to  turn. 
Crawford  said  that  that  letter  was  produced  in  the  cab 
inet,  and  that  it  brought  him  over  to  Jackson's  side, 
but  that  Calhoun  persisted  in  hostility.  Monroe  and 
every  member  of  his  cabinet,  when  appealed  to,  denied 
ihat  the  Rhea  letter  was  produced,  or  brought  into  con 
sideration  in  1818  at  all.  Jackson  immediately,  May 
13th,  inclosed  a  copy  of  Crawford's  letter  to  Calhoun, 
Mid  demanded  an  explanation  of  Calhoun's  apparent 

*  Autobiography,  222.  8  38  Nilas.  153. 


158  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

perfidy,  as  he  construed  it.  Jackson's  main  point  in  thia 
letter,  which  was  evidently  "  copied "  for  him,  is  that 
Calhoun  well  knew,  by  virtue  of  his  position  in  the  cab 
inet,  and  as  he  had  shown  by  his  orders,1  that  Jackson, 
in  all  that  he  did,  had  the  approval  and  connivance  of 
the  administration.  This  brought  out  all  the  tangled 
misunderstandings  about  Jackson's  letter  to  Monroe  and 
John  Rhea's  supposed  reply.  Calhoun  at  once  recog 
nized  his  position.  He  could  not  understand  the  allu 
sions  to  previous  understandings  which  had  never  existed, 
but  it  was  plain  that  Crawford  had  opened  an  irreparable 
breach  between  Calhoun  and  Jackson,  and  that  all  the 
hopes  Calhoun  had  built  upon  his  alliance  with  Jackson 
were  in  ruins.  He  also  saw  that  the  whole  movement 
was  a  Van  Buren  victory  over  him.  He  replied  on 
May  20th,  complaining  and  explaining.  He  really  had 
no  charge  to  repel.  He  had  done  nothing  wrong,  and 
was  guiltless  of  any  injustice  or  perfidy  towards  Jack 
son.  The  whole  matter  was  a  cabinet  secret.  Crawford 
had  violated  confidence  in  making  known  the  nature  of 
the  preliminary  discussions  which  preceded  the  adoption, 
by  Monroe's  cabinet,  of  a  definite  policy  as  to  Jackson's 
proceedings.  Calhoun  was  not  to  blame  for  any  of  the 
misunderstandings  about  the  previous  authorization 
which  Jackson  thought  he  had  received.  It  seems  that 
Calhoun  might  have  set  forth  this  position  with  dignity. 
He  did  not  do  so.  Jackson  replied  to  him,  May  30th,  in 
a  very  haughty  tone,  declaring  a  complete  breach  be 
tween  them  on  the  ground  of  Calhoun's  duplicity.  This 
letter  was  plainly  prepared  by  the  persons  who  were 
working  on  Jackson's  strong  personal  feeling  about  hii 
Florida  campaign  to  bring  him  to  a  breach  with  Cal 
1  See  page  56. 


THE   "GLOBE"  FOUNDED.  159 

,  and  to  throw  him  into  a  close  alliance  with  Van 
Buren.  The  plan  was  a  complete  success.  Lewis  saya 
that  Jackson  sent  Calhoun's  letter  of  May  20th  to  Van 
Buren,  that  he  might  read  it  and  give  advice  about  it, 
but  that  Van  Buren  would  not  read  it  because  he  did 
not  want  to  be  involved  in  the  affair  at  all.  Lewis 
further  says  that  Van  Buren  had  nothing  to  do  with 
getting  up  the  quarrel.  We  may  well  believe  all  this. 
Lewis  was  not  such  a  bungling  workman  in  a  job  of  that 
kind  as  to  commit  his  principal  to  any  inconvenient 
knowledge  or  compromising  activity. 

The  quarrel  with  Calhoun  brought  on  a  quarrel  with 
Duff  Green  and  the  "  Telegraph."  Amos  Kendall  sent  for 
Francis  P.  Blair,  an  old  Kentucky  friend  and  co-worker  of 
his,  and  his  successor  as  editor  of  the  "  Frankfort  Argus." 
Blair  was  then  thirty-nine  years  old.  He  was  another 
old  Clay  man,  converted  by  Kentucky  relief  politics  into 
a  Jackson  man.  He  was  a  fanatical  opponent  of  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States,  and  strongly  opposed  to 
nullification.  Parton  says  he  was  forty  thousand  dollars 
in  debt.  He  had  been  president  of  the  Bank  of  the 
Commonwealth  of  Kentucky,  and  was  indebted  to  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States.1  Blair  started  the  "  Globe," 
and  took  Green's  place  in  the  kitchen  cabinet,  which 
now  contained  a  very  large  element  of  Kentucky  relief 
politics.  Blair  was  the  prince  of  partisan  editors,  a 
man  made  to  run  an  organ.  For  he  was  not  a  mere 
mouth-piece.  He  was  independent  and  able  to  go  alone, 
but  had  infinite  tact,  discretion,  and  shrewdness,  so  that 
he  was  an  easy  man  to  work  with.  The  organ,  therefore, 
?rorked  perfectly.  Every  expression  ID  it  came  directly 
from  the  White  House.  If  Blair  spoke  without  consult" 
1  Kendall's  Autobiojrapw,  372. 


160  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

ing  Jackson,  the  harmony  and  sympathy  of  their  ideas 
was  such  that  Jackson's  mind  was  correctly  interpreted. 
If  Jackson  wanted  anything  said,  Blair  was  in  such 
accord  that  it  cost  him  nothing  in  the  way  of  conces 
sion  to  say  it.  He  and  Kendall  went  with  Jackson 
when  no  one  else  did,  and  they  were  the  leading  spirits 
in  the  government  of  the  country  until  1840.  The  first 
number  of  the  "  Globe  "  was  issued  December  7,  1830. 
Since  Blair  had  no  capital,  the  paper  was  at  first  semi- 
weekly,  but  Lewis  and  Kendall  brought  their  connections 
to  bear  on  the  office-holders  to  make  them  transfer  their 
subscriptions  from  the  "  Telegraph  "  to  the  "  Globe."  * 
Parton  says  that  Jackson  compelled  the  departments  to 
give  Blair  their  printing. 

The  quarrel  between  the  President  and  the  Vice-Pres 
ident  did  not  become  known  until  the  end  of  the  year. 
Adams  first  refers  to  it  in  his  diary  under  date  of  De 
cember  22, 1830.  Niles  mentions  it  as  a  rumor  January 
29, 1831.  In  February,  1831,  Calhoun  published  a  large 
pamphlet  about  the  whole  matter.2  The  next  thing  for 
his  enemies  to  do  was  to  get  his  three  friends,  Ingham 
Branch,  and  Berrien,  out  of  the  cabinet.  To  this  end 
those  who  were  in  the  secret  resigned,  as  a  means  of 
breaking  up  the  cabinet  and  forcing  a  reconstruction 
Barry  was  asked  to  remain  in  his  office.  Eaton  re 
signed  first,  April  7,  1831.  Van  Buren  resigned  April 
11,  1831,  in  a  letter  which  was  so  oracular  that  no  one 
could  understand  it.8  The  main  ideas  in  his  letter  of 
resignation  and  in  Jackson's  reply  were,  (1)  that  Jack 
Bon  did  not  intend  to  have  any  one  in  his  cabinet  who 
was  a  candidate  for  the  succession.  This  indicated  Van 
Buren  as  such  a  candidate.  (2)  That  the  cabinet  wai 
l  40  Niles,  318.  2  40  Niles,  11.  »  40  Nilee,  145. 


DISRUPTION  OF  THE  CABINET.  161 

wiginally  a  "  unit,"  and  that  Jackson  wanted  to  keep  liia 
Babinet  a  unit.  This  hint  had  no  effect  on  the  other 
Secretaries.  They  wanted  to  be  dismissed,  and  a  sepa 
rate  quarrel  was  necessary  in  the  case  of  each.  It  was 
in  this  connection  that  the  Peggy  O'Neil  affair  l  and  all 
the  old  misunderstanding  about  the  Seminole  war  came 
to  a  public  discussion.  Van  Buren  was  appointed  min 
ister  to  England,  and  he  went  out.  At  the  next  session 
of  Congress  a  great  political  conflict  arose  over  his  con 
firmation.  When  McLane  was  sent  out  to  England,  in 
1829,  he  had  instructions  from  Van  Buren  to  reopen  the 
negotiations  about  the  West  India  trade,2  and,  as  a  basis 
for  so  doing,  to  point  out  to  the  English  government  that 
the  party  which  had  brought  that  question  into  the  posi 
tion  in  which  it  then  stood  had  been  condemned  by  the 
people  at  the  election.  This  introduced  the  internal 
party  contests  of  the  country  into  diplomacy,  and  instead 
of  representing  this  nation  to  foreign  nations  as  a  unit, 
having,  for  all  its  international  relations,  a  continuous  and 
consistent  life,  it  invited  foreigners  to  note  party  changes 
here,  as  if  they  had  to  negotiate  at  one  time  with  one 
American  nation,  and  at  another  time  with  another.  The 
fact  that  Van  Buren  had  given  these  instructions  was 
alleged  as  a  reason  for  not  confirming  his  appointment, 
but  the  debate  took  a  wide  range.  His  confirmation 
was  defeated  by  the  casting  vote  of  Calhoun.  This 
check  to  Jackson's  plans  gave  just  the  requisite  spur  of 
personal  pique  to  his  desire  to  make  Van  Buren  Presi 
dent,  and  he  pursued  that  purpose  from  this  time  on 
tfith  all  his  powers.  It  was  in  the  debate  on  Van 

1  Webster  knew  of  that  affair  and  its  polftical  bearings 
lary,  1830.     (1  Correspondence,  483.) 
*  See  below,  page  169. 
11 


162  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Buren's  confirmation  that  William  L.  Marcy  cynically 
avowed  the  doctrine  :  "To  the  victors  belong  the  spoils." 
Eaton  was  in  a  state  of  ungovernable  rage  at  the  dis 
cussion  of  his  wife's  reputation  by  the  newspapers  from 
one  end  of  the  country  to  the  other.  He  challenged 
Campbell,  one  of  the  clergymen  mentioned  above  as 
prominent  in  connection  with  the  scandal.  June  18, 
1831,  he  challenged  Ingham,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 
Ingham  declined  to  fight.  A  few  days  later  Ingham 
complained  to  Jackson  that  he  had  been  waylaid  and 
hindered  in  his  duties  by  Eaton,  Lewis,  Randolph,  and 
others.  They  denied  that  they  had  molested  him,  or 
had  intended  to  do  so.1  Jackson's  plan  had  been  that 
Hugh  L.  White,  senator  from  Tennessee,  should  resign, 
and  that  Eaton  should  take  his  place.  White  was  to  be 
Secretary  of  War.2  White,  however,  who  perhaps  was 
piqued  that  he  was  not  made  Secretary  of  War  in  1829, 
declined  to  fulfil  his  share  of  this  programme.  He  became 
alienated  from  Jackson.  Eaton  was  made  Governor  of 
Florida.  From  1836  to  1840  he  was  minister  to  Spain. 
Parton  says  he  quarrelled  with  Jackson,  and  was  a  whig 
in  1840.3  He  died  in  1856.  Mrs.  Eaton  died  about 
1878. 

The  new  cabinet  was :  Edward  Livingston,  of  Loui 
siana,  Secretary  of  State ;  Louts  McLane,  of  Delaware, 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury ;  Lewis  Cass,  of  Michigan, 
Secretary  of  War ;  Levi  Woodbury,  of  New  Hampshire 
(who  had  given  up  to  Hill  his  place  in  the  Senate;, 
Secretary  of  the  Navy ;  Roger  B.  Taney,  of  Maryland, 
Attorney-General.  Adams  mentions  a  story  that  the 
War  Department  was  offered  to  William  Drayton 

i  40  Niles,  302.  2  Hunt's  Livingston,  35*. 

*  3  Parton,  368,  639.     See,  also,  page  273. 


THE  NEW   CABINET.  163 

leader  of  the  Union  party  of  South  Carolina.1  Thia- 
cabinet  was  a  "  unit,"  and  a  unit  for  Jackson  and  the 
successor  on  whom  he  had  determined. 

We  have  now  brought  the  intimate  and  personal  his 
tory  of  Jackson's  first  administration  down  to  the  time 
when  the  campaign  for  his  reelection  opened.  We  have 
Been  how  Jackson  construed  the  presidential  office  in  its 
immediate  bearings,  and  how  he  addressed  himself  to  its 
immediate  and  personal  duties. 

1  9  Adams,  183. 


CHAPTER  Vin. 

r\JBLIO    QUESTIONS    OF    JACKSON'S    FIRST    ADMIN  ISTBA 
TION. 1. 

IT  is  proposed  in  this  and  the  three  following  chapters 
to  take  up,  in  categorical  order,  the  great  questions  ol 
public  policy  with  which  Jackson  had  to  deal,  to  show 
how  each  question  stood  when  he  was  elected  President, 
and  to  show  what  was  done  about  it,  more  especially 
how  he  acted  upon  it,  during  his  first  administration 
down  to  December,  1831,  when  the  campaign  of  1832 
opened. 

The  first  two  points  to  be  noticed  are  questions  of 
foreign  relations. 

I.  The  trade  between  the  United  States  and  the 
British  West  Indies  had  been  a  source  of  irritation  and 
dissatisfaction  ever  since  the  United  States  had  been  in 
dependent.  Great  Britain  declined,  in  1815,  to  include 
the  West  Indies  in  the  commercial  treaty  then  nego 
tiated.  In  the  negotiations  of  1818,  Rush  and  Gallatin 
offered  complete  reciprocity  as  to  ships  and  goods,  but 
England  would  not  give  up  her  colonial  system.1  The 
act  of  Congress  of  April  15, 1818,  was  intended  to  coun 
tervail  the  English  navigation  system.  It  introduced  a 
policy  of  retaliation  in  which,  at  that  time,  much  faith 
was  placed.2  This  act  provided  that  no  British  ships 
ihould  come  here  from  any  port  to  which  an  American 
1  I  Rush,  417.  2  8^  page  197 


WEST  INDIA    TRADE  165 

jhip  might  not  go,  and  that  an  English  ship,  clearing 
aere,  should  give  bonds  not  to  land  her  cargo  where  an 
American  ship  might  not  go.  This  law  hurt  the  islands. 
England  then  made  Halifax  and  St.  John's  free  ports 
for  goods  in  transit  to  the  West  Indies.  This  arrange 
ment  drew  American  products  to  the  ports  mentioned, 
from  which  they  were  taken  to  the  West  Indies  in  Brit 
ish  ships-  Negotiations,  which  were  attempted,  came  to 
nothing,  because  the  English  insisted  on  laying  differen 
tial  duties  to  favor  their  northern  colonies.  By  the  act 
of  May  15,  1820,  the  United  States  forbade  all  trade 
with  the  British  West  Indies  in  British  vessels,  and  all 
importation  of  British  West  India  goods  save  in  direct 
trade  from  the  place  of  production.  This  closed  the 
trade  with  the  British  colonies  and  forced  concessions 
from  England,  which  greatly  strengthened  faith  in  the 
"countervailing"  policy.  By  an  act  of  Parliament  of 
June  24,  1822,  the  British  West  Indies  were  opened  to 
foreign  vessels,  at  speciiied  ports,  for  specified  goods, 
subject  to  the  colonial  duties  and  to  a  ten  per  cent  dif 
ferential  duty  to  favor  the  products  of  British  North 
America.1  The  voyage  of  an  English  ship  then  was  to 
the  United  States,  thence  to  Halifax,  thence  to  the  West 
Indies,  thence  to  England.  Monroe's  proclamation  of 
August  24,  1822,  responded  to  the  act  of  Parliament  by 
opening  the  ports  of  the  United  States  to  British  ships 
bearing  West  India  goods,  under  a  differential  tonnage 
duty  of  $1.00  per  ton,  and  a  differential  impost  of  ten 
per  cent.  Neither  an  American  nor  a  British  vessel 
could  then  bring  West  India  goods  from  a  northern 
British  colony,  nor  products  of  a  northern  colony  from 
ttie  West  Indies.2  By  th*  act  of  March  1,  1823,  the 
1  23  Niles,  28.  2  TwAsar/  Circular,  23  Niles,  86 


166  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

United  States  confined  the  trade  in  English  bottoms  to 
the  direct  trade,  and  the  differential  tonnage  duty  was 
put  at  ninety-six  cents.  The  demand  of  the  United 
States  then  was,  to  be  put  on  the  same  footing  in  the 
British  West  Indies  as  the  British  North  American  col 
onies.  If  this  claim  had  been  made  on  a  general  free- 
fcrade  theory,  it  would  have  been  wise  and  laudable,  but 
in  advance  of  the  age.  Under  the  idea  of  trade  which 
then  prevailed,  it  was  thought  to  be  an  unbecoming  de 
mand.  The  King  of  England,  by  an  order  in  council, 
July,  1823,  laid  a  retaliatory  differential  tonnage  duty  of 
4s.  3d,  per  ton  on  American  ships  in  the  West  Indies. 
Thus  the  statesmen  of  the  two  countries  were  trying  to 
see  what  mischievous  devices  they  could  invent  to  crip 
ple  trade,  and  to  treat  a  ship  coming  from  such  a  port, 
or  with  such  goods,  as  if  it  were  a  pirate  or  pest-laden. 
The  English  restrictions  were  aimed  at  the  Americans, 
but  it  was  very  plain  to  the  West  Indians  that  it  was 
they,  and  not  the  Americans,  who  bore  the  weight  of  all 
the  taxes  and  restrictions  by  which  the  shipping  of 
Great  Britain  was  protected  and  the  northern  colonies 
were  favored.  The  American  ships  fell  back  into  the 
old-fashioned  illicit  trade,  and  did  more  and  more  of  the 
business,  in  spite  of  all  the  regulations.  The  geography 
of  the  islands  offered  the  greatest  facilities  for  such 
irade.  The  islanders  connived  at  it.  Why  should 
planters  in  Jamaica  pay  ten  per  t#ent  extra  duty,  at 
the  bidding  of  statesmen  in  England,  in  order  to  buy 
inferior  flour  of  farmers  in  New  Brunswick  ?  No  men 
Df  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  have  been  found  who  would 
thus  sacrifice  their  interests,  if  they  saw  the  fact,  and  if 
they  could  in  any  way  help  themselves.  Adams  tells  a 
*tory  which  he  got  from  Foot,  of  Connecticut,  who  ha* 


RELAXATION  OF  THE  N AVI  GAT  JON  SYSTEM.     167 

aimself  been  engaged  in  the  West  India  trade.  He  took 
;,o  the  West  Indies  candles,  which  were  subject  to  heavy 
duty.  The  inspector  said  they  were  not  candles,  but 
herrings,  and  passed  them.1 

The  whole  English  navigation  system  was  decrepit, 
As  trade  expanded,  the  old  policy  became  impossible. 
By  the  act  of  Parliament  of  July  5,  1825,  England 
divided  the  powers  which  had  colonies  from  those  which 
had  none.  To  the  former  she  offered  complete  recip 
rocity,  metropolis  against  metropolis,  colonies  against 
colonies.  To  the  latter  she  offered  the  same  rights  in 
her  colonies  which  they  gave  to  England  and  her  posses 
sions.  Her  empire  as  a  whole  was  put  in  reciprocity 
with  any  other  empire  as  a  whole,  but  parts  of  her  em 
pire  were  to  favor  each  other.  The  proposition  thus 
made  to  all  the  world  was  to  stand  open  for  a  year,  and 
was  to  go  into  operation  in  favor  of  any  who,  within 
that  time,  should  give  notice  of  their  acceptance  of  it. 
On  account  of  politics  in  Congress  in  1825-26,  no  action 
was  taken  by  the  United  States.  The  protectionists  here 
ridiculed  the  pretended  slackening  of  the  navigation 
system,  and  they  made  light  of  all  Huskisson's  reforms 
which  were  carried  out  in  the  same  connection,  and  from 
which,  in  fact,  modern  free  trade  dates.  They  thought 
they  saw  interested  and  sinister  reasons  for  the  reforms. 
Interested  reasons  there  certainly  were,  and  no  others. 
There  never  are,  and  never  ought  to  be,  any  others,  for 
this  kind  of  legislation.  The  navigation  system  was  so 
cumbersome  and  burdensome  that  it  could  not  be  sus 
tained.  The  act  of  1825  was  pitiful  enough  in  com 
parison  with  sound  doctrine,  but  it  was  a  first  breach  in 
%a  old  system,  which  was  founded  in  strong  prejudiced! 
iiid  sustained  by  powerful  interests. 
1  7  Adams,  429. 


168  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

July  27,  1826,  an  order  in  council  was  issued,  closing 
the  ports  of  the  English  colonies  in  America,  except 
Canada  and  Nova  Scotia,  to  American  ships  after 
December  1,  1826.  England  now  interdicted  the  trade 
which  the  United  States  had  interdicted  in  1820.  Galla- 
tin  had  just  arrived  in  England  to  try  to  renew  negotia 
tions.  Canning  refused  to  negotiate,  saying  that  Eng 
land  meant  to  regulate  her  commercial  relations  by  the 
act  of  Parliament,  not  by  negotiations.  England  did 
not  complain,  he  said,  that  the  United  States  had  not 
cared  to  take  what  others  thought  worth  having.  Eng 
land  held  that  colonial  trade  was  a  boon,  to  be  paid  for, 
if  granted  at  all.  The  United  States  held  that  trade  is 
its  own  reward,  and  is  mutually  advantageous.1  The 
latter  ought  to  have  put  itself  plainly  and  consistently 
on  that  doctrine  in  all  its  bearings.  American  protec 
tionism  even,  at  that  time,  was  by  no  means  a  barbarian 
prejudice  against  trade,  or  a  sacrifice  of  national  inter 
ests  to  private  cliques,  in  the  measure  of  their  impu 
dence  and  rapacity.  The  United  States  wanted  com 
plete  reciprocity  as  to  ships  and  the  carrying  trade,  and 
its  doctrine  was  that  each  nation  should  arrange  its  fiscal 
system  to  suit  itself ;  but  it  tried  to  countervail,  by  taxes 
on  imports,  the  taxes  laid  by  foreign  nations  on  Ameri 
can  exports  of  grain,  etc.2  Part  of  the  English  regula 
tions  belonged  to  the  domestic  fiscal  system  of  Great 
Britain,  but  others  were  part  of  the  navigation  system. 
Hence  the  conflict  arose. 

1  Correspondence,  31  Niles,  269. 

2  See  below,  page  195.    Niles,  who  was  a  fanatical  protection 
1st,  said,  "  To  all  the  powers  that  wish  '  free  trade,'  we  say,  Le| 
free  tracie  he  ;  to  all  that  will  restrict  us,  we  say    Let  restrictioi 
W."     (31  Ni'ss,  240  :  December,  1826.) 


MCLAN&S  MISSION  169 

The  matter  had  now  (1827)  been  brought  into  a 
diplomatic  dead-lock,  where  the  next  move  must  be  for 
one  party  or  the  other  to  recede  from  its  position.  Can 
ning's  sarcasm  was  not  a  little  to  blame  for  this  state  of 
things.  The  opposition  in  the  United  States  made 
capital  out  of  the  entanglement.  In  the  mean  time  the 
illicit  trade  went  merrily  on,  and  the  smuggler  rectified, 
in  his  way,  the  folly  of  statesmen.  Thus  the  matter 
Btood  when  Jackson  was  elected. 

One  of  his  first  acts  was  to  send  McLane  to  England 
to  reopen  negotiations.  This  he  was  to  do  by  pointing 
to  the  result  of  the  election  as  a  rebuke  to  the  former 
administration,  which  had  brought  about  the  dead-lock.1 
Pending  the  negotiations  an  act  of  Congress  was  passed, 
May  29,  1830,  authorizing  the  President  to  declare  the 
acts  of  1818,  1820,  and  1823  repealed,  whenever  Amer 
ican  ships  should  be  allowed  in  the  West  Indies  on  the 
same  terms  as  British  ships  from  the  United  States,  and 
when  they  should  be  allowed  to  carry  goods  from  the 
colonies  to  any  non-British  ports  to  which  British  ships 
might  go.  This  act  was  sent  to  England.  Lord  Aber 
deen  said  that  it  was  all  that  England  had  ever  de 
manded.2  The  colonial  duties  were  raised,  a  differen 
tial  duty  in  favor  of  the  North  American  colonies  was 
laid,  and  the  trade  was  opened.  The  President  issued 
his  proclamation  October  5,  1830.  The  administration 
coasted  of  this  diplomatic  achievement.  The  truth  was 
that  the  United  States  set  out  to  force  England  to  let 
American  goods  come  into  the  West  Indies  on  the  same 
footing  as  British  North  American  goods.  England  waa 
Coerced  by  the  acts  of  1818  ani  1820.  Canning  said, 
»  1826,  that  England  had  yielded  to  coercion,  but  that 
Cf.  page  161.  2  39  Nileg,  390  fg. 


ANDREW  JACKSON. 

the  escaped  from  it  as  soon  as  she  could.  She  opened 
her  trade  to  all  the  world  as  an  escape.  The  counter 
vailing  system  of  the  United  States,  then,  no  longer  exer 
cised  any  coercion,  and  the  United  States,  to  get  the 
trade  reopened,  abandoned  the  demands  with  which  it 
had  started  on  the  experiment  of  countervailing.  This 
last  step  was  what  the  Jackson  administration  had  ac 
complished.  Niles  and  the  other  protectionists  scoffed 
at  the  new  arrangement.  They  said  that  the  illicit 
trade  was  better  than  the  new  arrangement.1  A  proof 
that  this  was  true  is  found  in  the  fact  that  the  illicit 
trade  went  on.  The  laws  forced  products  of  the  United 
States  to  reach  the  islands  through  Canada  and  Nova 
Scotia,  and  this  offered  just  so  much  premium  to  illicit 
trade. 

II.  The  claims  of  the  United  States  for  spoliations 
against  France  and  against  all  those  states  of  Europe 
which  had  been  drawn  by  Napoleon  into  his  Continental 
system,  had  been  a  subject  of  fruitless  negotiation  ever 
since  1815.2  Jackson  took  up  these  claims  with  new 
energy  and  spirit.  He  sent  W.  C.  Rives  to  France  in 
1829,  under  instructions  which  covered  the  whole  his 
tory  of  the  claims,  to  try  to  get  a  settlement.  In  his 
message  of  1829,  while  these  negotiations  were  pending, 
Jackson  referred  to  the  claims  as  likely  to  "  furnish  a 
subject  of  unpleasant  discussion  and  possible  collision." 
This  reference  was  not  of  a  kind  to  help  the  negotia 
tions.  In  1830  a  revolution  put  Louis  Philippe  on  the 
throne  under  a  Constitution.  New  hopes  of  a  settlement 

1  39  Niles,  298  ;  42  Niles,  148. 

2  Succinct  statements  of  the  origin  and  history  of  these  claimi 
*n  the  report  of  a  minority  of  the  committee  of  the  House,  41 

.  6,  and  the  article  47  N«es,  455. 


TREATY  OF  PARIS.  171 

!>f  the  claims  were  raised  by  this  turn  in  affairs.  A 
kreaty  was  finally  signed  at  Paris,  July  4,  1831,  by 
which  France  agreed  to  pay  twenty-five  million  francs, 
and  the  United  States  agreed  to  pay  one  and  a  half 
million  francs,  in  final  settlement  of  all  outstanding 
claims  of  citizens  of  one  country  against  the  government 
of  the  other  country.  The  treaty  was  ratified  February 
2,  1832.  The  first  instalment  became  due  February 
2,  1833.  Claims  against  the  other  States  of  the  old 
Continental  league  were  likewise  liquidated,  and  pay 
ment  was  secured  during  Jackson's  administration.  The 
administration  derived  great  credit  from  these  settle 
ments.  There  was  a  great  deal  more  in  the  matter  than 
the  money.  European  nations,  which  had  similar  claims 
against  France,  had  secured  payment  soon  after  the 
peace,  but  the  claims  of  the  United  States  had  been 
neglected.  Payment  now  meant  a  concession  of  con 
sideration  and  respect  to  the  United  States,  and  the 
people  felt  that  Jackson  had  won  this  for  the  nation. 

We  have  now  to  notice  seven  leading  questions  in  the 
internal  policy  of  the  nation  up  to  and  during  Jackson's 
first  term  of  office  :  — 

I.  The  federal  judiciary  had  never  yet  been  organ 
ized  in  such  a  manner  as  to  discharge  its  functions  satis 
factorily.  The  federal  judiciary  act,  which  was  passed 
at  the  close  of  Adams's  administration,  was  hastily  re 
pealed,  as  a  political  measure,  immediately  after  Jeffer 
son's  accession.  The  repeal  was  an  error,  for  the  fed 
eral  judiciary  continued  weak  and  inadequate  for  lack  of 
just  what  that  act  had  provided.  After  the  decisions 
on  great  constitutional  points  which  were  rendered  be 
tween  1819  and  1S25,  a  parfy  grew  up  which  was  ready 
to  make  any  attempt  to  reorganize  the  federal  judiciary 


172  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

an  occasion  for  an  attack,  both  on  the  federal  authority 
and  on  the  judicial  institution.  The  strongest  disposi 
tion  so  to  act  was  evinced  by  the  Kentuckians.1 

In  the  session  of  1825-26,  when  a  bill  for  some  new 
circuits  of  the  Supreme  Court  was  pending,  Rowan,  of 
Kentucky,2  moved  an  amendment  that  seven  judges  out 
of  ten  (the  number  which  the  bill  proposed)  must  con 
cur  in  order  to  declare  any  state  law  unconstitutional. 
The  whole  bill  was  lost  in  a  disagreement  of  the  two 
Houses. 

In  the  session  of  1827-28  a  bill  was  introduced  to 
regulate  the  procedure  of  the  federal  courts  in  the  new 
States  which  had  been  admitted  since  the  laws  of  Sep 
tember  29,  1789,  and  May  8,  1792,  which  regulated  the 
procedure  of  the  federal  courts,  were  passed.  To  thia 
bill  Rowan  proposed  an  amendment  which  would  take 
away  from  the  federal  courts  the  power  to  modify  or 
change  any  of  the  rules  of  procedure,  or  any  of  the 
forms  of  writs  of  execution,  which  were  to  be  those  of 
the  State  in  which  the  court  was  sitting.8  If  this  amend 
ment  had  been  passed,  the  federal  courts  would  not 
have  been  allowed  to  change  rules  and  forms,  but  the 
state  Legislatures  would  have  had  power  to  do  so,  and 
the  federal  judiciary  would  have  been  handed  over  to 
state  control.  This  amendment  was  adopted  by  the 
Senate.  Webster,  who  had  been  away,  returned  to  find 
that  the  whole  federal  judicial  system  had  been  thrown 
.nto  confusion 4  by  this  hasty  proposition,  which  had 
been  made  only  with  reference  to  some  of  the  whims  oi 
Kentucky  relief  politics.  He  exposed  the  effects  of  the 
bill.  It  was  recommitted  and  recast,  establishing  foi 

1  See  chapter  VI.  2  Cf.  page  123. 

•  Cf.  page  129.  *  7  Adams,  455. 


JEALOUSY  OF  THE  FEDERAL  JUDICIARY.    173 

Ihe  new  States  the  procedure  then  existing,  with  power 
in  the  courts  to  modify  under  the  supervision  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  and  in  this  shape  it  was  passed. 

In  1830  an  attempt  was  made  to  repeal  the  twenty- 
fifth  section  of  the  judiciary  act,  by  which  the  Supreme 
Court  is  empowered  to  pass  upon  the  constitutionality 
of  state  laws.  The  hill  was  lost  in  the  House  by  the 
vote  of  137  to  51,  but  the  minority  consisted  of  some  of 
the  leading  administration  men.  In  1831  the  House 
refused,  115  to  61,  to  consider  a  resolution  instructing 
the  judiciary  committee  to  report  a  bill  setting  terms  of 
years  for  federal  judges.1  In  1830  Berrien  gave  an 
opinion  on  the  South  Carolina  Police  Act,2  in  which  he 
overturned  Wirt's  opinion.  He  held  that  that  act  was 
valid  because  it  was  an  act  of  internal  police.  In  this 
opinion  he  laid  down  the  doctrine  of  the  extreme  South 
ern  state-rights  men  about  the  limits  of  federal  power. 
He  held  that  the  federal  authorities  ought  not,  in  exer 
cising  their  powers,  to  make  laws  or  treaties  to  come 
into  collision  with  anything  which  the  States  had  done 
under  their  reserved  powers,  unless  it  was  necessary  to 
do  so.  The  admission  of  black  men  into  the  State 
was  only  convenient,  not  necessary ;  hence  collision  on 
that  point  would  be  improper.8 

The  Jackson  party  and  the  Executive  Department 
were  on  terms  of  jealousy  and  distrust  with  the  judiciary 
for  several  years.  Another  expression  of  these  feelings 
Tvas  the  impeachment  of  Judge  Peck,  of  Missouri.  The 
democrats  were  especially  jealous  of  the  prerogative 
powers  of  the  courts,  among  the  rest  of  the  power  to  im 
prison  for  contempt.  Peck  wrote  out  and  published  in 

i  39  Niles,  405.  2  See  page  130.     ,. 

*  2  Opinions  of  the  Attorneys-General,  433. 


174  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

ft  newspaper,  in  1826,  a  decision  which  he  had  rendered. 
Lawless,  counsel  for  the  defeated  party,  published  a  re> 
view  of  the  opinion.  Peck  imprisoned  him  for  twenty 
four  hours,  and  suspended  him  from  practice  in  the 
court  for  eighteen  months,  for  contempt.  Lawless  peti 
tioned  the  federal  House  of  Representatives  during  three 
sessions  for  redress,  in  vain.  In  1829  the  democratic 
House  impeached  Peck.  Buchanan  was  the  leader.1 
The  impeachment  was  in  the  current  of  popular  feeling, 
and  there  was  capital  to  be  made  out  of  it.  January 
31,  1831,  the  vote  was,  21  to  convict,  22  to  acquit. 
Adams  says  that  Jackson  favored  acquittal  lest  Buch 
anan  should  gain  by  a  conviction,  just  as  Jefferson,  in 
Chase's  case,  favored  acquittal  lest  John  Randolph 
should  gain  power  by  a  conviction.2  By  an  act  o» 
March  2,  1831,  the  power  of  the  courts  to  punish  a. 
discretion  for  contempt  was  limited  to  cases  of  misbe 
havior  in  court,  or  so  near  to  the  court  as  to  obstruct 
the  administration  of  justice. 

II.  The  Indians  of  the  Gulf  States  had  been  in  col 
lision  with  the  Whites  ever  since  the  Revolution,  when 
the  Cherokees  and  Creeks  were  allied  with  England. 
The  government  of  the  United  States  restrained  the 
Indians  from  intercourse  with  foreign  nations,  and  made 
them  wards  of  the  nation,  but  it  made  treaties  with 
them  as  independent  tribes,  not  to  say  nations.  The 
History  is  a  monotonous  repetition  of  the  same  series  of 
tacts.  The  Indians  occupied  as  much  territory  per  man 
for  their  hunting-grounds  as  would  have  supported  a 
dozen  white  families.  The  Whites  gained  economic  ad 

1  Charges  and  specifications,  38  Niles,  245.     Cf.,  also,  2 

Wirt,  308. 
«  8  Adams,  306. 


TREAflES  BETWEEN  GEORGIA  AND  INDIANS.     175 

vantages  by  spreading  themselves  thinly  over  a  great 
area.  Treaties  were  made  by  which  the  Indians  ceded 
land,  and  a  boundary  was  drawn.  The  Whites  spread 
over  the  territory  and  up  to  the  boundary.  The  two 
races  then  began  to  commit  outrages  on  each  other. 
The  Whites  made  no  account  of  white  outrages  and 
great  account  of  red  outrages.  They  set  out  to  chastise 
the  Indians.  They  forced  a  new  treaty,  with  a  new- 
land  cession,  established  a  new  boundary,  and  began  the 
Fame  process  over  again. 

In  November,  1785,  Georgia  made  a  treaty  with  the 
Creeks  at  Galphinton,  by  which  they  ceded  land.  The 
Continental  Congress  was  not  a  party  to  this  treaty,  but 
it  made  one  with  the  Cherokees  in  December  of  the  same 
year,1  at  Hopewell.  In  1786  Georgia  made  another 
treaty  with  the  Creeks  at  Shoulder  Bone  Creek.  In 
1789  the  new  federal  government  sent  an  agent  to  in 
vestigate  the  treaties  made  by  Georgia.  He  approved  of 
them,  but  he  failed  in  his  effort  to  make  another  on  be 
half  of  the  federal  government,  because  McGillivray, 
the  half-breed  chief  of  the  Creeks,  opposed  any  further 
treaties.2  In  1790  McGillivray  and  several  other  chiefs 
were  persuaded  to  go  to  New  York.  There  they  made  a 
treaty.  Washington's  administration  was  in  the  attitude 
of  protecting  the  Indians  against  the  Georgians.  The 
Matter  were  much  displeased  by  the  treaty  of  New  York, 
because  it  gave  up  to  the  Indians  lands  which  had  been 
extorted  from  them  at  Galphinton.  McGillivray  died 
in  1793,  and  Georgia,  in  the  same  year,  made  war  on 
the  Creeks.  Washington  wrote  to  express  strong  dis 
approval  of  this  offensive  movement  on  the  part  ol 

1  2  Stevens,  4.0  fg. 

*  See  2  Pickett,  30  fg    foi  the  story  of  McGillivray. 


176  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Georgia.1  In  1796  the  United  States  made  a  treaty  at 
Holston  with  the  Cherokees,  by  which  the  latter  were 
to  be  subject  to  the  United  States  only,  and  to  treat  with 
the  United  States  only.  In  the  same  year  the  federal 
Indian  Intercourse  Act  forbade  any  one  to  go  into  the 
Indian  territories  under  penalty  of  fine  or  imprisonment. 
In  1798  the  Cherokees  made  a  further  cession  at  Tel- 
lico,  in  a  treaty  with  the  United  States,  by  which  their 
remaining  lands  were  secured  to  them,  and  they  were 
to  have  their  own  laws,  to  which  any  white  person  re 
siding  amongst  them  was  to  be  subject.2  There  was  an 
old  treaty  of  1777  between  Georgia  and  the  Cherokees, 
which  the  former  always  made  the  basis  of  its  claims. 
New  lands,  which  were  obtained  by  cession,  were,  ac 
cording  to  the  practice  of  Georgia,  distributed  by  lottery 
amongst  the  citizens  of  the  State.  Hence  the  eagerness 
for  land  cessions  of  the  people  of  that  State,  and  the  con 
stantly  renewed  collisions  with  the  Indians  and  with  the 
federal  government.  In  1802  the  United  States  agreed 
to  extinguish  the  Indian  title  to  lands  within  the  pre 
scribed  boundaries  of  Georgia,  "whenever  it  could  be 
peaceably  done  on  reasonable  terms,"  and  Georgia  ceded 
bO  the  United  States  the  present  States  of  Alabama  and 
Mississippi,  with  the  privilege  of  settling  with  the  Ya- 
100  land-scrip  holders,  to  do  which  ultimately  cost  four 
jnillion  dollars. 

Georgia  continually  pressed  the  federal  government 
bo  buy  off  the  Indian  title  to  lands  in  that  State,  and  it 
was  d^ne  from  time  to  time  for  certain  portions.  The 
treaty  of  1802  was  supposed  to  cover  Georgia's  claims 
for  the  expenses  of  the  Indian  wars  of  1793-94,  but 

1  2  Stevens,  454  ;  2  Pickett,  144. 

a  5  Ann.  Reg.  45.  3  2  Kennedy's  Wirt.  278. 


TREATY  OF  INDIAN  SPRING.  177 

those  claims  were  urged  until  1827,  when  Congress  voted 
$129,375  to  discharge  them.  At  the  urgent  solicitation 
of  Georgia,  Monroe  appointed  two  commissioners  to 
treat  with  the  Creeks,  of  whose  lands  nine  and  a  half 
million  acres  were  still  under  the  Indian  title.  The 
lower  Creeks  were  then  on  the  land  west  of  the  Flint 
River,  and  north  of  31°  30',  and  the  upper  Creeks  were 
almost  entirely  in  Alabama,  between  the  Coosa  river  and 
the  Georgia  boundary,  and  north  of  an  east  and  west  line 
through  the  Hickory  Ground  (Wetumpka).  These  boun 
daries  were  set  by  Jackson's  treaty  with  the  Creeks  of 
1814,  and  he  guaranteed  to  them  the  lands  which  were 
then  left  to  them.1  The  Cherokees  were  in  the  north* 
western  corner  of  Georgia,  the  northeastern  corner  of 
Alabama,  and  the  southeastern  corner  of  Tennessee,  be 
tween  the  Chattahoochee,  the  Etowah,  and  the  Hiwasee 
rivers.  The  Creeks  voted  to  put  to  death  any  one  who 
ehould  vote  to  sell  any  more  land,  and  refused  to  treat 
with  Monroe's  commissioners.  After  the  council  broke 
up,  a  few  chiefs,  headed  by  Mclntosh,  made  the  treaty 
of  Indian  Spring,  February  12,  1825,  ceding  all  their 
lands  in  Georgia  and  Alabama  for  $400,000.  The  Sen- 
ate  confirmed  this  treaty,  March  3,  1825.  April  30th 
the  Creeks  set  Mclntosh's  house  on  fire,  and  shot  him  as 
he  came  out.  Governor  Troup  of  Georgia  claimed  the 
lands  for  Georgia  at  once,  and  began  to  survey  them. 
He  also  set  up  a  lottery  to  dispose  of  them.  President 
Adams  appointed  an  agent  to  investigate  the  negotia 
tion  of  the  treaty.  The  agent  reported  that  forty-nine 
fiftieths  of  the  Creeks  repudiated  the  treaty  as  a  fraud 
on  them.  The  President  ordered  General  Gaines  to 
prevent  any  trespass  on  the  lands  of  the  Indians,  and 
1  Folio  State  Papers,  1  Indwn  Affairs,  827 
12 


178  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

pointed  out  to  Governor  Troup  the  objections  to  his 
proceedings.  Troup  blustered,  and  asked  if  the  Presi 
dent  would  hold  himself  responsible  to  the  State  of 
Georgia.  The  Georgia  Legislature  did  no£  sustain  the 
Governor.  The  treaty  of  Indian  Spring  was  annulled, 
and  a  new  one  was  made  in  January,  1826,  by  which  a 
part  of  the  lands  in  Georgia  were  ceded.  This  treaty 
was  not  confirmed,  and  another,  ceding  all1  the  lands 
in  Georgia,  was  finally  made,  as  Benton  says,  by  appeal 
ing  to  the  cupidity  of  the  chiefs.  The  Mclntosh  party 
got  an  indemnity,  and  a  large  sum  was  given  to  the 
chiefs.  Land  was  to  be  provided  west  of  the  Mississippi 
for  all  who  would  go  there.  This  treaty  did  not  satisfy 
the  Georgians.  Nevertheless,  inasmuch  as  by  the  last 
treaty  all  the  lands  in  Georgia  were  ceded,  and  by  the 
second  treaty  only  part  of  those  lands  were  ceded,  the 
Georgians  claimed  a  substantial  victory,2  although  not 
all  the  lands  in  Georgia  and  Alabama  were  ceded,  as  by 
the  treaty  of  Indian  Spring.  The  Cherokees  still  re 
mained  undisturbed.  In  January,  1828,  the  Georgia 
Legislature  passed  a  set  of  resolutions,  the  truculency  of 
which  is  unparalleled,  demanding  that  the  United  States 
should  extinguish  the  title  of  the  Cherokees.3 

The  Cherokees  were  the  most  civilized  of  the  Gulf  In 
dians,  and  perhaps  they  had  reached  a  higher  pitch  of 
civilization  than  any  other  Indians  have  ever  yet  reached.4 
They  had  horses  and  cattle,  goats,  sheep,  and  swine.  They 
raised  maize,  cotton,  tobacco,  wheat,  oats,  and  potatoes, 
*nd  traded  with  their  products  to  New  Orleans.  They 
bad  gardens,  and  apple  and  peach  orchards.  They  haq 
built  roads,  and  they  kept  inns  for  travellers.  Thej 

1  1  Benton,  59.  a  Hodgson,  141. 

*  9  Ann  Reg.,  Local  History,  143.  4  3  Ann.  Keg.  77. 


CIVILIZATION  OF  THE  INDIANS.  179 

manufactured  cotton  and  wool.  Probably  all  this  waa 
rery  poor  in  its  way.  Their  numbers  were  increasing. 
In  1825  there  were  13,563,  besides  220  resident  whites 
and  1,277  slaves,  in  the  Cherokee  country.  One  of  their 
number  had  invented  an  alphabet  for  their  language. 
They  had  a  civil  government,  imitated  from  that  of  the 
United  States.  The  Chickasaws  had  ten  mills  and 
fifty  workshops.  They  lived  in  the  northeast  corner 
of  Mississippi.  They  numbered  4,000,  and  were  in 
creasing.  The  Choctaws,  in  Central  Mississippi,  num 
bered  21,000,  and  ranked  next  to  the  Cherokees  in  civil 
ization.  The  Creeks  numbered  40,000,  and  were  the 
lowest  in  civilization.  The  money  paid  them  tor  their 
lands  had  debauched  them.  It  was  the  facts  that  the 
Indians  had  reached  a  certain  grade  of  civilization,  that 
they  were  increasing  in  numbers,  and  that  they  were 
forming  civilized  civil  and  Christian  bodies,  which  made 
all  the  trouble,  for  these  facts  all  led  to  the  probability 
that  the  Indians  would  remain  a  permanent  part  of  the 
society,  and  would  occupy  definite  areas  of  land  in  the 
midst  of  the  States.  It  certainly  was  a  home  question, 
when,  in  1829,  Jackson  asked  whether  Maine  or  New 
York  would  tolerate  an  Indian  state  within  her  own 
civil  limits.  Peter  B.  Porter,  Secretary  of  War  under 
Adams,  prepared  a  plan  for  an  Indian  territory  west  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  for  colonizing  the  Gulf  Indians  in 

t.  The  plan  was  referred  to  the  next  administration. 
Adams  made  himself  very  unpopular  in  the  Southwest 
by  his  action  to  protect  the  Indians.  He  did  not  get  a 
vote  in  Georgia  In  1828.  Jackson  had  abundantly 
shown1  that  he  held  the  Southwestern  white  man' 

riews  of  Indians  and  Indian  rights. 
1  See  page  23. 


180  ;   .         ANDREW  JACKSON. 

As  soon  as  Jackson  was  elected,  December  20,  1828t 
Georgia  passed  a  law  extending  her  jurisdiction  over  the 
Cherokee  lands  and  dividing  them  into  counties,  and 
enacted  that  no  Indian  should  testify  against  a  white 
man.  In  1829  she  modified  this  so  that  an  Indian 
might  testify  against  a  White  who  lived  in  the  Indian 
territory.  In  1829  Alabama,  and  in  1830  Mississippi, 
passed  similar  laws,  but  somewhat  milder.  The  new 
administration  admitted  the  soundness  of  the  theory  of 
these  laws,  which  were  plainly  in  contravention  of  the 
treaties  made  with  the  Indians  by  the  federal  govern 
ment.  In  his  message  of  1829  Jackson  said  that  he  had 
told  th<s  Indians  that  their  pretensions  would  not  be  sup 
ported.  In  the  spring  of  1830  Congress  passed  an  act 
for  encouraging  and  facilitating  the  removal  of  the  Gulf 
Indians  to  a  territory  set  apart  for  them  west  of  the 
Mississippi. 

The  quarrel  between  Georgia  and  the  Indians  had 
now  narrowed  down  to  a  struggle  with  the  Cherokees, 
who  were  the  most  civilized,  and  who  had  the  strongest 
treaty  guarantees  from  the  federal  authority  for  theii 
territory  and  their  self-government.  It  was  proposed  to 
test  the  proceedings  of  Georgia  before  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States.  In  the  summer  of  1830, 
Judge  Clayton,  a  Georgia  state  judge,  charged  the  grand 
iury  that  he  intended  to  allow  no  case  to  be  withdrawn 
.vrom  his  jurisdiction  by  any  foreign  authority,  but  that 
he  should  enforce  the  state  laws  about  the  Indians,  and 
lie  wanted  to  know  whether  he  was  to  be  supported  by 
the  people.1  The  first  test  arose  on  a  murder  case 
against  George  Tassel,  a  Cherokee,  for  killing  another 
Cherokee.  The  Superior  Court  of  Hall  County  tried 
1  39  Nilea,  99. 


GEORGIA  AND  THE  FEDERAL  AUTHORITY.    181 

fonvicted,  and  sentenced  him.  The  Chief  Justice  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  issued  a  citation  to 
the  State  of  Georgia,  December  12,  1830,  to  appear  and 
show  cause,  in  answer  to  a  writ  of  error,  why  the  sentence 
against  Tassel  should  not  be  corrected.1  Governor  Gil- 
mer  laid  this  document  before  the  Legislature,  which 
ordered  him  to  disregard  it,  and  to  resist  by  force  any 
attempt  to  interfere  with  the  criminal  law  of  the  State. 
On  the  28th  of  December  Tassel  was  hung. 

The  Governor  of  Georgia  called  on  the  President 
to  withdraw  the  federal  troops,  and  leave  Georgia  to 
deal  with  the  Indians  and  gold-diggers.  The  President 
complied.  The  Georgia  militia  marched  in,  and  com 
plaints  from  the  Indians  at  once  began  to  be  heard.  The 
President  refused  to  enforce  the  treaty  rights  of  the  In 
dians.  The  Cherokees  applied  to  the  Supreme  Court 
for  an  injunction  to  prevent  Georgia  from  interfering 
with  their  treaty  rights.  In  January,  1831,  the  court, 
while  in  effect  sustaining  the  claims  and  rights  of  the 
Cherokees,  declared  that  the  remedy  prayed  for  could 
aot  be  employed.  What  was  needed  was  not  a  judicial 
but  a  political  remedy.2  The  political  remedy  belonged 
to  the  Executive  and  the  President  had  refused  to  use  it. 

Georgia  ordered  all  white  residents  of  the  Cherokee 
country  to  obtain  state  licenses,  and  to  take  an  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  State.  Two  missionaries,  sent  out  by 
a  Boston  society,  Worcester  and  Butler,  amongst  others, 
did  not  comply  with  this  law.  They  were  arrested,  but 
were  at  first  released,  under  the  belief  that  they  were 
disbursing  agents  of  the  federal  government.  The  au 
thorities  at  Washington  denied  that  they  were  such. 
Thereupon  they  were  rearrested,  tried,  convicted,  and 
1  39  Nile&,  338.  2  5  Peters,  1. 


182  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

condemned  to  four  year's  hard  labor  in  the  penitentiary. 
In  sentencing  them  Judge  Clayton  made  another  stump 
Bpeech.1  On  a  writ  of  error  in  1832,  the  Supreme  Court 
held  that  the  law  under  which  these  men  were  convicted 
was  unconstitutional,  that  the  laws  of  Georgia  about  the 
Cherokees  contravened  federal  treaties  and  were  void, 
and  the  men  were  ordered  to  be  released.2  Georgia  re 
fused  to  obey.  The  Georgia  doctrine  seemed  to  be  that 
all  three  Departments  of  the  federal  government  must 
concur  in  holding  a  state  law  to  be  unconstitutional  in 
order  to  set  it  aside.8  Jackson  refused  to  take  any  exec 
utive  action  to  give  force  to  the  decision  of  the  court. 
The  presidential  election  was  at  hand,  and  he  said  that 
he  would  submit  his  conduct  to  the  people,  who  could  at 
the  election  show  whether  they  approved  or  disapproved 
of  his  refusal  to  sustain  the  decision.4  No  case  could 
more  distinctly  show  the  vice  of  the  political  philosophy 
which  Jackson  professed.  Twelve  persons  in  all  were 
convicted,  in  Georgia,  of  illegal  residence  in  the  Indian 
country.  All  were  pardoned.5  The  missionaries  refused 
at  first  to  accept  a  pardon.  In  January,  1833,  they  with 
drew  their  suit  in  the  Supreme  Court,  and  were  re 
leased.6 

In  1833  Alabama  came  into  collision  with  the  federal 
government  on  account  of  Indians.  Federal  troops  were 
employed  to  expel  intruders  from  the  Indian  territory. 

i  41Niles,  174.  2  6  Peters,  515. 

»  9  Adams,  548. 

4  Greeley  has  a  story  that  Jackson  said,  "  John  Marshall  has 
made  his  decision.  Now  let  him  enforce  it."  (1  Greeley,  106.) 
Jackson  disliked  Marshall,  although  he  had  no  active  enmity 
Against  him.  Scarcely  two  men  could  be  found  less  likely  to  ap 
fcreciate  each  other  personally  or  politically. 

«  7  Ann.  Reg.  265.  «  43  Nile*,  419. 


REMOVAL   OF  THE   GULF  INDIANS.  183 

In  executing  this  duty  they  killed  one  Owens.  The  state 
authorities  attempted  to  try  for  murder  the  soldiers 
through  whose  action  the  man  met  his  death.  The  mili 
tary  authorities  would  not  consent.  The  federal  govern 
ment,  taught  by  nullification,  took  a  firmer  position  than 
in  the  case  of  Georgia.  By  a  compromise,  the  reserva 
tion  was  made  smaller,  and  the  white  intruders  were  al 
lowed  to  buy  titles  from  the  Indians.1 

In  September,  1830,  a  treaty  was  negotiated  at  Danc 
ing  Rabbit  Creek  with  the  Choctaws,  over  whom  Missis 
sippi  had  extended  her  laws,  by  which  they  ceded  their 
lands  and  went  west  of  the  Mississippi.  They  were  to 
be  provided  with  land,  transportation,  houses,  tools,  a 
year's  subsistence,  $50,000  for  schools,  $20,000  a  year 
for  twenty  years,  $250  each,  for  twenty  years,  for  four 
chiefs,  and  $500  for  another,  as  president  of  the  nation, 
should  such  an  officer  be  chosen.  When  this  treaty 
was  before  the  Senate  for  ratification  the  preamble  was 
stricken  out,  because  it  recited  that  "  the  President  of 
the  United  States  has  said  that  he  cannot  protect  the 
Choctaw  people  from  the  operation  of  these  laws"  of 
Mississippi.2  During  the  next  eight  years  the  tribes  wero 
all  half  persuaded,  half  forced,  to  go.  The  Indian  Terri 
tory  was  roughly  defined  by  an  act  of  June  30,  1834. 
Part  of  the  Cherokees  had  gone  in  1818,  because  they 
wanted  to  follow  their  old  mode  of  life.  In  1836  all 
the  rights  of  the  Cherokees  east  of  the  Mississippi  were 
bought  for  five  million  dollars  and  the  expenses  of  re 
moval.8  In  the  same  year  the  Creeks  broke  into  hostili 
ties,  and  were  forced  to  migrate.  In  1838  the  civilized 
Cherokees  migrated,  except  a  few,  who  disappeared  ai 
Indians  have  disappeared  everywhere  else. 

*  45  Mies,  155  ;  Hodgson,  179. 

8  40  Niles.  106.  8  50  Nile*.  285 


CHAPTER  IX. 

PUBLIC  QUESTIONS   OF    JACKSON'S  FIRST  ADMINMTSA 
TION.  —  ii. 

III.  The  land  system  of  the  United  States  had  been 
adopted  in  1800,  when  the  price  was  fixed  at  $2.00  per 
acre,  and  long  credit  was  given,  or  at  'the  rate  of  $1.64 
per  acre,  cash.1  In  1820  the  price  was  reduced  to  $1.25 
per  acre,  cash,  as  a  minimum  price.  There  were  heavy 
arrears  due  for  lands  sold  on  credit.  The  policy  to  be 
pursued  with  the  lands  came  to  be  a  great  political  ques 
tion.  The  popular  notion  was  that  the  lands,  while 
wild  and  in  the  hands  of  the  government,  were  a  great 
property.  The  earth's  surface  is  an  abode  for  man,  and 
a  source  from  which  he  can  get  a  supply  of  the  things 
to  satisfy  his  needs,  if  he  will  work  hard  enough  for 
them.  In  its  natural  state  the  land  is  only  an  opec 
chance,  worth  a  great  deal  to  a  man  who  has  no  otKer 
chance,  but  not  attractive  to  a  man  who  has  any  com 
mand  of  the  resources  of  life  which  may  be  employed 
in  civilized  communities.  The  earth's  surface  is  not  g- 
koon  or  gift  of  nature  to  man,  and  cannot  be  a  thin^  of 
ralue  while  wild.  To  subdue  the  land  to  the  use  of  man 
costs  hardship,  labor,  and  self-denial.  Often  it  costs  dis 
ease,  and  the  premature  death  of  generations.  "Wnat 
then,  can  any  one  afford  to  give  for  wild  land  ?  He  car 
»nly  afford  to  give  a  remuneration  for  the  survey  whick 
i  Seybert,  354. 


POLITICAL  ECONOMY  OF   LAND.  185 

secures  him  a  definite  description  and  identification  of 
the  land  which  he  has  appropriated,  and  for  the  author 
ity  of  a  civil  government  which  protects  his  title.  If, 
then,  the  purchaser  does  not  occupy  and  till,  he  looks  to 
the  demand  for  land,  which  will  advance  as  the  country 
fills  up  with  population,  to  give  him  a  profit  on  his  out 
lay.  He  has  appropriated  part  of  a  natural  monopoly, 
and  advancing  demand  will  give  him  profit.  In  the 
mean  time  interest  and  taxes  are  running  against  him. 
Hence  it  has  happened  again  and  again  that  land  spec 
ulators  have  been  ruined  in  financial  revulsions.  If  the 
purchaser  occupies  and  tills  the  land,  he  is  putting  cap 
ital  into  it  all  the  time,  and  he  and  his  neighbors,  as 
they  build  up  a  commonwealth,  gain  incidentally  by  the 
monopoly  principle,  and  by  cooperation.  Any  holder 
who  seeks  only  the  monopoly  profit  on  raw  land  is  work 
ing  against  himself,  unless  he  can  divide  his  possessions, 
and  sell  part  and  withhold  part  in  a  judicious  adjust 
ment.  Then,  however,  a  great  capital  and  a  long  time 
are  necessary.  The  federal  government  was  in  this  last 
position.  Its  lands,  therefore,  were  not  a  source  of  in 
come  or  a  valuable  possession  to  it.  Down  to  Septem 
ber  30,  1832,  the  lands  had  cost  $49.7  million,  and  the 
total  revenue  received  from  them  had  amounted  to 
$38.3  million. 

Various  plans  for  dealing  with  the  lands  had  been 
proposed  previous  to  Jackson's  accession.  One  was  that 
the  States  should  seize  the  lands  by  virtue  of  their  "  sov 
ereignty."  This  short  and  easy  method  recommended 
itself  to  the  politicians  of  the  emphatic  and  metaphy 
sical  school.  It  meant  s  imply  that  the  first  settlers  should 
buy  some  land,  organize  a  State,  and  get  "  sovereignty," 
ind  then  take  possession  of  the  rest  of  the  land  withia 


186  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

the  civil  jurisdiction.  Another  plan  was  to  sell  to  the 
States  at  a  nominal  price.  Another  :  to  sell  all  the  land 
at  graduated  prices,  for  what  it  would  bring.  Another : 
to  give  the  land  to  actual  settlers  (since  realized  in  the 
homestead  law).  Another:  to  use  the  lands  as  a  fund 
for  internal  improvements  and  education  (since  realized 
in  the  railroad  subsidies  and  agricultural  college  land 
grants).  It  is  plain  that  if  the  federal  government  buys 
territory  by  treaties  like  those  of  Louisiana  and  Florida, 
and  surveys  the  lands,  and  maintains  civil  institutions 
over  all  the  territory,  and  then  gives  the  lands  away, 
what  it  gives  is  the  outlay  necessary  to  bring  the  land  to 
the  point  where  a  civilized  man  can  begin  to  use  it.  Of 
course  the  new  States  wanted  population,  and  were 
eager  that  the  federal  government  should  encourage  im 
migration  by  making  this  outlay  and  giving  away  the 
product  of  it. 

The  old  States,  especially  the  tariff  States,  then  saw 
distinctly  the  relation  of  the  lands  to  the  tariff.  Every 
thing  which  enhanced  the  attractiveness  of  the  land  and 
made  it  easier  to  get  at  it  was  just  so  much  force  draw 
ing  the  man  who  had  no  land  and  no  capital  away  from 
the  old  States  and  out  of  the  wages  class.  Every  im 
provement  in  transportation;  every  abolition  of  taxes 
and  restrictions  like  the  corn  laws,  which  kept  American 
agricultural  products  out  of  England;  every  reduction 
in  the  price  of  land,  increased  the  chances  of  the  mac 
who  had  nothing,to  become  by  industry  and  economy 
an  independent  land-owner.  The  capitalist  employer 
in  the  old  States  was  forced  to  offset  this  attractiveness 
•f  the  land  by  raising  wages.  This  of  course  is  the  rea 
son  why  wages  in  the  United  States  are  high,  and  why 
to  wages  class  has  ever  yet  been  distinctly  differentiated 


TARIFF  AND  LAND.  187 

here._  It  might  justly  be  argued  that  it  was  improper 
for  the  federal  government  to  raise  funds  by  taxation  on 
the  old  States,  and  expend  them  in  buying,  surveying, 
and  policing  wild  land,  and  then  to  give  the  land  away 
to  either  "  the  poor  "  or  the  rich  ;  but  the  protectionists 
distinctly  faced  the  issue  which  was  raised  for  their  pet 
dogma,  and  demanded  that  the  lands  should  not  be  sur 
veyed  and  sold  abundantly  and  cheaply,  but  should  be 
kept  out  of  the  market.  The  effect  of  this  would  ba 
to  prevent  the  population  from  spreading  thinly  ovei 
the  whole  continent,  to  make  it  dense  in  the  old  States, 
to  raise  the  value  and  rent  of  land  there,  to  produce  a 
class  dependent  on  wages,  i.  e.,  a  supply  of  labor,  and 
to  keep  wages  down.  At  the  same  time  all  the  taxes 
on  clothing,  furniture,  and  tools  would  reduce  the  net 
return  of  the  agriculturist  and  lower  the  attractiveness 
of  the  land.  Lower  wages  Would  then  suffice  to  hold 
the  laborer  in  the  East.  These  two  lines  of  legislation 
would  therefore  be  consistent  and  support  each  other ; 
but  they  were  sorely  unjust  to  the  man  who  had  noth 
ing  save  his  stout  hands  with  which  to  fight  the  battle 
of  life  and  his  good-will  to  work. 

The  free-trade  States  of  the  South  and  the  free-land 
States  of  the  West,  therefore,  fell  most  naturally  into 
the  "  coalition  "  which  the  tariff  men  and  national  re 
publicans  denounced.  The  latter  said  that  the  Southern 
ers  had  agreed  to  surrender  the  lands  to  the  West  as  a 
price  for  the  assistance  of  the  West  against  the  Eastern 
States  and  the  tariff.1  The  sudden  and  unaccountable 
popularity  of  Jackson  in  rural  Pennsylvania  threw  that 
State,  in  spite  of  the  tariff  interests  of  her  capitalists,  into 
the  combination  to  which  Jackson  belonged  sectionally, 
1  9  Adanu,  235. 


188  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

and  the  ambitious  politicians  of  New  York,  seeing  the 
need  of  joining  Jackson,  brought  as  much  as  they  could 
of  that  State  to  his  support.  These  combinations  con 
stituted  the  Jackson  party,  in  regard  to  the  incoherency 
of  whose  elements  something  has  been  said  and  more 
will  appear.  Clay  was  operating  his  political  career 
through  tariff  and  internal  improvements,  with  the  lands 
as  a  fund  for  colonization,  canals,  roads,  and  education. 
This  gave  him  no  strength  in  the  West,  and  he  could 
not  break  Jackson's  phalanx  in  Pennsylvania,  where  his 
own  policy  should  have  made  him  strong.  Hence  he 
never  could  consolidate  a  party.  Benton  antagonized 
Clay  in  the  West  by  taking  up  the  policy  of  free  land?. 
In  1827  Rush,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  included  in 
his  annual  report  a  long  dissertation  on  lands,  tariff, 
and  internal  improvements.  He  sees  and  states  dis 
tinctly  and  correctly  the  relation  between  free  land  and 
tree  trade,  restricted  land  sales  and  protection.1  He 
makes  an  argument  out  of  it  for  protection  and  for  not 
selling  the  lands  cheaply,  although  he  does  not  venture^ 
positively  to  urge  the  latter.  He  lays  down  the  dogma 
that  "  the  creation  of  capital  is  retarded  by  the  diffusion 
of  a  thin  population  over  a  great  surface  of  soil,"  —  a 
dogma  which  is  the  very  opposite  of  the  truth.  He  also 
declares  that  the  price  at  which  the  lands  were  being 
sold  was  an  encouragement  by  legislation  to  agriculture, 
which  is  not  true,  and  would  not  be  true  unless  the 
lands  were  sold  for  less  than  the  cost  of  buying,  survey 
ing,  and  policing.  The  figures  above  given  show  that 
the  lands  had  been  sold  as  nearly  as  possible  at  cost 
prce.  Leaving  out  these  errors,  his  recognition  of  the 
economic  relations  and  their  effects  is  correct ;  y«t  thej 
1  33  Niles,  250. 


FOOTS  RESOLUTIONS  189 

leem  to  him  to  sustain  an  argument  for  restriction  on 
trade  and  restriction  on  the  sales  of  land,  and  he  dis 
tinctly  favors  the  plan  of  making  it  hard  for  the  non- 
eapitalist  to  get  upon  the  land,  in  order  that  the  non- 
capitalist  may  be  kept  in  the  old  States,  and  may  be 
more  willing  to  work  there  for  wages.  One  thing,  at 
least,  must  be  admitted  to  the  credit  of  the  statesmen  of 
that  day  who  believed  in  the  restrictive  system.  They 
did  not  give  away  the  lands  by  a  homestead  law,  and 
distribute  them  to  railroads  which  were  to  render  the 
new  land  easily  accessible,  while  they  laid  restrictions  on 
imports  to  encourage  manufacturing,  and  they  did  not 
propose  to  pay  subsidies  to  ships  for  bringing  goods  in, 
while  they  were  laying  duties  to  keep  goods  out.  Their 
Bystem  was  vicious,  but  the  abuse  was  perpetrated  only 
once;  it  was  not  multiplied  into  itself  three  or  four 
times.  It  was  based  on  an  error,  but  the  error  was  at 
least  logical  and  consistent  with  itself. 

In  January  and  February,  1829,  Illinois  and  Indiana 
adopted  resolutions  questioning  the  right  of  the  federal 
government  to  the  lands  in  those  States.  They  did  not 
adopt  the  Georgia  tone,  but  they  seemed  disposed  to 
adopt  the  Georgia  policy  in  case  of  a  disagreement  with 
the  federal  government. 

Jackson  had  no  settled  policy  in  regard  to  land.  In 
bis  first  message  he  favored  distribution  of  the  surplus 
revenue  among  the  States,  so  soon  as  the  debt  should 
be  paid. 

December  29,  1829,  Foot,  of  Connecticut,  offered  in 
lie  Senate  a  resolution  that  the  Committee  on  Public 
w*ands  should  inquire  into  th<3  expediency  of  restricting 
sales  of  land  to  fands  not  yet  sold  at  the  minimum  price, 
i  «.,  within  the  areas  which  up  to  that  time  had  been 


190  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

put  upon  the  market.  It  was  in  the  debate  on  thif 
resolution  that  Webster  and  Hayne  became  involved  in 
their  famous  argument  on  the  theory-  of  the  confedera 
tion.  Benton  introduced  a  bill  for  selling  the  laiida 
at  graduated  prices,  so  that  those  remaining  unsold  at 
$1.25  should  not  be  reserved,  but  sold  at  lower  prices, 
after  they  had  been  three  years  on  the  market.  The 
Senate  passed  this  bill  May  7,  1830.  It  was  not  acted 
on  in  the  House. 

In  January,  1831,  the  subject  came  up  again  in  the 
House,  on  an  appropriation  for  surveys,1  and  produced 
a  long  debate,  in  which  all  the  views  of  the  question  were 
represented.  In  his  annual  report  for  1831,  McLane, 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  proposed  that  the  lands 
should  be  sold  to  the  States  in  which  they  lay  at  a  fair 
price,  and  that  the  sum  thus  obtained  should  be  divided 
amongst  the  States.  March  22,  1832,  Bibb  moved,2  in 
the  Senate,  that  the  Committee  on  Manufactures  should 
report,  as  a  preliminary  to  the  consideration  of  the  tariff, 
on  the  expediency  of  reducing  the  price  of  the  lands, 
and  also  on  the  expediency  of  surrendering  the  lands  to 
the  States.  Clay  reported  from  that  committee  against 
both  propositions,  and  in  favor  of  giving  ten  per  cent  of 
the  proceeds  of  the  lands  to  the  new  States,  in  addition 
to  wh$»t  they  were  already  entitled  to,  arid  dividing  the 
residue  among  all  the  States.  Clay's  report  was  re 
Serred  to  the  Committee  on  Public  Lands,  which  re 
ported,  May  18th,  adversely  to  his  propositions,  ami 
recommended  a  minimum  price  of  $1.00 ;  lands  remain 
ing  unsold  at  that  price  for  five  years  to  be  then  sold 
Cor  fifty  cents  ;  fifteen  per  cent  of  the  proceeds  to  be 
divided  amongst  the  new  States.  No  action  was  take* 

i  6  Ann.  Reg.  81.  *  7  Ann.  Reg.  57. 


POLICY  ABOUT  IMPROVEMENTS. 

/ 

on  accoimt  of  the  disagreement  of  the  two  Houses,  but 
the  administration,  by  its  attitude  on  the  land  question, 
gained  strength  in  the  Western  States  for  the  presiden 
tial  election  of  1832. 

IV.  Internal  improvements.  In  1802  appropria 
tions  were  made  for  a  road  to  the  northwestern  terri 
tory.  In  1807  Gallatin  made  an  elaborate  report  on 
public  works,  laying  down  doctrines  which  no  one  would 
dispute  about  the  advantage  of  public  highways  and 
means  of  transportation.  The  Jeffersonians  were  timid 
on  the  point  of  constitutionality,  but  they  did  not  raise 
the  question  of  expediency,  and  there  was  no  party 
question  about  internal  improvements.  By  the  act  of 
May  11,  1812,  provision  was  made  for  the  survey  of  a 
road  from  Robinstown,  Maine,  to  St.  Mary's,  Georgia. 
This  was  a  north  and  south  road,  proposed,  in  the  inter 
est  of  justice,  to  offset  the  Cumberland  road  from  east 
to  west.  The  vice  of  the  policy,  therefore,  presented 
itself  at  once.  It  was  impossible  to  select  only  the 
enterprises  which  were  of  a  national  character,  and 
were  really  demanded  by  public  necessity  and  con 
venience.  Local  jealousy  and  self-interest  demanded 
"  equal "  favor,  and  the  enterprises  were  either  all  im 
possible,  or  could  be  carried  out  only  by  log-rolling  to 
include  them  all. 

February  16,  1816,  Calhoun  moved  for  a  committee 
to  inquire  into  the  expediency  of  setting  apart  the  bonus 
wid  profits  from  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  as  a 
find  for  internal  improvements.  At  the  next  session 
Ctbill  to  that  effect  was  passed.  Madison  vetoed  it, 
becniise  the  federal  government  had  not  the  power  tc 
engage  in  such  enterprises.  Monroe  declared,  in  his 
first  message,  that  he  held  the  same  vie\ts  as  Mad 


r 


92  ANDKEW  JACKSON. 

ison  on  this  subject.1  In  1817  the  subject  of v  internal 
improvements  was  much  agitated,  but  without  action. 
on  account  of  Monroe's  well-known  views  on  the  sub- 
ject.  Popular  opinions  were  strong  to  the  effect  that 
all  government  expenditures  were  a  boon  or  favor  which 
the  government  ought  to  distribute  equally,  and  it  was 
very  common  to  hear  a  congressman  complain  that  the 
federal  government  derived  more  revenue  from  his  dis 
trict  than  the  sums  expended  there.  Congressmen  were 
also  beginning  to  find  out  how  the  public  expenditures 
could  be  used  to  make  capital  for  themselves.  May  4, 
1822,  Monroe  vetoed  a  bill  for  collecting  tolls  on  the 
Cumberland  road,  and  keeping  it  in  repair.  In  this  veto 
message  he  discussed  the  whole  subject  of  internal  im 
provements.  He  admitted  that  expenditures  for  that 
purpose  were  advantageous  and  proper,  if  the  enter 
prises  were  national  in  character ;  but  he  objected  to 
them  strenuously  when  they  were  local  and  special,  and 
he  thought  that  Congress  had  no  constitutional  power 
to  carry  them  out  in  either  case. 

By  the  act  of  April  30,  1824,  $30,000  were  appropri 
ated  as  an  annual  appropriation  for  surveys,  to  be  made 
by  the  board  of  engineers,  of  such  roads,  canals,  and 
river  improvements  as  the  President  might  designate. 
The  theory  of  this  act  was  that  the  engineers  might  be 
advantageously  employed,  in  time  of  peace,  in  finding 
out  what  works  were  practicable  and  likely  to  be  worth 
executing.  In  the  session  of  1827-28  the  whole  subject 
•same  up  again  on  a  question  of  passing  the  annual  ap 
propriation  of  $30,000.  The  question  of  internal  im 
provements  then  first  took  on  a  party  character,  and 
party  exigency  forced  not  a  few  men  on  either  side  it 
*  6  Ann.  Reg.  68. 


VETO   OF  THE  MAYSVILLE  ROAD. 

lhange  their  opinions.  Crawford  alone  of  the  candi 
dates  in  1824  had  been  understood  to  be  a  strict  con- 
itructionist.  Calhoun  had  favored  improvements.  Clay 
was  not.  at  this  time,  earnestly  in  favor  of  them.1  The 
opposition  assailed  the  policy  as  unconstitutional,  and 
some  of  the  finest  pettifogging  of  the  political  scholastics 
and  casuists  was  done  on  this  question.  Little  was  said 
about  the  expediency  of  the  policy  Oakley,  of  New 
York,  in  the  House,  March  1,  1828,  declared  that 
under  the  act  of  1824  the  President  had  been  exposed 
to  a  constant  assault  from  Governors,  members  of  Con 
gress,  Legislatures,  mayors,  and  corporations,  to  cause 
the  surveys  for  local  and  private  enterprises  to  be  made 
at  the  expense  of  the  United  States.  The  opposition 
did  not  dare  to  oppose  directly  all  projects  under  the 
vicious  system.  Their  proposition  was  to  distribute 
funds  for  internal  improvements  to  the  States.  The 
appropriation,  in  1828,  was  finally  carried,  with  a  pro 
viso  that  the  surveys  were  to  be  made  only  for  works  of 
a  national  character. 

Jackson,  in  his  first  message,  indicated  hostility  to 
the  general  policy  of  internal  improvements,  and  favored 
distribution.2  May  27,  1830,  he  vetoed  a  bill  for  sub 
scription,  by  the  United  States,  to  the  stock  of  the 
Maysville  and  Lexington  road.3  In  his  veto  message  he 
placed  himself  on  the  constitutional  doctrine  of  Madison 
und  Monroe.  The  local  and  political  interests  which 
liad  become  involved  in  the  system  at  this  time  were 
very  numerous  and  very  strong.  Tvie  evil  of  special 

i  7  Adams,  191.  2  See  page  189. 

8  This  road  was  ta  run  through  the  strongest  Jackson  district 
in  Kentucky.  (Claj  to.  Wsbster .  1  WebsterV  Correspondence 

•010 

13 


ANDREW  JACKSON. 

legislation  was  growing.  Politicians  and  interested 
speculators  combined  to  further  each  other's  interests  at 
the  public  expense.  Jackson  affronted  the  whole  inter 
est  ;  one  would  say  that  he  affronted  it  boldly,  if  it  were 
not  that  he  acted  with  such  spontaneous  will  and  dis 
regard  of  consequences  that  there  was  no  conscious 
exercise  of  courage.  He  was  not  able  to  put  an  end  to 
the  abuse,  but  he  curtailed  it.  He  used  the  exceptional 
strength  of  his  political  position  to  do  what  no  one  else 
would  have  dared  to  do  in  meeting  a  strong  and  grow 
ing  cause  of  corruption.  He  held  a  bill  for  the  Louis 
ville  canal,  and  another  for  light-houses,  over  the  ses 
sion,  and  then  returned  them  unsigned.  At  the  session 
of  1830—31  a  bill  for  improvements  was  passed  by  such 
majorities  that  a  veto  was  useless.  In  1831-32  Jackson 
signed  one  such  bill  and  "  pocketed  "  another.  In  the 
session  of  1832-33  an  internal  improvement  bill  was 
defeated  by  parliamentary  tactics.  In  the  message  of 
1832  Jackson  recommended  the  sale  of  all  the  stocks 
held  by  the  United  States  in  canals,  turnpikes,  etc.  He 
educated  his  party,  for  that  generation  at  least,  up  to  a 
position  of  party  hostility  to  special  legislation  of  every 
kind. 

V.  Tariff.  The  "  American  system "  is  an  elastic 
designation,  which  can  be  applied  to  win  a  presumption 
in  favor  of  whatever  one  desires  to  recommend.  In  our 
history  it  has  changed  its  meaning  in  every  generation 
AJS  above  stated,1  the  United  States,  between  the  second 
vrar  and  1830,  did  not  favor  treaties  of  commerce.  The 
Oolicy  of  treaties  of  commerce  was  European.  Its 
•heory  was  that,  all  nations  having  restrictions  on  trada 
*nd  regarding  them  as  wise,  one  nation  should  break 
1  See  page  168. 


"RECIPROCITY."  195 

down  its  restrictions  to  a  specified  degree  and  for  a 
ipecified  counter-relaxation,  in  favor  of  another  nation 
with  which  it  might  make  a  commercial  treaty.  The 
favors  and  relaxations  granted  were  therefore  special 
and  individual,  and  the  relations  of  trade  hetween  na 
tions  were  the  result  of  all  the  special  and  peculiar 
relaxations  which  had  been  made,  starting  from  a  the 
ory  of  isolation  and  prohibition.  The  United  States, 
from  the  first  independent  acts  performed  by  it  as  a 
nation  with  any  other  nation,  the  commercial  treaty 
and  treaty  of  alliance  with  France  in  1778,  adopted  a 
different  policy.  It  started  not  from  an  hypothetical 
situation  of  prohibition  and  isolation,  but  from  an  hy 
pothesis  of  perfect  freedom.  It  tried  to  get  into  the 
commercial  relations  of  Europe,  but  it  would  not  grant 
any  special  privileges.  Its  doctrine  was  that  each  na-v 
tion,  while  rendering  trade  as  free  as  possible,  should 
be  governed  in  its  fiscal  arrangements  by  its  own  needs, 
circumstances,  and  good  judgment,  but  that,  once  having 
adopted  its  system,  it  should  present  a  uniform  front 
to  foreign  nations.  This  was  the  "American  system"^ 
in  the  first  generation.  In  the  second  generation  the 
difficulty  of  combining  an  independent  fiscal  system 
with  commercial  treaties  led  to  a  prejudice  against  the 
latter,  and  they  were  sought  almost  exclusively  for  the 
sake  of  receiving  reciprocity  as  to  ships  and  the  carry** 
ing  trade.  Then  the  "  American  system  "  underwent 
a  change.  "  Reciprocity  "  did  not  mean  mutual  relaxa 
tion  and  concession,  but  retaliation.  The  United  States 
departed  from  the  un?fo?mity  and  independence  of  its 
fiscal  system  to  countervail  and  resent  what  it  considered 
discrimination  against  itself.  There  was  no  case  in  which 
%ny  nation  placed  on  products  of  the  United  States  » 


196  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

heavier  tax  than  was  laid  on  the  same  products  from 
any  other  country,  save  in  the  case  of  colonies  ;  but  the 
discrimination  complained  of  lay  in  the  selection  for 
taxation  of  those  commodities  which  the  United  States 
produced,  as  a  means  of  protecting  the  same  commod 
ities  when  produced  in  the  taxing  countries.  It  was 
urged  that  the  American  system  required  that  the  United 
States  should  protect  the  production  at  home  of  products 
similar  to  those  which  were  produced  by  the  country 
whjr>h  taxed  the  products  of  the  United  States.  Hence 
the  American  system  then  meant  retaliation  to  force  a 
foreign  nation  to  break  down  its  protective  system,  — 
just  the  policy  advocated  by  the  newest  school  of  "  re- 
ciprocitarians  "  and  "  fair  traders  "  in  England.  Re 
taliation  always  amounts  to  just  this  :  Inasmuch  as  the 
other  party  has  cut  himself  off,  by  his  protective  taxes, 
from  the  share  which  he  might  have  had,  through  trade, 
in  our  natural  advantages,  incidentally  narrowing  the 
market  for  our  products,  and  so  injuring  us,  therefore  let 
us  now,  in  addition,  cut  ourselves  off,  by  protective  taxes, 
from  the  share  which  we  might  obtain,  through  trade,  in 
his  natural  advantages,  for  the  sake  of  incidentally  nar 
rowing  the  market  for  his  products,  and  so  injuring 
him.  When  the  scale  of  operations  is  small  enough  for 
the  effects  to  be  perceived,  retaliation  will  generally  ac 
complish  its  object ;  for  it  is  no  satisfaction  to  us,  in  the 
long  run,  when  we  are  suffering  from  harm  done  us  by 
somebody,  to  know  that  he  is  hurting  himself  more ;  but 
when  the  scale  of  operations  is  large,  retaliation  ia 
powerless,  because  the  effects  of  it  then  pass  under  that 
great  class  of  things,  —  the  despair  of  the  reformers  arid 
nocial  philosophers,  —  the  things  which  people  do  uot- 


"COUNTERVAILING."  197 

In  1817  an  act  was  passed  to  retaliate  for  certain  re- 
Itrictions  laid  by  Nova  Scotia  and  New  Brunswick  on 
New  England  ships  engaged  in  the  plaster  trade.  Here 
the  scale  of  operations  was  small  and  the  effects  were 
immediate  and  evident.  The  provinces  repealed  their 
restrictions.  This  instance  greatly  stimulated  faith  in 
the  policy  of  "  countervailing."  It  was  referred  to  as  a 
demonstration  of  the  power  of  that  policy.1  The  ap 
plication  of  it  to  the  West  India  trade  has  been  noticed. 

We  have  already  briefly  described  the  tariff  of  1824.a 
In  anticipation  of  the  passage  of  that  act  large  quantities 
of  woollen  goods  were  imported.  In  that  and  the  pre 
ceding  year  manufacturing  in  England  had  been  very 
active,  under  a  pressure  of  flush  times,  and  in  the  ex 
pectation  of  a  good  market  in  the  South  American  states, 
which  had  just  won  their  independence.  The  expecta 
tions  were  disappointed.  On  the  mania  followed  the 
crisis  and  panic  in  1825.  Then  large  stocks  were  thrown 
on  this  market  and  sacrificed  for  a  quick  return.  In 
1825  Huskisson  brought  forward  the  first  reforms  in 
the  system  of  taxation.  His  propositions,  viewed  from 
to-day's  stand-point,  seem  beggarly  enough,  but  at  that 
time  they  seemed  revolutionary.  He  reduced  taxes  on 
raw  materials,  chemicals,  dye-stuffs,  and  materials  of 
industry.  Raw  wool  was  reduced  from  sixpence  to  a 
Denny  and  a  half  penny  per  pound,  according  to  quality. 
Vfter  the  tariff  of  1824  was  passed  by  Congress,  the 
English  woollen  producers  imported  some  of  their  cloths 
into  this  country  in  an  unfinished  state,  in  order  to  get 
them  in  below  the  minimum  (33 £  cents;,  and  then  had 
them  finished  here.  They  also  sent  agents  to  this  coun 
try,  to  whom  they  invoiced  their  cloths  below  the  open 
?ia  J*et  price. 

1  5  Adams,  41.  'See  page  76. 


198  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Every  one  of  the  above  statements,  as  will  be 
introduces  a  fact  which  affected  the  relations  of  the 
American  woollen  industry  in  its  competition  with  the 
English  woollen  industry  in  a  way  to  counteract  any  pro 
tection  by  the  tariff.  A  number  of  persons  had  begun 
the  manufacture  of  woollens  because  the  federal  legisla 
tion  encouraged  them  so  to  do,  not  because  they  under 
stood  that  business,  or  had  examined  the  industrial  con 
ditions  of  success  in  it.  They  were  pleased  to  consider 
Huskisson's  legislation  as  hostile  to  the  United  States, 
and  they  called  for  measures  to  countervail  it.  They 
also  construed  as  fraud  the  importation  of  unfinished 
cloths  and  the  practice  of  invoicing  to  agents  at  manu 
facturer's  cost.  The  "  American  system  "  therefore  un 
derwent  another  transformation.  It  now  meant  to  coun 
tervail  and  offset  any  foreign  legislation,  even  in  the 
direction  of  freedom  and  reform  or  advance  in  civiliza 
tion,  if  that  legislation  favored  the  American  consumer. 

The  first  complaint  came  from  the  old  free-trade  sec 
tion.  After  1824  the  New  England  States,  which  up  to 
that  time  had  been  commercial  States,  turned  to  manu 
factures.  They  had  resisted  all  the  earlier  tariffs.  They 
would  have  been  obliged  to  begin  manufacturing,  tariff 
or  no  tariff,  on  account  of  the  growing  density  of  the 
population ;  but  there  was  force  in  Webster's  assertion, 
in  reply  to  Hayne,  that  New  England,  after  protesting 
against  the  tariff  as  long  as  she  could,  had  conformed  to 
a  policy  forced  upon  the  country  by  others,  and  had 
embarked  her  capital  in  manufacturing.1  October  23, 
1826,  the  Boston  woollen  manufacturers  petitioned  Con 
gress  for  more  protection.2  They  said  that  they  hao' 
been  led,  by  the  profits  of  the  English  woollen  industry  ii 
1  3  Webster's  Works,  305.  2  31  Niles.  145. 


TARIFF  ON  COTTONS  AND  WOOLLENS.   195 

1824  and  the  tariff  of  1824,  to  begin  manufacturing 
Woollens,  confident  that  they  should  not  yield  to  fair  com 
petition,  and  that  such  competition  would  be  secured  to 
them  by  law.  They  went  on  to  say  that  the  English 
woollen  manufacturers  had  glutted  the  market  in  Eng 
land,  and  produced  distress  there,  which  had  reacted  on 
fchis  country.  They  said  that  they  could  not  be  relieved 
"  without  the  aid  of  their  national  government." 

This  appeal  of  the  woollen  manufacturers  brought  out 
new  demands  from  other  quarters.  Especially  the  wool- 
growers  came  forward.  They  had  not  gained  anything 
by  the  tariff.  A  few  shrewd  men,  who  took  to  breeding 
sheep  and  who  sold  out  their  flocks  to  the  farmers  (who 
were  eager  buyers,  because  they  were  sure,  since  they 
had  a  protective  tax  in  their  favor,  that  they  were  to 
make  fortunes  out  of  wool),  won  by  the  tariff.  No  one 
else  did.  It  is  stated  that  the  woollen  manufacturers  did 
not  dare  to  ask  for  higher  duties  in  1824,  because  they 
feared  that  the  wool-growers  would  only  demand  so 
much  more.1  They  thought  that  their  want  of  success 
was  due  to  want  of  experience  and  skill,  and  they  looked 
to  make  improvements.  In  fact,  the  tax  on  wool  was 
raised,  in  1824,  more  than  that  on  woollens. 

By  the  tariff  of  1816  the  tax  on  cottons  was  fixed  for 
three  years  at  25  per  cent ;  after  that  at  20  per  cent. 
This  was  a  direct  application  of  the  theory  that  a  protect 
ive  tax  is  good  to  set  up  an  industry,  and  that  it  may 
then  be  lowered  or  removed.  The  device  of  the  mini 
mum  was  introduced,  however,  and  all  cottons,  except 
nankeens,  which  cost  less  than  25  cents  per  square  yard, 
tfere  to  be  held  to  have  cost  25  cents.  By  this  device 
Ihe  tax  on  the  lowest  grades  was  made  greatly  highei 
1  2  Ann.  Reg.  102. 


200  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

than  it  seemed  to  be.  For  the  same  three  years  wool 
vens  were  to  be  taxed  25  per  cent ;  after  that,  20  pel 
cent.  In  1824  the  tax  on  cottons  was  put  back  to  25 
per  cent,  and  woollens  were  raised  to  25  per  cent  i£ 
worth  not  above  33^  cents  per  square  yard,  and  30  per 
cent  or  33^  per  cent  if  of  greater  value.  Wool,  which 
was  free  in  1816,  was  graded  at  15  per  cent,  20  per 
cent,  and  30  per  cent,  in  1824. 

January  10, 1827,  Mallary,  of  Vermont,  introduced  the 
"  woollens  bill,"  for  "  adjusting  "  the  tariff  on  wool  and 
woollens.1  Niles  had  taken  up  the  high  tariff  doctrine 
ten  years  before,  and  had  preached  it  in  his  "  Register  " 
assiduously.  His  economic  notions  were  meagre  and 
erroneous  throughout,  and  he  had  absolutely  no  training. 
He  had  no  doubt,  however,  that  he  was  inculcating  the 
rules  of  prosperity  and  wise  government.  He  unques 
tionably  exerted  a  great  influence ;  for  he  never  tired 
of  his  labored  prescriptions  for  "  giving  a  circulation  to 
money,"  and  "  encouraging  industry."  He  took  up  the 
cause  of  the  woollen  men  with  his  whole  heart.  Of  his 
sincerity  and  disinterestedness  there  can  be  no  question. 
To  him  and  the  economists  and  statesmen  of  his  school 
the  minimum  seemed  to  be  a  marvellous  invention.  Mal 
lary  proposed  to  use  it  to  the  utmost.  He  proposed  to 
leave  the  rates  of  tax  unchanged,  but  to  apply  them  on 
and  between  minima  of  40  cents,  $2.50,  and  $4.00. 
Cloth,  therefore,  which  cost  41  cents  was  to  be  held  to 
have  cost  $2.50,  and  the  tax  on  it  was  to  be  62^  cents. 
Wool  which  cost  over  10  cents  was  to  be  held  to  have 
cost  40  cents.  The  duty  on  it  was  to  be  35  per  cent  for 
I  yoar ;  then  40  per  cent.  The  principle  now  proposed 
ra?,  therefore,  that  the  duties  should  advance  with  tima 
i  31  Niles,  319. 


THE  "WOOLLENS  BSLL."  201 

The  woollens  bill  passed  the  House,  106  to  95.  Et  was 
tabled  in  the  Senate  by  the  casting  vote  of  Calhoun, 
Calhoun  was  forced  into  this  vote  uy  a  manoeuvre  of 
Van  Buren,  who  "  dodged."  Calhoun  suffered,  in  conse 
quence,  in  Pennsylvania  and  New  York.  Politics  ran 
very  high  on  this  bill.  In  fact,  they  quite  superseded 
all  the  economic  interests.1  The  opposition  were  afraid 
of  offending  either  the  Pennsylvania  supporters  of  Jack 
son,  or  the  Southern  supporters  of  Jackson.  Passion 
began  now  to  enter  into  tariff  discussion,  not  only  on 
the  part  of  the  Southerners,  but  also  between  the  wool 
men  and  the  woollen  men,  each  of  whom  thought  the 
other  grasping,  and  that  each  was  to  be  defeated  in  his 
purpose  by  the  other.  Niles  said  that  it  was  more  a 
wool  bill  than  a  woollens  bill,  and  the  woollen  men  were 
much  dissatisfied  with  it. 

May  14,  1827,  the  Pennsylvania  Society  for  the  Pro 
motion  of  Manufactures  and  the  Mechanic  Arts  called  a 
convention  of  wool  growers  and  manufacturers.  The 
convention  met  at  Harrisburg,  July  30,  1827.  It  was 
found  necessary  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  the  convention 
in  order  to  make  allies  of  interests  which  would  other 
wise  become  hostile.  The  convention  went  on  the  plan 
of  favoring  protection  on  everything  which  asked  for  it. 
The  result  was  that  iron,  steel,  glass,  wool,  woollens, 
hemp,  and  flax  were  recommended  for  protection. 
Louisiana  was  not  represented,  and  so  sugar  was  left 
out.  It  was  voted  to  discourage  the  importation  of  for 
eign  spirits  and  the  distillation  of  spirits  from  foreign 
products,  by  way  of  protection  to  Western  whiskey.  The 
convention  proposed,  as  its  idea  of  a  reasonable  and 
proper  tax  on  wool  and  woollen^  the  following : a  On 

I  31  NHes,  321 ;  33  Niles,  385.  2  32  NiLw,  388 


202  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

torool  which  cost  8  cents  or  less  per  pound,  20  cents  pel 
pound  and  an  advance  of  2-£  cents  per  pound  per  an 
num  until  it  should  be  50  cents ;  on  woollens,  four 
minima  were  proposed,  50  cents,  $2.50,  $4.00,  and 
$6.00,  on  which  the  tax  was  to  be  40  per  cent  for  a 
year,  45  per  cent  the  next  year,  and  50  per  cent  there 
after.  The  minimum  on  cottons  was  to  be  raised  to  40 
cents. 

When  the  20th  Congress  met,  the  tariff  was  the  ab 
sorbing  question.  Popular  interest  had  become  engaged 
in  it  and  parties  were  to  form  on  it,  but  it  perplexed 
the  politicians  greatly.  It  was  to  this  Congress  at  its 
opening  that  Rush  sent  the  report  described  above.1 
Stevenson,  of  Virginia,  an  anti-tariff  man,  was  chosen 
Speaker.  Adams  says  that  Stevenson  won  votes  by 
promising  to  make  a  committee  favorable  to  the  tariff.3 
Stevenson  put  Mallary  at  the  head  of  the  committee, 
but  he  put  an  anti-tariff  majority  behind  him.  The 
"  Annual  Register "  8  stated  the  foreign  trade  of  the 
country  then  as  follows :  Twenty-four  million  dollars' 
worth  of  cotton,  rice,  and  tobacco  were  exported  to 
England  annually.  Four  million  dollars'  worth  moro 
were  exported  to  other  countries.  The  imports  from 
England  were  seven  or  eight  millions'  worth  of  wool 
lens,  about  the  same  value  of  cottons,  three  or  four  mil 
lions'  worth  of  iron,  steel,  and  hardware,  and  miscella 
neous  articles,  bringing  the  total  up  to  twenty-eight 
millions.  From  this  it  was  plain  that  the  producers  of 
bread-stuffs  in  the  United  States,  who  were  kept  out  of 
England  by  the  corn  laws,  were  forced  to  take  theii 
products  to  the  West  Indies  and  South  America,  and 

1  See  page  188.  s  7  Adams,  369. 

«  3  Ann.  Reg.  37. 


FOREIGN  TRADE  BALANCE,  1828.  203 

exchange  them  there  for  four  millions'  worth  of  colo 
nial  produce,  which  England  would  receive,  in  order  to 
balance  the  account.  The  editor  of  the  "  Annual  Reg 
ister  "  built  upon  this  fact  his  argument  for  protection 
as  a  retaliation  to  break  down  the  English  corn  laws. 
He  saw  that  the  Southern  staple  products  must  be  the 
fulcrum  for  the  lever  by  which  the  English  restrictions 
were  to  be  broken.  He  offered  the  Southerners  a  cer 
tain  consolation  in  the  hope  that  there  would  be  a  larger 
consumption  of  their  staples  at  home,  but  really  con 
cluded  that,  as  between  interests,  the  grain  interest  of 
the  North  and  West  was  worth  more  than  the  interests 
of  the  South.  It  is  not  strange  if  this  mode  of  reason 
ing  was  not  relished  in  the  South.1 

Mallary  stated  in  debate  that  the  consumption  of 
woollens  in  the  United  States  was  then  seventy-two  mill 
ion  dollars  per  annum,  of  which  ten  millions'  worth  were 
imported,  twenty-two  millions'  worth  were  manufactured 
in  the  United  States,  and  forty  millions'  worth  were  pro 
duced  by  household  spinning  and  weaving  ("  domestic 
industry,"  as  the  term  was  then  used).  If  these  statistics 
are  worth  anything,  the  twelve  millions  of  population 
consumed,  on  an  average,  six  dollars'  worth  of  woollens 
per  head  per  annum.  What  Mallary  proposed  to  do 
was  to  prevent  the  ten  millions'  worth  from  being  im 
ported.  To  do  this  he  would  increase  the  cost  of  the 
part  imported  and  the  part  manufactured  at  home,  the 
result  of  which  would  be  that  still  a  larger  part  of  the 
population  would  have  to  be  clothed  in  homespun. 
Thus  his  project  might  easily  defeat  itself,  so  far  as  it 
itmied  to  benefit  the  American  manufacturer,  p-nd  it 
rould  deprive  the  American  people  of  the  rest,  leisure 
1  See  page  9,08. 


204  ANDREW  JACRtfON. 

and  greater  satisfaction,  as  well  as  abundance,  which 
new  machinery  and  the  factory  system  were  -winning 
out  of  the  textile  industries,  as  compared  with  the  old 
household  spinning  and  weaving. 

The  Committee  on  Manufactures  of  the  House  had 
been  taking  testimony  on  the  tariff  during  the  recess. 
The  Southern  free-traders  had  brought  this  about  against 
the  opposition  of  the  Northern  protectionists.  There 
were  only  twenty-eight  witnesses  examined,  of  whom 
nine  were  voluntary  and  seven  were  members  of  Con 
gress.  The  evidence  amounted  to  nothing  but  com 
plaints  of  hard  times  and  losses.1  The  deduction  that 
these  facts  were  due  to  a  lack  of  sufficient  tariff  was 
taken  for  granted.2 

Silas  Wright  and  other  anti-tariff  men  on  the  Com 
mittee  on  Manufactures  would  not  let  Mallary  report 
the  propositions  of  the  Harrisburg  convention  on  wool 
and  woollens.8  Mallary  tried  to  introduce  those  propo 
sitions  as  amendments  on  the  floor  of  the  House.  All 
the  interests,  industrial  and  political,  pounced  upon  the 
bill  to  try  to  amend  it  to  their  notions.  New  England 
and  the  Adams  men  wanted  high  duties  on  woollens  and 
cottons,  and  low  duties  on  wool,  iron,  hemp,  salt,  and 
molasses  (the  raw  material  of  rum).  Pennsylvania, 
Ohio,  and  Kentucky  wanted  high  taxes  on  iron,  wool, 
hemp,  molasses  (protection  to  whiskey),  and  low  taxes 

1  34  Niles,  1. 

2  As  a  specimen  of  the  value  of  such  complaints :  In  April, 
1828,  Niles  said  that  there  was  dullness  in  trade  and  great  distress 
It  Baltimore.     (34  Niles,  139.)     In  October  he  said  that  he  had 
Hot  been  through  parts  of  the  city  for  a  long  time,  and  that  on  a 
lecent  walk  he  had  been  astonished  at  tin  signs  of  prosperity 

35  Niles,  81.) 
•  Hammond's  Wright,  104. 


TARIFF  OF  1828.  205 

Dn  woollens  and  cottons.  The  Southerners  wanted  low 
taxes  on  everything,  but  especially  on  finished  goods; 
and  if  there  were  to  be  heavy  taxes  on  these  latter  they 
did  not  care  how  heavy  the  taxes  on  the  raw  materials 
were  made.  This  last  point  and  the  unswerving  loyalty 
of  rural  Pennsylvania  to  Jackson  enabled  the  Jackson 
party  to  hold  together  its  discordant  elements.  The 
political  and  economic  alliances  of  the  South  were  plainly 
inconsistent.1 

The  act  which  resulted  from  the  scramble  of  selfish 
special  interests  was  an  economic  monstrosity.  The 
industrial  interests  of  twelve  millions  of  people  had  been 
thrown  into  an  arena  where  there  was  little  knowledge 
of  economic  principles,  and  no  information  about  the  in 
dustrial  state  of  the  country,  or  about  the  special  indus 
tries.  It  being  assumed  that  the  Legislature  could, 
would,  and  was  about  to,  confer  favors  and  advantages, 
there  was  a  scramble  to  see  who  should  get  the  most. 
At  the  same  time  party  ambitions  and  strifes  seized 
upon  the  industrial  interests  as  capital  for  President- 
making.  May  19,  1828,  the  bill  became  a  law.  The 
duty  on  wool  costing  less  than  10  cents  per  pound  was 
15  per  cent,  on  other  wool  20  per  cent  and  30  per  cent 
That  on  woollens  was  40  per  cent  for  a  year,  then  45 
per  cent,  there  being  four  minima,  50  cents,  $1.00, 
$2.50,  $4.00.  All  which  cost  over  $4.00  were  to  be 
taxed  45  per  cent  for  a  year,  then  50  per  cent.  Niles 
and  all  the  woollen  men  were  enraged  at  this  arrange 
ment.  No  South  Carolinian  was  more  discontented 
than  they.  The  "  dollar  minimum  was  the  especial 
lause  of  their  rage.  Cloth  which  cost  51  cents  they 
ranted  to  regard  as  costing  $2.50,  and  to  tax  it  40  pel 
See  page  211 


206  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

rent  on  that,  i.  «.,  $1.00.  The  dollar  minimum  let  in  a 
large  class  of  cloths  which  cost  from  $1.00  to  $1.25, 
and  which  could  be  run  down  to  cost  from  90  to  99 
cents. 

The  process  of  rolling  iron  had  not  yet  been  intro 
duced  into  this  country.  It  was  argued  that  rolled  iron 
was  not  as  good  as  forged,  and  this  was  made  the 
ground  for  raising  the  tax  on  rolled  iron  from  $30.00  to 
$37.00  per  ton,  while  the  tax  on  forged  iron  was  raised 
from  $18.00  to  $22.40.  Rolled  iron  was  cheaper,  and 
was  available  for  a  great  number  of  uses.  The  tax,  in 
this  case,  "  countervailed  "  an  improvement  in  the  arts, 
and  robbed  the  American  people  of  their  share  in  the 
advantage  of  a  new  industrial  achievement.  The  tax  on 
steel  was  raised  from  $20.00  to  $30.00  per  ton ;  that  on 
hemp  from  $35.00  to  $45.00  per  ton ;  that  on  molasses 
from  5  cents  to  10  cents  per  gallon ;  that  on  flax  from 
nothing  to  $35.00  per  ton.  The  tax  on  sugar,  salt,  and 
glass  remained  unchanged,  and  that  on  tea  also,  save  by 
a  differential  tonnage  duty.  Coffee  was  classified  and 
the  tax  reduced.  The  tax  on  wine,  by  a  separate  act, 
was  reduced  one  half  or  more.1 

This  was  the  "  tariff  of  abominations,"  so  called  on 
account  of  the  number  of  especially  monstrous  provi 
sions  which  it  contained.  In  the  course  of  the  debate 
on  it  the  dogma  was  freely  used  that  protective  taxes 
lower  prices,  and  the  exclusion  of  American  grain  by 
the  English  corn  laws  was  a  constantly  effective  argu 
ment.  Credit  varying  from  nine  to  eighteen  months 
T»S  allowed  under  this  as  under  the  previous  tariffs. 
1  Se«  page  343. 


CHAPTER  X. 

PUBLIC   QUESTIONS     OF     JACKSON'S    FIRST     ADMINTSTIU 
TION. III. 

VI.  Nullification.  The  Southerners  bitterly  de 
nounced  the  tariff  of  1828.  They  had  already  begun 
to  complain  of  the  operation  of  the  system  four  or  five 
years  before.  To  understand  their  complaint,  it  is 
enough  to  notice  with  what  reckless  extravagance  the 
tariff  theory,  even  if  its  truth  were  admitted,  was  being 
handled  in  1828.  Of  course  the  public  argument  in 
favor  of  the  tariff  necessarily  took  the  form  of  asser 
tions  that,  by  some  occult  process  or  other,  the  taxation 
proposed  would  be  beneficent  to  all,  and  that  the  pro 
tective  theory  was  a  theory  of  national  wealth.  The 
Southerners  were  sure  that  they  paid  the  expenses  of 
the  experiment,  and  they  ventured  the  inference  that 
those  who  were  so  eager  for  the  tariff  saw  their  profit 
ia  it ;  but  when  the  attempt  was  made  to  find  any  com 
pensation  to  the  nation  or  to  the  South,  no  such  thing 
could  be  found.  Up  to  that  point  there  was  the  plain 
fact  of  capital  expended  and  capital  gained ;  at  that 
point  all  turned  into  dogma  and  declamation. 

March  12,  1828,  McDuffie,  of  Soutli  Carolina,  pre 
sented  a  report  from  the  Committee  on  Ways  and 
Means  *  against  the  tariff.  He  enumerated  the  varieties 
»f  woollens  used  by  the  people,  and  showed  tho  operation 
i  34  Nito.  & 


208  AN  DUE  W  JACKSON. 

of  the  minima  upon  each.  He  then  went  on  to  discuss 
the  economic  doctrines  and  the  theory  of  protection  as  a 
mode  of  increasing  the  wealth  of  the  country,  and  more 
especially  the  effect  of  the  proposed  taxes  on  the  agri 
cultural  and  exporting  sections.  The  facts  and  doctrines 
Btated  by  him  were  unanswerable,  but  they  did  not 
touch  either  the  political  motives  or  the  interested  pe 
cuniary  motives  which  were  really  pushing  the  tariff. 
He  had  all  the  right  and  all  the  reason,  but  not  the 
power.  The  agricultural  States  were  forced,  under  the 
tariff,  either  to  export  their  products,  exchange  them 
for  foreign  products,  and  pay  taxes  on  these  latter  to 
the  federal  treasury  before  they  could  bring  them  home, 
or  else  to  exchange  their  products  with  the  Northern 
manufacturers  for  manufactured  products,  and  to  pay 
taxes  to  the  latter  in  the  price  of  the  goods.  All  the 
mysteries  of  exchange,  banking,  and  brokerage  might 
obscure,  they  never  could  alter,  these  actual  economic 
relations  of  fact.  When  the  Southerners  were  put  off 
with  the  glib  commonplace  reply  to  their  remonstrance 
that  they  would  sell  more  cotton  to  the  North,  they 
were  doubly  exasperated.  If  the  South,  under  free 
trade,  produced  100  bales  of  cotton,  of  which  it  exported 
75  bales  for  $3,750  and  sold  25  bales  to  the  North  for 
$1,250,  it  got  $5,000  for  100  bales.  If  a  ten  per  cent 
tax  was  laid  on  manufactures,  and  if  that  tax  availed, 
as  argued,  to  cause  only  60  bales  to  be  exported  and  40 
to  be  sold  at  the  North,  then  the  60  exported,  at  the 
same  price  as  before,  would  bring  $3,000  worth  of  man 
ufactured  goods,  on  which  ten  per  cent  must  be  paid  to 
get  them  home  ;  net  $2,700.  The  40  bales  sold  at  the 
North  would  bring  $2,000,  at  the  same  price  as  befora 
but  goods  bought  with  this  $2,000  would  be  enhance*. 


THE  SOUTHERN  GRIEVANCE.  209 

hi  price  ten  per  cent  by  the  protection,  and,  as  comparec, 
with  former  returns,  the  goods  now  obtained  would  oe 
worth  $1,800.  The  South  would  therefore  have  ob 
tained  for  100  bales  $4,500  worth  of  products  at  the 
old  free-trade  prices.  Therefore  the  difference  in  the 
distribution  of  the  product  could  make  no  difference  at 
all  in  the  facts  of  profit  and  the  incidence  of  the  tax, 
and  at  the  end  of  the  calculation  the  intricate  device 
came  to  nothing  but  an  imposition  of  ten  per  cent  tax 
on  the  agricultural  products  of  the  country. 

The  .protectionists  always  affected  to  deride  the  South 
ern  declaration  that  the  tax  fell  on  the  South.  The  po^ 
ular  notion  was  that  the  tariff  tax  bore  on  the  foreigner 
in  some  way  or  other,  and  helped  the  domestic  producer 
to  a  victory  over  the  foreigner.  Since  the  object  of  the 
tariff  was  to  prevent  importations  of  foreign  goods,  it 
would,  if  it  succeeded,  make  the  foreigner  stay  at  home, 
and  keep  his  goods  there.  This  of  course  deprived  him 
of  a  certain  demand  for  his  goods,  and  prevented  him 
from  reaching  a  gain  which,  under  other  conditions,  he 
might  have  won,  but  it  could  not  possibly  render  him  or 
his  capital  in  anyway  available  for  "  encouraging  Amer 
ican  manufactures."  The  American  consumer  of  Amer 
ican  products  is  the  only  person  whom  American  laws 
could  reach  in  order  to  make  him  contribute  capital  to 
build  up  American  industry.  So  far,  then',  as  the  Amer 
ican  protected  industries  were  concerned,  they  preyed 
upon  each  other  with  such  results  of  net  gain  and  loss 
as  chance  and  stupidity  might  bring  about.  So  far  as 
American  non-protected  industries  were  concerned,  they, 
being  the  naturally  strong  and  independent  industries  of 
the  country,  sustained  the  whole  body  of  protected  iu- 
iustries,  which  were  simply  parasites  apon  them.  Tbt 
14 


210  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

protective  theory,  as  a  theory  of  wealth,  therefore  pro 
posed  to  organize  national  industry  as  an  independent 
body  with  a  parasite  upon  it,  while  the  free-trade  theory 
proposed  to  let  industry  organize  itself  as  so  many  in 
dependent  and  vigorous  bodies  as  the  labor,  capital,  and 
land  of  the  country  could  support. 

The  grievance  of  the  South  in  1828  is  undeniable. 
So  long  as  the  exports  of  the  country  were  almost  ex 
clusively  Southern  products  —  cotton  and  tobacco  —  and 
so  long  as  the  federal  revenue  was  almost  entirely  da- 
rived  from  duties  on  imports,  it  is  certain  that  the 
Southern  industries  either  supported  the  federal  govern 
ment  or  paid  tribute  to  the  Northern  manufacturers. 
The  Southerners  could  not  even  get  a  hearing  or  patient 
and  proper  study  of  the  economic  questions  at  issue. 
Their  interests  were  being  sacrificed  to  pretended  national 
interests,  just  as,  under  the  embargo,  the  interests  of  New 
England  were  sacrificed  to  national  interests.  In  each 
case  the  party  which  considered  its  interests  sacrificed 
came  to  regard  the  Union  only  as  a  cage,  in  which  all 
were  held  in  order  that  the  stronger  combination  might 
plunder  the  weaker.  No  amount  of  precept  or  emphasis 
can  make  the  Union,  which  is  the  paramount  civil  inter 
est  of  the  American  people,  strong  and  permanent,  if 
any  section  or  party  in  it  has  reason  to  believe  that  its 
interests  are  sacrificed  in  the  Union ;  and  the  Union 
nevex  can  be  secure  unless  there  is  a  disposition  in  the 
predominant  majority  at  any  time  to  listen  with  patience 
to  any  remonstrance,  and  to  exercise  power  with  moder 
ation  and  justice. 

The  more  thoroughly  the  economist  and  political 
philosopher  recognizes  the  grievance  of  the  Southerner! 
in  1828,  the  more  ho  must  regret  the  unwisdom  of  the 


VOTES  ON  THE  TARIFF  OF  1828.  211 

Southern  proceedings.  The  opponents  of  the  tariff  of 
1828  adopted  the  policy  of  voting  in  favor  of  all  the 
(t  abominations  "  on  points  of  detail,  in  the  hope  that 
they  could  so  weight  down  the  bill  that  it  would  at  last 
fail  as  a  whole.1  Hence  those  Southerners  who  sup 
ported  Jackson  voted  with  the  Pennsylvania  and  New 
York  high-tariff  men  for  all  the  worst  features  of  the 
bill,  while  New  England  and  the  Adams  men,  who 
started  as  high-tariff  men,  voted  on  the  other  side. 
The  Southern  Jackson  men  wanted  to  give  way  suffi 
ciently  on  the  tariff  to  secure  one  or  two  doubtful  States. 
For  instance,  they  were  willing  to  protect  whiskey  and 
hemp  to  win  Kentucky  from  Clay  to  Jackson.  They 
were,  in  fact,  playing  a  game  which  was  far  too  delicate, 
between  their  economic  interests  and  their  political 
party  affiliations.  They  were  caught  at  last.  In  the 
vote  on  the  previous  question  in  the  House,  the  yeas 
were  110,  of  whom  11  were  Adams  men  and  99  Jackson 
men ;  the  nays  were  91,  of  whom  80  were  Adams  men 
and  11  Jackson  men.  The  nays  were  those  who  wanted 
a  tariff,  but  who  wanted  to  amend  the  bill  before  them 
a  great  deal  more  before  they  passed  it ;  that  is,  they 
wanted  to  take  out  the  abominations  which  the  anti- 
tariff  men  had  voted  into  it.  On  the  final  passage  of 
the  bill,  the  yeas  were  105,  of  whom  61  were  Adams 
men  and  44  Jackson  men ;  the  nays  were  94,  of  whom 
35  were  Adams  men  and  59  were  Jackson  men.  Of 
the  yeas  only  3  were  from  south  of  the  Potomac.  The 
policy  of  the  Southern  free-traders,  like  most  attempts 
tt  legislative  finesse,  proved  an  entire  failure.  The 
high-tariff  men,  although  every  man  had  intense  objeo* 
rion  to  something  in  the  bill  voted  for  it  rather  that 
i  35  Nilea  *2. 


212  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

defeat  the  bill  entirely.  The  New  England  men  did 
not  know  how  to  vote.  In  the  end  23  of  them  voted 
against  the  bill  and  16  for  it.1  The  bill  passed  the 
Senate,  26  to  21.  Webster  did  not  know  on  May  7th 
how  he  should  vote.2  He  voted  for  it,  and  then  went 
home  and  defended  the  vote  on  the  ground  that  he  had 
to  take  the  good  and  evil  of  the  measure  together.1 
After  all,  the  tariff  made  no  capital  for  anybody.  The 
protectionists  by  threatening  both  parties  forced  both  to 
concede  the  tariff,  after  which  the  protectionists  voted 
vrith  either  party,  according  to  their  preferences,  just  as 
they  would  have  done  if  both  had  resisted  instead  of 
both  yielding. 

Van  Buren  obtained  "  instructions  "  from  Albany  to 
vote  for  the  tariff,  in  order  to  be  able  to  do  so  without 
offending  the  Southerners.4  Calhoun  declared,  in  a 
speech  in  the  Senate,  February  23,  1837,  that  Van 
Buren  was  to  blame  for  the  tariff  of  1828.5 

The  South  had  already  begun  to  discuss  remedies  be 
fore  the  tariff  of  1828  was  passed.  Colonel  Hamilton, 
of  South  Carolina,  at  a  public  dinner  in  the  autumn  of 
1827,  proposed  "  nullification "  as  a  remedy,  the  term 
being  borrowed  from  the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  reso 
lutions  of  1798.  Those  resolutions  now  came  to  have 
for  a  certain  party  in  the  South  the  character  and 
authority  of  an  addendum  to  the  Constitution.  They 

1  35  Niles,  52.  2  7  Adams,  534. 

*  1  Webster's  Works,  165. 
4  Mackeinzie,  103 ;     Hammond's  Wright,  105. 
6  Green's  Telegraph  Extra,  271,  says  Adams  wanted  to  vet« 
the  tariff  of  1828,  and  throw  himself  on  the  South,  uniting  with 
Calhoun,  brit  that  Clay  would  not  let  him  do  so,  because  thaf 
ruin  him  and  the  American  system.     This  is  a  very  doubt 
atory. 


THE  RESOLUTIONS  OF  1798.  213 

urere,  in  truth,  only  the  manifesto  of  a  rancorous  oppo 
sition,  and  they  belong,  in  the  history  of  the  country,  in 
the  same  box  of  curious  products  of  political  passion 
with  the  resolutions  of  the  Hartford  convention.  Yet, 
at  that  time,  to  call  a  man  a  "  federalist "  would  have 
been  a  graver  insult  throughout  the  South  than  it  would 
be  now,  in  the  North,  to  call  a  man  a  secessionist. 

An  examination  of  the  resolutions  of  1798,  as  they 
were  adopted,  will  fail  to  find  nullification  in  them. 
The  resolutions,  with  a  number  of  other  most  interesting 
documents  connected  therewith,  are  given  by  Niles  iu 
a  supplement  to  his  43d  volume.  By  examination  of 
these  it  appears  that  Jefferson's  original  draft  of  the 
Kentucky  resolutions  contained,  in  the  eighth  resolution, 
these  words  :  "  Where  powers  are  assumed  which  have 
not  been  delegated,  a  nullification  of  the  act  is  the  right 
remedy."  The  Legislature  of  Kentucky  cut  out  this 
and  nearly  all  the  rest  of  the  eighth  resolution.  The 
executory  resolution,  as  drawn  by  Jefferson,  ended  thus  : 
'  The  co-States  [he  means  those  States  which  adopt  these 
resolutions]  .  .  .  will  concur  in  declaring  these  acts 
[the  alien  and  sedition  laws]  void  and  of  no  force,  and 
will  each  take  measures  of  its  own  for  providing  that 
neither  of  these  acts  .  .  .  shall  be  exercised  within  their 
respective  territories."  The  Legislature  struck  this  out, 
and  adopted,  as  the  executory  resolution:  "The  co- 
States  .  .  .  will  concur  in  declaring  these  [acts]  void 
and  of  no  force,  and  will  each  unite  with  this  common 
wealth  in  requesting  their  repeal  at  the  next  session  of 
Congress."  Some  of  the  other  States  responded  to  these 
resolutions,  and  in  1799  Kentucky  passed  a  resolution 
In  which  occurs  this  statement :  "  A  nullification  by  those 
lovereignties  of  all  unauthorized  acts  done  under  color 


214  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Df  that  instrument  [the  Constitution]  is  the  rightful 
remedy."  Madison's  Virginia  resolutions  do  not  con 
tain  nullification  either  in  form  or  substance,  least  of 
all  as  a  practical  remedy.  They  declare  the  alien  and 
sedition  acts  unconstitutional,  and  that  "  the  necessary 
and  proper  measures  will  be  taken  by  each  [of  the  con 
curring  States]  for  cooperating  with  this  State  "  to  pre 
serve  the  reserved  rights  of  the  States  and  people.  In 
1799  Madison  made  a  long  report  to  the  Virginia  House 
of  Delegates,  in  which  he  analyzed  and  defended  the 
resolutions  of  1798,  and  especially  defended  the  rem 
edy  proposed,  namely,  a  solemn  resolution  and  protest, 
communicated  to  the  other  States.  He  construed  this 
remedy  strictly.  In  May,  1830,  Madison  wrote  to  Liv 
ingston,  approving  of  an  anti-nullification  speech  made 
by  him  on  March  15th  of  that  year.  He  thus  states 
the  error  of  the  nullifiers :  "  The  error  in  the  late  com 
ments  on  the  Virginia  proceedings  has  arisen  from  a 
failure  to  distinguish  between  what  is  declaratory  of 
opinion  and  what  is  ipso  facto  executory ;  between  the 
rights  of  the  parties  and  of  a  single  party ;  and  between 
resorts  within  the  purview  of  the  Constitution  ard  the 
ultima  ratio  which  appeals  from  a  Constitution  can 
celled  by  its  abuses  to  original  rights,  paramount  to  all 
Constitutions,"  In  1830  Madison  also  wrote  two  long 
letters,  one  to  Edward  Everett,  the  other  to  Andrew 
Stevenson,  in  which  he  interprets  the  Virginia  resolu 
tions.  He  certainly  softens  them  down  somewhat, 
which  is  a  proof  that  party  heat  influenced  him  when  ho 
wrote  them.  He  lays  especial  stress  on  the  limited  and 
harmless  nature  of  the  proposed  action  of  Virginia, 
His  two  letters  are  the  best  statement  of  "  Madisoniai 
federalism." 


JEFFERSON  AND  NULLIFICATION.  218 

It  is  certain  that  the  nullification  of  a  federal  law  in  a 
State,  by  a  state  authority,  as  a  practical  and  available 
remedy  against  an  offensive  measure,  found  no  sanction 
in  1798-99,  except  in  the  supplementary  resolution  of 
Kentucky,  when  the  heat  of  the  controversy  favored  an 
extreme  position.  It  was  a  notion  of  Jefferson,  in 
which  Madison  did  not  join,  and  which  neither  Legis 
lature  adopted,  except  as  stated.  Never  until  1827  was 
any  body  of  men  found  to  take  up  the  notion,  and  try 
to  handle  it  as  reasonable  and  practical.  Nullification' 
is  jacobinism.  It  is  revolution  made  a  constant  political 
means,  and  brought  into  the  every-day  business  of  civil 
life.  Nothing  is  more  astonishing  in  American  political 
history  than  the  immunity  enjoye'd  by  some  men,  and 
the  unfair  responsibility  enforced  against  others.  Every 
school-boy  is  taught  to  execrate  the  alien  and  sedition 
laws,  and  John  Adams  bears  the  odium  of  them,  but  no 
responsibility  worth  speaking  of  for  nullification  attaches 
to  Jefferson.  He  was  the  father  of  it  and  the  sponsor 
of  it,  and  the  authority  of  his  name  was  what  recom 
mended  it  in  1827. 

In  December,  1827,  the  South  Carolina  Legislature 
raised  a  committee  on  the  powers  of  the  federal  govern 
ment  in  regard  to  tariff.  In  the  winter  of  1827-28  the 
Legislatures  of  several  Southern  States  passed  resolutions 
about  protective  tariff  legislation.  South  Carolina  had 
been  a  federal  State  in  the  previous  generation.  She 
had  not  been  opposed  to  the  federal  government  save 
JQ  the  matter  of  her  "  police  bill."  Georgia  had  been 
the  turbulent  State,  —  the  one  which  had  had  the  most 
frequent  collisions  with  the  federal  government,  and  had 
Behaved  on  those  occasions  witn  violence  and  folly. 
South  Carolina  in  Monroe's  time  was  latitudinirian  and 


216  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

mil-radical,  and  as  such  was  opposed  to  Georgia. 
South  Carolina  now  declared  the  tariff,  internal  im» 
provements,  and  appropriations  for  the  colonization  so- 
ciety  unconstitutional.  Georgia  declared  the  tariff  and 
internal  improvements  unconstitutional;  declared  that 
Georgia  would  not  submit  to  the  action  of  Congress, 
and  affirmed  the  right  of  secession.2  The  t>ld  Crawford 
party,  however,  took  sides  against  nullification,  and  pre 
vented  Georgia  from  ranging  herself  with  South  Caro 
lina.  At  a  meeting  at  Athens,  August  6,  1828,  pre 
sided  over  by  Crawford,  a  committee,  consisting  of 
Wayne,  Berrien,  Cobb,  Gilmer,  Clayton,  Troup,  and 
others,  reported  an  address  and  resolutions  denouncing 
the  tariff,  but  disclaiming  all  disunion  sentiments  or 
purposes,  and  favoring 3  constitutional  remedies.  In 
1832  Crawford  advocated  a  theory  that  secession  was 
wrong  until  after  a  convention  to  amend  the  Constitu 
tion  had  been  tried  and  proved  a  failure.4  North  Caro 
lina  protested,  in  1828,  against  the  new  tariff,  declaring 
that  it  violated  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution  and  opposed 
the  interests  of  that  State.  Alabama  denied  the  con 
stitutionality  of  the  tariff,  and  denounced  it  as  pillage  of 
that  State. 

The  proceedings  of  South  Carolina  did  not  remedy 
the  matter  at  all.  They  altered  the  issue  very  much  to 
the  satisfaction  of  the  protectionists.  The  Union  and 
the  supremacy  of  the  law  were  something  on  which  a 
ranch  better  fight  could  be  made  than  on  the  tariff,  and 
the  protectionists,  having  secured  the  law,  wanted  noth* 
ing  better  than  to  draw  away  attention  from  the  criti 
tism  of  it  by  making  the  fight  on  nullification.  Cal 

1  38  Niles,  1 54.  2  3  Ann.  Reg.  64. 

*  35  Niles,  14.  *  42  Niles,  389. 


AEASONS  FOR  EXASPERATION 

aoun  and  the  South  Carolinians  had  changed  the  fighting 
from  free  trade  to  nullification,  and  on  that  they  stood 
alone.  They  threw  away  a  splendid  chance  to  secure 
a  sound  policy  on  one  of  the  first  economic  interests 
of  the  country.  In  the  debate  between  Webster  and 
Hayne  the  latter  won  a  complete  victory  on  tariff  and 
land.  Webster  made  the  fighting  on  the  constitutional 
question,  and  turned  away  from  the  other  questions  al 
most  entirely.  He  had  no  standing  ground  on  tariff 
and  land.  He  was  on  record  in  his  earliest  speeches  as 
an  intelligent  free-trader,  and  his  biographer  l  has  in 
finite  and  fruitless  trouble  to  try  to  explain  away  the 
fact.  When  Hayne  opened  the  constitutional  question 
he  gave  Webster  every  chance  of  victory. 

The  action  of  Congress  in  passing  the  tariff  of  1828, 
in  spite  of  the  attitude  of  the  South,  seemed  to  the 
Southerners  to  indicate  an  insolent  disregard  of  their 
expostulations.  Of  course  it  was  not  a  question  to  be 
settled  by  a  majority.  A  remonstrance  against  injustice 
and  wrong  cannot  be  put  down  by  any  majority.  There 
may  be  many  answers  to  the  remonstrance,  or  it  may 
not  be  practicable  to  yield  to  it,  but  to  disregard  it  and 
answer  it  by  a  heavier  and  more  reckless  imposition  of 
the  same  kind  is  not  good  government,  whether  it  be  a 
democratic  majority  which  levies  a  tariff,  or  a  despot 
who  levies  a  forced  loan.  The  supporters  of  the  tariff 
were  forced  to  argue  that  it  was  a  wise  public  and  na 
tional  policy,  just  as  it  might  be  argued  that  a  state 
«hurch  or  a  state  theatre  is  a  beneficial  public  institution, 
vhich  it  is  expedient  to  support  by  taxation  ;  but  the 
remonstrance  of  one  man,  paying  only  one  dollar  tax, 
vho  should  say  that  he  did  not  believe  in  these  institw 
i  I  Curtis's  Webster,  207  fg. 


218  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

tions,  and  did  not  want  to  contribute  to  their  support, 
would  at  least  be  entitled  to  respectful  consideration  in 
any  Legislature,  and  it  would  suffice  to  condemn,  in 
the  forum  of  political  philosophy,  the  policy  of  support 
ing  such  institutions  by  taxation.  In  the  winter  oi 
1828-29  the  South  Carolina  Legislature  sent  to  the  Sen 
ate  an  "  Exposition  and  Protest "  against  the  new  law. 
Georgia  wanted  to  nullify  both  Indian  legislation  and 
tariff.  Virginia  adopted  the  principle  of  nullification. 
North  Carolina  denounced  the  tariff,  but  nullification 
also.  Alabama  denounced  the  tariff,  but  recognized  the 
right  of  Congress  to  levy  revenue  duties,  with  incidental 
protective  effect.  In  1829  Alabama  went  nearer  to  nul 
lification.  This  was  the  high  water  mark  of  nullifica 
tion  outside  of  South  Carolina.  All  these  States  were 
taun,ted,  in  answer  to  their  remonstrances,  with  the  votes 
of  the  Southern  members  on  the  details  of  the  tariff  of 
abominations. 

Neither  party  could  let  the  tariff  rest.  A  high  tariff 
is  in  a  state  of  unstable  equilibrium.  If  legislators  could 
ever  gain  full  and  accurate  knowledge  of  all  the  circum 
stances  and  relations  of  trade  in  their  own  country,  and 
in  all  countries  with  which  it  trades ;  if  they  had  suffi 
cient  wit  to  establish  an  artificial  tax  system  which 
should  just  fit  the  complicated  facts,  and  produce  the  re 
sults  they  want  without  doing  any  harm  to  anybody's 
interests ;  and  if,  furthermore,  the  circumstances  and  re 
lations  of  trade  would  remain  unchanged,  it  would  oe 
possible  to  make  a  permanent  and  stable  tariff.  Each 
of  these  conditions  is  as  monstrously  impossible  as  any 
thing  in  economics  can  be.  Hence  constant  new  efforts 
we  necessary,  as  well  to  suit  those  to  whom  the  tariff 
loeg  not  yet  bring  what  they  expected  from  it  as  to 


EFFECT  OF  JACKSON'S  TOAST.  219 

silence  those  who  are  oppressed  by  it.  The  persons 
whose  interests  were  violated  by  the  tariff  of  1828  tried 
every  means  in  their  power  to  evade  it.  January  27, 
1830,  Mallary  brought  in  a  bill  to  render  the  custom 
house  appraisal  more  stringent  and  effective.  McDuffie 
responded  with  a  proposition  to  reduce  all  taxes  on 
woollens,  cottons,  iron,  hemp,  flax,  molasses,  and  indigo 
to  what  they  were  before  the  tariff  of  1824  was  passed. 
The  whole  subject  was  reopened.  McDuffie's  bill  was 
defeated,  and  Mallary's  was  passed.  By  separate  bills 
the  taxes  on  salt,  molasses,  coffee,  cocoa,  and  tea  were 
reduced. 

In  April,  1830,  came  Jackson's  Union  toast.1  It  was 
a  great  disappointment  to  the  mass  of  the  Southerners, 
who  had  been  his  ardent  supporters,  and  who  had  hoped, 
from  his  action  in  regard  to  Georgia  and  the  Indians, 
that  he  would  let  the  powers  of  the  federal  government 
go  by  default  in  the  case  of  the  tariff  also.2  The  per 
sonal  element,  which  always  had  such  strong  influence 
with  Jackson,  had  become  more  or  less  involved  in  the 
nullification  struggle  with  which  Calhoun  was  identified. 
The  Georgia  case  involved  only  indirectly  the  authority 
and  prestige  of  the  federal  government.  The  immediate 
parties  in  interest  were  the  Indians.  Nullification  in 
volved  directly  the  power  and  prestige  of  the  federal 
government,  and  he  would  certainly  be  a  most  excep 
tional  person  who,  being  President  of  the  United  States, 
would  allow  the  government  of  which  he  was  the  head 
to  be  defied  and  insulted. 

On  the  22d  of  November,  1830,  a  bill  for  a  state  con 
vention  failed  to  get  a  two  thirds  vote  in  the  South 
Carolina  Legislature.  An  attempt  was  then  made  to 

1  See  page  156.  2  Hodgson,  166-7 


220  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

test  the  constitutionality  of  the  tariff  in  the  courts  by 
refusing  to  pay  duty  bonds,  and  pleading  "no  consider 
ation  "  for  the  taxes  levied ;  but  the  United  States  Dis 
trict  Court,  in  1831,  refused  to  hear  evidence  of  "  no 
consideration  "  drawn  from  the  character  of  the  tariff  of 
1828.1 

June  14,  1831,  Jackson  wrote  a  letter  to  a  committee 
of  citizens  of  Charleston,  in  answer  to  an  invitation  to 
attend  the  celebration  of  the  Fourth  of  July  at  that 
city,  in  which  he  indicated  that  a  policy  of  force  would 
be  necessary  and  proper  against  nullification.  The 
Governor  of  the  State  brought  this  letter  to  the  notice 
of  the  Legislature,  which  adopted  resolutions  denounc 
ing  the  act  of  the  President  in  writing  such  a  letter, 
and  denying  the  lawfulness  of  the  steps  which  he  de 
scribed.  North  Carolina  now  denounced  nullification, 
but  the  other  States  as  yet  held  back. 

On  the  5th  of  October,  1831,  a  free-trade  convention 
met  at  Philadelphia.  On  the  26th  of  October  a  protec 
tionist  convention  met  at  New  York.  Gallatin  wrote  the 
address  published  by  the  former.  Of  course  it  was  all 
free  trade,  —  no  nullification.  A.  H.  Everett  wrote  the 
address  issued  by  the  New  York  convention.  The  public 
debt  was  being  paid  off  with  great  rapidity,  and  the 
.ieed  for  revenue  was  all  the  time  declining.  The 
.free-traders  said  :  In  that  case,  let  us  abolish  the  taxes, 
and  not  raise  a  revenue  which  we  do  not  need.  It  will 
be  an  additional  advantage  that  we  can  do  away,  with 
out  any  complicated  devices,  with  all  the  protective 
taxes  which  one  citizen  pays  to  another,  and  which  take 
shelter  under  the  revenue  taxes.  Let  the  people  keep 
%nd  use  their  own  earnings.  The  protectionists  wanted 
1  7  Ann.  Reg.  260. 


CLAY'S  PROGRAMME.  221 

to  remove  the  taxes  from  all  commodities  the  like  of 
which  were  not  produced  here.  They  argued  that,  if 
the  country  was  out  of  debt,  it  could  afford  to  enter  on 
great  schemes  of  national  development  by  government 
expenditure.  They  therefore  proposed  to  keep  up  the 
taxes  for  protective  purposes,  and  to  spend  the  revenue 
(in  which  they  regarded  the  revenue  from  land  as  a  thing 
by  itself)  on  internal  improvements,  pensions,  French 
spoliation  claims,  etc.  These  were  not  yet  strictly 
party  positions,  but  in  general  the  former  was  the  ad 
ministration  policy  and  the  latter  the  opposition  policy. 

The  session  of  1831-32  was  full  of  tariff.  A  presi 
dential  election  was  again  at  hand.  J.  Q.  Adams  was 
put  at  the  head  of  the  Committee  on  Manufactures  with 
an  anti-tariff  majority.  McDuffie  was  chairman  of  the 
Committee  on  Ways  and  Means.  January  19, 1832,  the 
House  instructed  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  col 
lect  information  about  manufactures.  A  report  was 
rendered  in  two  large  volumes  in  1833,  after  the  whole 
subject  had  been  disposed  of.  Clay  was  nominated  for 
President  in  December,  1831,  and  was  preparing  his 
policy  and  programme.  A  conference  was  held  at 
Washington  by  his  supporters,  at  which  he  presented 
his  views,  as  it  appears,  in  a  somewhat  dictatorial  man 
ner.1  He  wanted  all  the  revenue  taxes  (on  tea,  coffee, 
wine,  etc.)  abolished.  The  protective  taxes  he  wanted 
to  make  prohibitory,  so  as  to  stop  revenue.  He  said  that 
the  duties  on  hemp  were  useless,  as  our  dew-rotted  hemp 
aever  could  compete  with  the  water-rotted  hemp  which 
was  imported.  He  was  willing  to  allow  a  drawback  on 
All  rigging  exported.  Dearborn  said  that  the  tax  on 
hemp  had  closed  every  rope-walk  in  Boston.  This  waa 
1  8  Adams,  445. 


222  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

rather  hard,  considering  that  the  tax  on  hemp  had  beeia 
laid  for  the  sake  of  Kentucky,  and  now  the  member 
from  Kentucky  and  father  of  the  "  American  system  " 
said  that  protection  to  hemp  was  useless.  Adams  said 
that  the  House  Committee  on  Manufactures  would  re 
duce  the  duties  prospectively ;  that  is,  to  take  effect 
when  the  debt  should  be  paid.  Clay  wanted  to  stop 
paying  the  debt  in  order  to  take  away  the  administra 
tion  "cry."  Adams  took  sides  with  Jackson  on  the 
point  of  paying  the  debt.  He  thought  public  opinion 
favored  that  policy.  He  also  thought  Clay's  programme 
would  appear  like  defying  the  South.  Clay  said  that 
he  did  not  care  whom  he  defied.  "  To  preserve,  main 
tain,  and  strengthen  the  American  system  he  would  defy 
the  South,  the  President,  and  the  Devil."  We  may  say 
what  we  like  of  the  nullifiers,  but,  so  far  as  they  met 
with  and  knew  of  this  disposition  on  the  part  of  Clay 
and  his  supporters,  they  would  not  have  been  free  men 
if  they  had  not  resisted  it ;  for  it  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  the  real  question  at  issue  was  whether  their  prop 
erty  should  be  taken  away  from  them  or  not. 

In  the  annual  message  for  1831  Jackson  recom 
mended  that  the  tariff  be  amended  so  as  to  reduce 
revenue.  February  8,  1832,  McDuffie  reported  a  bill 
making  the  taxes  on  iron,  steel,  sugar,  salt,  hemp,  flour, 
woollens,  cottons,  and  manufactures  of  iron  twenty-five 
per  cent  for  a  year  after  June  30,  1832,  then  eighteen 
and  three  fourths  per  cent  for  a  year,  and  then  twelve 
and  one  half  per  cent  for  an  indefinite  period.  All  other 
goods  which  were  taxed  over  twelve  and  one  half  per 
sent  at  the  time  of  passing  the  bill  were  to  be  taxed 
twelve  and  one  half  per  cent  after  June  30,  1832. 
\pril  27.  1832,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  (Me 


TARIFF  OF  1832.  223 

Lane)  presented  a  tariff  bill  in  answer  to  a  call  by  the 
House.  It  was  planned  to  raise  twelve  millions  oi 
revenue.  It  was  proposed  to  collect  fifteen  per  cent  on 
imports  in  general,  with  especial  and  higher  rates  on 
the  great  protected  commodities.  This  was  the  adminis* 
tration  plan.  The  House  Committee  on  Manufacturer 
reported  a  bill  May  23d,  which  was  taken  up  instead  oi 
the  others.  The  battle  reopened,  and  ranged  over  the 
whole  field  of  politics  and  political  economy.  The  act, 
as  finally  passed  (July  14,  1832),  reduced  or  abolished 
many  of  the  revenue  taxes.  It  did  not  materially  alter 
the  protective  taxes.  The  tax  on  iron  was  reduced, 
that  on  cottons  was  unchanged,  that  on  woollens  was 
raised  to  fifty  per  cent;  wool  costing  less  than  eight 
cents  per  pound  was  made  free,  other  wool  was  taxed  as 
before.  Woollen  yarn  was  now  first  taxed.  This  waa 
the  position  of  tariff  and  nullification  when  the  presi 
dential  election  was  held. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

PUBLIC    QUESTIONS    OF     JACKSON'S     FIRST    ADMDTI8TBA 
TION. IV. 

VH.  National  bank.  Democracy *  affirms  that  men 
are,  may  be,  ought  to  be,  were  born,  or  were  created, 
equal,  and  it  determines  that  in  politics  they  shall  be 
treated  as  if  they  were  so,  facts  to  the  contrary  notwith 
standing.  The  inequality  of  men  in  their  industry,  econ- 
nomy,  prudence,  self-control,  etc.,  etc.,  produces  the  most 
marked  results  in  the  different  amounts  of  capital  which 
they  accumulate.  For  capital  is  the  support  and  fortifi 
cation  of  human  existence,  and  a  man  of  virtuous  habits 
and  right  life  secures  his  existence  against  destructive 
forces  by  accumulating  capital.  His  capital  is  at  once 
the  reward  of  right  living  and  the  means  of  better  liv 
ing.  At  the  same  time  it  is  a  proof  of  inequality  and 
the  cause  of  inequality.  The  existence  of  capital  is 
therefore  a  refutation  of  all  dogmas  of  equality.  If 
there  were  no  capital,  men  would  sink  to  the  level  of  the 
other  animals,  and  become  approximately  equal  to  each 
other  when  they  were  all  equal  to  brutes.  The  advocates 

1  Democracy  is  a  theory  about  sovereignty,  or  who  ought  to 
rule.  Its  first  dogma  is  that  all  men  are  equal.  Its  second  dogma 
is  that  power  and  rule  belong  of  right  to  a  majority  of  the  equal 
and  undifferentiated  units.  It  therefore  affirms  that  the  demos 
ought  to  rule,  in  contradiction  to  autocracy,  theocracy,  aristocracy 
and  other  theories  of  who  ought  to  rule.  The  first  principle  01 
tivil  liberty  is  that  there  is  no  one  who,  of  right,  ought  to  rule. 


DEMOCRACY  AND  PLUTOCRACY,  225 

»f  equality  consequently  rage  against  capital  which  con 
tradicts  their  theories.  The  inequality  in  the  distribu 
tion  of  capital,  which  is  at  once  the  proof  and  the  reward 
of  unequal  effort  and  virtue,  is  a  still  more  favorite  ob 
ject  of  attack,  but  so  long  as  men  strive  upwards  and 
away  from  their  original  brutishness,  the  inequalities  in 
their  being  and  doing  will  inevitably  produce  inequali 
ties  in  their  having  and  enjoying.  Of  all  the  supersti 
tions  which  have  ever  been  entertained  by  men,  the 
most  astonishing  is  the  one  which  has  been  accepted 
during  the  last  century  :  That  the  mass  of  men  are  by 
nature  wise  and  good — although  universal  experience 
proves  that  men  become  wise  and  good  only  by  severe 
and  prolonged  effort.  And  yet,  the  fate  of  modern  de 
mocracy  is  to  fall  into  subjection  to  plutocracy.  In  ita 
struggles  against  what  is  called  "  the  money  power," 
democracy  strives  against  its  fate,  yet  hastens  it  on. 
Democracy  strives  to  banish  the  power  of  capital  from 
open  and  admitted  influence  in  political  affairs.  One  of 
two  results  follows :  (1)  When  the  capital  is  combined 
with*  virtue  and  high  principle,  it  really  is  banished  from 
all  share  in  politics.  The  consequence  is  that  the  com 
munity  loses  the  incalculable  advantage  which  it  might 
gain  from  the  experience  and  good-will  of  men  who 
have  accumulated  capital  by  integrity,  or  have  managed 
inherited  capital  with  honor  and  success,  and  whose 
assistance  in  resisting  corrupt  schemes,  or  in  reforming 
,'aws  which  give  chances  to  corrupt  and  crafty  men  to 
accumulate  capita*  without  industry  or  integrity,  would 
be  invaluable.  (2)  When  capital  is  in  the  hands  of  cor 
rupt  and  crafty  men,  it  is  driven  to  secret  modes  of  in 
fluence,  which  undermine  and  destroy  institutions,  and 
-egislation  is  moulded  to  suit  the  ideas  and  modes  oi 
15 


226  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

operation  of  the  crafty  and  lazy,  instead  of  those  of  the 
honest  and  industrious.  We  might  as  well  expect  to 
free  ourselves  from  the  pressure  of  the  atmosphere  as 
to  abolish  "  the  money  power."  The  effect  would  be  as 
mischievous  in  one  case  as  in  the  other.  What  is  true 
is  that  selfishness  and  cupidity  constantly  strive  to  make 
use  of  laws  ana  civil  institutions  to  divert  one  man's 
earnings  to  another  man's  use.  This  occurs  whenever 
laws  change  at  all  that  distribution  of  products  which 
would  be  brought  about  by  the  free  operation  of  eco 
nomic  forces.  The  modern  industrial  organization,  in 
cluding  banks,  corporations,  joint-stock  companies, 
financial  devices,  national  debts,  paper  currency,  na 
tional  systems  of  taxation,  is  largely  the  creation  of 
legislation  (not  in  its  historical  origin,  but  in  the  mode 
of  its  existence  and  in  its  authority),  and  is  largely  regu 
lated  by  legislation.  Capital  is  the  breath  of  life  to  this 
organization,  and  every  day,  as  the  organization  becomes 
more  complex  and  delicate,  the  folly  of  assailing  capital 
or  credit  becomes  greater.  At  the  same  time  it  is  evi 
dent  that  the  task  of  the  legislator  to  embrace  in  his  view 
the  whole  system,  to  adjust  his  rules  so  that  the  play  of 
the  civil  institutions  shall  not  alter  the  natural  play  of 
the  economic  forces,  requires  more  training  and  more 
acumen.  Furthermore,  the  greater  the  complication 
and  delicacy  of  the  industrial  system,  the  greater  the 
chances  for  cupidity  when  backed  by  craft,  and  the  task 
of  the  legislator  to  meet  and  defeat  the  attempts  of 
this  cupidity  is  one  of  constantly  increasing  difficulty 
Finally,  the  methods  and  machinery  of  democratic  re 
publican  self-government,  —  caucuses,  primaries,  com 
mittees,  and  conventions,  —  lend  themselves  perhaps 
snore  easily  thai:  any  other  political  methods  and  ma 


BANK  OF  NORTH  AMERICA.  227 

ihinery  to  the  uses  of  selfish  cliques  which  seek  polit- 
cal  influence  for  interested  purposes. 

In  the  United  States  the  democratic  element  in  public 
opinion  has  always  been  jealous  of  and  hostile  to  the 
money  power.  The  hostility  has  broken  out  at  different 
times  in  different  ways,  as  an  assault  on  banks,  corpora 
tions,  vested  rights,  and  public  credit.  Sometimes  it 
seems  as  if  the  "  money  power  "  were  regarded  super- 
gtitiously,  as  if  it  were  a  superhuman  entity,  with  will 
and  power.  The  assaults  on  it  are  mingled  with  dread, 
as  of  an  enemy  with  whom  one  is  not  yet  ready  to  cope, 
but  whose  power  is  increasing  rapidly,  so  that  the  chance 
of  ultimate  victory  over  him  is  small.  W«e  are  now  to 
study  one  of  the  greatest  struggles  between  democracy 
and  the  money  power. 

The  Bank  of  North  America  was  forced,  in  1784-85, 
to  weather  a  storm  of  popular  opposition  and  prejudice 
in  Pennsylvania.  All  the  elements  of  the  opposition, 
which  has  been  above  described,  were  well  represented 
there.  There  was  jealousy  of  capital,  fear  of  the  in 
fluence  of  a  corporation  of  capitalists  in  politics,  super 
stition  about  banking,  denunciation  of  a  monopoly,  and 
incoherent  denunciations  of  the  bank  for  the  most  con 
tradictory  misdeeds.1  When  Hamilton  founded  the 
first  Bank  of  the  United  States  2  there  arose  the  same 
doubts  and  complaints,  and  the  same  opposition ;  and 
the  dissatisfaction,  although  it  was  silenced  for  a  time, 
lasted  as  long  as  that  bank  lasted,  and  came  out  again 
when  the  question  of  rechartering  it  was  brought  up. 
Each  party  regarded  the  bank  as  an  available  power  in 
politics,  and  each  tried  to  get  control  of  it.  The  one 

1  3  Sparks's  Morris,  440 ;  Jonsiderations  on  the  Bank  of  Nortb 
America ;  3  Wilson's  Works.  2  See  page  12 


228  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

*rhich  failed  (the  republicans)  then  denounced  the  bank 
us  dangerous  to  the  state.  Niles  affirmed  a  great  many 
times  that,  in  1798,  no  man  who  was  not  a  "black 
cockade  federalist"  could  get  accommodation  at  the 
bank.  The  bank  authorities  always  denied  this,  and 
it  is  very  doubtful  indeed  if  it  was  true.  Niles  is  far 
better  authority  for  what  the  republicans  believed  at 
that  heated  period  than  he  is  for  the  facts  as  to  the 
management  of  the  bank.  State  banks  at  that  time 
were  distinctly  regarded  as  political  engines.  Each 
bank  had  a  well-defined  party  character,  and  "  accom 
modated  "  only  men  of  its  own  party.  It  seems  that 
people  then  would  have  been  as  much  astonished  if  a 
group  of  federalists  asked  for  a  bank  charter  from  a 
republican  Legislature  as  we  would  be  now  if  a  repub 
lican  should  ask  a  democratic  House  to  elect  him  clerk. 
Jefferson,  when  President,  wrote  to  Gallatin,  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury:  "I  am  decidedly  in  favor  of  making 
all  the  banks  republican  by  sharing  deposits  amongst 
them  in  proportion  to  the  disposition  they  show."  1  Pit- 
kin,  who  was  a  federalist,  found  it  quite  natural  that  a 
republican  Congress  should  not  be  willing  to  recharter 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  since  it  was  federalist.2 
Very  little  is  known  of  the  banking  merits  or  demerits 
of  the  bank.  It  was  favored  by  the  suspension  of  specie 
payments  by  the  Bank  of  England.  It  published  no 
reports  of  its  condition  until  January,  1811.8  Pitkin 
gives  a  generalized  statement,  in  round  numbers,4  of  the 
operations  of  the  bank.  It  paid,  on  an  average,  eight 
and  thirteen  thirty-fourths  per  cent  dividend  per  annum. 
In  1810,  when  the  question  of  renewing  the  chartel 

»  I  Gatlaun's  Writings,  129.  2  Pitkin,  421. 

*  geybwrt,  523.  *  Pitkin,  418.  6  Sejbert,  5'il 


FIRST  BANK  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.        229 

came  up,  a  great  political  and  economic  controversy 
arose.  It  was  generally  expected  that  a  commercial 
crisis  would  occur  if  the  bank  was  forced  to  wind  up. 
The  business  men  and  men  of  capital  generally  wanted 
the  charter  renewed.  Matthew  Carey's  letters  to  Adam 
Seybert  undoubtedly  expressed  the  opinion  of  that  class. 
The  republicans  opposed  the  bank  as  aristocratic,  fed 
eralist,  a  dangerous  political  engine,  and  because  its 
stock  was  partly  held  by  foreign  noblemen.  Clay  was 
one  of  the  leaders  of  the  opposition  to  the  bank.  The 
recharter  was  reported  to  the  Senate  by  William  H. 
Crawford,  who  ardently  favored  it.  It  was  defeated 
by  the  casting  vote  of  the  Vice-President,  George  Clin 
ton,  of  New  York.  The  bank  paid  back  its  capital  in 
dividends  from  time  to  time  down  to  1834 ;  in  all  109| 
for  100  paid  in. 

The  old  bank  went  out  of  existence  without  any  con 
vulsion  in  business.  Its  place  was  taken  by  local  banks. 
During  the  second  war  these  banks  suspended,  except 
in  New  England,  and  then  went  on  to  issue  notes  in  the 
most  extravagant  manner,  until  the  currency  of  the 
country  was  depreciated  at  least  twenty-five  per  cent, 
and  was  furthermore  unequally  depreciated,  so  that  it 
was  necessary  to  have  a  list  of  all  the  banks,  and  a 
quotation  of  them,  in  order  to  calculate  the  value  of  any 
number  of  notes.  The  notes  were  loaned  to  the  Treas 
ury,  which  did  its  business  with  the  rags  which  the 
banks  manufactured  and  loaned  to  it  for  its  six  per  cent 
bonds.  There  was  then  no  outcry  against  the  money 
power.  The  mania  was  to  make  more  banks,  and  the 
state  Legislatures  were  besieged  by  applicants  for  bank 
•barters  ;  that  is,  by  corporation?  which  desired  the  priv« 
dege  of  issuing  paper  to  be  used  as  currency  by  the  gov- 


280  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

eminent  and  the  public,  who  should  pay  them  interest 
for  it,  while  it  cost  them  nothing  but  the  paper  and 
printing.  The  mischievous  notion  has  always  been  held 
in  this  country  that  a  bank  is  an  institution  whose  prime 
function  is  to  issue  circulating  notes.  To  read  the 
doctrines  and  plans  of  1814-16  one  would  think  the 
people  here  thought  that  a  bank  manufactured  capital 
out  of  nothing,  and  could  give  it  away.  Its  main  duty 
was  to  dole  it  out  fairly,  and  if  the  existing  banks  did 
not  do  this  some  more  ought  to  be  made.  They  talked 
about  a  man's  "  right "  to  accommodation,  as  if  a  bank 
resembled  a  town  pump,  at  which  every  one  might  draw. 
At  this  juncture  there  would  have  been  some  sense  in 
assailing  the  "money  power,"  for  ninety-nine  in  one 
hundred  of  these  banks  were  pure  swindles.  They  had 
no  capital,  by  issuing  notes  they  borrowed  instead  of 
lending,  and  they  paid  no  interest. 

The  administration  was  republican,  but  its  financial 
distress  was  so  great  that  it  was  obliged  to  put  away 
its  constitutional  scruples  and  its  party  tradition,  and 
to  propose  a  national  bank.  Many  forms  of  this  were 
suggested,  for  it  was  very  hard  for  the  old  republicans  to 
be  obliged  to  reinstate  Hamilton's  bank.  The  Senate 
wanted  to  make  a  bank  to  suit  the  administration  ;  that 
in,  one  which  should  lend  to  the  Treasury.  No  bank 
could  do  this  in  the  measure  desired  and  maintain  spe 
cie  payments.  The  House  would  not  consent  to  a  big 
paper-money  machine,  not  paying  specie,  but  providing 
notes  for  the  government.  In  January,  1815,  after  a 
long  struggle,  a  bank  charter  was  passed  to  suit  the 
House.  Madison  vetoed  it,  because  the  bank  would  not 
help  the  Treasury  at  all  if  it  could  make  no  loans.  Th« 
Bouse  was  more  anxious  that  it  should  restore  the  cor 


CHARTER  OF  THE  SECOND   BANK.          231 

rency,  believing  that,  if  that  could  be  done,  prices  of 
supplies  would  fall,  loans  could  be  placed  in  a  sound 
currency,  and  real  relief  would  follow.  There  was 
especial  reason  for  this  view,  because  the  money  market 
of  the  country  was  then  at  Boston,  where  the  currency 
was  not  depreciated.  It  was  said  that  the  New  Eng- 
landers  would  not  sustain  the  public  credit,  because  Vhey 
would  not  subscribe  to  stocks  in  their  currency  at  the 
same  rates  at  which  the  people  of  Philadelphia  and 
Baltimore  subscribed  to  stocks  in  their  currency.1  The 
New  Englanders  were  also  denounced  for  drawing  specie 
from  the  Middle  States  and  exporting  it,2  because  the 
specie  of  course  left  the  States  where  the  paper  issues 
were  excessive,  and  went  to  the  States  where  the  paper 
issues  were  small.  When  it  accumulated  in  excess  of 
the  requirement  in  the  latter  States,  it  was  exported, 
which  was  another  ground  of  denunciation.8 

Another  bill  was  introduced  at  once,  which  provided 
for  a  bank  to  conform  to  the  wishes  of  the  administra 
tion.  This  bill  was  before  the  House  on  the  day  on 
which  news  of  the  treaty  of  Ghent  was  received  at 
Washington  (February  13th).  Pitkin  says  the  news 
was  received  at  the  moment  of  voting.4  The  bill  was 
laid  aside  and  was  never  .revived. 

At  the  next  session  (1815-16)  the  proposition  came 
up  for  a  national  bank,  not  as  a  financial  resource  for 
the  Treasury,  but  to  check  the  local  banks  and  force  a 
return  to  specie  payments.  The  charter  became  a  law 
A.pril  10,  18i6.  It  was  a  perfect  imitation  of  Hamil- 

1  See  the  Report  of  the  Secretarv  of  t'ne  Treasury,  1815.     Se« 
also  3  Webster's  Works,  35,  his  speech  on  the  proposed  bank. 
a  Ingersoll,  250. 
•  Carey's  dice  Branch,  294,  298.  k  Pitkin,  427 


232  ANDREW  JACK  SON. 

ton's  bank.  In  this  bank  also  the  government  had  • 
big  stock  note  for  seven  millions  of  dollars  of  stock, 
which  it  had  subscribed  for  as  a  resource  to  pay  its 
lebts,  not  as  investment  for  free  capital.  The  bank  was 
chartered  for  twenty  years. .  Its  capital  was  thirty-five 
millions,  seven  subscribed  by  the  United  States  in  a  five 
per  cent  stock  note,  seven  by  the  public  in  specie,  and 
twenty-one  by  the  public  in  United  States  stocks.  It 
was  to  pay  a  bonus  of  one  and  one  half  millions  in  two, 
three,  and  four  years.  It  was  not  to  issue  notes  under 
$5.00,  and  not  to  suspend  specie  payments  under  a  pen 
alty  of  twelve  per  cent  on  all  notes  not  redeemed  on  pres 
entation.  Twenty  directors  were  to  be  elected  annually 
by  the  stockholders,  and  five,  being  stockholders,  were 
to  be  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  United  States 
and  confirmed  by  the  Senate.  The  federal  government 
was  to  charter  no  other  bank  during  the  period  of  the 
charter  of  this.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  might 
at  any  time  redeem  the  stocks  in  the  capital  of  the  bank, 
including  the  five  per  cent  subscription  stock.  He 
might  remove  the  public  deposits  if  he  should  see  fit,  but 
must  state  his  reasons  for  so  doing  to  Congress  at  its  next 
meeting.  The  bank  engaged  to  transfer  public  funds 
without  charge.  At  first  it  undertook  to  equalize  the 
currency  by  receiving  any  notes  of  any  branch  at  any 
branch,  but  it  was  soon  forced  to  abandon  the  attempt. 
The  old  bank  had  never  done  this.1  Two  things  were 
mixed  up  in  this  attempt :  (1)  The  equalization  of  the 
different  degrees  of  depreciation  existing  in  the  bank 
notes  of  different  districts.  This  the  bank  could  no4 
nave  corrected  save  by  relentlessly  presenting  all  local 
notes  for  redemption,  until  they  were  made  equal  t* 
1  Carey's  Letters,  55. 


FAULTS   OF  THE  CHARTER.  233 

jpecie  or  were  withdrawn.  So  far  as  the  bank  did  thia 
it,  won  the  reputation  of  a  "  mo  aster  "  which  was  crush 
ing  out  the  local  banks.1  (2)  The  equalization  of  the 
domestic  exchanges.  This  was  impossible  and  undesir 
able,  since  capital  never  could  be  distributed  in  exact 
proportion  to  local  needs  for  it.  The  failure  of  the  bank 
to  "  equalize  the  exchanges,"  and  its  refusal  to  take  any 
notes  at  any  branch,  earned  it  more  popular  condemna 
tion  than  anything  else. 

The  bank  charter  contained  a  great  many  faults.  To 
mention  only  those  which  affected  its  career  :  The  capi 
tal  was  too  large.  There  was  no  reason  for  lending  its 
capital  to  the  government,  i.  e.,  putting  it  into  public 
stocks,  or  making  it  a  syndicate  of  bond-holders.  There 
was  every  reason  why  the  United  States  should  not  hold 
stock  in  it,  especially  when  it  could  not  pay  for  the 
same.  The  dividends  of  the  bank  from  1816  to  1831, 
when  the  government  paid  its  stock  note,  averaged  five 
per  cent  per  annum,  paid  semi-annually.  The  United 
States  paid  five  per  cent  on  its  stock  note  quarterly. 
This  gave  room  for  another  complaint  by  the  enemies  of 
the  bank. 

The  bank  was  established  at  Philadelphia.  It  began 
with  nineteen  branches,  and  grew  to  twenty-five.  Specie 
payments  were  resumed  nominaUy  February  20,  1817.. 
after  which  date,  according  to  a  joint  resolution  of  Con 
gress  of  April  16,  1816,  the  Treasury  ought  to  receive 
>»nly  specie,  or  notes  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States, 
or  of  specie-paying  banks,  or  Treasury  notes.  In  the 
first  two  years  of  its  existence  the  great  bank  was 
sarried  to  the  verg;e  of  bankruptcy  by  as  bad  banking  as 
iver  was  heard  of.  Instead  of  checking  the  othei 
*  Seepage  121. 


234  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

oanks  in  their  improper  proceedings,  it  led  and  sur 
passed  them  all.  A  clique  inside  the  bank  was  jobbing 
in  its  shares,  and  robbing  it  to  provide  the  margins. 
Instead  of  rectifying  the  currency,  it  made  the  currency 
worse.  Instead  of  helping  the  country  out  of  the  dis 
tress  produced  by  the  war,  it  plunged  the  country  into 
the  commercial  crisis  of  1819,  which  caused  a  general 
liquidation,  lasting  four  or  five  years.  All  the  old- 
school  republicans  denounced  themselves  for  having 
abandoned  their  principles.  All  the  ill-doing  of  the 
bank  they  regarded  as  essential  elements  in  the  charac 
ter  of  any  national  bank.  Niles  denounced  the  whole 
system  of  banking,  and  all  the  banks.  He  had  good 
reason.  It  is  almost  incredible  that  the  legislation  of 
any  civilized  country  could  have  opened  the  chance  for 
such  abuses  of  credit,  banking,  and  currency  as  then 
existed.  The  franchise  of  issuing  paper  notes  to  be  used 
by  the  people  as  currency,  that  is  to  say,  the  license  to 
appropriate  a  certain  amount  of  the  specie  circulation  of 
the  country,  and  to  put  one's  promissory  notes  in  the 
place  of  it,  was  given  away,  not  only  without  any 
equivalent,  but  without  any  guarantee  at  all.  When 
Niles  and  Gouge  denounced  banking  and  banks,  it  was 
because  they  had  in  mind  these  swindling  institutions. 
The  great  bank  justly  suffered  with  the  rest,  because  it 
had  made  itself  in  many  respects  like  them.  The  popu 
lar  anti-bank  party,  opposed  to  the  money  power,  was 
very  strong  during  the  period  of  liquidation. 

Langdon  Cheves,  of  South  Carolina,  was  elected  pres 
ident  of  the  bank  March  6,  1819.  He  set  about  re- 
Storing  it.  In  three  years  he  had  succeeded,  although 
the  losses  were  over  three  millions.  Nicholas  Biddle 
iras  elected  president  of  the  bank  in  January,  1823 


BRANCH  DRAFTS  INVENTED.  236 

He  was  only  thirty-seven  years  old,  and  had  been  more 
a  literary  man  than  anything  else.  He  was  appointed 
government  director  in  1819.  His  election  in  Cheves'a 
place  was  the  result  of  the  conflict  between  a  young  and 
progressive  policy,  which  he  represented,  and  an  old 
and  conservative  policy.  At  the  nearest  date  to  Janu 
ary  1,  1823,  the  bank  had  $4.6  million  notes  out ;  $4.4 
million  specie ;  $2.7  million  public  deposits ;  $1.5  mill 
ion  deposits  by  public  officers  ;  $3.3  million  deposits  by 
individuals;  $28.7  million  bills  discounted.  Congress 
refused  to  allow  the  officers  of  the  branches  to  sign 
notes  issued  by  the  branches.  It  is  not  clear  why  this 
petition  was  refused,  except  that  Congress  was  in  no 
mood  to  grant  any  request  of  the  bank.  The  labor,  for 
the  president  and  cashier  of  the  parent  bank,  of  signing 
all  the  notes  of  the  bank  and  branches  was  very  great. 
Accordingly,  in  1827,  branch  drafts  were  devised  to 
avoid  this  inconvenience.  They  were  the  counterpart 
of  bank-notes.  They  were  drawn  for  even  sums,  by  the 
cashier  of  any  branch,  on  the  parent  bank,  to  the  order 
of  some  officer  of  the  branch,  and  endorsed  by  the  latter 
to  bearer.  They  then  circulated  like  bank-notes.  They 
were  at  first  (1827)  made  in  denominations  of  $5.00  and 
$10.00.  In  1831  the  denomination  $20.00  was  added. 
Binney,  Wirt,  and  Webster  gave  an  opinion  that  these 
drafts  were  legal.  Rush,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
approved  of  them,  and  allowed  public  dues  to  be  paid  in 
them.1  These  branch  drafts  were  a  most  unlucky  in 
vention,  and  to  them  is  to  be  traced  most  of  the  subse- 
nuent  real  trouble  of  th^  balk.  The  branches,  espe 
cially  the  distant  ones,  when  they  issued  these  drafts,  did 
ttot  lend  their  own  capital,  but  that  jf  the  bank  At 
1  Document  B 


236  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Philadelphia.  At  the  same  time,  therefore,  thej  fell  in 
debt  to  the  parent  bank.  This  stimulated  their  issues. 
The  borrowers  used  these  drafts  to  sustain  what  were 
called  "  race-horse  bills."  These  were  drafts  drawn 
between  the  different  places  where  there  were  branches, 
60  that  a  bill  falling  due  at  one  place  was  met  by  the 
discount  of  a  bill  drawn  on  another  place.  This  system 
was  equivalent  to  unlimited  renewals.  It  kept  up  a 
constant  inflation  of  credit.  Up  to  the  time  of  Jackson's 
accession  these  drafts  had  not  yet  done  much  harm,  and 
had  attracted  no  adverse  criticism. 

At  the  session  of  1827-28,  P.  P.  Barbour  brought 
forward  a  proposition  to  sell  the  stock  owned  by  the 
United  States  in  the  bank.  A  debate  arose  concerning 
the  bank,  and  it  seems  that  there  was  a  desire  on  the 
part  of  a  portion  of  the  opposition  to  put  opposition  to 
the  bank  into  their  platform.1  The  project  failed.  Bar- 
bour's  resolution  was  tabled,  174  to  9. 

The  facts  which  are  now  to  be  narrated  were  not 
known  to  the  public  until  1832.  They  are  told  here 
as  they  occurred  in  the  order  of  time. 

June  27,  1829,  Levi  Woodbury,  senator  from  New 
Hampshire,  wrote  to  Samuel  Ingham,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  making  confidential  complaints  of  Jeremiah 
Mason,  the  new  president  of  the  Portsmouth,  New 
Hampshire,  branch  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States, 
because  (1)  of  the  general  brusqueness  of  his  manner ; 
(2)  of  his  severity  and  partiality  in  the  matter  of  loans 
and  collections.  He  added  that  Mason  was  a  friend  oi 
Webster.  "  His  political  character  is  doubtless  known 
to  you."  He  also  said  that  the  complaints  were  general 
lad  from  all  political  parties.  Ingham  enclosed  thl 
1  33  Niles,  275. 


CORRESPONDENCE  OF  INGE  AM  AND  BIDDLE.    237 

uetter  to  Biddle,  pointing  out  that  the  letter  seemed  to 
ttave  been  called  out  by  the  political  effects  of  the  action 
of  the  branch.  He  said  that  the  administration  wanted 
no  favors  from  the  bank.  Biddle  replied  that  he  would 
investigate. 

One  great  trouble  with  Biddle,  which  appeared  at 
once  in  this  correspondence,  was  that  he  wrote  too 
easily.  When  he  got  a  pen  in  his  hand,  it  ran  away 
with  him.  In  this  first  reply,  he  went  on  to  write  a  long 
letter,  by  which  he  drew  out  all  the  venomous  rancor  of 
Levi  Woodbury  and  Isaac  Hill  against  the  old  federal 
ists  and  Jeremiah  Mason  and  the  bank,  all  which  lurked 
in  Ingham's  letter,  but  came  out  only  in  the  form  of 
innuendo  and  suggestion.  The  innuendoes  stung  Biddle, 
and  he  challenged  the  suggestions  instead  of  ignoring 
them.  Thus  he  gave  them  a  chance  to  come  forth  with 
out  sneaking.  He  was  jauntily  innocent  and  unconscious 
of  what  spirit  he  was  dealing  with  and  what  impended 
over  him.  He  stated  (1)  that  Mason  had  been  appointed 
jo  a  vacancy  caused  by  the  resignation,  not  by  the  re 
moval,  of  his  predecessor;  (2)  that  the  salary  of  the 
position  had  not  been  increased  for  Mason  ;  (3)  that 
lifter  Mason's  appointment,  Webster  was  asked  to  per 
suade  him  to .  accept.  He  quoted  a  letter  from  Wood- 
bury  to  himself,  in  July,  in  which  Woodbury  said  that 
.Mason  was  as  unpopular  with  one  party  as  the  other, 
Biddle  inferred,  no  doubt  correctly,  that  Mason,  as 
banker,  had  done  his  duty  bj  the  bank,  without  re 
gard  to  politics.  He  explained  that  the  branch  had 
previously  not  been  well  managed,  and  that  Mason  was 
put  in  as  a  competent  banker  ard  lawyer  to  put  it  right 
again.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  Mason,  in  order  to  put  the 
bank  right,  had  to  act  severely,  and  that  he  especially 


238  ANDRE  W  JACKSON 

disappointed  those  who,  on  account  of  political  syin 
pathy,  expected  favors,  but  did  not  get  them.  Politics 
had  run  high  in  New  Hampshire  for  ten  or  twelve 
years.  Mason  and  Webster  on  one  side,  and  Hill, 
Woodbury,  and  Plumer  on  the  other,  had  been  in 
strong  antagonism.  The  relations  had  been  amicable 
between  some  of  them,  but  Hill  and  Mason  were  two 
men  who  could  not  meet  without  striking  fire.  Hill  was 
now  president  of  a  small  bank  at  Concord,  and  business 
jealousy  was  added  to  political  animosity.  Woodbury 
had  been  elected  to  the  Senate  as  an  Adams  man,  and 
the  personal  and  political  feelings  were  only  more  in 
tense,  because  Adams  was  called  a  republican.  The 
federalists  were  first  invited  to  support  him,  then  they 
were  ignored,1  and  Woodbury  and  Hill  were  working 
for  Jackson. 

Biddle,  as  if  dissatisfied  with  whatever  prudence  he 
had  shown  in  his  first  letter,  wrote  another,  in  which  he 
declared  that  the  bank  had  nothing  to  do  with  politics ; 
that  people  were  all  the  time  trying  to  draw  it  into 
politics,  but  that  it  always  resisted. 

July  23d  Ingham  wrote  again  to  Biddle,  insisting  that 
there  must  be  grounds  of  complaint,  and  that  exemption 
from  party  preference  was  impossible.  He  added  that 
he  represented  the  views  of  the  administration. 

In  August  the  Secretary  of  War  ordered  the  pension 
agency  transferred  from  the  Portsmouth  branch  to  the 
bank  at  Concord,  of  which  Isaac  Hill  had  been  presi 
dent.  The  parent  bank  forbade  the  branch  to  comply 
with  this  order,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  illegal.  Tho 
irdei  was  revoked. 

September  15th  Biddle  wrote  again  to  Ingham.     H/ 

1  1  Webster's  Correspondence,  415,  419. 


BIDDLE   TO  INGE  AM  — 1829  239 

bad  visited  Buffalo  and  Portsmouth  during  the  *jmmer. 
His  letter  is  sharp  and  independent  in  tone.  He  says 
that  two  memorials  have  been  sent  to  him  by  Isaac  Hill, 
Second  Controller  of  the  Treasury,  one  from  the  busi 
ness  men  of  Portsmouth,  and  the  other  from  sixty  mem 
bers  of  the  Legislature  of  New  Hampshire,  requesting 
Mason's  removal,  and  nominating  a  new  board  of  di 
rectors,  "friends  of  General  Jackson  in  New  Hamp 
shire."  Those  proceedings  were  evidently  planned  by 
the  anti-bank  clique  at  Washington  to  provoke  Biddle. 
He  hastened  to  crown  that  purpose  with  complete  suc 
cess.  He  says  that  public  opinion  in  the  community 
around  a  bank  is  no  test  of  bank  management,  and  that 
the  reported  opinion  at  Portsmouth,  upon  examination, 
"  degenerated  into  the  personal  hostility  of  a  very 
limited,  and  for  the  most  part  very  prejudiced,  circle." 
He  then  takes  up  three  points  which  he  finds  in  Ing- 
ham's  letters,  suggested  or  assumed,  but  not  formulated. 
These  are:  (1)  That  the  Secretary  has  some  super 
vision  over  the  choice  of  officers  of  the  bank,  which 
comes  to  him  from  the  relations  of  the  government  to 
the  bank.  (2)  That  there  is  some  action  of  the  govern 
ment  on  the  bank,  which  is  not  precisely  defined,  but  of 
which  the  Secretary  is  the  proper  agent.  (3)  That  it  is 
the  right  and  duty  of  the  Secretary  to  make  known  to 
the  president  of  the  bank  the  views  of  the  administra 
tion  on  the  political  opinions  of  the  officers  of  the  bank. 
He  then  says  that  the  board  acknowledge  no  responsi 
bility  whatever  to  the  Secretary  in  regard  to  the  polit- 
'cal  opinions  of  the  officers  of  the  bank ;  that  the  bank 
is  responsible  to  Congress  only,  and  is  carefully  shielded 
by  its  charter  from  executive  control.  He  indignantly 
deiTes  that  freedom  from  political  bias  is  imDossible 


240  ANDREW  JACKSON 


the  folly  of  the  notion  of  political  "checks  and 
counter-balances  "  between  the  officers  of  the  bank,  and 
declares  that  the  bank  ought  to  disregard  all  parties. 
He  won  a  complete  victory  on  the  argument  of  his 
points,  but  delivered  himself,  on  the  main  issue,  without 
reserve  into  the  hands  of  his  enemies. 

Ingham's  letter  of  October  5th  is  a  masterly  specimen 
of  cool  and  insidious  malice.  In  form  it  is  smooth, 
courteous,  and  plausible,  but  it  is  full  of  menace  and 
deep  hostility.  He  discusses  the  points  implied  by  him, 
but,  in  form,  raised  by  Biddle.  He  says  that  if  the 
bank  should  abuse  its  powers  the  Secretary  is  authorized 
to  remove  the  deposits.  Hence  the  three  points  which 
Biddle  found  in  his  former  letter  are  good.  It  does  not 
appear  that  Biddle  ever  thought  of  this  power  as  within 
the  range  of  the  discussion,  or  of  the  exercise  of  it  as 
amongst  the  possibilities.  Ingham  says  there  are  two 
theories  of  the  bank:  (1)  That  it  is  exclusively  for 
national  purposes  and  for  the  common  benefit  of  all,  and 
that  the  "employment  of  private  interests  is  only  an 
incident,  —  perhaps  an  evil,  —  founded  in  mere  con 
venience  for  care  and  management."  (2)  That  it  is 
intended  "  to  strengthen  the  arm  of  wealth,  and  coun 
terpoise  the  influence  of  extended  suffrage  in  the  disp<>- 
tition  of  public  affairs,"  and  that  the  public  deposits  are 
one  of  its  means  for  performing  this  function.  He  says 
that  there  are  two  means  of  resisting  the  latter  theory  : 
.he  power  to  remove  the  deposits,  and  the  power  to  ap 
point  five  of  the  directors.  He  adds  that,  if  the  bank 
ghould  exercise  political  influence,  that  would  afford  him 
She  strongest  motive  for  removing  the  deposits.  Bid 
iie'e  reply  of  October  9th  shows  that  he  recognizes  a 
'ast  what  temper  he  has  to  deal  with.  He  is  still  gaj 


THE  BANK  CORRESPONDENCE.  241 

and  good-natured,  and  he  recedes  gracefully,  only  main 
Laining  that  it  is  the  policy  of  the  bank  to  keep  out  of 
politics. 

In  Ingham's  letters  of  July  23d  and  October  5th  is  to 
be  found  the  key  to  the  "  bank  war."  Ingham  argues 
that  the  bank  cannot  keep  out  of  politics,  that  its  offi 
cers  ought  to  be  taken  from  both  parties,  and  that,  if 
it  meddles  with  politics,  he  will  remove  the  deposits. 
The  only  road  left  by  which  to  escape  from  the  situation 
he  creates  is  to  go  into  politics  on  his  side.  No  evidence 
is  known  to  exist  that  the  bank  had  interfered  in  poli 
tics.  The  administration  men  are  distinctly  seen  in  this 
correspondence,  trying  to  drivo  it  to  use  political  in 
fluence  on  their  side,  and  the  bank  resists,  not  on  behalf 
of  the  other  party,  but  on  behalf  of  its  independence. 
It  is  the  second  of  the  alleged  theories  in  the  letter  of 
October  5th,  however,  which  demands  particular  atten 
tion.  The  Jackson  administration  always  pretended 
that  the  managers  of  the  bank  construed  the  character 
and  function  of  the  bank  according  to  that  theory.  It 
is  the  Kentucky  relief  notion  of  the  bank  in  its  extreme 
and  most  malignant  form.  The  statement  is,  on  its 
face,  invidious  and  malicious.  It  is  not,  even  in  form, 
a  formula  of  functions  attributed  to  the  bank.  It  is  a 
construction  of  the  political  philosophy  of  a  national 
bank.  It  is  not  parallel  with  the  first  statement.  It 
was  ridiculous  to  allege  that  the  stockholders  of  the 
bank  had  subscribed  twenty-eight  million  dollars,  not 
even  for  party  purposes,  but  to  go  crusading  against 
democracy  and  universal  suffrage-  However,  the  justice 
or  injustice  of  the  allegations  in  these  letters,  which 
could  be  submitted  to  no  tribunal,  and  which  touched 
taotives,  not  acts,  was  immaterial.  The  administration 


242  ANDREW  JACKSOtf. 

had  determined  to  make  war  on  the  bank.  The  ultimate 
agents  were  Amos  Kendall,  who  brought  the  Kentucky 
relief  element,  and  Isaac  Hill,  who  brought  the  element 
of  local  bank  jealousy  and  party  rancor.  Inghain  pub 
lished,  in  1832,1  after  the  above  correspondence  had 
been  published,  an  "  Address  "  in  his  own  defence.  Ho 
says  that  he  found,  to  his  surprise,  soon  after  he  entered 
Jackson's  cabinet,  that  the  President  and  those  nearest 
in  his  confidence  felt  animosity  against  the  bank.  He 
Baw  that  the  persons  who  had  the  most  feeling  influ 
enced  the  President's  mind  the  most.  Allegations  of 
fact  were  reported  in  regard  to  political  interference 
by  the  bank.  Ingham  says  that  when  he  was  urged  to 
action  about  the  bank  he  tried  to  trace  down  these 
stories  to  something  tangible.  He  quotes  the  only  state 
ment  he  ever  got.  It  is  a  letter  by  Amos  Kendall, 
giving  second  or  third  hand  reports  of  the  use  of  money 
by  officers  of  the  bank  in  the  Kentucky  election  of  1825, 
when  the  court  question  was  at  issue.2  The  man  whom 
Kendall  gave  as  his  authority  failed,  when  called  upon, 
to  substantiate  the  assertion.  In  Kendall's  Autobiog 
raphy  there  is  a  gap  from  1823  to  1829,  and  the  origin 
of  his  eager  hostility  to  the  bank  is  not  known.  Jackson 
is  not  known  to  have  had  any  opinion  about  the  bank 
when  he  came  to  Washington.  He  is  not  known  to 
have  had  any  collision  with  the  bank,  except  that,  when 
he  was  on  his  way  to  Florida,  as  Governor,  the  branch 
it  New  Orleans  refused  his  request  that  it  would  ad 
vance  money  to  him  on  his  draft  on  the  Secretary  oi 
State.8  Hill  and  Kendall,  either  by  telling  Jackson 
that  the  bank  had  worked  against  him  in  the  election. 
or  by  other  means,  infused  into  his  mind  the  hostility  t« 
•  42  Niles,  315.  2  See  page  127.  8  2  Parton,  596. 


HINTS   OF  THE  COMING  BANK   WAR.          243 

H;  which  had  long  rankled  in  theirs.  They  were  soon 
reenforced  by  Blair,  who  was  stronger  than  either,  and 
more  zealously  hostile  to  the  bank  than  either. 

In  November,  1829,  about  a  week  before  Congress 
met,  Amos  Kendall  sent  privately l  a  letter  to  the 
"  Courier  and  Enquirer,"  Jackson  organ  at  New  York, 
in  which  he  insinuated  that  Jackson  would  come  out 
against  the  bank  in  the  annual  message.  A  head  and 
tail  piece  were  put  to  this  letter,  and  it  was  put  in  as 
an  editorial.  It  attracted  some  attention,  but,  its  origin 
being  of  course  unknown,  it  was  received  with  a  great 
deal  of  skepticism.  In  its  form  it  consisted  of  a  series 
of  queries,2  of  which  the  following  may  be  quoted  as  the 
most  significant,  and  as  best  illustrating  the  methods  of 
procedure  introduced  in  Jackson's  administration.  We 
must  remember  that  these  queries  were  drawn  up  by  a 
man  in  the  closest  intimacy  with  the  President,  who 
helped  to  make  the  message  what  it  was,  and  we  must 
further  remember  what  we  have  already  learned  of 
William  B.  Lewis's  methods.  "  Will  sundry  banks 
throughout  the  Union  take  measures  to  satisfy  the 
general  government  of  their  safety  in  receiving  deposits 
of  the  revenue,  and  transacting  the  banking  concerns  of 
the  United  States  ?  Will  the  Legislatures  of  the  several 
States  adopt  resolutions  on  the  subject,  and  instruct  their 
senators  how  to  vote  ?  Will  a  proposition  be  rn^de  to 
authorize  the  government  to  issue  exchequer  bills,  to  the 
amount  of  the  annual  revenue,  redeemable  at  pleasure, 
*o  constitute  a  circulating  medium  equivalent  *o  the 
totes  issued  by  the  United  States  Bank  ?  "  Sc  ?ar  as 
Appears,  no  one  saw  in  these  queries  *he  oracle 

1  Memoirs  of  Bennett,  111. 

*  It  is  quoted  37  Niles,  3"S     (January  30,  1830.1 


244  ANDREW  JACKSON 

foretold  the  history  of  the  United  States  for  the  next 
ken  or  fifteen  years. 

Jackson's  first  annual  message  contained  a  paragraph 
on  the  hank  which  struck  the  whole  country  with  as 
tonishment.  "  We  had  seen,"  says  Niles,  "  one  or  two 
dark  paragraphs  in  certain  of  the  newspapers,  which 
led  to  a  belief  that  the  administration  was  not  friendly 
to  this  great  moneyed  institution,  but  few  had  any  sus 
picion  that  it  would  form  one  of  the  topics  of  the  first 
message."  l  After  mentioning  the  fact  that  the  charter 
would  expire  in  1836,  and  that  a  recharter  would  be 
asked  for,  the  message  said  that  such  an  important 
question  could  not  too  soon  be  brought  before  Congress. 
"  Both  the  constitutionality  and  the  expediency  of  the 
law  creating  this  bank  are  well  questioned  by  a  large 
portion  of  our  fellow  citizens,  and  it  must  be  admitted 
by  all  that  it  has  failed  in  the  great  end  of  establishing 
a  uniform  and  sound  currency."  The  question  is  then 
raised  whether  a  bank  could  not  be  devised,  "  founded 
on  the  credit  of  the  government  and  its  revenues," 
which  should  answer  all  the  useful  purposes  of  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States. 

No  period  in  the  history  of  the  United  States  could 
be  mentioned  when  the  country  was  in  a  state  of  more 
jrofound  tranquillity,  both  in  its  domestic  and  foreign 
Delations,  and  in  a  condition  of  more  humdrum  prosper- 
'ty  in  its  industry,  than  1829.  The  currency  never  had 
been  as  good  as  it  was  then,  for  the  troubles  of  the 
early  '20 's,  both  in  the  East  and  in  the  West,  had  been 
to  a  great  extent  overcome.2  The  currency  has  nevei 

1  37  Niles,  257. 

See  the  tables  in  2  Macgregor,  1140;  also  Gallatin  on  fcb 
7«r«wc*  and  Banking  System  of  the  United  State*. 


CRITICISM  OF  THE  MESSAGE.  245 

been  better  and  more  uniform,  if  we  take  the  whole 
Gountry  over,  since  1829  than  it  was  then.  Tho  pro 
ceedings,  of  which  the  paragraph  in  the  message  of  1829 
was  the  first  warning,  threw  the  currency  and  banking 
of  the  country  into  confusion  and  uncertainty,  one  thing 
following  upon  another,  and  they  have  never  yet  re 
covered  the  character  of  established  order  and  routine 
operation  which  they  had  then.  The  bank  charter  was 
not  to  expire  until  March  3,  1836  ;  that  is,  three  years 
beyond  the  time  when  Jackson's  term  would  expire. 
He  seems  to  apologize  for  haste  in  bringing  up  the  ques 
tion  of  its  renewal.  It  certainly  was  a  premature  step, 
and  can  only  be  explained  by  the  degree  of  feeling 
which  the  active  agents  had  mingled  with  their  opinions 
about  the  bank.  It  was,  moreover,  a  new  mode  of  state 
ment  for  the  President  to  address  Congress,  not  on  his 
own  motion,  and  to  set  forth  his  own  opinions  and  rec 
ommendations,  but  as  the  mouth-piece  of  "  a  large  por 
tion  of  our  fellow  citizens."  Who  were  they?  How 
many  were  they  ?  How  had  they  made  their  opinions 
known  to  the  President  ?  Why  did  they  not  use  the 
press  or  the  Legislature,  as  usual,  for  making  known 
their  opinions  ?  Who  must  be  dealt  with  in  discussing 
the  opinions,  the  President  or  the  "  large  portion,"  etc.  ? 
What  becomes  of  the  constitutional  responsibility  of  the 
President,  if  he  does  not  speak  for  himself,  but  gets  his 
notions  before  Congress  as  a  quotation  from  somebody 
else,  and  that  somebody  "  a  large  portion  of  our  fellow 
citizens  "  ?  Then  again  the  question  must  arise  :  Does 
\he  President  correctly  quote  anybody  ?  No  proofs  can 
fee  found  that  any  hundred  persons  in  the  United  States 
*art  active  doubts  of  the  constitutionality  and  expediency 
if  the  bank,  or  were  looking  forward  to  its  recharter  M 


246  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

it  political  crisis  to  be  prepared  for.  If  the  theoreticaJ 
question  had  been  raised,  a  great  many  people  would 
have  said  that  they  thought  a  national  bank  unconstitu« 
tional.  They  would  have  said,  as  any  one  must  say 
now,  that  there  was  no  power  given  in  the  Constitution 
to  buy  territory,  but  they  did  not  propose  to  give  up 
Louisiana  and  Florida.  Just  so  in  regard  to  a  national 
bank.  The  Supreme  Court  had  decided  in  McCulloch 
vs.  Maryland  that  the  bank  charter  was  constitutional, 
and  that  was  the  end  of  controversy.  The  question  of 
the  constitutionality  of  the  bank  had  no  life,  and  oc 
cupied  no  place  in  public  opinion,  so  far  as  one  can 
learn  from  newspapers,  books,  speeches,  diaries,  corre 
spondence,  or  other  evidence  we  have  of  what  occupied 
the  minds  of  the  people.  Jackson's  statement  was  only 
a  figure  of  speech.  The  observation  which  is  most  Im 
portant  for  a  fair  judgment  of  his  policy  of  active  hos 
tility  to  the  bank  is,  that  any  great  financial  institution 
or  system  which  is  in  operation,  and  is  performing  its 
functions  endurably,  has  a  great  presumption  in  its 
favor.  The  only  reasonable  question  for  statesman  or 
financier  is  that  of  slow  and  careful  correction  and  im 
provement.  The  man  who  sets  out  to  overturn  and 
destroy,  in  obedience  to  "  a  principle,"  especially  if  he 
Jiows  that  he  does  not  know  the  possible  scope  of  his 
Dwn  action,  or  what  he  intends  to  construct  afterwards, 
issumes  a  responsibility  which  no  public  man  has  any 
right  to  take. 

The  vague  and  confused  proposition  of  the  President 
for  some  new  kind  of  bank  added  alarm  to  astonish 
ment.  "What  did  he  mean  by  his  bank  on  the  credit 
und  revenues  of  the  government?  It  sounded  like  a 
big  paper-money  machine.  If  there  was  anv  intelligible 


ACTION  OF  CONGRESS  ON  THE  BANK.         247 

idea  in  it,  it  referred  to  something  like  the  Bank  of  the 
Commonwealth  of  Kentucky  on  a  still  larger  scale 
The  stock  of  the  bank  declined  from  125  to  116  on 
Account  of  the  message.1  It  was  supposed  that  the 
President  must  have  knowledge  of  some  facts  about  the 
bank. 

The  part  of  the  message  about  the  bank  was  referred 
in  both  Houses.  April  13,  1830,2  McDuffie  made  a 
long  report  from  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means. 
He  argued  that  the  constitutionality  of  the  bank  was 
settled  by  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  and  by 
prescription.  He  defended  the  history  and  expediency 
of  the  bank,  and  ended  by  declaring  the  bank  proposed 
by  the  President  to  be  very  dangerous  and  inexpedient, 
both  financially  and  politically,  —  the  latter  because  it 
would  increase  the  power  of  the  Executive.  In  the 
Senate,  Smith,  of  Maryland,  reported  from  the  Com 
mittee  on  Finance  in  favor  of  the  bank.8  The  House, 
May  10,  1830,  tabled,  by  89  to  66,  resolutions  that  the 
House  would  not  consent  to  renew  the  charter  of  the 
bank,  and  on  May  29th  it  tabled,  95  to  67,  a  series  of 
resolutions  calling  for  a  comprehensive  report  of  the 
proceedings  of  the  bank.  As  yet  there  were  no  allega 
tions  against  the  management  of  the  bank.  The  stock 
rose  to  130  on  the  reports  of  the  committees  of  Con 
gress. 

A  great  many  politicians  had  to  "  turn  a  sharp  cor 
ner,"  as  Niles  expressed  it,  when  Jackson  came  out 
Against  the  bank.  His  supporters  in  Pennsylvania 
lities  were  nearly  all  bank  nrsn.  Van  Buren,  Marcy, 
Ind  Butler  had  signed  a  petition,  in  1826,  for  a  branch 


38  Niles,  177.  2  38  xiles,  183. 

38  Niles,  126. 


248  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

of  the  bank  at  Albany.1  The  petition  was  refused.  la 
January,  1829,  Van  Buren,  as  Governor  of  New  York, 
referred  to  banks  under  federal  control  as  objectionable. 
The  administration  party  was  not  yet  consolidated.  It 
was  still  only  that  group  of  factions  which  had  united  in 
opposition  to  Adams.  The  bank  question  was  one  of 
the  great  questions  through  which  Jackson's  popularity 
and  his  will  hammered  them  into  a  solid  party  phalanx. 
All  had  to  conform  to  the  lines  which  he  drew  for  the 
party,  under  the  influence  of  Kendall,  Lewis,  and  Hill. 
If  they  did  not  do  so,  they  met  with  speedy  discipline. 

In  his  message  for  1830,  Jackson  again  inserted  a 
paragraph  about  the  bank,  and  proposed  a  bank  as  a 
"  branch  of  the  Treasury  Department."  The  outline  is 
very  vague,  but  it  approaches  the  sub-treasury  idea. 
No  notice  was  taken  of  this  part  of  the  message  in  the 
session  of  1830-31.  On  a  test  question,  whether  to 
refer  the  part  of  the  message  relating  to  the  bank  to 
the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  or  to  a  select  com 
mittee,  the  bank  triumphed,  108  to  67.  Benton  offered 
a  joint  resolution,  in  the  Senate,  February  2,  1831, 
"That  the  charter  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States 
ought  not  to  be  renewed."  The  Senate  refused  leave, 
23  to  20,  to  introduce  it.  In  July,  1831,  the  Secretary 
of  War  ordered  the  pension  funds  for  the  State  of  New 
York  to  be  removed  from  the  New  York  branch.  Bid- 
die  remonstrated,  because  there  was  no  authority  of  law 
for  the  order,  and  the  Auditor  had  refused  to  accept 
such  an  order  as  a  voucher  in  a  previous  case.  Secre 
tary  Cass  revoked  the  order,  March  1,  1832.  In  the 
nessage  of  1831  Jackson  referred  to  the  bank  questior 
*9  one  on  which  he  had  discharged  his  duty  and  frees 
1  Mackeinzie,  98 


MCLANE  IN  FAVOR  OF  TEE  BANK.       249 

his  responsibility.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Mc- 
Lane,  in  his  annual  report,  December,  1831,  made  a 
long  and  strong  argument  in  favor  of  the  bank.  If  we 
may  judge  from  the  tone  of  the  message  of  1831,  Jack 
son  was  willing  to  allow  the  bank  question  to  drop,  at 
least  until  the  presidential  election  should  be  over. 
There  is  even  room  for  a  suspicion  that  McLane's  argu 
ment  in  favor  of  the  bank  was  a  sort  of  "  hedging ; "  for 
although  the  Secretary's  report  was  not  necessarily  sub 
mitted  to  the  President,1  Jackson  was  hardly  the  man  to 
allow  a  report  to  be  sent  in  of  which  he  disapproved. 

We  have  now  concluded  our  review  of  the  public 
questions  which  occupied  attention  during  Jackson's 
first  administration,  and  have  brought  the  history  of 
those  questions,  and  of  his  proceedings  in  regard  to 
them,  down  to  the  time  when  the  presidential  campaign 
vf  1832  opened,  — December,  1831. 
i  See  page  302. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE   CAMPAIGN    OF    1832. 

CLAY  was  the  leading  man  in  the  opposition,  but  lli« 
opposition  was  by  no  means  united.  A  new  factor  had 
been  gaining  importance  in  politics  for  the  last  few 
years.  The  politicians  had  ignored  it  and  sneered  at 
it,  but  it  had  continued  to  grow,  and  was  now  strong 
enough  to  mar,  if  it  could  not  make,  a  national  election. 

In  1826  a  bricklayer,  named  William  Morgan,  who 
lived  at  Batavia,  N.  Y.,  and  was  very  poor,  thought  that 
he  could  earn  something  by  writing  an  exposure  of  the 
secrets  of  free-masonry,1  he  being  a  mason.  The 
masons  learned  that  he  had  written  such  a  book.  They 
caused  his  arrest  and  imprisonment  over  Sunday  on  a 
frivolous  civil  complaint,  and  searched  his  house  for  the 
manuscript  during  his  absence.  A  month  later  he  was 
arrested  again  for  a  debt  of  $2.10,  and  imprisoned 
under  an  execution  for  $2.69,  debt  and  costs.  The 
next  day  the  creditor  declared  the  debt  satisfied.  Mor 
gan  was  released,  passed  at  the  prison  door  into  the 
hands  of  masked  men,  was  placed  in  a  carriage,  taken 
to  Fort  Niagara,  and  detained  there.  A  few  days  later 
a  body  was  found  floating  in  the  river,  which  was  iden 
tified  as  Morgan's  body.  The  masons  always  denied 
that  this  identification  was  correct.  Morgan  has  never 

1  Report  of  the  Special  Agent  of  the  State  of  New  York.  5 
Ann.  Reg.  537. 


OUTRAGE   ON  MORGAN.  251 

been  seen  or  heard  of  since.  In  January,  1827,  certain 
persons  were  tried  for  conspiracy  and  abduction.  They 
pleaded  guilty,  and  so  -prevented  a  disclosure  of  details.1 
The  masons  confessed  and  admitted  abduction,  but  de 
clared  that  Morgan  was  not  dead.  The  opinion  that 
Morgan  had  been  murdered,  and  that  the  body  found 
was  his,  took  possessions  of  the  minds  of  those  people  of 
Western  New  York  who  were  not  masons.  Popular 
legend  and  political  passion  have  become  so  interwoven 
with  the  original  mystery  that  the  truth  cannot  now  be 
known. 

The  outrage  on  Morgan  aroused  great  indignation  in 
Western  New  York,  then  still  a  simple  frontier  country. 
Public  opinion  acted  on  all  subjects.  A  committee  ap 
pointed  at  a  mass-meeting  undertook  an  extra-legal 
investigation,  and  soon  brought  the  matter  into  such 
shape  that  no  legal  tribunal  ever  after  had  much  chance 
of  unravelling  it.  After  the  fashion  of  the  time,  and  of 
the  place  also,  a  political  color  was  immediately  given  to 
the  affair.  As  Spencer,  the  special  agent  appointed  by 
the  State  to  investigate  the  matter,  declared  in  his  re 
port,  the  fact  of  this  political  coloring  was  disastrous  to 
the  cause  of  justice.  The  politicians  tried  to  put  down 
the  whole  excitement,  because  it  traversed  their  plans 
and  combinations.  They  asked,  with  astonishment 
and  with  justice,  what  the  affair  had  to  do  with  politics. 
The  popular  feeling,  however,  was  very  strong,  and  it 
was  fed  by  public  meetings,  committee  reports,  etc. 
The  monstrous  outrage  deserved  that  a  strong  public 
opinion  should  sustain  the  institutions  of  justice  in 
finding  out  and  punishing  toe  perpetrators.  Some  of 
ihe  officers  were  too  lax  ana  indifferent  in  the  discharge 
1  2  Hamnond.  376. 


252  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

cf  their  duties  to  suit  the  public  temper.  They  were 
masons.  Hence  the  inference  that  a  man  who  was  a 
mason  was  not  fit  or  competent  to  be  entrusted  with 
public  duties.  The  political  connection  was  thus  ren 
dered  logical  and  at  least  plausible.  Many  persons  re 
solved  not  to  vote  for  anyone  who  was  a  mason  for 
any  public  office.  Moreover,  the  excitement  offered  an 
unexampled  opportunity  to  the  ambitious  young  orators 
and  politicians  of  the  day.  It  was  a  case  where  pure 
heat  and  emphasis  were  the  only  requirements  of  the 
orator.  He  need  not  learn  anything,  or  have  any  ideas. 
A  number  of  men  rose  to  prominence  on  the  movement 
who  had  no  claims  whatever  to  public  influence.  They 
of  course  stimulated  as  much  as  they  could  the  popular 
excitement  against  masonry,  which  furnished  them  their 
opportunity  and  their  capital.  Many  masons  withdrew 
from  the  order.  Others  foolishly  made  light  of  the 
outrage  itself.  For  the  most  part,  however,  the  masons 
argued  that  masonry  was  no  more  responsible,  as  an  in- 
Btitution,  for  the  outrage  on  Morgan  than  the  Christian 
church  is  responsible  for  the  wrongs  done  in  its  name  by 
particular  persons  and  groups.  These  discussions  only 
sharpened  the  issue,  and  masons  and  anti-masons  came 
to  be  a  division  which  cut  across  all  the  old  party  lines 
in  the  State  of  New  York.  In  1828  the  anti-masons 
were  the  old  Clintonians,1  the  rump  of  the  federalists, 
and  many  buck-tails,  with  whom  horror  at  the  Morgan 
outrage  was  a  controlling  motive.  Jackson,  Clinton, 
and  Van  Buren  were  then  allied.  Jackson  and  Clinton 
were  masons.  The  Clintonians  who  would  not  follow 
Clinton  to  the  support  of  Jackson,  either  because  they 
disliked  the  man  or  because  he  was  a  mason,  and  th« 
1  Clinton  died  February  11,  1828. 


POLITICAL  EFFECTS   OF  ANTI-MASONRY.     253 

wick-tails  who  would  not  vote  for  a  mason,  were  Adams 
men.  The  great  body  of  the  buck-tails  (amongst  whom 
party  discipline  was  stronger  than  in  any  other  faction), 
the  Clintonians  who  followed  Clinton  into  the  Jackson 
camp,  and  the  masons  who  let  defence  of  the  order  coar 
fcrol  their  politics,  were  Jackson  men.  Hence  the  New 
York  vote  (which  was  taken  by  districts  in  1828)  was 
divided. 

The  regency  buck-tail  democrats,  being  in  control 
of  the  state  government,  tried  to  put  down  the  excite 
ment  by  indirect  means,  because  of  its  disorganizing 
effects.  This  made  them  appear  to  suppress  inquiry,  and 
to  be  indifferent  to  the  outrage.  It  only  fanned  the 
flame  of  popular  indignation,  and  strengthened  anti- 
masonry.  The  anti-masons  came  out  as  an  anti-ad 
ministration  party  in  1830.  They  held  a  convention  at 
Utica  in  August,  and  framed  a  platform  of  national 
principles.  This  is  the  first  "  platform,"  as  distinguished 
from  the  old-fashioned  address.  The  anti-masons  had 
come  together  under  no  other  bond  than  opposition  to 
masonry.  If  they  were  to  be  a  permanent  party,  and  a 
national  party,  they  needed  to  find  or  make  some  polit 
ical  principles.  This  was  their  great  political  weakness 
and  the  sure  cause  of  their  decay.  Their  party  had  no 
root  in  political  convictions.  It  had  its  root  elsewhere, 
and  in  very  thin  soil  too,  for  a  great  political  organiza 
tion.  Since  the  masons  were  not  constantly  and  by  the 
fife  principle  of  their  order  perpetrators  of  outrages  and 
murders,  they  could  not  furnish  regular  fuel  to  keep  up 
the  indignation  of  the  anti-masons.  The  anti-masons, 
then,  put  on  their  principles  as  an  after-thought.  For 
this  reason,  however,  they  needed  an  explicit  statement 
of  them,  if  possible,  in  a  categorical  form,  i.  e.,  a  plat 


254  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

form,  far  more  than  a  party  which  had  an  historical 
origin,  and  traditions  derived  from  old  political  contro 
versies.  Anti-masonry  spread  rapidly  through  New 
York  and  large  parts  of  Pennsylvania  and  Massachu 
setts.  Vermont  hecame  a  stronghold  of  it.  It  is  by  no 
means  extinct  there  now.  It  had  considerable  strength 
in  Connecticut  and  Ohio.  It  widened  into  hostility  to 
all  secret  societies  and  extra-judicial  oaths.  Perhaps  it 
reached  its  acme  when  it  could  lead  men  like  J.  Q. 
Adams  and  Joseph  Story  to  spend  days  in  discussing 
plans  for  abolishing  the  secrecy  of  the  Phi  Beta  Kappa 
society  of  Harvard  College.1  It  only  showed  to  what 
extent  every  man  is  carried  away  by  the  currents  of 
thought  and  interest  which  prevail  for  the  time  being  in 
the  community. 

The  anti-masons  next  invented  the  national  political 
convention.2  They  held  one  at  Philadelphia,  September 
11,  1830,8  which  called  another,  to  meet  September 
26,  1831,  at  Baltimore,  to  nominate  candidates  for 
President  and  Vice-President.  At  the  latter  date  112 
delegates  met.4  William  Wirt,  of  Maryland,  was  nomi 
nated  for  President,  and  Amos  Ellmaker,  of  PennsyL 
vania,  for  Vice-President,  almost  unanimously.  Wirt 
had  been  a  mason,  and  had  neglected,  not  abandoned,  the 

1  8  Adams,  383. 

2  A  convention  of  delegates  from  eleven  States  nominated  De 
Witt  Clinton,  in  1812.     Binns  (page  244)  claims  to  have  invented 
Ihe  national  convention,  but  his  was  a  project  for  introducing  inta 
fche  congressional  caucus  of  the  republican   party  special  dele 
gates  from  the  non-republican  States,  so  as  to  make  that  body 

spresent  the  whole  party. 
8  39  Niles,  58. 

4  41  Niles,  83,  107.     Twelve  States  were  represented.     W,  IJ 
Reward  and  Thaddeus  Stevens  were  in  the  convention. 


•        ANTI-MASONIC  NOMINATIONS.  256 

Drder.  In  his  letter  of  acceptance l  lie  said  that  he  had 
often  spoken  of  "  masonry  and  anti-masonry  as  a  fitter 
subject  for  farce  than  tragedy."  He  circumscribed  and 
tamed  down  the  whole  anti-masonic  movement,  and  put 
himself  on  no  platform  save  hostility  to  oaths  which 
might  interfere  with  a  man's  civic  duties.  He  put  the 
whole  Morgan  case  aside,  except  so  far  as,  on  the  trial, 
it  appeared  that  masonry  hindered  justice.  The  anti- 
masons  were,  in  fact,  aiming  at  political  power.  They 
had  before  them  the  names  of  McLean,  Calhoun,  and 
J.  Q.  Adams.2  New  York  wanted  McLean.  He  de 
clined.8  The  anti-masonic  convention  published  a  long 
address,  setting  forth  the  history  and  principles  of  the 
party.4  There  was  a  hope,  in  which  Wirt  seems  to 
have  shared,  that  when  the  anti-masons  presented  a 
separate  nomination  Clay  would  withdraw,  and  the 
national  republicans  would  take  up  Wirt.6  When  this 
hope  had  passed  away,  Wirt  wanted  to  withdraw,  but 
could  not  do  so.6  He  had  from  the  first  desired  Clay's 
election,  and  had  agreed  to  stand  only  when  assured 
that  Clay  could  not  unite  the  anti-Jackson  men.  Clay 
refused  to  answer  the  interrogatories  of  the  anti-masons. 
He  said,  "  I  do  not  know  a  solitary  provision  in  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  which  conveys  the 
slightest  authority  to  the  general  government  to  inter 
fere,  one  way  or  the  other,  with  either  masonry  or 
><nti-masonry."  He  said  that  if  the  President  should 

1  2  Kennedy's  Wirt,  350.  2  8  Adams,  412,  416. 

«  41  Niles,  259.  *  41  Niles,  166. 

*  Judge  Spencer  thought  that  Wirt  could  unite  the  opposition, 
if  Clay  would  stand  back,  and  that  Wirt  cculd  be  elected  ovei 
?.*ckson.  (1  Curtis's  Webster,  402.) 

«  2  Kennedy's  W'irt,  356,  362.  36«. 


ANDREW  JACKSON. 

meddle  with  that  matter  he  would  be  a  usurper  and  « 
tyrant.1 

The  opposition  therefore  went  into  the  contest  divided 
and  discordant.  The  anti-masons  were  strong  enough 
to  produce  that  state  of  things,  and  of  course  their  con 
duct  showed  that  the  opposition  was  not  united  on  any 
political  policy  whatever.  Jackson,  on  the  contrary, 
had  been  consolidating  a  party,  which  had  a  strong  con 
sciousness  of  its  power  and  its  purpose  and  a  vigorous 
party  will.  Jackson  had  the  credit  of  recovering  the 
West  India  trade,  settling  the  spoliation  claims,  and 
placing  all  foreign  relations  on  a  good  footing.  He 
also  claimed  that  he  had  carried  the  administration  of 
the  government  back  to  the  Jeffersonian  ideas.  In 
general  this  meant  that  he  held  to  the  non-interference 
theory  of  government,  and  to  the  policy  of  leaving 
people  to  be  happy  in  their  own  way.  He  had  not  yet 
been  forced  to  commit  himself  on  land  and  tariff,  al 
though  he  had  favored  a  liberal  policy  about  land  ;  but 
on  internal  improvements  he  had  spoken  clearly,  and 
inferences  were  freely  drawn  as  to  what  he  would  do  on 
land  and  tariff.  He  had  favored  state  rights  and  strict 
construction  in  all  the  cases  which  had  arisen.  He  had 
discountenanced  all  heavy  expenditures  on  so-called  na 
tional  objects,  and  had  prosecuted  as  rapidly  as  possible 
the  payment  of  the  debt.  Here  was  a  strong  record 
and  a  consistent  one  on  a  number  of  great  points  of 
policy,  and  that,  of  course,  is  what  is  needed  to  form  n 
party.  The  record  also  furnished  two  or  three  good 
party  "  cries."  The  general  non-interference  policy 
strengthens  any  government  which  recurs  to  it.  AL' 
£«Teraments  in  time  depart  from  it,  because  they  al 
1  41  Niles,  260 ;  8  Adams,  430. 


JACKSON'S  PARTY.  257 

credit  themselves  with  power  to  do  better  for  the 
people  than  the  people  can  do  for  themselves.  In 
1831-32  Jackson  had  not  yet  reached  this  stage  in  his 
career.  The  delicate  points  in  his  record  were  tariff 
and  bank.  If  he  assailed  the  tariff,  would  he  not  lose 
Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  and  Kentucky  ?  If  he  favored  it, 
would  he  not  lose  the  South  ?  This  was  the  old  division 
in  the  body  of  his  supporters,  and  it  seemed  that  he 
might  now  be  ruined  if  that  cleft  were  opened.  Also,  ii 
he  went  on  with  the  "  bank  war,"  would  he  not  lose 
Pennsylvania  ?  His  mild  message  on  the  bank  in  1831 
seemed  to  indicate  fear. 

Clay  declared  unhesitatingly  that  the  campaign  re 
quired  that  the  opposition  should  force  the  fighting  on 
tariff  and  bank,  especially  on  the  latter.  We  have  seen  * 
what  his  demeanor  and  demands  were  in  the  conference 
at  Washington.  For  the  fight  out-of-doors  he  though! 
that  the  recharter  of  the  bank  was  the  strongest  issue  he 
could  make.  Of  course  Benton's  assertion2  that  the 
bank  attacked  Jackson  is  a  ridiculous  misrepresentation. 
Clay  did,  however,  seize  upon  the  question  which  Jack 
son  had  raised  about  the  bank,  and  he  risked  that  im 
portant  financial  institution  on  the  fortunes  of  a  political 
campaign.  The  bank  was  very  unwilling  to  be  so  used. 
Its  disinterested  friends  in  both  parties  strongly  dis- 
Buaded  Biddle  from  allowing  the  question  of  recharter 
to  be  brought  into  the  campaign.8  Clay's  advisers  tried 
to  dissuade  him.  The  bank,  however,  could  not  oppose 
Ihe  public  man  on  whom  it  depended  most  and  the 
party  leaders  deferred  at  last  to  their  chief.  Jackson 
never  was  more  dictatorial  and  obstinate  than  Clay  was 
*t  this  juncture.  Clay  was  the  champion  of  the  system 

*  Page  22?  2  1  Benton,  227.  3  Ingersoll,  S68. 

17 


258  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

of  state-craft  which  makes  public  men  undertake  a  tute 
lage  of  the  nation,  and  teaches  them  not  to  be  content  to 
let  the  nation  grow  by  its  own  forces,  and  according  to 
the  shaping  of  the  forces  and  the  conditions.  His  sys 
tem  of  statesmanship  is  one  which  always  offers  shelter 
to  numbers  of  interested  schemes  and  corrupt  enter 
prises.  The  public  regarded  the  bank,  under  his  polifc* 
ical  advocacy,  as  a  part  of  that  system  of  state-craft. 

The  national  republican  convention  met  at  Baltimore, 
December  12, 1831. l  It  consisted  of  155  delegates  from 
seventeen  States.  Abner  Lacock,  of  Pennsylvania,  who 
as  senator  had  made  a  very  strong  report  against  Jack 
son  on  the  Seminole  war,  was  president  of  the  conven 
tion.  John  Sergeant,  of  Pennsylvania,  was  nominated 
for  Vice-President.  The  convention  issued  an  address, 
in  which  the  bank  question  was  put  forward.  It  was 
declared  that  the  President  "  is  fully  and  three  times 
over  pledged  to  the  people  to  negative  any  bill  that  may 
be  passed  for  rechartering  the  bank,  and  there  is  little 
doubt  that  the  additional  influence  which  he  would  ac 
quire  by  a  reelection  would  be  employed  to  carry 
through  Congress  the  extraordinary  substitute  which  he 
has  repeatedly  proposed."  The  appeal,  therefore,  was 
to  defeat  Jackson  in  order  to  save  the  bank  and  prevent 
,Jhe  device  proposed  by  Jackson  from  being  tried. 

Such  a  challenge  as  that  could  have  but  one  effect  on 
Jackson.  It  called  every  faculty  he  possessed  into 
activity  to  compass  the  destruction  of  the  bank.  Instead 
of  retiring  from  the  position  he  had  taken,  the  moment 
there  was  a  tight  to  be  fought,  he  did  what  he  did  at 
New  Orleans.  He  moved  his  lines  up  to  the  last  point 
he  could  command  on  the  side  towards  the  enemy  Tin 
1  41  Niles,  301. 


PETITION  FOR  RECHARTER.  259 

Uiti-bank  men,  Kendall,  Blair,  and  Hill,  must  have  been 
delighted  to  see  the  adversary  put  spurs  into  Jackson'g 
animosity.  The  proceedings  seemed  to  prove  just  what 
the  anti-bank  men  had  asserted :  that  the  bank  was  a 
great  monster,  which  aimed  to  control  elections,  and  to 
set  up  and  put  down  Presidents.  The  campaign  of 
1832  was  a  struggle  between  the  popularity  of  the  bank 
and  the  popularity  of  Jackson.  His  popularity  in  rural 
Pennsylvania  had  never  had  any  rational  basis,  and 
hence  could  not  be  overthrown  by  rational  deductions. 
His  spirit  and  boldness  in  meeting  the  issue  offered  by 
Clay  won  him  support.  His  party  was  not  broken ;  it 
was  consolidated. 

On  the  9th  of  January,  1832,  in  prosecution  of  the 
programme,  the  memorial  of  the  bank  for  a  renewal  of 
its  charter  was  presented  in  the  Senate  by  Dallas,  and 
in  the  House  by  McDuffie.  These  men  were  both 
"  bank  democrats."  Sargent 1  says  Biddle  told  him 
that  the  bank  wanted  Webster,  or  some  such  unequivocal 
friend  of  the  bank,  to  present  the  memorial,  but  that 
Dallas  claimed  the  duty  as  belonging  to  him.  There  was 
great  and  just  dissatisfaction  with  Dallas  for  the  way  in 
which  he  managed  the  business.  He  intimated  a  doubt 
whether  the  application  was  not  premature,  and  a  doubt 
about  the  policy  of  the  memorial,  lest  "it  might  be 
drawn  into  a  real  or  imaginary  conflict  with  some  higher, 
Aome  more  favorite,  some  more  immediate  wish  or  pur 
pose  of  the  American  people."  In  the  Senate  the  peti 
tion  was  referred  to  a  select  committee,  and  in  the 
House  to  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means.  The  Sen- 
nate  committee  reported  favorably  March  13th  and  ree- 
Mnmended  only  a  few  changes  in  the  old  charter.  They 
1  1  Sargent,  215. 


260  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

proposed  to  demand  a  bonus  of  one  and  a  half  millions 
in  three  annual  instalments.  In  the  House,  McDuffie 
reported  February  9th.1  He  said  that  the  proposition  to 
recharter  had  called  out  a  number  of  wild  propositions. 
The  old  bank  was  too  large,  but  one  was  proposed  with 
a  capital  of  fifty  millions.  He  criticised  the  notion  that 
oil  citizens  should  have  an  equal  right  to  subscribe  to 
the  stock  of  the  bank.  If  A  has  $100  on  balance  and 
B  owes  $100  on  balance,  their  "  equal  right "  to  sub 
scribe  to  bank  stock  is  a  strange  thing  to  discuss. 

Benton 2  says  that  the  opponents  of  the  bank  in  Con 
gress  agreed  upon  a  policy.  They  determined  to  fight 
the  charter  at  every  point,  and  to  bring  the  bank  into 
odium  as  much  as  possible.  He  says  that  he  organized 
a  movement  to  this  effect  in  the  House,  incited  Clayton, 
of  Georgia,  to  demand  an  investigation  of  the  bank,  and 
furnished  him  with  the  charges  and  specifications  on 
which  to  base  that  demand.  Clayton  moved  for  an 
investigation,  February  23d.  He  presented  Benton's 
charges,  seven  important  and  fifteen  minor  ones.  Mc 
Duffie  answered  the  charges  at  once,  but  the  investiga 
tion  was  ordered  to  be  made  by  a  special  committee. 
They  reported,  April  30th.  The  majority  imported  that 
the  bank  ought  not  to  be  rechartered  until  the  debt  was 
all  paid  and  the  revenue  readjusted.  R.  M.  Johnson 
signed  this  repor^  so  as  to  make  a  majority,  out  of  good 
nature.  He  rose  in  his  place  in  Congress  and  said  that 
he  had  not  looked  at  a  document  at  Philadelphia.  The 
minority  reported  that  the  bank  ought  to  be  rechartered : 
that  it  was  sound  and  useful.  John  Quincy  Adams 
oxade  a  third  report,  in  which  he  brought  his  character 
Jstic  industry  to  bear  on  the  question,  and  discussed  at 
1  Document  C.  2  1  Benton  236. 


CHARGES  AGAINST  THE  BANK.  261 

the  points  raised  in  the  attack  on  the  bank.  It  is  to 
bis  report  that  we  are  indebted  for  a  knowledge  of  the 
correspondence  of  1829  between  Biddle  and  Ingliam, 
and  the  controversy  over  the  Portsmouth  branch,  which 
was  the  first  skirmish  in  the  "  bank  war."  ] 

The  charges  against  the  bank,  and  the  truth  about 
them,  so  far  as  we  can  discover  it,  were  as  follows  :  — 

(1.)  Usury.  The  bank  sold  Bank  of  Kentucky  notes 
to  certain  persons  on  long  credit.  When  these  persons 
afterwards  claimed  an  allowance  for  depreciation,  it  was 
granted.  A  case  which  came  to  trial  went  off  on  tech 
nicalities,  wrhich  were  claimed  to  amount  to  a  confession 
by  the  bank  of  a  corrupt  bargain.2  The  bank  had  also 
charged  discount  and  exchange  for  domestic  bills,  when 
these  two  together  amounted  to  more  than  six  per  cent, 
the  rate  to  which  it  was  restrained  by  its  charter.  This 
charge  was  no  doubt  true.  The  device  was  used  by  all 
banks  to  evade  the  usury  law. 

(2.)  Branch  drafts  issued  as  currency.  The  amount 
of  these  outstanding  was  $7.4  millions.  The  majority 
of  the  committee  doubted  the  lawfulness  of  the  branch 
drafts,  but  said  nothing  about  the  danger  from  them 
as  instruments  of  credit.  Adams  said  they  were  useful, 
but  likely  to  do  mischief.  These  drafts  were  in  form 
redeemable  where  issued,  but  in  intention  and  practice 
they  were  redeemed  hundreds  of  miles  away,  and  they 
had  no  true  convertibility.  There  was  no  check  what 
ever  on  the  inflation  of  the  currency  by  them  so  long  as 
credit  was  active.  Cambreleng  very  pointedly  asked 
Biddle  how  the  brancb  draft  arrangement  differed  from 

1  Document  B. 

«  Cf.  Bank  of  the  United  State*  -s.  William  Owens  cf  cu.  I 


£62  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

an  obligation  of  a  Philadelphia  bank  to  redeem  all  the 
notes  of  all  the  banks  in  Pennsylvania.  Biddle  replied 
that  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  controlled  all  the 
branches  which  issued  branch  drafts  on  it.  That  was, 
to  be  sure,  the  assumption,  but  he  had  had  hard  ex 
perience  all  winter  that  it  was  not  true  in  fact.1 

(3.)  Sales  of  coin,  especially  American  coin.  The 
bank  had  bought  and  sold  foreign  coin  by  weight.  The 
majority  held  that  such  coins  were  not  bullion,  because 
Congress  had  fixed  their  value  by  law.  Adams  easily 
showed  the  fallacy  of  this.  All  gold  coins,  then,  Ameri 
can  included,  were  a  commodity,  not  money.2  The 
bank  had  sold  $84,734.44  of  American  gold  coin. 

(4.)  Sales  of  public  stocks.  The  bank  was  forbidden 
by  the  charter  to  sell  public  stocks,  the  object  being  to 
prevent  it  from  manipulating  the  price  of  the  same.  In 
1824,  in  aid  of  a  refunding  scheme,  the  bank  took 
some  public  stocks  from  the  government,  and  had  spe 
cial  permission  by  act  of  Congress  to  sell  them.  Tho 
majority  disapproved  of  the  sale. 

(5.)  Gifts  to  roads,  canals,  etc.  The  bank  had  made 
two  subscriptions  of  $1,500  each  to  the  stock  of  turn 
pike  companies.  The  other  cases  were  all  petty  gifts 
to  fire  companies,  etc.  The  majority  argued  that,  since 
the  administration  had  pronounced  against  internal  im 
provements,  the  bank  ought  not  to  have  assisted  any  such 
works.  Adams  said  that  the  administration  had  opposed 
internal  improvements,  on  the  ground  that  they  were 
unconstitutional  when  undertaken  by  the  federal  govern 
ment  ;  but  he  asked  what  argument  that  furnished 
against  such  works  when  undertaken  by  anybody  else. 

(6.)  Building  houses  to  rent  or  sell.  The  bank  had 
1  Sae  below,  page  270-1.  2  See  page  333. 


CHARGES  AGAINST  THE  BANK.  263 

been  obliged,  in  some  cases,  to  take  real  estate  for  debts. 
When  it  could  not  sell,  it  had,  in  a  few  cases,  improved. 

These  points  were  the  alleged  violations  of  the  charter. 
Biddle  denied  the  seventh  charge,  of  non-user,  in  failing 
to  issue  notes  in  the  South  and  West  for  seven  years. 
Adams  pointed  out  that  these  charges  would  only  afford 
ground  for  a  scire  facias  to  go  before  a  jury  on  the 
facts.  The  charges  of  mismanagement,  and  the  truth 
about  them,  so  far  as  we  can  ascertain,  were  as  follows : 

(1.)  Subsidizing  the  press.  Webb  and  Noah,  of  the 
"Courier  and  Enquirer"  (administration  organ  until 
April,  1831 ;  then  in  favor  of  the  bank),  Gales  and 
Seaton,  of  the  "National  Intelligencer"  (independent 
opposition),  Duff  Green,  of  the  "Telegraph"  (adminis 
tration  organ  until  the  spring  of  1831),  and  Thomas 
Ritchie  of  the  Richmond  "  Enquirer "  (administration) 
were  on  the  books  of  the  bank  as  borrowers.  The 
change  of  front  by  the  "  Courier  and  Enquirer  "  was  re 
garded  as  very  significant.  Adams  said  that  there  was 
no  law  against  subsidizing  the  press,  and  that  the  phrase 
meant  nothing.  He  protested  against  the  examination 
of  the  editors.  The  case  stood  so  that,  if  the  bank  dis 
counted  a  note  for  an  administration  editor,  it  was  said 
to  bribe  him  5  if  for  an  opposition  editor,  it  was  said  to 
subsidize  him. 

(2.)  Favoritism  to  Thomas  Biddle,  second  cousin  of 
the  president  of  the  bank.  Reuben  M.  Whitney  was 
the  witness  on  this  charge.  T.  Biddle  was  the  broker 
if  the  bank.  N.  Biddle  admitted  that  the  bank  had 
k)llowed  a  usage,  adopted  by  other  banks,  of  allowing 
vash  in  the  drawer  to  be  loaned  out  to  particular  persons, 
Mid  replaced  by  securities,  which  were  passed  as  casli, 
for  8  few  days.  He  said  the  practice  had  been  diacon 


264  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

tinned.  Whitney  made  a  very  circumstantial  charge 
that  T.  Biddle  had  been  allowed  to  do  this,  and  that  he 
had  paid  no  interest  for  the  funds  of  the  hank  of  which 
he  thus  got  the  use.  N.  Biddle  proved  that  he  was  in 
Washington  when  Whitney's  statement  implied  his 
presence  in  Philadelphia.  Adams  said  Whitney  lied. 
I  was  certainly  true,  and  was  admitted,  that  T.  Biddle 
had  had  enormous  confidential  transactions  with  the 
bank,  but  Whitney  was  placed,  in  respect  to  all  the  im 
portant  part  of  his  evidence,  in  the  position  of  a  con 
victed  calumniator.  He  went  to  Wasljjbgton,  where  he 
was  taken  into  the  kitchen  cabinet  and  made  special 
agent  of  the  deposit  banks.  In  1837  he,. published  an 
"  Address  to  the  American  People,"  in  which  he  reit 
erated  the  charges  against  Biddle.1 

(3.)  Exporting  specie,  and  drawing  specie  from  the 
South  and  West.  The  minority  state  that  the  usual 
current  was,  that  silver  was  imported  from  Mexico  to 
New  Orleans,  and  passed  up  the  Mississippi  and  Ohio, 
and  was  exported  to  China  from  the  East.  From 
1820  to  1832,  $22.5  million  were  drawn  from  the  South 
and  West  to  New  York.  The  bank  was  charged  with 
draining  the  West  of  specie.  So  far  as  the  current  of 
silver  was  normal,  the  bank  had  nothing  to  do  with 
it.  If  there  had  been  no  banks  of  issue,  the  West  would 
have  kept  enough  specie  for  its  use,  and  the  current 
would  have  flowed  through  and  past,  leaving  always 
enough.  The  paper  issues  in  the  valley  drove  out  the 
specie,  and  little  stayed.  The  branch  drafts  after  1827 
helped  to  produce  this  result,  and  the  charge  was,  ir 
10  far,  just.2  The  bank  was  also  charged  with  export 

*  52  Nihd,  106. 

•  Gouge  saya  that,  in  1828,  there  was  no  local  bank  in  opera 


CHARGES  AGAINST  THE  BANK.  265 

Sng  specie  as  a  result  of  its  exchange  operations.  It 
sold  drafts  on  London  for  use  in  China,  payable  six 
months  after  sight.  They  were  sold  for  the  note  of  the 
buyer  at  one  year.  The  goods  could  be  imported  and 
sold  to  meet  the  draft.  This  produced  an  inflation  of 
credit,  since  one  who  had  no  capital,  if  he  could  get  the 
bank  accommodation,  could  extend  credit  indefinitely. 
The  majority  made  a  point  on  this,  but  they  added  the 
following  contribution  to  financial  science  :  "  The  legiti 
mate  object  of  banks  the  committee  believe  to  be  grant 
ing  facilities,  not  loaning  capital."  On  that  theory  there 
would  have  been  no  fault  to  be  found  with  the  China 
drafts,  which  must  have  been  a  great  "  facility  "  to  those 
who  could  get  them,  and  who  had  no  other  capital. 

(4.)  The  improper  increase  of  branches.  It  was 
true  that  there  were  too  many.  Cheves,  in  his  time, 
thought  some  of  them  disadvantageous  to  the  bank,  but 
it  had  been  importuned  to  establish  them,  and  there  was 
complaint  if  a  branch  was  lacking  where  the  government 
or  influential  individuals  wanted  one. 

(5.)  Expansion  of  the  circulation  by  $1.3  million  be 
tween  September  1,  1831,  and  April  1,  1832,  although 
the  discounts  had  been  reduced  during  the  winter.  The 
bank  was  struggling  already  with  the  branch  drafts,  and 
the  facts  alleged  were  produced  by  its  efforts  to  cope 
with  the  effects  of  the  drafts. 

(6.)  Failure  of  the  bank  to  serve  the  nation.  The 
majority  made  another  extraordinary  blunder  here. 
They  said  £hat  the  duties  were  paid  at  New  York  and 
Philadelphia,  and  that  drafts  on  these  cities  were  al 
ways  at  a  premium.  Hence  they  argued  that  the  bank 

lion  in  Kentucky,  Indiana,  Illinois,  or  Missouri,  and  only  tma 
wch  in  Tennessee,  Mississippi,  and  Alabama.  (Gouge,  39.) 


266  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

gained  more  the  further  it  transferred  funds  for  the 
government.  The  minority  ridiculed  this  as  an  anni 
hilation  of  space,  a  means  of  making  a  thing  worth  more 
the  further  it  was  from  where  it  was  wanted. 

(7.)  Mismanagement  of  the  public  deposits.  The 
majority  state  what  they  think  the  hank  ought  to  do. 
It  ought  to  use  its  capital  as  a  permanent  fund,  and  loan 
the  public  deposits  on  time,  so  as  to  be  payable  near  the 
time  when  they  would  be  required  by  the  government 
for  the  debt  payments.  If  the  bank  had  done  this  it 
would  have  carried  to  a  maximum  the  disturbances  in 
the  money  market  which  were  actually  produced  by  the 
semi-annual  payments  on  the  debt.  It  would  have  in 
flated  and  contracted  its  discounts  by  an  enormous  sum 
every  six  months. 

(8.)  Postponement  of  the  payment  of  the  three  per 
cents.  These  stocks  were  issued  in  1792  for  the  accrued 
interest  on  the  Revolutionary  debt.  They  were  to  be 
paid  at  100.  The  Secretary  informed  the  bank,  March 
24th,  just  before  the  bank  committee  was  raised,  that 
he  should  pay  half  the  three  per  cents  ($6  million)  in 
July.  Biddle  hastened  to  Washington  to  secure  a  post 
ponement  ;  not,  as  he  affirmed,  for  the  sake  of  the  bank, 
but  for  two  other  reasons  :  (1)  that  $9  million  duty 
bonds  would  be  payable  July  1st,  and  the  merchants 
would  be  put  to  inconvenience  if  the  debt  payment  felJ 
at  that  time ,  (2)  a  visitation  of  cholera  was  to  be 
feared,  which  would  derange  industry  ;  and  the  payment 
of  the  debt,  with  the  recall  of  so  much  capital  loaned 
to  merchants,  would  add  to  the  distress.  The  friends  of 
the  bank  said  that  these  reasons  were  good  and  sufli 
eient.  Its  enemies  said  that  they  were  specious,  but  wer« 
wily  pretexts.  The  Secretary  agreed  to  defer  the  pay 


CHARGES  AGAINST  THE  BANK.  26? 

nient  of  $5  million  of  the  three  per  cents  until  October 
1st,  the  bank  agreeing  to  pay  the  interest  for  three 
months.1  This  matter  will  be  discussed  below. 

(9.)  Incomplete  number  of  directors.  Biddle  was 
both  government  director  and  elected  director,  so  that 
there  were  only  twenty-four  in  all. 

(10.)  Large  expenditures  for  printing :  $6,700  in 
1830 :  $9,100  in  1831.  From  1829,  the  date  of  Jack- 
son's  first  attack,  the  bank  spent  money  on  pamphlets 
and  newspapers  to  influence  public  opinion  in  its  favor. 

(11.)  Large  contingent  expenditures.  There  was  a 
contingent  fund  account,  the  footings  of  which,  in  1832, 
were  $6  million,  to  sink  the  losses  of  the  first  few  years, 
the  bonus,  premiums  on  public  stocks  bought,  banking 
house,  etc.,  etc. 

(12.)  Loans  to  members  of  Congress  in  advance  of 
appropriations.  Adams  objected  to  this  as  an  evil  prac 
tice.  He  said  afterwards  that  the  investigation  into 
this  point  was  dropped,  because  it  was  found  that  a 
large  number  of  congressmen  of  both  parties  had  had 
loans. 

(13.)  Refusal  to  give  a  list  of  stockholders  resident 
in  Connecticut,  so  that  that  State  might  collect  taxes 
from  them  on  their  stock. 

(14.)  Usurpation  of  the  control  of  the  bank  by  the 
exchange  committee  of  the  board  of  directors,  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  other  directors.  This  charge  was  de 
nied. 

In  all  this  tedious  catalogue  of  charges  we  can  find 

nothing  but  frivolous  complaints  and  ignorant  criticism 

successfully  refuted,  except  when  we  touch  the  branch 

drafts.     The  majority   of  the  iommittee,  if   all   their 

1  Document  D. 


868  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

points  are  taken  together,  thought  that  the  bank  ought 
to  lend  the  public  deposits  liberally,  and  draw  them  in 
promptly  when  wanted  to  pay  the  debt,  yet  refuse  no 
accommodation  (especially  to  any  one  who  was  em 
barrassed),  not  sell  its  public  stocks,  not  increase  its 
circulation,  not  draw  in  its  loans,  not  part  with  its 
specie,  not  draw  on  the  debtor  branches  in  the  West, 
not  press  the  debtor  state  banks,  and  not  contract  any 
temporary  loans.  The  student  of  the  evidence  and  re 
ports  of  1832,  if  he  believes  the  bank's  statements  in  the 
evidence,  will  say  that  the  bank  was  triumphantly  vin 
dicated.  Two  facts,  however,  are  very  striking :  (1) 
The  most  important  of  the  charges  against  which  the 
bank  successfully  defended  itself  in  1832  were  the  very 
acts  of  which  it  was  guilty  in  1837-38,  and  they  were 
what  ruined  it;  these  were  the  second  charge,  which 
involved  Whitney's  veracity,  and  the  fourteenth  charge, 
which  the  bank  denied.  (2)  Whether  the  bank  was 
thoroughly  sincere  and  above-board  in  these  matters  is 
a  question  on  which  an  unpleasant  doubt  is  thrown  by 
the  certainty  that  it  was  not  thoroughly  honest  in.  some 
other  matters.  In  regard  to  the  three  per  cents,  it  is 
certain  that  Biddle  wanted  to  defer  the  payment  for  the 
sake  of  the  bank.  He  was  embarrassed  already  by  the 
debt  of  the  Western  branches,  which  had  been  produced 
by  the  operation  of  the  branch  drafts.  Their  effect  was 
just  beginning  to  tell  seriously.  There  was  a  great 
movement  of  free  capital  in  the  form  of  specie  to  this 
country  in  1830,  on  account  of  revolutions  in  Europe. 
Fn  1830  and  1831  the  United  States  paid  its  stock  note 
in  the  capital  of  the  bank.  Capital  was  easy  to  borrow. 
In  October,  1831,  a  certain  stringency  set  in.  Th« 
Kranch  drafts  were  transferring  the  capital  of  the 


BIDDLKS  PLAUSIBILITY.  269 

to  tie  Western  branches,  and  locking  it  up  there  in 
accommodation  paper,  indefinitely  extended  by  drawing 
Mid  redrawing.  Biddle  could  not  make  the  Western 
branches  pay.  He  was  forced  to  curtail  the  Eastern 
branches.  At  such  a  juncture  it  was  impossible  for  him 
to  see  with  equanimity  a  debt  which  bore  only  three 
per  cent  interest  paid  off  at  one  hundred,  when  the 
market  rate  was  seven  or  eight  per  cent.  He  wanted 
to  get  possession  of  that  capital.  Even  before  he  re 
ceived  notice  that  the  three  per  cents  were  to  be  paid, 
he  tried  to  negotiate  with  Ludlow,  the  representative 
of  a  large  number  of  holders  of  the  three  per  cents, 
for  the  purchase  of  the  same.  Ludlow  had  not  power  to 
sell.1  Great  consequences  hung  on  the  strait  into  which 
the  branch  drafts  had  pushed  the  bank,  and  this  meas 
ure  of  relief  to  which  Biddle  had  recourse.  Biddle  was 
too  plausible.  In  any  emergency  he  was  ready  to  write 
a  letter  or  report,  to  smooth  things  over,  and  present  a 
^ood  face  in  spite  of  facts.  Any  one  who  has  carefully 
studied  the  history  of  the  bank,  and  Biddle's  "  state 
ments,"  will  come  to  every  statement  of  his  with  a  dis 
agreeable  sense  of  suspicion.  It  is  by  no  means  certain, 
whatever  the  true  explanation  of  the  contradiction  may 
be,  that  Whitney  told  a  lie  in  the  matter  in  which  his 
word  and  Biddle's  were  opposed. 

Biddle's  theory  of  bank-note  issues  was  vicious  and 
false.  He  thought  that  the  business  of  a  bank  was  to 
furnish  a  paper  medium  for  trade  and  commerce.  He 
thought  that  this  medium  served  as  a  token  and  record 
of  transactions,  the  exchange  turning  upon  itself,  as  it 
urere,  so  that  the  transactions  to  be  accomplished  called 
tut  the  paper,  and  when  accomplished  brought  the  papei 
1  Folk's  Minority  "Report,  '  333,  Document  E. 


270  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Dack.  There  could  then  be  no  inflation  of  the  paper,  if 
it  was  only  put  out  as  demanded  for  real  transactions. 
Therefore  he  never  distinguished  between  bills  of  ex 
change  and  money,  or  the  true  paper  surrogate  for 
money,  which  is  constantly  and  directly  interchangeable 
with  money,  so  that  it  cannot  degenerate  into  a  negoti 
able  instrument  like  notes  and  bills.  His  management 
of  the  bank  was  a  test  of  his  theory  on  a  grand  scale. 
The  branch  drafts  were  a  special  test  of  it.  It  was 
proven  that  they  had  none  of  the  character  of  convertible 
bank-notes  or  money,  but  were  instruments  of  credit, 
and,  like  all  instruments  of  credit  which  have  cut  loose 
from  actual  redemption  in  capital,  there  was  no  more 
limit  to  their  possible  inflation  than  to  the  infinity  of 
human  hopes  and  human  desires.  Only  a  few  months 
after  this  investigation,  November,  1832,  the  president 
of  the  Nashville  branch  wrote  to  Biddle,  "  Be  assured, 
sir,  that  we  are  as  well  convinced  as  you  are  that  too 
many  bills  are  offered  and  purchased,  —  amounting  to 
more  than  the  present  crop  of  cotton  and  tobacco  will 
pay ;  I  mean,  before  all  these  papers  are  taken  up."  It 
does  not  appear  that,  in  the  spring  of  1832,  Biddle  yet 
perceived  the  operation  of  the  branch  drafts,  and  it 
3ould  not  be  said  that  sincerity  required  that  he  should 
avow  a  mistake  to  a  hostile  committee  ;  but  his  letter  to 
Clayton,  appended  to  the  report  of  1832,  is  meretricious 
and  dazzling,  calculated  to  repel  investigation  and  cover 
up  weakness  by  a  sensational  assertion.  "  The  whole 
policy  of  the  bank  for  the  last  six  months  has  been  ex- 
elusively  protective  and  conservative,  calculated  to  miti 
gate  suffering  and  yet  avert  danger."  He  sketches  ou 
bi  broad  and  bold  outlines  the  national  and  interns 
tic-nal  relations  of  American  industry  and  commerce 


BIDDL&S   INSINCERITY.  271 

ind  the  financial  relations  of  the  Treasury,  with  the  hank 
enthroned  over  all  as  the  financial  providence  of  the 
country.  This  kind  of  writing  had  a  great  effect  on  the 
uninitiated.  Who  could  dispute  with  a  man  who  thus 
handled  all  the  public  and  private  finance  of  the  whole 
country  as  a  school-master  would  tell  boys  how  to  do  a 
sum  in  long  division  ?  However,  it  was  all  humbug,  and 
especially  that  part  which  represented  the  bank  as 
watching  over,  and  caring  for  the  public.  As  Gouge 
most  justly  remarked,  after  quoting  some  of  Biddle's 
rhetoric :  "  The  true  basis  of  the  interior  trade  of  the 
United  States  is  the  fertility  of  the  soil  and  the  industry 
of  the  people.  The  sun  would  shine,  the  streams  would 
flow,  and  the  earth  would  yield  her  increase,  if  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States  was  not  in  existence."  l  If  the 
bank  had  been  strong,  Biddle's  explanations  would  all 
have  been  meretricious ;  as  it  was,  the  bank  had  been 
quite  fully  occupied  in  1831-32  in  taking  care  of  itself, 
nitigating  its  own  sufferings  and  averting  its  own  dan 
gers. 

No  doubt  the  bank  was  the  chief  sufferer  from  th" 
shocks  inflicted  on  the  money  market  by  the  sudden  ana 
heavy  payments  on  the  public  debt.  Long  credits  wer? 
given  for  duties.  When  paid  they  passed  into  the  bank 
as  public  deposits.  They  were  loaned  again  to  mer 
chants  to  pay  new  duties,  so  that  one  credit  was  piled 
upon  another  already  in  this  part  of  the  arrangement. 
Then  the  deposits  were  called  in  to  meet  drafts  of  the 
Treasury  to  pay  the  debt,  and  so  passed  to  the  former 
Cund-holders.  These  latter  next  entered  the  money 
market  as  investor,  and  the  capital  passed  into  new  em 
ployments.  Therefore  Benton's  argument,  which  all  tb« 
1  Gouge,  56. 


272  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

anti-bank  men  caught  up,  that  the  financial  heats  and 
chills  of  this  period  were  certainly  due  to  the  malice  of 
the  bank,  is  of  no  force  at  all.  The  disturbances  were 
such,  they  necessarily  lasted  so  long,  and  they  finally 
settled  down  to  such  uncalculable  final  effects  that  all 
such  deductions  as  Benton  made  were  unwarranted.  A 
public  debt  is  not  a  blessing,  but  it  is  not  as  great  a 
curse  as  a  public  surplus,  and  it  is  very  possible  to  pay 
off  a  debt  too  rapidly.  We  shall,  on  two  or  three  fur 
ther  occasions  in  this  history,  find  the  "  public  deposits  " 
banging  about  the  money  market  like  a  cannon  ball 
loose  in  the  hold  of  a  ship  in  a  high  wind. 

While  the  committee  was  investigating  the  bank  the 
political  strife  was  growing  more  intense,  and  every 
chance  of  dealing  dispassionately  with  the  question  of 
recharter  had  passed  away.  In  January,  Van  Buren's 
nomination  as  minister  to  England  was  rejected  by  the 
Senate.1  The  Legislature  of  New  York  had  passed 
resolutions  against  the  recharter  of  the  bank.2  This 
hurt  Van  Buren  in  Pennsylvania.  Such  was  the  strange 
combination  of  feelings  and  convictions  at  this  time  that 
Jackson  could  demolish  the  bank  without  shaking  his 
hold  on  Pennsylvania,  but  Van  Buren  was  never  for 
given  for  the  action  of  his  State  against  the  bank.  It 
illustrated  again  the  observation  made  above,  that  the 
popular  idol  enjoys  an  unreasonable  immunity,  while 
others  may  be  held  to  an  unreasonable  responsibility. 
All  Jackson's  intensest  personal  feelings,  as  well  as  the 
choice  of  the  kitchen  cabinet,  now  converged  on  Vair 
Buren's  nomination.  The  Seminole  war  grudge,  hatred 
Df  Calhoun,  the  Eaton  scandal,  and  animosity  to  tlu 
Senate  contributed  towards  this  end.  ' 

1  8«e  page  161.  2  2  Hammool.  351. 


DEMOCRATIC  CONVENTION-- 1832.  273 

Parton  gives  us  one  of  Lewis's  letters,  which  shows 
Ihe  wire-pulling  which  preceded  the  first  democratic 
convention.  Kendall  was  in  New  Hampshire  in  the 
Bpring  of  1831.  Lewis  wrote  to  him  to  propose  that  a 
convention  should  be  held  in  May,  1832,  to  nominate 
Van  Buren  for  Vice-President.  He  suggested  that  the 
New  Hampshire  Legislature  should  be  prompted  to 
propose  it.  Kendall  arranged  this  and  wrote  a  letter, 
giving  an  account  of  the  meeting,  resolutions,  etc., 
which  was  published  anonymously  in  the  "  Globe,"  July 
6,  1831.  The  "  Globe "  took  up  the  proposition  and 
approved  of  it.  The  convention  met  at  Baltimore,  May 
21,  1832.  John  H.  Eaton  was  a  delegate  to  the  con 
vention.  He  intended  to  vote  against  Van  Buren,  for, 
although  Van  Buren  had  taken  Mrs.  Eaton's  part,  he 
had  not  won  Eaton's  affection.  Lewis  wrote  to  Eaton 
that  he  must  not  vote  against  Van  Buren  "  unless 
he  was  prepared  to  quarrel  with  the  general."  Van 
Buren  was  nominated  by  260  votes  out  of  326.  The 
**  spontaneous  unanimity  "  of  this  convention  was  pro 
duced  by  the  will  of  Andrew  Jackson  and  the  energetic 
discipline  of  the  kitchen  cabine't.  It  may  well  be 
doubted  whether,  without  Jackson's  support,  Van  Buren 
could  have  got  260  votes  for  President  or  Vice-Presi 
dent  in  the  whole  United  States,  in  1832.  The  "  Globe  " 
dragooned  the  whole  Jackson  party  into  the  support  of 
Van  Buren,  not  without  considerable  trouble.  The  con- 
rention  adopted  an  address  prepared  by  Kendall,  con 
taining  a  review  of  Jackson's  first  administration.1 

May  7,  1832,  a  national  republican  convention  of 
young  men  met  in  Washington.  TFllliam  Cost  Johnson 
cas  president.  The  convention  ratified  the  nominatioi 

1  Kendall's  Autobiography  296. 

18 


274  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

*f  Clay  and  Sergeant,  and  passed  a  series  of  resolutions 
in  favor  of  tariff  and  internal  improvements,  and  ap 
proving  the  rejection  of  Van  Buren's  nomination.1 

During  the  spring  and  summer  Biddle  took  quarters 
in  Washington,  from  which  he  directed  the  congressional 
campaign  on  hehalf  of  the  recharter.  He  was  then  at 
the  zenith  of  his  power  and  fame,  and  enjoyed  real  re 
nown  in  Europe  and  America.  He  and  Jackson  were 
pitted  against  each  other  personally.  Biddle,  however, 
put  a  letter  in  Livingston's  2  hands,  stating  that  he  would 
accept  any  charter  to  which  Jackson  would  consent.1 
Jackson  never  fought  for  compromises,  and  nothing  was 
heard  of  this  letter.  Jackson  drew  up  a  queer  plan  of 
a  "hank,"  which  he  thought  constitutional  and  suitable, 
but  ft  remained  in  his  drawer.4  The  anti-bank  men 
affirmed  that  Biddle  was  corrupting  Congress. 

The  charter  passed  the  Senate  June  llth,  28  to  20, 
and  the  House,  July  3d,  107  to  85.  It  was  sent  to  the 
President  July  4th.  The  Senate  voted  to  adjourn  July 
16th.  It  was  a  clever  device  of  theirs  to  force  Jackson  to 
sign  or  veto  by  giving  him  more  than  ten  days.  They 
wanted  to  force  him  to  a  direct  issue.  It  is  not  prob- 
a-ble  that  there  was  room  for  his  will  to  be  any  further 
stimulated  by  this  kind  of  manoauvring,  but  he  never 
flinched  from  a  direct  issue,  and  the  only  effect  waa 
to  put  him  where  he  would  have  risked  his  reelection 
&nd  everything  else  on  a  defiant  reply  to  the  challenge 

1  42  Niles,  206,  236. 

2  Livingston  was  on  the  side  of  the  bank.     (Hunt's  Livingston^ 
!53.) 

•  Ingersoll,  268.     On  the  same  page  it  is  said  that  Biddle  w*l 
atked  of  for  President  of  the  United  States. 

•  Ingersoll,  283. 


VETO  OF  THE  BANK.  275 

offered.  Niles  says  *  that,  a  week  before  the  bill  passed, 
the  besl  informed  were  "  as  six  to  half  a  dozen,"  whether 
the  bill,  if  passed,  would  be  vetoed,  but  that,  for  the 
two  or  three  days  before  the  bill  was  sent  up,  a  veto 
was  confidently  expected.  The  veto  was  sent  in,  July 
10th.2  The  reasons  given  for  it  were :  (1)  The  bank 
would  have  a  monopoly  for  which  the  bonus  was  no 
equivalent.  (2)  One  fifth  of  the  stockholders  were 
foreigners.  (3)  Banks  were  to  be  allowed  to  pay  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States  in  branch  drafts,  which  in 
dividuals  could  not  do.  (4)  The  States  were  allowed 
to  tax  the  stock  of  the  bank  owned  by  their  citizens, 
which  would  cause  the  stock  to  go  out  of  the  country. 

(5)  The  few  stockholders  here  would  then  control  it. 

(6)  The  charter  was  unconstitutional.     (7)  The  business 
of  the  bank  would  be  exempt  from  taxation.     (8)  There 
were  strong  suspicions  of  mismanagement  in  the  bank. 

(9)  The   President   could   have  given   a  better   plan. 

(10)  The  bank  would  increase  the  distinction  between 
rich  and  poor. 

The  bill  was  put  to  vote  in  the  Senate  July  13th,  but 
failed  of  two  thirds  (22  to  19).  If  the  bank  was  to 
continue  to  exist  it  was  now  necessary  to  defeat  Jackson. 
The  state  bank  interest,  however,  had  now  been  aroused 
to  the  great  gain  it  would  make  if  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States  should  be  overthrown.  The  Jackson  party 
thereby  won  the  adhesion  of  an  important  faction.  The 
«afety-fund  banks  of  New  York  were  bound  into  a  solid 
phalanx  by  their  system,  and  they  constituted  a  great  po- 

1  42  Niles,  337. 

2  Congress  has  chartered  national   banks  as  follows:    1791, 
*15  (vetoed),  1816,  1832  (vetoed1    1841,  two  bills,  both  vetoed, 

?863. 


276  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

litical  power.  The  chief  crime  alleged  against  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States  was  meddling  with  politics.  The 
safety-fund  banks  of  New  York  were  an  active  political 
power  under  Van  Buren's  control,  and  they  went  into 
this  election  animated  by  the  hope  of  a  share  in  the  de 
posits.  The  great  bank  also  distributed  pamphlets  and 
subsidized  newspapers,  fighting  for  its  existence.  The 
Jackson  men  always  denounced  this  action  of  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States  as  corrupt,  and  as  proof  of  the 
truth  of  Jackson's  charges. 

Jackson  got  219  electoral  votes  ;  Clay,  49  ;  Floyd,  11 
(of  South  Carolina,  the  nullification  ticket)  ;  Wirt,  7 
(of  Vermont).  There  were  two  vacancies  (in  Mary 
land)  Clay  carried  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  Con 
necticut,  Delaware,  and  Kentucky,  and  five  votes  in 
Maryland.  For  Vice-President  Van  Buren  got  189. 
Pennsylvania  would  not  vote  for  him.  She  gave  her  30 
votes  to  William  Wilkins.  Sergeant  got  49  votes ; 
Henry  Lee,  of  Massachusetts,  11  (of  South  Carolina) ; 
Ellmaker,  7.  At  this  election  South  Carolina  alone 
Jirew  her  vote  by  her  Legislature.  The  popular  vota 
was  707,217  for  Jackson ;  328,561  for  Clay ;  254,720 
for  Wirt.  Jackson's  majority,  in  a  total  vote  (excluding 
Srath  Carolina)  of  1,290,498,  was  123,936.  In  Ala 
bama  tLero  was  no  anti-Jackson  ticket 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

TARIFF,   NULLIFICATION,  AND   BANK  DURING   JAOKSOX'S 
SECOND   ADMINISTRATION. 

GENERAL  JACKSON  now  advanced  to  another  develop 
ment  of  his  political  philosophy  and  his  political  art. 
No  government  which  has  felt  itself  strong  has  ever  had 
the  self-control  to  practice  faithfully  the  non-interference 
theory.  A  popular  idol  at  the  head  of  a  democratic 
republic  is  one  of  the  last  political  organs  to  do  so. 
The  belief  in  himself  is  of  course  for  him  a  natural 
product  of  the  situation,  and  he  is  quite  ready  to  be 
lieve,  as  he  is  constantly  told,  that  he  can  make  the 
people  happy,  and  can  "  save  the  country  "  from  evil 
and  designing  persons,  namely,  those  who  do  not  join 
the  chorus  of  adulation.  A  President  of  the  United 
States,  under  existing  social  and  economic  circum 
stances,  has  no  chance  whatever  to  play  the  role  of  Cae 
sar  or  Napoleon,  but  he  may  practise  the  methods  of 
personal  government  within  the  limits  }f  the  situation. 
Jackson  held  that  his  reelection  was  a  triumphant  vindi 
cation  of  him  in  all  the  points  in  which  he  had  been 
engaged  in  controversy  with  anybody,  and  a  kind  of 
charter  to  him,  as  representative,  or  rather  tribune,  of 
the  people,  to  go  on  and  govern  on  his  own  judgment 
over  and  against  everybody,  including  Congress.  His 
Action  about  the  Cherokee  Indians,  his  attitude  to  the 
Supreme  Court,  his  construction  of  his  duties  under  the 


278  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Constitution,  his  vetoes  of  internal  improvements  anil 
the  bank,  his  defence  of  Mrs.  Eaton,  his  attitude  toward 
Calhoun  and  Clay,  his  discontent  with  the  Senate,  all 
things,  great  and  small,  in  which  he  had  been  active  and 
interested,  were  held  to  be  covered  and  passed  upon  by 
the  voice  of  the  people  in  his  reelection.1  Adulation  and 
Buccess  had  already  done  much  to  make  Jackson  a  dan 
gerous  man.  After  his  reelection,  his  self-confidence 
and  self-will  became  tenfold  greater.2  Moreover,  his  in- 
intimates  and  confidential  advisers,  Kendall,  Lewis, 
Blair,  and  Hill,  won  more  confidence  in  themselves,  and 
handled  their  power  with  greater  freedom  and  certainty. 
It  has  already  been  shown  in  this  history  that  they  were 
perfect  masters  of  the  art  of  party  organization,  and 
they  had  a  strong  hatred  of  the  bank ;  but  they  had  no 
statesman-like  ideas  in  finance  or  public  policy,  and  they 
governed  by  playing  on  the  prejudices  and  vanity  of 
Jackson. 

1  We  may  test  this  theory  in  regard  to  one  point,  the  bank. 
The  Legislature  of  Pennsylvania,  on  the  2d  of  February,  1832, 
within  eight  months  of  the  election  at  which  Jackson  got  three 
fifths  of  the  vote  of  Pennsylvania,  instructed  the  senators  anoJ 
representatives  in  Congress  from  that  State,  by  a  unanimous 
vote  in  the  Senate,  and  by  77  to  7  in  the  House,  to  secure  the  r«»- 
charter  of  the  bank. 

2  "The  truth  is,   I  consider  the  President  intoxicated  with 
power  and  flattery."     "  All  the  circumstances  around  him  [when 
He  came  to  office]  were  calculated  to  make  him  entertain  an  ex 
alted  opinion  of  himself,  and  a  contemptuous  one  of  others.     His 
,wn  natural  passions  contributed  to  this  result/'     (Duane,  133, 
under  date  October,  1833.)     "  There  is  a  tone  of  insolence  and 
insuit  in  his  intercourse  with  both  Houses  of  Congress,  especially 
since  his  reelection,  which  never  was  witnessed  between  the  Ex 
ecutive  and  the  Legislature  before."     (9  Adams,  51  :  December 

S,  1833) 


PERSONAL   GOVERNMENT.  279 

Jackson's  modes  of  action  in  his  second  term  were 
those  of  personal  government.  He  proceeded  avow 
edly,  on  his  own  initiative  and  responsibility,  to  experi 
ment,  as  Napoleon  did,  with  great  public  institutions 
and  interests.  It  came  in  his  way  to  do  some  good, 
to  check  some  bad  tendencies  and  to  strengthen  some 
good  ones ;  but  the  moment  the  historian  tries  to  ana 
lyze  these  acts,  and  to  bring  them  for  purposes  of 
generalization  into  relations  with  the  stand-point  or 
doctrine  by  which  Jackson  acted,  that  momefit  he  per 
ceives  that  Jackson  acted  from  spite,  pique,  instinct, 
prejudice,  or  emotion,  and  the  influence  he  exerted  sinks 
to  the  nature  of  an  incident  or  an  accident.  Then,  al 
though  we  believe  in  personal  liberty  with  responsibility, 
and  in  free  institutions  ;  although  we  believe  that  no 
modern  free  state  can  exist  without  wide  popular  rights ; 
although  we  believe  in  the  non-interference  theory,  and 
oppose  the  extension  of  state  action  to  internal  improve 
ments  and  tariffs  ;  although  we  recognize  the  dreadful 
evils  of  bad  banking  and  fluctuating  currency ;  and 
although  we  believe  that  the  Union  is  absolutely  the 
first  political  interest  of  the  American  people,  yet,  i'f  we 
think  that  intelligent  deliberation  and  disciplined  reason 
ought  to  control  the  civil  affairs  of  a  civilized  state,  we 
must  say  of  Jackson  that  he  stumbled  along  through 
a  magnificent  career,  now  and  then  taking  up  a  chance 
without  really  appreciating  it ;  leaving  behind  him  dis 
torted  and  discordant  elements  of  good  and  ill,  just  fit 
to  produce  turmoil  and  disaster  in  the  future.  We 
have  already  seen,  in  some  cases,  what  was  the  tyranny 
of  his  popularity.  It  crushed  out  reason  and  common 
lense.  To  the  gravest  arguments  and  remonstrances, 
Jie  answer  was,  literally,  "  Hurrah  for  Jackson  !  "  Is, 


280  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

then,  that  a  sound  state  of  things  for  any  civilized  state  ? 
Is  that  the  sense  of  democracy?  Is  a  democratic  re 
public  working  fairly  and  truly  by  its  theory  in  such  a 
case  ?  Representative  institutions  are  degraded  on  the 
Jacksonian  theory,  just  as  they  are  on  the  divine-right 
theory,  or  on  the  theory  of  the  democratic  empire. 
There  is  not  a  worse  perversion  of  the  American  system 
of  government  conceivable  than  to  regard  the  President 
as  the  tribune  of  the  people,  endowed  by  his  election 
with  prerogative  to  check,  warn,  correct,  guide,  and 
watch  the  representatives  of  the  nation  in  Congress  as- 
^  sembled. 

One  of  the  most  remarkable  modes  of  personal  rule 
employed  by  Jackson  was  the  perfection  and  refinement 
given  to  the  "  organ "  as  an  institution  of  democratic 
government.  In  the  hands  of  Blair  the  "  Globe  "  came 
to  be  a  terrible  power.  Every  office-holder  signed  his 
allegiance  by  taking  the  "Globe."  In  it  both  friend 
and  foe  found  daily  utterances  from  the  White  House 
a  propos  of  every  topic  of  political  interest.  The  sug 
gestions,  innuendoes,  queries,  quips,  and  sarcasms  of  the 
"  Globe "  were  scanned  by  the  men  who  desired  to 
recommend  themselves  by  the  zeal  which  anticipates, 
and  the  subserviency  which  can  even  dispense  with,  a 
command.  The  editorials  scarcely  veiled  their  inspira 
tion  and  authorization.  The  President  issued  a  message 
to  his  party  every  day.  He  told  the  political  news  con 
fidentially,  and  in  advance  of  the  mere  newspapers 
while  deriding  and  denouncing  his  enemies,  praising  the 
Adherents  who  pleased  him,  and  checking,  warning,  or 
stimulating  all  as  he  thought  best  to  promote  discipline 
and  efficiency.  When  we  say  "  he  "  did  it,  we  speak,  ol 
tourae,  figuratively.  If  it  was  Blair's  voice,  Jacksop 


NULLIFICATION  CONVENTION.  281 

ratified  it.  If  it  was  Jackson's  will.  Blair  promulgated 
it 

The  South  Carolinians  thought  that  the  limit  of 
proper  delay  and  constitutional  agitation  had  been 
reached  when  -the  tariff  of  July,  1832,  was  passed.  In 
the  year  1832  the  nullifiers,  for  the  first  time,  got  con 
trol  of  South  Carolina.  The  Legislature  was  convened, 
by  special  proclamation  for  the  22d  of  October  1832,  — 
a  month  earlier  than  usual.  An  act  was  passed,  October 
25th,  ordering  a  convention  to  be  held  on  the  19th  of 
November.  The  Legislature  then  adjourned  until  its 
regular  day  of  meeting,  the  fourth  Monday  in  Novem 
ber.  The  convention  met  as  ordered ;  Governor  Hamil 
ton  was  president  of  it.  It  adopted  an  ordinance  that  the 
acts  of  Congress  of  May  19,  1828,  and  July  14,  1832, 
were  null  and  void  in  South  Carolina.  These  proceed 
ings  conformed  to  a  theory  of  the  practice  of  nullification 
which  the  South  Carolina  doctrinaires  had  wrought  out : 
namely,  that  the  Legislature  could  not  nullify,  but  that 
a  convention,  being  the  State  in  some  more  original 
capacity,  and  embodying  the  "  sovereignty  "  in  a  purer 
emanation,  could  do  so.  The  theory  and  practice  of 
nullification  was  a  triumph  of  metaphysical  politics. 
The  South  Carolinians  went  through  the  evolutions,  by 
which,  as  they  had  persuaded  themselves,  nullification 
could  be  made  a  constitutional  remedy,  with  a  solem 
nity  which  was  either  edifying  or  ridiculous,  according 
as  one  forgot  or  remembered  that  the  adverse  party 
attached  no  significance  to  the  evolutions. 

The  ordinance  provided  that  no  appeal  from  a  South 
Carolina  court  to  a  fedaral  court  should  be  allowed 
in  any  case  arising  under  any  of  the  laws  passed  in 
pursuance  of  the  ordinance;  such  an  appeal  to  be  a 


282  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

contempt  of  court.  All  officers  and  jurors  were  to  takfl 
an  oath  to  the  ordinance.  South  Carolina  would  secede 
if  the  United  States  should  attempt  to  enforce  anything 
contrary  to  the  ordinance.  November  27th  the  Legis 
lature  met  again,  and  passed  the  laws  requisite  to  put  the 
ordinance  in  operation.  Goods  seized  by  the  custom 
house  officers  might  be  replevied.  Militia  and  volun 
teers  might  be  called  out.  A  thousand  stand  of  arms 
were  to  be  purchased. 

A  Union  convention  met  at  Columbia  early  in  Decem 
ber.  It  declared  itself  ready  to  support  the  federal 
government.  It  appeared,  therefore,  that  there  would 
be  civil  war  in  South  Carolina.  The  Union  men  were 
strong  in  Charleston  and  in  the  Western  counties. 

Jackson  immediately  took  up  the  defiance  which 
South  Carolina  had  offered  to  the  federal  government. 
He  ordered  General  Scott  to  Charleston,  and  caused 
troops  to  collect  within  convenient  distance,  although 
not  so  as  to  provoke  a  collision.  He  ordered  two  war 
vessels  to  Charleston.  He  issued,  December  10th,  a 
proclamation  to  the  people  of  South  Carolina.  It  was 
written  by  Livingston,  who,  as  we  have  seen,1  had  taken 
up  a  position  against  nullification  more  than  two  years 
before.  He  represented  the  only  tariff  State  in  the 
South,  —  Louisiana.  It  has  been  asserted  that  Jackson 
did  not  like  the  constitutional  doctrines  of  the  procla 
mation,  which  are  Madisonian  federalist,  and  not  such  as 
he  had  held,  but  that  he  let  the  paper  pass  on  account 
of  the  lack  of  time  to  modify  it.2  There  is  nothing  of 

*  See  page  214. 

2  Lewis  in  3  Parton,  466;  Tyler's  laney,  188.  laney  re- 
torded,  in  1861,  that  he  should  have  objected  to  some  of  the  doo 
irines  of  th*»  proclamation,  if  he  had  been  in  Washington  at  th« 
time. 


ANTI-NULLIFICATION  PROCLAMATION.       283 

the  Jacksonian  temper  in  the  document.  It  is  strong, 
moderate,  eloquent,  and,  at  last,  even  pathetic.1  It  is 
very  long  :  The  following  passage  is  perhaps  the  most 
important  in  it :  "I  consider  the  power  to  annul  a  law 
of  the  United  States,  assumed  by  one  State,  incompatible 
with  the  existence  of  the  Union,  contradicted  expressly 
by  the  letter  of  the  Constitution,  unauthorized  by  its 
spirit,  inconsistent  with  every  principle  on  which  it  was 
founded,  and  destructive  of  the  great  object  for  which 
it  was  formed."  This  proclamation  voiced  the  opinion 
and  feeling  of  the  whole  country,  except  the  nullifiers  in 
South  Carolina  and  a  few  of  their  comrades  in  other 
Southern  States.  The  dignified  tone  of  the  paper  was 
especially  satisfactory.  It  was  the  right  tone  to  take  to 
men  who  had  allowed  their  passionate  temper  to  commit 
them  to  unworthy  and  boyish  proceedings,  and  who  had 
sought  a  remedy  for  civil  grievances  in  acts  which  made 
liberty  and  security  impossible.  Jackson  found  him 
self  a  national  civil  hero  for  once,  and  he  enjoyed 
the  plaudits  of  people  who  had  detested  him  the  most 
earnestly.  He  lives  in  popular  memory  and  tradition 
chiefly  as  the  man  who  put  down  this  treason,  but  the 
historian  must  remember  that,  if  Jackson  had  done  hia 
duty  in  regard  to  Georgia  and  the  Indians,  nullification 
would  never  have  attained  any  strength.  The  Southern 
ers  were  astonished  at  the  proclamation.  It  seemed  to 
them  inconsistent,  even  treacherous.2  The  constitutional 
theories  were  not  at  all  such  as  Jackson  had  been  under 
stood  to  hold.  They  ascribed  Jackson's  attitude  on  thia 

1  Jackson  contributed  a  suggesfion  of  the  pathos.  (Hunt'i 
Livingston,  373.) 

*  Hodgson,  173.  Cf.  Resolution  ot  he  South  Carolina  Legi* 
Ature,  43  Niles,  300. 


284  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

question  to  hatred  of  Calhoun.  Old  John  Randolph, 
who  was  in  a  dying  condition,  roused  himself  as  the 
champion  of  state  rights,  although  he  had  been  a  strong 
adherent  of  Jackson,  and  went  through  the  counties  of 
Virginia,  in  which  he  had  once  been  a  power,  in  hia 
carriage,  to  try  to  arouse  the  people  to  resist  the  danger 
ous  doctrines  of  the  proclamation,1  and  yet  to  uphold 
the  Union. 

December  20th,  Governor  Hayne  of  South  Carolina 
issued  a  proclamation  in  answer  to  Jackson's.  Calhoun 
resigned  the  vice-presidency,  December  28th.  He  was 
elected  senator  in  Hayne's  place.  He  had  been  Vice- 
President  for  eight  years.  He  now  returned  to  the 
floor  and  to  active  work.  He  never  afterwards  took 
position  in  any  party.  He  was  an  isolated  man,  who 
formed  alliances  to  further  his  ends.  South  Carolina 
also  remained  an  isolated  State  until  1840,  when  she 
voted  for  Van  Buren  and  came  back  into  the  ranks. 
Calhoun  seemed  to  have  lost  the  talent  for  practical 
statesmanship  which  he  had  shown  in  his  earlier  years. 
He  involved  himself  tighter  and  tighter  in  spinnings  of 
political  mysticism  and  fantastic  speculation.  Harriet 
Martineau  calls  him  a  cast-iron  man,  and  describes  his 
eager,  absorbed,  over-speculative  type  of  conversation 
and  bearing,  even  in  society.2  "  I  know  of  no  man  who 
lives  in  such  utter  intellectual  solitude.  He  meets  men 
and  harangues  them  by  the  fireside  as  in  the  Senate. 
He  is  wrought  like  a  piece  of  machinery,  set  going 
vehemently  by  a  weight,  and  stops  while  you  answer 
He  either  passes  by  what  you  say,  or  twists  it  into  suifr 
ibility  with  what  is  in  his  head,  and  begins  to  lector* 

1  2  Garland's  Randolph,  360. 

a  1  Martineau,  Western  Travel,  144. 


JACKSON  ASK  ft  FOR  INCREASED  POWERS.    285 

again."  He  "  is  as  full  as  ever  of  his  nullification  doc« 
triues  [1836],  ind  those  who  krow  the  force  that  is  in 
him.  and  his  utter  incapacity  of  modification  by  other 
mim  -3,  .  .  .  will  no  more  expect  repose  and  self-  reten 
tion  from  him  than  from  a  volcano  in  full  force.  Re 
laxation  is  no  longer  in  the  power  of  his  will.  I  never 
saw  any  one  who  so  completely  gave  me  the  idea  of 
possession." 

In  his  message  of  1832,  Jackson  said  that  the  pro 
tective  system  must  ultimately  be  limited  to  the  commod 
ities  needed  in  war.  Beyond  this  limit  that  system  had 
already  produced  discontent.  He  suggested  that  the 
subject  should  be  reviewed  in  a  disposition  to  dispose  of 
it  justly.  December  13th  the  Seriate  called  on  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  propose  a  tariff  bill.  De 
cember  27th,  in  the  House,  the  Committee  on  Ways  and 
Means  reported  a  bill  based  on  the  Secretary's  views. 
It  proposed  an  immediate  and  sweeping  reduction, 
with  a  further  reduction,  after  1834,  to  a  "  horizontal " 
rate  of  fifteen  per  cent  or  twenty  per  cent.  January  16, 
1833,  Jackson  sent  in  a  message,  in  which  he  informed 
Congress  of  the  proceedings  of  South  Carolina,  and 
asked  for  power  to  remove  the  custom  house  and  to 
hold  goods  for  customs  by  military  force  ;  also  for  pro 
visions  that  federal  courts  should  have  exclusive  juris 
diction  of  revenue  cases,  and  that  the  Circuit  Court  of 
the  United  States  might  remove  revenue  cases  from  state 
courts.  Calhoun,  in  reply  to  this  message,  declared  that 
South  Carolina  was  nol  hostile  to  the  Union,  and  he 
«ade  one  unanswerable  point  against  Jackson's  position. 
Jackson  had  referred  to  the  Supreme  Court  as  the 
proper  authority  to  decide  the  constitutionality  of  the 
tariff.  The  milliners  had  always  wished  to  get.  the 


286  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

tariff  before  the  Supreme  Court,  but  there  was  no  way 
to  do  so.  The  first  tariff  of  1789  was  preceded  by  a 
preamble,  in  which  the  protection  of  domestic  manufact 
ures  was  specified  as  one  of  the  purposes  of  the  act, 
but  this  form  had  not  been  continued.  The  anti-tariff 
men  tried  to  have  such  a  preamble  prefixed  to  the  tariff 
act  of  1828,  but  the  tariff  majority  voted  it  down. 
Congress  had  unquestioned  power  to  lay  taxes.  How 
could  it  be  ascertained  what  the  purpose  of  the  majority 
in  Congress  was,  when  they  voted  for  a  certain  tax  law  ? 
How  could  the  constitutionality  of  a  law  be  tried,  when 
it  turned  on  the  question  of  this  purpose,  which,  in  the 
nature  of  the  case,  was  mixed  and  unavowed  ?  *  It 
was  not,  therefore,  fair  to  represent  the  nullifiers  as 
neglecting  an  obvious  and  adequate  legal  remedy.  A 
grand  debate  on  constitutional  theories  arose  out  of  Cal- 
houn's  criticism  of  Jackson's  message  and  proclamation. 
Calhoun,  Grundy,  and  Clayton  each  offered  a  set  of 
resolutions,2  and  a  flood  of  metaphysical  dogmatizing 
about  constitutional  law  was  let  loose.  As  it  began  no 
where,  it  ended  nowhere.  In  these  disputes,  the  dis 
putants  always  carefully  lay  down,  in  their  resolutions 
about  "  the  great  underlying  principles  of  the  Constitu 
tion,"  those  premises,  which  will  sustain  the  deductions 
which  the  disputant  in  question  wants  to  arrive  at  for 
the  support  of  his  interests.  In  the  mean  time  the 
merits  of  the  particular  question  are  untouched.  To 
inform  one's  self  on  the  merits  of  the  question  would 
require  patient  labor.  To  dogmatize  on  "great  prin 

1  The  principle  is  covered  fully  by  the  decision  in  Loan  Assa 
ciation  vs.  Topeka  (20  Wallace,  655),  but  the  practical  difficulty 
trobably  remains. 

«  43  Niles,  Supp.  222.     The  debate  is  there  given 


ENFORCEMENT  ACT.  287 

liples"  and  settle  the  question  by  an  inference  is 
easy.  Consequently,  the  latter  method  will  not  soon  b* 
abandoned. 

On  the  21st  of  January,  1833,  a  bill  for  enforcing  the 
collection  of  the  revenue  was  reported  to  the  Senate.  It 
gave  the  powers  and  made  the  provisions  which  Jackson 
had  asked  for.  On  the  next  day  Calhoun  introduced 
his  resolutions  :  that  the  States  are  united  "  as  parties  to 
a  constitutional  compact;  "  that  the  acts  of  the  general 
government,  outside  of  the  defined  powers  given  to  it, 
are  void ;  that  each  State  may  judge  when  the  compact 
is  broken ;  that  the  theory  that  the  people  of  the  United 
States  "  are  now  or  ever  have  been  united  on  the  prin 
ciple  of  the  social  compact,  and  as  such  are  now  formed 
into  one  nation  or  people,"  is  erroneous,  false  in  history 
and  reason.  It  would  only  be  tedious  to  cite  the  other 
resolutions  offered.  Webster  was  good  enough  lawyer 
to  get  tired  of  the  metaphysics  very  soon.  Hodgson 
says  that  he  withdrew,  defeated  by  Calhoun.1  The 
appearance  of  the  "  social  compact "  as  an  understood 
and  accepted  element  of  political  philosophy  is  worth 
noting. 

The  state  Legislatures  also  passed  resolutions.  Mas 
sachusetts,  Connecticut,  Delaware,  New  York,  Missouri, 
Tennessee,  and  Indiana  pronounced  against  nullification ; 
North  Carolina  and  Alabama  against  nullification  and 
tariff ;  Georgia  against  the  tariff,  also  that  nullification 
is  unconstitutional,  and  that  a  convention  of  the  Gulf 
States,  should  be  held  ;  New  Hampshire,  that  the  tariff 
should  be  reduced ;  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  Ver 
mont,  New  Jersey,  and  Pennsylvania,  that  the  tarifl 
1  Hodgsoo,  174. 


288  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

•light  not  to  be  reduced.  Virginia  offered  to  mediaU 
between  the  United  States  and  South  Carolina.1 

The  House  was  at  work  on  the  tariff  during  January. 
February  12th,  Clay  introduced  the  compromise  tariff  in 
the  Senate,  to  supersede  all  other  propositions  and  be  a 
final  solution  of  all  pending  troubles.  Of  all  the  duties 
which  were  over  twenty  per  cent  by  the  act  of  July  14, 
1832,  one  tenth  of  the  excess  over  twenty  per  cent  was 
to  be  struck  off  after  September  30, 1835,  and  one  tenth 
each  alternate  year  thereafter  until  1841.  Then  one 
half  the  remaining  excess  was  to  be  taken  off,  and  in 
1842  the  tax  would  be  reduced  to  twenty  per  cent  as  a 
horizontal  rate,  with  a  large  free  list,  home  valuation,  and 
no  credit.  Credit  for  duties  worked  very  mischievously. 
An  importer  sold  his  goods  before  he  paid  his  duties. 
The  price  he  obtained  contained  the  duties  which  he  had 
not  yet  paid.  Hence  he  was  able  to  get  capital  from 
the  public  with  which  (o  carry  on  his  business.  In  the 
end  perhaps  he  became  bankrupt,  and  did  not  pay  the 
duties  at  all.  In  1831  a  report  from  the  Treasury 
stated  the  duty  bonds  in  suit  at;  $6.8  million,  of  which 
only  $1  million  was  estimated  to  be  collectible.  Clay's 
compromise,  as  first  drawn,  had  a  preamble,  in  which  it 
was  stated  that,  after  March  3,  1840,  all  duties  should 
oe  equal,  "  and  solely  for  the  purpose  and  with  the  in 
tent  of  providing  such  revenue  as  may  be  necessary  to 
an  economical  expenditure  by  the  government,  without 
regard  to  the  protection  or  encouragement  of  any  branch 
of  domestic  industry  whatever."  2 

Webster  objected  to  the  horizontal  rate,  and  to  ar 
attempt  to  pledge  future  Congresses.  He  was  now  re- 
feed,  after  having  previously  made  some  of  the  mosj 

*  8  Ann.  Reg.  48.  2  1  Curtis's  Webster,  434,  455. 


ENFORCEMENT  AND   COMPROMISE.  289 

masterly  arguments  ever  made  for  free  trade,  to  defend 
protection  by  such  devices  as  he  could.  Now  he  de- 
tided  Adam  Smith  and  the  other  economists.1  He  first 
paltered  with  his  convictions  on  the  tariff,  and  broke  his 
moral  stamina  by  so  doing.  Many  of  the  people  who 
have  been  so  much  astonished  at  his  "  sudden  "  apostasy 
on  slavery  would  understand  it  more  easily  if  their  own 
judgment  was  more  open  to  appreciate  his  earlier 
apostasy  on  free  trade.  February  13th,  he  introduced 
resolutions  against  the  compromise.2 

The  enforcing  act  passed  the  Senate,  February  20, 
1833,  by  32  to  8.  On  the  21st  the  compromise  tariff 
was  taken  up  in  the  Senate.  On  the  25th  the  House 
recommitted  the  tariff  bill  which  was  there  pending, 
with  instructions  to  the  committee  to  report  the  com 
promise  bill.  On  the  26th  the  latter  was  passed,  119  to 
85.  On  the  same  day  the  Senate  laid  Clay's  bill  on  the 
table,  took  up  the  same  bill  in  the  copy  sent  up  from 
the  House,  and  passed  it,  29  to  16.  On  the  27th  the 
House  passed  the  enforcing  bill,  111  to  40.  Thus  the 
olive  branch  and  the  rod  were  bound  up  together. 

There  was  one  moment  in  January  when  ex-Governor 
Hamilton  seemed  ready  to  precipitate  a  conflict,  and 
when  Governor  Hayne  seemed  ready  to  support  him ; a 
but  the  leading  milliners  determined  to  wait  until  Con 
gress  adjourned.  February  1st  was  the  day  appointed 
tor  nullification  to  go  into  effect,  but  all  action  was  post 
poned.  The  Legislature  replied  to  Jackson's  procla 
mation  by  a  series  of  resolutions  which  charged  him 
*nth  usurpation  and  tyranny.4  Jackson  was  annoyed 

1  1  Webster's  Correspondence,  5A~ 

«  43  Niles,  40b.  8  8  Ann.  Reg.  290 

«  43  Niles.  900. 

19 


290  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

by  these  resolutions,  and  made  threats  against  the  lead 
ing  nullifiers  in  January.  The  Governor  had  summoned 
the  convention  to  meet  again  on  March  llth.  The  com 
promise  tariff  was  regarded  as  a  substantial  victory.  It 
became  a  law  on  March  3d,  the  day  on  which  the  tariff 
of  July  14,  1832,  went  into  effect.  The  convention 
repealed  the  ordinance  of  nullification,  passed  another 
ordinance  nullifying  the  enforcement  act,  and  adjourned. 
It  is  not  quite  clear  whether  the  last  act  was  a  hit  of 
fireworks  to  fete  the  conclusion  of  the  trouble,  or  was 
seriously  meant.  If  it  was  serious,  it  strongly  illus 
trated  the  defective  sense  of  humor  which  characterized 
all  the  proceedings  of  the  nullifiers.  The  gentlemen 
who  had  nullified  a  tax,  and  then  nullified  a  contingent 
declaration  of  war,  would  probably,  in  the  next  stage, 
have  tried,  by  ordinance,  to  nullify  a  battle  and  a  de 
feat. 

The  compromise  tariff  settled  nothing.  The  fact  was 
that  Clay  had  been  driven,  by  the  rapacity  of  the  pro 
tected  interests,  to  a  point  from  which  he  could  neither 
advance  nor  recede,  and  Calhoun  had  been  driven  by 
the  nullification  enterprise  into  a  similar  untenable 
position.  Benton  says  that  Calhoun  was  afraid  of  Jack 
son,  who  had  threatened  to  hang  the  nullifiers.  Curtis, 
j>n  the  authority  of  Crittenden,  says  that  Calhoun,  in 
alarm,  sought  an  interview  with  Clay,  and  that  Clay  in 
tervened.1  They  met  and  patched  up  the  compromise, 
by  which  they  opened  an  escape  for  each  other.  For 
ton  years  afterwards  they  wrangled,  in  the  Senate,  over 
*he  question  who  was  in  the  worse  predicament  and  wha 
iron  most  in  1833.  Clay  claimed  that  he  rescued  pro 
lection  from  the  slaughter  which  awaited  it  in  Vet 
1  1  Curtis 's  Webster,  444. 


THE  BANK  AND  THE  THREE  PER  CENTS.     291 

planck's  bill.  Calhoun  claimed  that  the  compromise 
tariff  was  a  free-trade  victory,  won  by  nullification. 
Clay  said  that  he  made  the  compromise  out  of  pity  for 
Calhoun  and  South  Carolina,  who  were  in  peril.  Cal 
houn  said  that  nullification  killed  the  tariff,  and  that 
Clay  was  flat  on  his  back  until  Calhoun  helped  him  to 
rise  and  escape  by  the  compromise.  The  protected  in 
terests  were  as  angry  with  Clay  as  if  he  had  never 
served  them.  They  accused  him  of  treachery.  He 
never  gained  anything  by  his  devotion  to  protection. 
He  was  right  at  least  in  saying  that  protection  would 
have  been  overthrown  in  1833  if  it  had  not  been  for 
the  compromise  tariff.1 

Jackson's  animosity  towards  the  bank,  in  the  autumn 
of  1832,  had  gathered  the  intensity  and  bull-dog  ferocity 
which  he  always  felt  for  an  enemy  engaged  in  active 
resistance.  In  the  matter  of  the  three  per  cents,  the 
bank  gave  him  a  chance  of  attack.  In  July  General 
Cadwallader  was  sent  to  Europe  to  try  to  negotiate  with 
the  holders  of  the  three  per  cents  for  an  extension  of 
the  loan  for  a  year  beyond  October,  the  bank  becoming 
the  debtor,  and  paying,  if  necessary,  four  per  cent  on 
the  extension.  The  bank,  then,  instead  of  paying  the 
lebt  for  the  government,  desired  to  intrude  itself  into 
\he  position  of  the  Treasury,  and  extend  a  loan  which 
ihe  Treasury  wanted  to  pay.  Its  object  of  course  was 
to  get  a  loan  at  three  or  four  per  cent.  This  proceed 
ing  was  obviously  open  to  grave  censure*.  The  obliga 
tion  of  the  Treasury  would  not  cease,  although  the  bank 
<ould  have  taken  the  public  money  appropriated  to  the 

1  See  a  speech  by  Cla/ton  or.  Hugh  L.  White's  action,  Oc 
tober  5,  1842.  (63  Niles  106.)  Parton  (III.  478)  has  the  sam« 
Kory. 


292  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

payment  of  the  debt.  Five  million  dollars  were  in  fact 
transferred,  in  October,  to  the  Redemption  of  the  Public 
Debt  Account.  It  seems  to  be  indisputable  that  the 
bank,  in  this  matter,  abused  its  relation  to  the  Treasury 
as  depository  of  the  public  funds.  August  22d  General 
Cadwallader  made  an  arrangement  with  the  Barings, 
by  which  they  were  to  pay  off  all  the  holders  of  the 
stocks  who  were  not  willing  to  extend  them  and  take 
the  bank  as  debtor.  The  Barings  bought  $1,798,597, 
and  extended  $2,376,481.  The  arrangement  with  the 
Barings  was  to  be  secret,  but  it  was  published  in  a  New 
York  paper,  October  llth.  October  15th,  Biddle  re 
pudiated  the  contract,  because,  under  it,  the  bank  would 
become  a  purchaser  of  public  stocks,  contrary  to  the 
charter.  Would  he  have  repudiated  the  contract  if  it 
had  not  been  published  ? 

The  message  of  1832  was  temperate  in  tone,  but  very 
severe  against  the  bank.  The  President  interpreted 
the  eagerness  of  the  bank  to  get  possession  of  the  three 
per  cents  as  a  sign  of  weakness,  and  he  urged  Congress 
to  make  a  "  serious  investigation  "  to  see  whether  the 
public  deposits  were  safe.  An  agent,  Henry  Toland, 
was  appointed  to  investigate  on  behalf  of  the  Treasury. 
He  reported  favorably  to  the  bank.  The  Committee  on 
Ways  and  Means  also  investigated  the  bank.  The 
President's  message  created  considerable  alarm  for  a 
time,  and,  at  some  places,  there  were  signs  of  a  run  on 
the  branches.1  February  13,  1833,  Polk  reported  a  bill 
fo  sell  the  stock  owned  by  the  nation  in  the  bank.  It 
was  rejected,  102  to  91.  The  majority  o*  the  Committee 
on  Ways  and  Means  reported  (Verplanck's  report)  thai 
Ihe  bank  was  sound  and  that  the  deposits  were  safe 
1  43NUee.  315. 


REPORTS  OF  1833  ON  THE  BANK.  298 

On  January  1,  1833,  the  assets  were  $80.8  million, 
the  liabilities  $37.8  million ;  leaving  $43  million  to  pay 
$35  million  of  capital.  The  circulation  was  $17.5 
million ;  specie  $9  million.  The  state  banks  were  esti 
mated  to  have  $68  million  circulation  and  $10  millioo 
or  $11  million  specie.  The  minority  report  (Folk's) 
doubted  if  the  assets  were  all  good,  and  hence  doubted 
the  solvency  of  the  bank.  It  referred  to  the  Western 
debts,  and  the  minority  gave,  in  a  supplemental  report, 
evidence  of  the  character  of  these  debts.  The  com 
mittee  investigated  the  proceedings  of  the  bank  in  re 
lation  to  the  three  per  cents.  The  minority  reported 
that  they  could  not  find  out  clearly  what  was  the  final 
arrangement  made  by  the  bank,  but  it  appeared  that 
the  certificates  had  been  surrendered,  and  that  the  bank 
had,  by  and  through  the  former  transaction,  obtained  a 
loan  in  Europe.  The  majority  said  that  the  bank  had 
receded  from  the  project,  and  that  there  was  nothing 
more  to  say  about  it.1 

October  4,  1832,  Biddle  informed  the  directors  that 
the  bank  was  strong  enough  to  relax  the  orders  given  to 
the  Western  branches,  in  the  previous  winter,  to  con 
tract  their  loans  and  remit  eastward.  He  then  supposed 
that  the  arrangement  with  the  Barings  about  the  three 
per  cents  had  been  concluded.  The  Western  affairs, 
however,  were  at  this  time  approaching  a  crisis.  The 
supplementary  report  (Folk's)  by  the  minority  of  the 
Committee  on  Ways  and  Means,  March  2,  1833,2  con 
tains  conclusive  evidence  that  the  Western  branches* 
irere  in  a  very  critical  condition ;  that  there  had  been 
drawing  and  redrawing  between  the  branches,  and  that 
Biddlo  knew  it.  The  directors  Had  testified  to  the 
1  Document  E  *  Ibid. 


294  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

committee  that  they  knew  nothing  of  any  such  proceed 
ings.  Some  of  the  most  important  points  in  evidence 
are  as  follows,  September  11,  1832,  the  cashier  of  the 
branch  at  Lexington,  Kentucky,  wrote  that  he  was  en 
during  a  run.  Two  hundred  and  seventy-five  thousand 
dollars  were  sent  to  him  from  Philadelphia,  Louisville, 
St.  Louis,  New  Orleans,  and  Natchez.  A  letter  from 
Biddle  to  the  president  of  the  Nashville  branch,  dated 
November  20,  1832,  shows  plainly  that  he  knew  that 
redrawing  was  going  on.  In  a  letter  from  the  president 
of  the  Nashville  branch,  November  22d,  the  following 
passage  occurs :  "  We  will  not  be  able  to  get  the  debta 
due  this  office  paid ;  indeed,  if  any,  it  will  be  a  small 
part;  the  means  are  not  in  the  country."  The  same 
branch  officer,  in  a  letter  of  November  24th,  plainly 
states  that  he  had  been  forced  to  collect  drafts  drawn 
on  him  by  the  parent  bank,  and  the  New  York,  Balti 
more,  Washington,  Richmond,  Pittsburgh,  Cincinnati, 
Louisville,  and  Lexington  branches,  and  that  he  could 
not  prevent  a  protest  save  by  redrawing  on  New  Or 
leans.  Again,  November  26th,  he  states  that  he  had, 
within  a  year,  collected  drafts  for  a  million  dollars  for 
the  bank  and  branches,  "  which,  with  small  exceptions, 
have  been  paid  through  our  bill  operations."  The 
majority  of  the  committee  of  1832-33  had  interpreted 
the  fluctuations  in  the  amount  of  bills  at  Nashville  as 
proof  that,  when  the  crops  came  in,  the  debts  were  can 
celled.  The  minority  show  that  these  fluctuations  were 
iue  to  the  presence  of  the  "  racers  "  at  one  or  the  othe? 
5iid  of  the  course.  It  is  quite  beyond  question  that  a 
nass  of  accommodation  bills  were  chasing  each  othei 
from  branch  to  branch  in  the  years  1832-33,  and  tha 
Jiey  formed  a  mass  of  debt,  which  the  bank  could  not 
"or  the  time,  control. 


THE  DRAFT  ON  FRANCE.  29fi 

March  2,  1833,  the  House  adopted,  109  to  46,  a 
resolution  that  the  deposits  might  safely  be  continued  in 
the  bank.  The  reports  of  the  committee  had  not  been 
earefulty  considered  by  anybody.  The  bank  question 
«ras  now  a  party  question,  and  men  voted  on  it  accord 
ing  to  party,  not  according  to  evidence.  Whatever 
force  might  be  attributed  to  any  of  the  facts  brought  out 
by  Polk  in  the  minority  report,  it  does  not  appear  that 
anybody  in  Congress  really  thought  that  the  bank  was 
insolvent  and  the  deposits  in  danger.  His  supplemental 
report  bears  date  March  2d.  Polk  did  not  propose  to 
withdraw  the  deposits.  He  wanted  to  avoid  any  posi 
tive  action.  McDuffie  objected  to  this  policy  that,  if 
Congress  took  no  action,  Jackson  would  remove  the 
deposits  on  the  principle  that  silence  gives  consent.1 

The  first  instalment  of  the  payment  by  France  was 
due  February  2,  1833.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
did  not  draw  until  February  7th.  Then  he  drew  a  sight 
draft,  which  he  sold  to  the  bank  for  $961,240.30.  Con 
gress,  March  2d,  passed  an  act  ordering  the  Secretary 
to  loan  this  sum  at  interest.  The  treaty  of  July  4, 1831, 
was  unpopular  in  France,  and  the  French  Chambers  had 
not  passed  any  appropriation  to  meet  the  payments  pro 
vided  for  in  it.  The  draft  was  therefore  protested, 
and  was  taken  up  by  Hottinger  for  the  bank,  because  it 
bore  the  indorsement  of  the  bank.  The  bank  had  put 
the  money  to  the  credit  of  the  Treasury,  and  it  claimed 
to  prove,  by  quoting  the  account,  that  the  funds  had 
been  drawn.  Hence  it  declared  that  it  was  out  of  funds 
for  twice  the  amount  of  the  bill.  It  demanded  fifteen 
|te?  cent  damages  under  an  old  law  of  Maryland,  which 
sra*  rhe  law  of  the  District  of  Colambia.  The  Trea» 
i  44  Nile*,  108. 


296  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Bry  paid  the  amount  of  the  bill,  and  offered  to  pay  the 
actual  loss  incurred.  July  8,  1834,  Biddle  informed 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  that  the  sum  of  $170,041 
would  be  retained  out  of  a  three  and  a  half  per  cent 
dividend  payable  July  17th,  on  the  stock  owned  by  the 
United  States.  March  2,  1838,  the  United  States 
brought  suit  against  the  bank,  in  the  federal  Circuit 
Court  of  Pennsylvania,  for  the  sum  so  withheld.  It  got 
judgment  for  $251,243.54.  The  bank  appealed  to  the 
Supreme  Court,  which,  in  1844,  reversed  the  judgment, 
finding  that  the  bank  was  the  true  holder  of  the  bill  and 
entitled  to  damages.1  On  a  new  trial  the  Circuit  Court 
gave  judgment  for  the  bank.  The  United  States  then 
appealed  on  the  ground  that  a  bill  drawn  by  a  govern 
ment  on  a  government  was  not  subject  to  the  law  mer 
chant.  The  Supreme  Court  sustained  this  view,  in  1847, 
and  again  reversed  the  decision  of  the  Circuit  Court.8 
No  further  action  was  taken. 

In  the  spring  of  1833,  McLane  was  transferred  from 
the  Treasury  to  the  State  Department.  He  was  opposed 
to  the  removal  of  the  deposits  by  executive  act,  which 
was  now  beginning  to  be  urged  in  the  inmost  adminis 
tration  circles.  William  J.  Duane,  of  Pennsylvania,  was 
appointed  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  This  appointment 
tfas  Jackson's  own  personal  act.  He  had  admired 
Duane's  father,  the  editor  of  the  "  Aurora,"  and  he  de 
clared  that  the  son  was  a  chip  of  the  old  block.  In  thia 
be  was  mistaken.  Duane  was  a  very  different  man 
Crom  his  father.8  He  was  a  lawyer  of  very  good  stand 

1  2  Howard,  711.  2  5  Howard,  382. 

3  Par  ton  obtained  from  William  B.  Lewis  an  inside  account  <X 
nvs  removal  of  the  deposits.  Duane  wrote  a  full  account  of  it 
und  there  is  another  account  in  Kendall's  Autobiography,  but  I 
»  by  the  editor,  and  only  at  second  hand  from  KendaL 


PROJECT  OF  REMOVING  THE  DEPOSITS.     297 

[ng.  He  had  never  been  a  politician  or  office-holder, 
but  had  shunned  that  career.  Lewis  says  that  he  does 
not  know  who  first  proposed  the  removal  of  the  deposits, 
but  that  it  began  to  be  talked  of  in  the  inner  adminigh 
tration  circles  soon  after  Jackson's  second  election.  In 
the  cabinet  McLane  and  Cass  were  so  earnestly  opposed 
to  the  project  that  it  was  feared  they  would  resign. 
McLane  sent  for  Kendall  to  know  why  it  was  desired 
to  execute  such  a  project.  This  was  before  McLane 
left  the  Treasury.  Kendall  endeavored  to  persuade  him. 
Cass  finally  said  that  he  did  not  understand  the  ques 
tion.  Woodbury  was  neutral.  Barry  assented  to  the 
act,  but  brought  no  force  to  support  it.  Taney  strongly 
supported  the  project.  He  was  an  old  federalist,  who 
had  come  into  Jackson's  party  in  1824,  on  account  of 
Jackson's  letters  to  Monroe  about  non-partisan  appoint 
ments.1  He  was  Jackson's  most  trusted  adviser  in  1833  : 
so  his  biographer  says,  and  it  seems  to  be  true.  Van 
Buren  warmly  opposed  the  removal  at  first.  Kendall 
persuaded  him.  He  seems  to  have  faltered  afterwards, 
but  Kendall  held  him  up  to  the  point.2  Benton  warmly 
approved  of  the  removal,  but  was  not  active  in  bringing 
it  about.  Lewis  opposed  it. 

The  proceeding  is  traced,  by  all  the  evidence,  to  Ken 
dall  and  Blair  as  the  moving  spirits,3  with  Reuben  M. 
Whitney  as  a  coadjutor.  These  men  had  no  public 
official  responsibility.  They  certainly  were  not  recog- 
pized  by  the  nation  as  the  men  who  ought  to  have  a 
sontrolling  influence  on  public  affairs.  They  were  ani 
mated  by  prejudice  and  rancor  sixteen  years  old.  An 
drew  Jackson's  power  and  popularity,  moving 


»  Tyler's  Taney,  158.  2  Kendall's  Autobiography,  383. 

*  Kendall's  Autobiography,  375. 


298  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Under  the  impulse  of  the  passions  which  animate  a* 
Indian  on  the  war-path,  were  the  engine  with  which 
these  naen  battered  down  a  great  financial  institution. 
The  bank  had  been  guilty  of  great  financial  errors,  but 
they  were  not  by  any  means  beyond  remedy.  The 
Bank  of  England,  at  the  same  period,  was  guilty  of 
great  financial  errors.  Blair  and  Kendall  were  not 
working  for  sound  finance.  Blair's  doctrine  was  that 
fche  bank  would  use  the  public  deposits  as  a  means  of 
corrupting  the  political  institutions  of  the  country.  If 
that  were  true,  it  proved  the  error  of  having  a  great 
surplus  of  public  money  in  the  Treasury,  i.  e.,  in  the 
bank.  He  said  that  the  bank  would  corrupt  Congress.1 
In  August  Duane  wrote,  "It  is  true  that  there  is  an 
irresponsible  cabal  that  has  more  power  than  the  people 
are  aware  of."  "  What  I  object  to  is  that  there  is  an 
under-current,  a  sly,  whispering,  slandering  system  pur 
sued."  2  In  his  history  of  the  matter,  written  five  years 
later,  he  says  :  "I  had  heard  rumors  of  the  existence 
of  an  influence  at  Washington,  unknown  to  the  Consti 
tution  and  to  the  country  ;  and  the  conviction  that  they 
were  well  founded  now  became  irresistible.  I  knew 
that  four  of  the  six  members  of  the  last  cabinet  and 
hat  four  of  the  six  members  of  the  present  cabinet  op 
posed  a  removal  of  the  deposits,  and  yet  their  exertions 
were  nullified  by  individuals,  whose  intercourse  with 
the  President  was  clandestine.  During  his  absence  [in 
New  England]  several  of  those  individuals  called  on 
me,  and  made  many  of  the  identical  observations,  in  the 
identical  language  used  by  himself.  They  represented 
Congress  as  corruptible,  and  the  new  members  as  is 
fceed  of  special  guidance.  ...  In  short,  I  felt  satisfied; 
in  3  Parton,  503.  *  Daane,  130. 


REMOVAL   OF  THE  DEPOSITS.  299 

from  all  that  I  saw  and  heard,  that  factious  and  selfish 
views  alone  guided  those  who  had  influence  with  the 
Executive,  and  that  the  true  welfare  and  honor  of  the 
country  constituted  no  part  of  their  objects."  ]  Lewis 
gives  a  report  of  a  conversation  with  Jackson,  in  which 
he  (Lewis)  tried  to  persuade  Jackson  to  desist  from 
the  project.  Jackson's  points  were,  "  I  have  no  con 
fidence  in  Congress."  "  If  the  bank  is  permitted  to 
have  the  public  money,  there  is  no  power  that  can 
prevent  it  from  obtaining  a  charter ;  it  will  have  it  if 
it  has  to  buy  up  all  Congress,  and  the  public  funds 
would  enable  it  to  do  so !  "  "  If  we  leave  the  means  of 
corruption  in  its  hands,  the  presidential  veto  will  avail 
nothing."  2  The  statements  in  Kendall's  "  Autobiogra 
phy  "  are  in  perfect  accord  with  these.  It  is  perfectly 
plain  who  was  at  the  bottom  of  this  project,  what  their 
motives  were,  how  they  set  to  work,  how  they  gave  a 
bias  to  Jackson's  mind,  and  furnished  him  with  argu 
ments  and  phrases.  It  is  also  worthy  of  the  most  care 
ful  attention  that  they  and  Jackson  were  now  busy 
"saving  the  country,"  holding  in  check  the  constitu 
tional  organs  of  the  country,  above  all  Congress ;  and 
that  they  were  proceeding  upon  assumptions  about  the 
motives  and  purposes  of  the  bank  which  were  not  true, 
and  had  not  even  been  tested,  and  upon  assumptions  in 
regard  to  the  character  of  Congress  which  were  insult 
ing  to  the  nation.  The  Jeffersonian  non-interference 
theories  were  now  all  left  far  behind.  Jacksonian  democ 
racy  was  approaching  already  the  Napoleonic  type  of 
the  democratic  empire,  in  which  "  the  elect  of  the 
nation"  is  charged  to  prDtect  the  state  against  every 
body,  chiefly,  however,  against  any  cc  jstitutional  organs. 
1  Duane,  9.  2  Lewis  in  3  Parton,  505  fg. 


300  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

On  the  first  day  of  Duane's  official  life,  June  1,  183$ 
Whitney  called  on  him,  obviously  in  a  certain  ambas 
sadorial  capacity,  and  made  known  to  him  the  project 
to  remove  the  deposits  from  the  bank,  and  to  use  state 
oanks  as  depositories  and  fiscal  agents.  A  few  days 
later  Jackson  started  on  a  progress  through  New  Eng 
land.  The  recent  overthrow  of  nullification  had  ren 
dered  him  very  popular.  No  one  knew  of  any  new 
trouble  brewing,  and  there  was  a  general  outburst  of  en 
thusiasm  and  satisfaction  that  a  great  cause  of  political 
discord  had  been  removed,  and  that  peace  and  quiet 
might  be  enjoyed.  Jackson  was  feted  enthusiastically 
and  generally.  Harvard  College  made  him  a  Doctor  of 
Laws.  Adams  said  that  it  was  "  a  sycophantic  compli 
ment."  Jackson  was  very  ill  at  this  time.  Adams  wrote 
a  spiteful  page  in  the  "  Diary,"  alleging  that  "  four  fifths 
of  his  sickness  is  trickery,  and  the  other  fifth  mere  fa 
tigue."  "  He  is  so  ravenous  of  notoriety  that  he  craves 
the  sympathy  for  sickness  as  a  portion  of  his  glory."  l 
The  low  personal  injustice  which  is  born  of  party  hatred 
is  here  strikingly  illustrated. 

Duane  did  not  accept  the  role  for  which  he  had  been 
selected.  He  objected  to  the  removal  of  the  deposits. 
Jackson  sent  to  him  from  Boston  a  long  argument, 
written  by  Kendall,  to  try  to  persuade  him.  Jackson  re 
turned  early  in  July.  The  question  of  the  removal  was 
then  debated  between  him  and  Duane  very  seriously, 
Duane  standing  his  ground.  It  is  evident  that  Taney  was 
then  asked  to  take  the  Treasury  in  case  Duane  should 
continue  recalcitrant.  Jackson  left  Washington  on  an 
excursion  to  the  Rip  Raps  without  having  come  to  an 
wrangement  with  Duane.2 

1  4  Adams,  5. 

*  Lu  May.  1833,  Jackson  laid  the  corner-stone  of  a  mounmenH 


KENDALL'S  NEGOTIATIONS.  301 

In  July  rumors  became  current  that  the  Presiden. 
intended  to  remove  the  deposits.1  August  5,  1833, 
while  Jackson  was  absent,  Taney  wrote  to  him,  encourag 
ing  him  to  prosecute  the  project  of  removal,  and  thor 
oughly  approving  of  it.  It  is  a  sycophantic  letter.2  In 
August  Kendall  went  on  a  tour  through  the  Middle 
and  Eastern  States  to  negotiate  with  the  state  banks  so 
as  to  find  out  whether  they  would  undertake  the  fiscal 
duties.  His  first  project  seems  to  have  been  based  on 
the  New  York  Safety  Fund  system.  He  got  no  en 
couragement  for  this.8  To  more  general  inquiries  as  to 
a  willingness  to  enter  into  some  arrangement  he  got  a 
number  of  favorable  replies.4  Commenting  on  these 
replies,  Duaiie  says,  "  It  was  into  this  chaos  that  I  was 
asked  to  plunge  the  fiscal  concerns  of  the  country  at  a 
moment  when  they  were  conducted  by  the  legitimate 
agent  with  the  utmost  simplicity,  safety,  and  despatch."  B 

On  Jackson's  return  he  took  up  the  business  at  once. 
Of  course  Kendall's  negotiations  could  not  be  kept  se 
cret.  "  Niles's  Register  "  for  September  7,  1833,  con 
tains  a  long  list  of  extracts  from  different  newspapers 
presenting  different  speculations  as  to  the  probability  of 
'•he  removal  of  the  deposits.  The  money  market  was, 
of  course,  immediately  affected.  The  bank  had  ordered 

;o  Washington's  mother.  On  his  way  to  the  site  of  the  monu 
ment,  while  the  steamboat  was  at  Alexandria,  Lieutenant  Ran 
dolph,  who  had  been  dismissed  from  the  navy  because  he  could 
jiot  make  his  accounts  good,  committed  an  assault  on  the  Pres 
'dent,  and  attempted  to  pull  his  nose.  Considerable  politico/ 
beat  was  excited  by  the  ex*;ra  legal  measures  taken  to  punish 
Randolph  for  his  outrage.  (44  Nibs,  1 70.) 
1  44  Niles,  353.  2  Tyler's  Taney,  195, 

§  Document  F.  page  IP-  4  Document  F. 

*  Doane,  96. 


802  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

its  branches  to  buy  no  drafts  having  over  ninety  days 
to  run.  This  was  too  short  a  time  for  "  racers,"  consid« 
ering  the  difficulty  of  communication.  The  Western 
debts  had  now  been  considerably  curtailed  by  the  stren 
uous  efforts  which  had  been  made  during  the  year.  In 
the  cabinet,  Duane  was  still  resisting.  The  sixteenth 
section  of  the  bank  charter  gave  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  by  specific  designation,  the  power  to  remove 
the  deposits. 

By  the  acts  of  July  2,  1789,  and  May  10,  1800,  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  reports  to  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives.  John  Adams  objected  to  the  position  thus 
created  for  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.1  At  other 
times  also  it  has  caused  complaint.2  His  position  cer 
tainly  was  anomalous.  His  powers  and  responsibilities 
were  in  no  consistent  relation  to  each  other.  He  was 
independent  of  the  President  in  his  functions,  yet  might 
be  removed  by  him.  He  reported  to  Congress  what  he 
had  done,  yet  could  not  be  removed  by  Congress  except 
by  impeachment.  Jackson  now  advanced  another  step 
in  his  imperial  theory.  He  said  to  Duane :  I  take  the 
responsibility ;  and  he  extended  his  responsibility  over 
Duane  on  the  theory  that  the  Secretary  was  a  sub 
ordinate,  bound  only  to  obey  orders.  What  then  was 
the  sense  of  providing  in  the  charter  that  the  Secretary 
might  use  a  certain  discretion,  and  that  he  should  state 
to  Congress  his  reasons  for  any  use  he  made  of  it  ? 
Jackson's  responsibility  was  only  a  figure  of  speech ;  he 
wras  elected  for  a  set  term,  and  could  rot  and  would  not 

1  1  Gibbs,  569. 

3  4  Adams,  501.  See  a  history  of  the  Treasury  Department  i» 
t  report  of  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means,  March  4,  1834 
'4«Niles,  39.) 


PAPER  READ  IN  THE   CABINET.  303 

land  again.  As  Congress  stood  there  was  m>  danger  ol 
impeachment.  His  position,  therefore,  was  simply  that 
he  was  determined  to  do  what  he  thought  hest  to  do, 
because  there  was  no  power  at  hand  to  stop  him. 

OD  the  18th  of  September  the  President  read,  in  the 
meeting  of  his  cabinet,  a  paper  prepared  by  Taney,1  in 
which  he  argued  that  the  deposits  ought  to  be  removed. 
The  grounds  were,  the  three  per  cents,  the  French  bill, 
the  political  activity  of  the  bank,  and  its  unconstitu 
tionally.  He  said  that  he  would  not  dictate  to  the 
Secretary,  but  he  took  all  the  responsibility  of  deciding 
that,  after  October  1st,  no  more  public  money  should  be 
deposited  in  the  bank,  and  that  the  current  drafts  should 
withdraw  all  money  then  in  it.  Duane  refused  to  give 
the  order  and  refused  to  resign.  He  was  dismissed, 
September  23d.  Taney  was  transferred  to  the  Treas 
ury.  He  gave  the  order.  Taney  told  Kendall  that  he 
was  not  a  politician,  and  that,  in  taking  a  political  office, 
he  sacrificed  his  ambition,  which  was  to  be  a  judge  of 
the  Supreme  Court.2  Duane  at  once  published  the  final 
correspondence  between  the  President  and  himself,  in 
which  he  gave  fifteen  reasons  why  the  deposits  ought 
not  to  be  removed.3  One  of  them  was,  "  I  believe  that 
the  efforts  made  in  various  quarters  to  hasten  the  re 
moval  of  the  deposits  did  not  originate  with  patriots  or 
statesmen,  but  in  schemes  to  promote  factious  and  self 
ish  purposes."  The  administration  press  immediately 
turned  upon  Duane  with  fierce  abuse. 

The  removal  of  the  deposits  was  a  violent  and  unnec- 
Bssary  step,  even  from  Jackson's  stand-point,  as  Lewis 
fried  to  persuade  him.  The  bank  had  no  chance  of  a 

<•  Tyler's  Taney,  204  Kendau's  Aitobhyraphy,  186. 

»  45  Niles,  336.  •  Lewis  in  3  I  arton.  506. 


304  ANDREW  JACKSOtf. 

recliarter,  unless  one  is  prepared  to  believe  that  it  could 
and  would  buy  enough  congressmen  to  get  a  two-thirds 
majority.  If  it  had  been  willing  to  do  that,  it  had 
enough  money  of  its  own  for  the  purpose,  even  after  the 
deposits  were  withdrawn.  The  removal  caused  a  great 
commotion,  —  even  a  panic.1  Bank  stock  fell  one  and 
one  half  per  cent  at  New  York.  But  it  recovered  when 
the  paper  read  in  the  cabinet  was  received,  because  the 
grounds  were  only  the  old  charges.  The  public  con 
fidence  in  the  bank  had  not  been  shaken  by  the  charges, 
investigations,  and  reports.  The  bank  replied  to  the 
President's  paper  by  a  long  manifesto,  in  which  it  pur 
sued  him  point  by  point.8  No  doubt  Biddle  wrote  this 
paper.  In  order  to  defend  the  bank  in  the  matter  of  the 
three  per  cents,  he  resorted  to  the  tactics  noticed  before. 
He  said  that  there  was  heavy  indebtedness  to  Europe 
in  1832,  on  account  of  the  importations  of  1831.  He 
wanted  to  prevent  an  exportation  of  specie  and  give  the 
country  leisure  to  pay  that  debt.  He  says  that  the 
bank  was  at  ease,  and  would  have  kept  quiet  if  it  had 
considered  only  its  own  interests.  Nothing  less  than  the 
movements  which  involve  continents  and  cover  years 
will  do  for  him  to  explain  his  policy.  No  motive  less 
than  universal  benevolence  will  suffice  to  account  for  the 
action  of  the  bank.  These  pretences  were,  as  similar 
ones  almost  always  are,  not  true. 

The  average  monthly  balance  in  the  bank,  to  the 
credit  of  the  Treasury,  from  1818  to  1833,  was  $6.7 
million.  In  1832  it  was  $11.3  million.  In  1833  it 
was  $8.5  million.  In  September,  1833,  it  was  $9.1 
million.*  Kendall  reported  to  a  cabinet  meeting  the 
revolts  of  his  negotiations  with  the  banks.  One  bani 

-  45  Niles,  65.  2  45  Niies>  049.  3  DOCUMent  H. 


DISORDER  IN  THE  FISCAL  SYSTEM.          305 

was  objected  to  "  on  political  grounds." J  Twenty-three 
were  selected  before  the  end  of  the  year.  The  chanct 
for  favoritism  was  speedily  perceived.  The  first  in 
tention  was  to  use  the  Bank  of  the  Metropolis,  Washing 
ton,  as  the  head  of  the  system  of  deposit  banks,  although 
uo  system  was  devised.  In  fact,  the  administration  had 
taken  the  work  of  destruction  in  hand  with  great  vigor, 
but  it  never  planned  a  system  to  take  the  place  of  the 
old  one.  The  Bank  of  the  United  States  had,  of  course, 
been  compelled  to  devise  its  own  measures  for  carrying 
on  the  business  of  the  Treasury,  so  far  as  it  was  charged 
with  that  business.  The  Treasury  was  now  forced  to 
oversee,  if  it  did  not  originate,  the  system  of  relations 
between  the '  deposit  banks.  January  30,  1834,  Silas 
Wright  made  a  statement  which  was  understood  to  be 
authoritative.  He  said  that  the  Executive  had  entered 
again  upon  the  control  of  the  public  money  which  be 
longed  to  him  before  the  national  bank  was  chartered ; 
that  the  administration  would  bring  forward  no  law  to 
regulate  the  deposits,  but  that  the  Executive  would  pro 
ceed  with  the  experiment  of  using  state  banks.  Webster 
expressed  strong  disappointment  and  disapproval,  claim 
ing  that  there  should  be  a  law.2  March  18, 1834,  Web- 
Bter  proposed  a  bill  to  extend  the  charter  of  the  Bank  of 
the  United  States  for  six  years,  without  monopoly,  the 
public  money  to  be  deposited  in  it,  it  to  pay  to  the 
Treasury  $200,000  annually  on  March  4th,  none  of  its 
notes  to  be  for  less  than  $20.00.  The  bank  men  would 
not  agree  to  support  it.  It  was  tabled  and  never  called 
ap.3  April  15, 1834,  sis.  mop^hs  after  the  deposits  were 

1  Kendall's  Autobiography,  387.  2  tb  Niles,  400. 

»  46  Niles,  52  ;  1  Curtia's  Webster,  485;  4  Webster  s  Wjrk* 
ft 

90 


306  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

removed,  Taney  sent  to  the  Committee  on  Ways  and 
Means  a  plan  for  the  organization  of  the  deposit  hank 
lystem,  but  it  was  a  mere  vague  outline.1  December 
15,  1834,  Woodbury  sent  in  a  long  essay  on  currency 
and  banking,  but  no  positive  scheme  or  arrangement. 
It  was  not  until  June,  1836,  that  the  system  was  regu 
lated  by  measures  aiming  at  efficiency  and  responsibility. 
Taney  desired  that  Kendall  should  be  president  of 
the  Bank  of  the  Metropolis  and  organize  the  system, 
but  Kendall's  readiness,  which  had  not  before  failed, 
had  now  reached  its  limit.  The  Bank  of  the  Metropolis 
was  then  asked  to  admit  Whitney  as  agent  and  corre 
spondent  of  the  deposit  banks.  The  bank  refused  to  do 
this,  and  the  plan  of  making  that  bank  the  head  was 
given  up.2  The  banks  were  recommended  to  employ 
Whitney  as  agent  and  correspondent  at  Washington  for 
their  dealings  with  the  Treasury.  He  was  thus  placed 
in  a  position  of  great  power  and  influence.  He  did  not 
escape  the  charge  of  having  abused  it,  and  an  investiga 
tion,  in  1837,  produced  evidence  very  adverse  to  his 
good  character.  Part  of  the  correspondence  between 
him  and  the  banks  was  then  published.  From  that  cor 
respondence  it  is  plain  that  the  chief  argument  brought 
to  support  an  application  for  a  share  of  the  deposits,  or 
other  favor,  was  devotion  to  Jackson  and  hatred  of  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States.3  It  is  not  proven  that  the 
deposits  were  ever  used  by  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States  for  any  political  purpose  whatever.  It  is  con 
clusively  proven  that  the  deposits  were  used  by  Jack- 
son's  administration,  through  Whitney's  agency,  to  re 
ward  adherents  and  to  win  supporters.  The  first  banJjj 

*  45  Niles,  1 57.  2  Kendall's  Autobiography,  388. 

*  5*  Nile*  S1 


THE  TRANSFER  DRAFTS.  307 

which  took  up  the  system  also,  in  some  cases,  used  the 
deposits  which  were  given  to  them  to  put  themselves  in 
the  position  which  they  were  required,  by  the  theory  of 
the  deposit  system,  to  occupy.  Taney  assumed  that 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States  would  make  a  spiteful 
attempt  to  injure  the  deposit  banks  by  calling  on  them 
fco  pay  balances.  It  was  then  considered  wrong  and 
eruel  for  one  bank  to  call  on  another  to  pay  balances 
promptly.  Taney,  therefore,  placed  some  large  drafts 
on  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  in  the  hands  of 
officers  of  the  deposit  banks  at  New  York,  Philadelphiar 
and  Baltimore,  so  that  they  might  offset  any  such  ma 
licious  demand.  Otherwise,  the  drafts  were  not  to  be 
used.  The  bank  took  no  steps  which  afforded  even  a 
pretext  for  using  these  drafts,  but  the  president  of  the 
Union  Bank  of  Maryland  cashed  one  of  them  for 
$100,000  a  few  days  after  he  got  it,  and  used  the  money 
in  stock  speculations.1  For  fear  of  scandal  this  act  was 
passed  over  by  the  Executive,  but  it  led  to  an  investiga 
tion  by  Congress.  Taney  was  a  stockholder  in  the 
Union  Bank.2  The  Manhattan  Company  used  one  of 
these  drafts  for  $500,000.3  Taney  claimed  the  power 
to  make  these  transfers.  He  referred  it  back  to  a  pre 
cedent  set  by  Crawford,4  who,  in  his  turn,  when  he  had 
been  called  to  account  for  it,  had  referred  it  back  to 
Gallatin.  The  source  of  the  stream,  however,  was  not 

1  Kendall's  Autobiography,  389.     Cf.  Document  H.  page  339 
It  is  well  worth  while  to  read  these  two  passages  together  in 
order  to  see  how  much  deceit  there  was  in  the  proceedings  about 
ftie  removal  of  the  deposits 

2  Quincy's  Adams,  2?7.     He  sold  his  stock  Feoruary  18,  18S4 
Document  M.) 

8  Document  EL 
Document  F. 


308  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Gallatin,  but  William  Jones,  Acting  Secretary.1  Thf 
baneful  effects  of  the  large  surplus  of  public  money  arc 
plain  enough. 

At  the  session  of  1833-34  the  message  alleged,  as  the 
occasion  of  removing  the  deposits,  the  report  of  the 
government  directors  of  the  bank,  which  showed,  as 
Jackson  said,  that  the  bank  had  been  turned  into  an 
electioneering  engine.  It  was  never  alleged  that  the 
bank  had  spent  money  otherwise  than  in  distributing 
Gallatin's  pamphlet  on  currency,  McDuffie's  report  of 
1830,  and  similar  documents.  Some  might  think  that 
it  was  not  wise  and  right  for  the  bank  so  to  defend  it 
self,  since  politics  were  involved  ;  but  its  judge  was  now 
the  most  interested  party  in  the  contest,  the  one  to  whom 
that  offence  would  seem  most  heinous,  and  he  insisted 
on  imposing  a  penalty  at  his  own  discretion,  on  an  ex 
parte  statement  of  his  own  appointees,  and  a  penalty 
which  could  not  be  considered  appropriate  or  duly 
measured  to  the  offence.  He  also  charged  the  bank 
with  manufacturing  a  panic.  Taney  reported  "his" 
reasons  for  the  removal.  He  argued  that  the  Secretary 
must  discharge  his  duties  under  the  supervision  of  the 
President ;  that  the  Secretary  alone  had  power  to  re 
move  the  deposits ;  that  Congress  could  not  order  it  to 
be  done ;  that  the  Secretary  could  do  it,  if  he  thought 
best,  for  any  reason,  not  necessarily  only  when  the  bank 
had  misconducted  itself.  He  put  the  removal  which  had 
beon  executed  on  the  ground  of  public  interest.  The 
people  had  shown,  in  the  election,  that  they  did  not 
rant  the  bank  rechartered.  It  was  not  best  to  remove 

1  American  State  Papers,  4  Finance,  266,  279.  Cf  1  Gal 
ktiVg  Writings,  80.  It  has  been  asserted  that  Hamilton  use\t 
ike  same  power.  (Ingersoll  279.  Cf.  6  Hamilton's  Works,  175/ 


WAR    WITH  THE  SENATE.  809 

die  deposits  suddenly  when  the  charter  should  expire. 
He  blamed  the  bank  for  increasing  its  loans  from  De 
cember  1,  1832,  to  August  2,  1833,  from  $61.5  million 
to  $64.1  million,  and  then  reducing  them,  from  that  date 
until  October  2,  1833,  to  $60  million.  He  said  that 
the  bank  had  forfeited  public  confidence,  had  excluded 
the  government  directors  from  knowledge  to  which  they 
were  entitled,  had  shown  selfishness  in  the  affair  of  the 
French  bill,  had  done  wrongly  about  the  three  per  cents, 
had  granted  favors  to  editors,  and  had  distributed  docu 
ments  to  control  elections.  He  favored  the  use  of  the 
state  banks  as  fiscal  agents  of  the  government. 

December  9th  the  bank  memorialized  Congress  against 
the  removal  of  the  deposits  as  a  breach  of  contract.  A 
great  struggle  over  the  bank  question  occupied  the  whole 
session.  The  Senate  refused,  25  to  20,  to  confirm  the 
reappointment  of  the  government  directors,  who  were 
said  to  have  acted  as  the  President's  spies.  Jackson 
sent  the  names  in  again  with  a  long  message,1  and  they 
were  rejected,  30  to  11.  Taney's  appointment  as  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury  was  rejected,  to  Jackson's  great 
indignation.  Taney  was  then  nominated  for  judge  of 
the  Supreme  Court,  and  again  rejected.  Marshall  died 
in  July,  1835.  Taney  was  appointed  Chief  Justice,  De- 
tember  28,  1835,  and  confirmed,  March  15,  1836. 

December  llth  Clay  moved  a  call  for  a  copy  of  the 
paper  read  in  the  cabinet.  Jackson  refused  it  on  the 
ground  that  Congress  had  no  business  with  it.  The 
document,  in  fact,  had  no  standing  in  our  system  of 
government.  It  was  another  extension  of  personal 
government,  by  the  adoption  of  a  Napoleonic  procedure, 
The  "Emperor  made  known  his  vill  by  a  letter  of  in 
46  Niles,  180. 


ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Btructions  to  his  minister,  and  this,  when  published 
informed  the  public.  Jackson  used  his  "  paper  read  in 
the  cabinet "  in  just  that  way.  By  publi slung  it  he 
violated  the  secrecy  and  privilege  of  the  cabinet,  and 
made  it  a  public  document,  but  when  it  was  called  for 
he  fell  back  on  cabinet  privilege.1  If  Jackson's  doctrine 
was  sound,  there  would  be  modes  of  governing  this 
country  without  any  responsibility  to  Congress,  and  the 
"cabinet,"  as  such,  would  come  to  have  recognized 
functions  as  a  body  for  registering  and  publishing  the 
rescripts  of  the  President.  It  was  a  thoroughly  con 
sistent  extension  of  the  same  doctrine  that  Jackson,  in 
his  reply,  in  which  he  refused  to  comply  with  the  call 
of  the  Senate,  professed  his  responsibility  to  the  Amer 
ican  people,  and  his  willingness  to  explain  to  them  the 
grounds  of  his  conduct.  Such  a  profession  was  an  insult 
to  the  constitutional  organ  of  the  mind  and  will  of  the 
American  people  worthy  of  a  military  autocrat,  and  al 
though  it  might  have  a  jingle  which  would  tickle  the 
ears  of  men  miseducated  by  the  catch-words  of  democ 
racy,  a  people  which  would  accept  it  as  a  proper  and 
lawful  expression  from  their  executive  chief  would  not 
yet  have  learned  the  alphabet  of  constitutional  govern 
ment. 

In  January,  1834,  Jackson  seiit  in  a  message  com 
plaining  that  the  bank  still  kept  the  books,  papers,  and 
funds  belonging  to  the  pension  agency  with  which  it  had 
.Hitherto  been  charged.  The  Senate  voted,  May  26th, 
26  to  17,  that  the  Secretary  of  War  had  no  authority  to 
remove  the  pension  funds  from  the  bank. 

Clay  introduced  resolutions  which  finally  took  thii 
tixape :  "  Resolved,  (1)  That  the  President,  in  the  lai* 
1  45  Niles,  247. 


CENSURE   OF  JACKSON.  311 

•xecutive  proceed!,  gs  in  relation  to  the  public  revenue, 
has  assumed  upon  himself  authority  and  power  not  con 
ferred  by  the  Constitution  and  the  laws,  but  in  deroga 
tion  of  both.  (2)  That  the  reasons  assigned  by  the 
Secretaiy  for  the  removal  are  unsatisfactory  and  insuf 
ficient."  Benton  offered  a  resolution  that  Biddle  should 
be  called  to  the  bar  of  the  Senate  to  give  the  reasons  for 
the  recent  curtailments  of  the  bank,  and  to  answer  for  the 
use  of  its  funds  for  electioneering.1  January  5,  1834, 
Webster  reported  from  the  Committee  on  Finance  in 
regard  to  the  removal  of  the  deposits.  Clay's  second 
resolution  was  at  once  adopted,  28  to  18.  March  28th 
the  first  resolution  was  adopted,  26  to  20.  April  15th, 
Jackson  sent  in  a  protest  against  the  latter  resolution. 
The  Senate  refused  to  receive  it,  27  to  16,  declaring  it 
a  breach  of  privilege.  The  main  points  in  the  protest 
were  that  the  President  meant  to  maintain  intact  the 
rights  of  the  Executive,  and  that  the  Senate  would  be 
the  judges  in  case  of  impeachment,  but  for  that  reason 
ought  not  to  express  an  opinion  until  the  House  saw  fit 
to  impeach.  The  bank  charter  provided  that  the  Secre 
tary  should  report  his  reasons  to  Congress.  On  the 
doctrine  of  the  protest,  however,  one  House  of  Congress 
could  adopt  no  expression  of  opinion  on  the  report  sub 
mitted,  because  it  must  wait  for  the  other.  The  ad 
ministration  press  kept  up  truculent  denunciations  of 
the  Senate  all  winter.  The  "  Pennsylvanian  "  said  :  "  The 
democrats  never  heartily  sanctioned  it,  and  now,  having 
fche  power,  should  amend  or  get  rid  of  it  once  and  for- 
sver."  2  The  New  York  "  Standard  "  called  the  sen* 
lors  "  usurpers."  8 

1  45  Niles  332.  2  48  Niles,  .31. 

•  Ibid.  i47. 


812  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

The  debates  of  the  winter  were  acrimonious  in  the 
extreme.  Probably  no  session  of  Congress  before 
1860-61  was  marked  by  such  fierce  contention  in  Con 
gress  and  such  excitement  out-of-doors.  Chevalier, 
who  was  an  acute  and  unprejudiced  observer,  said  that 
the  speeches  of  the  administration  men  resembled  the 
French  republican  tirades  of  1791-92.  They  had  the 
Bame  distinguishing  trait,  —  emphasis.  "  Most  generally 
the  pictures  presented  in  these  declamations  are  fantas 
tical  delineations  of  the  moneyed  aristocracy  overrun 
ning  the  country,  with  seduction,  corruption,  and  slavery 
in  its  train,  or  of  Mr.  Biddle  aiming  at  the  crown."1 
The  chief  weapon  of  debate  was  emphasis  instead  of 
fact  and  reason.  With  an  "  old  hero  "  to  support  and  the 
"  money  power  "  to  assail,  the  politicians  and  orators  of 
the  emphatic  school  had  a  grand  opportunity.  There 
is  also  an  unformulated  dogma,  which  seems  to  command 
a  great  deal  of  faith,  to  this  effect,  that,  if  a  man  is  only 
sufficiently  ignorant,  his  whims  and  notions  constitute 
"  plain  common  sense."  There  are  no  questions  on 
which  this  dogma  acts  more  perniciously  than  on  ques 
tions  of  banking  and  currency.  Wild  and  whimsical 
notions  about  these  topics,  propounded  with  vehemence 
and  obstinacy  in  Congress,  helped  to  increase  the  alarm 
»ut-of-doors. 

Senators  Bibb,  of  Kentucky,  and  White,  of  Tennes 
see,  went  into  opposition.  Calhoun,  also,  for  the  time, 
Allied  himself  heartily  with  the  opposition. 

The  Virginia  Legislature  passed  resolutions  condemn 

ing  the  dismissal  of  Dtiane  and  the  removal  of  the  de 

posits.     In  pursuance  of  the  dogmas  of  Virginia  demon 

•acj,  Rives,  senator  from  that  State  and  supporter  of  th« 

1  Chevalier,  61. 


EXPUNGING  AND  INSTRUCTIONS.  813 

administration  measures,  resigned.     B.  W.  Leigh  was 

elected  in  his  place. 

As  soon  as  the  resolution  of  censure  was  passed,  Ben- 
ton  gave  notice  of  a  motion  to  expunge  the  same  from 
the  records.  He  introduced  such  a  resolution  at  the  next 
session,  and  the  Jackson  party  was  more  firmly  consoli 
dated  than  ever  before  in  the  determination  to  carry 
it.  The  personal  element  was  present  in  that  enterprise, 
with  the  desire  for  revenge,  and  the  wish  to  demonstrate 
loyalty.  March  3,  1835,  the  words  "  ordered  to  be  ex 
punged  "  were  stricken  from  Benton's  resolution,  39  to 
7,  and  the  resolution  was  tabled,  27  to  20.  The  agita 
tion  was  then  carried  back  into  the  state  elections,  and 
"  expunging  "  came  to  be  a  test  of  party  fealty.  Ben- 
ton  renewed  the  motion  December  26,  1836.  The  Leg 
islature  of  Virginia  adopted  instructions  in  favor  of  it. 
John  Tyler  would  not  vote  for  it,  and  resigned.  Leigh 
would  not  do  so,  and  would  not  resign.  He  never  re 
covered  party  standing.1  Rives  was  sent  back  in  Tyler's 
place.  This  martyrdom  and  Tyler's  report  on  the  bank, 
mentioned  below,  made  Tyler  Vice-President.2  The  vice 
of  the  doctrine  of  instructions  was  well  illustrated  in 
these  proceedings.  If  the  Virginia  doctrine  were  ad 
mitted,  senators  would  be  elected,  not  for  six  years,  but 
until  the  politics  of  the  State  represented  might  change. 
The  senator  would  not  be  a  true  representative,  under 
the  theory  of  representative  institutions,  but  a  delegate, 
\>r  ambassador.  It  would  be  another  victory  of  pure 
democracy  over  constitutional  institutions. 

The  administration  had  a  majority  in  the  Senate  in 
1836,  but  Benton  says  that  a  caucus  was  held  on  expung 

1  See  his  letter  of  reply  •  50  Nilea,  28. 
1  Wise,  158. 


B14  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

ing.  The  resolution  was  passed,  24  to  19,  that  black 
ines  should  be  drawn  around  the  record  on  the  journa* 
of  the  Senate,  and  that  the  words  "  expunged,  by  ordei 
of  the  Senate,  this  16th  day  of  January,  1837,"  should 
be  written  across  it.  It  was  a  great  personal  victory  for 
Jackson.  The  Senate  had  risen  up  to  condemn  him  for 
something  which  he  had  seen  fit  to  do,  and  he  had  suc 
cessfully  resented  and  silenced  its  reproof.  It  gratified 
him  more  than  any  other  incident  of  the  latter  part  of 
his  life.  It  was  still  another  step  forward  in  the  de 
velopment  of  his  political  methods,  according  to  which 
his  personality  came  more  and  more  into  play  as  a 
political  force,  and  the  constitutional  institutions  of  the 
country  were  set  aside.  The  day  after  the  resolution 
was  expunged,  leave  was  refused,  in  the  House,  to  bring 
in  a  resolution  that  it  is  unconstitutional  to  expunge  any 
part  of  any  record  of  either  House.1 

March  4,  1834,  Polk  reported  from  the  Committee  on 
Ways  and  Means  on  the  removal  of  the  deposits,  sup 
porting  Jackson  and  Taney  in  all  their  positions.  He 
offered  four  resolutions,  which  were  passed,  April  4th 
as  follows :  (1)  that  the  bank  ought  not  to  be  re 
chartered,  132  to  82  ;  (2)  that  the  deposits  ought  not 
to  be  restored,  118  to  103  ;  (3)  that  the  state  banks 
ought  to  be  depositories  of  the  public  funds,  117  to  105  ; 
(4)  that  a  select  committee  should  be  raised  on  the 
bank  and  the  commercial  crisis,  171  to  42.  The  coni- 

1  There  was  a  case  of  expunging  in  Jefferson's  time.  A  res- 
3lution  which  had  been  passed  contained  a  statement  that  cer 
tain  filibusters  thought  that  they  had  executive  sanction.  Thia 
was  expunged.  (1  Adams,  439.)  A  case  is  mentioned  in  Massa 
chusetts.  Quincj's  resolution  against  rejoicing  in  naval  victoriei 
Was  expunged.  (Ingersoll,  23.)  For  a  discussion  of  other  prece 
foots  *3«  the  speeches  of  Rives  and  Leigh.  (50  Niles,  168,  173. 


REPORTS  OF  1834.  315 

mittee  last  mentioned  reported  May  22d.*  The  ma 
jority  said  that  the  bank  had  resisted  all  their  attempts 
to  investigate.  They  proposed  that  the  directors  should 
be  arrested  and  brought  to  the  bar  of  the  House.  The 
position  of  the  bank  seemed  to  be,  at  this  time,  that 
since  the  bank  charter  was  to  expire  and  the  deposits 
had  been  withdrawn,  any  further  investigations  were 
only  vexatious.  The  minority  of  the  committee  (Ed 
ward  Everett  and  W.  W.  Ellsworth)  reported  that  the 
committee  had  made  improper  demands,  and  that  the 
instruction  given  to  the  committee  to  examine  the  bant 
in  regard  to  the  commercial  crisis  was  based  on  im 
proper  assumptions.  The  Senate,  June  30th,  instructec 
the  Committee  on  Finance  to  make  another  investig» 
tion  of  all  the  allegations  against  the  bank  made  by 
Jackson  and  Taney  in  justification  of  the  removal.  Tha* 
committee  reported  December  18,  1834,  by  John  Tyler.3 
The  report  goes  over  all  the  points,  with  conclusions 
favorable  to  the  bank  on  each.  The  time  was  long  gone 
by,  however,  when  anybody  cared  for  reports. 

The  excitement  about  the  removal  of  the  deposits  was 
greatly  exaggerated.  The  public  was  thrown  into  a 
panic,  because  it  did  not  quite  see  what  the  effect  would 
be.  It  is  untrue  that  the  bank  made  a  panic,  and  it  is 
untrue  to  say  that  there  was  no  real  crisis.  The  statistics 
jf  loans,  etc.,  which  the  hostile  committees  were  fond  of 
gathering,  proved  nothing,  because  they  proved  anything. 
If  the  bank  loans  increased,  the  bank  was  extending 
its  loans  to  curry  favor.  If  they  decreased,  the  bank 
was  punishing  the  public,  and  making  a  panic.  As  bank 
'oans  always  fluctuate,  the  argument  nev°r  slackened. 
The  figures  appended  to  Tyler's  report  cover  the  whole 
*  46  Niles,  221  '225.  -  Document  I. 


316  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

history  of  the  bank.  There  are  no  fluctuations  there 
which  can  be  attributed  to  malicious  action  by  the  bank 
The  root  of  all  the  wrong-doing  of  the  bank,  out  oi 
which  sprang  nearly  all  the  charges  which  were  in  any 
measure  just,  was  in  the  branch  drafts  and  the  bad 
banking  in  the  West.  The  loans  increased  up  to  May, 
1832,  when  they  were  $70.4  million.  The  increase,  so 
far  as  it  was  remarkable,  was  in  the  Western  branches. 
The  operation  of  the  "  racers  "  is  also  distinctly  trace 
able  in  the  accounts  of  the  parent  bank  and  some  of  the 
branches.  The  effect  of  the  general  restraint  imposed 
can  also  be  seen,  and  the  movement  can  be  traced  by 
which  the  bank,  drawing  back  from  the  perilous  position 
into  which  it  was  drifting  in  1832,  got  its  branches  into 
better  condition,  and  improved  its  whole  status  from 
October,  1832,  to  October,  1833.  It  was  this  course 
which  afforded  all  the  grounds  for  the  charge  of  panic- 
making. 

The  bank  was  very  strong  when  the  deposits  were 
removed.  The  loans  were  $42.2  million;  domestic 
exchange,  $17.8  million  ;  foreign  exchange,  $2.3  mill 
ion  ;  specie,  $10.6  million  ;  due  from  state  banks, 
$2.2  million ;  notes  of  state  banks,  $2.4  million ;  pub 
lic  deposits,  $9  million;  private  deposits,  $8  million; 
circulation,  $19.1  million.  It  also  held  real  estate 
worth  $3  million.  During  the  winter  of  1833-34  there 
was  a  stringent  money  market  and  commercial  distress. 
The  state  banks  were  in  no  condition  to  take  the  public 
vleposits.  They  were  trying  to  strengthen  themselves, 
n/nd  to  put  themselves  on  the  level  of  the  Treasury  re 
quirements  in  the  hope  of  getting  a  share  of  the  deposits, 
ft  was  they  who  operated  a  bank  contraction  during  thai 
winter.  It  was  six  months,  and  then  only  by  the  favo* 


COMMERCIAL   CRISIS.  SI? 

and  concession  of  the  Treasury,  before  the  local  banks, 
"  pet  banks  "  as  they  soon  came  to  be  called,  could  get 
into  a  position  to  take  the  place  of  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States.  This  was  the  "  chaos "  into  which 
Duane,  like  an  honest  man,  and  man  of  sense,  had  re 
fused  to  plunge  the  fiscal  interests  of  the  country. 
The  administration,  however,  charged  everything  to 
Biddle  and  the  bank.  Petitions  were  sent  to  Congress. 
Benton  and  the  others  said  that  there  was  no  crisis,  and 
that  the  petitions  were  gotten  up  for  effect,  to  frighten 
Jackson  into  restoring  the  deposits.  The  proofs  of  the 
genuineness  and  severity  of  the  crisis,  in  the  forty-fifth 
volume  of  "  Niles's  Register,"  are  ample.  In  January, 
1834,  exchange  on  England  was  at  one  hundred  and 
one  and  a  half  (par  one  hundred  and  seven)  ;  capital 
was  loaning  at  from  one  and  a  half  per  cent  to  three  per 
cent  per  month ;  bank-notes,  were  quoted  at  varying 
rates  of  discount.1  Delegations  went  to  Washington  to 
represent  to  Jackson  the  state  of  the  country.  He  be 
came  violent ;  told  the  delegations  to  go  to  Biddle  ; 
that  he  had  all  the  money ;  that  the  bank  was  a  "  mon 
ster,"  to  which  all  the  trouble  was  due.  In  answer  to 
a  delegation  from  Philadelphia,  February  11, 1834,  Jack- 
eon  sketched  out  the  bullionist  programme,  which  the 
administration  pursued  from  this  time  forth  as  an  off 
set  to  the  complaints  about  the  removal  of  the  deposits.3 
Up  to  this  time  it  had  been  supposed  that  Jackson 
lather  leaned  to  paper-money  notions.  He  now  pro 
posed,  as  an  "  experiment "  (so  he  called  it),  to  induce 

1  46  Niles,  133. 

*  Taney  made  the  first  official  statement  of  the  plan  of  the  ad 
tiinlstration  in  a  letter  to  the  Com  Jiit.ee  ->n  Ways  and  Means, 
ipril  15,  1834. 


318  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

the  banks,  by  promising  them  a  share  in  the  deposits,  tt 
give  up  the  use  of  notes  under  $5.00,  later  to  do  away 
with  all  under  $10.00,  and  finally  to  restrict  bank-notes 
to  $20.00  and  upwards,  so  as  to  bring  about  a  circulation 
of  which  a  reasonable  part  should  be  specie.  The  no 
tion  was  good  as  far  as  it  went,  but  had  precisely  the 
fault  of  a  good  financial  notion  in  the  hands  of  incompe 
tent  men ;  the  scheme  did  not  take  into  account  all  the 
consequences  of  distributing  the  deposits  as  proposed. 
It  persuaded  the  banks  to  conform  to  external  rules 
about  circulation,  but,  under  the  circumstances,  these 
rules  did  not  have  the  force  they  were  supposed  to  have, 
and  the  bank  loans  were  stimulated  to  an  enormous  in 
flation,  which  threw  the  whole  business  of  the  country 
into  a  fever,  and  then  produced  a  great  commercial 
crisis.  For  a  short  period,  in  the  summer  of  1834,  the 
currency  was  in  a  very  sound  condition.  The  Bank  of 
the  United  States  was,  by  the  necessity  of  its  position, 
under  strong  precautions.  The  state  banks,  by  their 
efforts  to  meet  the  Treasury  requirements,  were  stronger 
than  ever  before.  The  popular  sentiment,  however,  had 
now  swung  over  again  to  the  mania  for  banks.  Each 
district  wanted  a  deposit  bank,  so  as  to  get  a  share  in  the 
Btream  of  wealth  from  the  public  Treasury.  If  a  deposit 
could  not  be  obtained,  then  the  bank  was  formed  in 
order  to  participate  in  the  carnival  of  credit  and  specu 
lation,  for  a  non-deposit  bank  could  manage  its  affairs 
as  recklessly  as  it  chose.  The  deposit  banks  speedily 
drew  together  to  try  to  prevent  any  more  from  being 
admitted  to  share  in  the  public  deposits.  The  mania 
for  banking  was  such  that  formal  riots  occurred  at  thi 
lubscription  to  the  stock  of  new  banks.1  The  favored 

1  42  Niles,  257  ;  44  Niles,  371.     See  some  of  these  facts  at* 
tie  use  made  of  them  in  Brothers's  T7mtetf  States  p.  ^i. 


MANIA  FOR  BANKS.  319 

few,  who  could  subscribe  the  whole,  sold  to  the  rest  al 
nn  advance.  To  be  a  commissioner  was  worth  from 
$500  to  SljOOO.1  There  was  a  notion,  borrowed  per 
haps  from  the  proceedings  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States  in  the  organization  of  both  national  banks, 
that  to  make  a  bank  was  a  resource  by  which  a  group  of 
insolvent  debtors  could  extricate  themselves  from  their 
embarrassments.  The  Tammany  society  being  in  debt, 
a  plan  was  formed  for  paying  the  debt  by  making  a 
bank.2  When  the  great  fire  occurred  in  New  York,  De 
cember,  1835,  a  proposition  was  made  to  create  a  bank 
as  a  mode  of  relieving  the  sufferers.  "  To  make  a 
bank,"  said  Niles,  "  is  the  great  panacea  for  every  ill 
that  can  befall  the  people  of  the  United  States,  and  yet 
it  adds  not  one  cent  to  the  capital  of  the  community."  8 
The  effect  of  this  multiplication  of  banks,  and  of  the 
scramble  between  them  for  the  public  deposits,  was  that 
an  enormous  amount  of  capital  was  arbitrarily  distrib 
uted  over  the  country,  according  to  political  favoritism 
and  local  influence,  and  in  entire  disregard  of  the  in 
dustrial  and  commercial  conditions.  The  public  debt 
was  all  paid  January  1,  1835.  After  that  date  the  pub 
lic  deposits  increased  with  great  rapidity,  and  there  waa 
no  occasion  to  spend  them.  The  state  of  things  waa 
therefore  this :  an  immense  amount  of  capital  was  being 
collected  by  taxes,  and  then  was  being  distributed  to 
favored  corporations,  as  a  free  loan  for  an  indefinite 
period,  on  which  they  could  earn  profits  by  lending  it 
at  interest.  No  monster  bank,  under  the  most  malicious 
management,  could  have  produced  as  much  harm,  either 
political  or  financial,  as  this  system  produced  while  it 
ttsted. 
1  46  Niles,  188.  2  Mackenzie,  7J  «  49  Niles,  299, 


ANDREW  JACKSON. 

November  5,  1834,  Secretary  Woodbury  informed 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States  that  the  Treasury  would 
not  receive  branch  drafts  after  January  1,  1835.  This 
led  to  a  spirited  correspondence  with  Biddle,  in  which 
the  latter  defended  the  drafts  as  good,  both  in  law  and 
finance.1  In  the  message  of  1834  Jackson  recapitulated 
the  old  complaints  against  the  bank,  and  'recommended 
that,  on  account  of  its  "high-handed  proceedings,"  its 
notes  should  no  longer  be  received  by  the  Treasury,  and 
that  the  stock  owned  by  the  nation  should  be  sold.  The 
session  of  1834-35  was,  however,  fruitless  as  to  banking 
and  currency.  January  12,  1835,  on  Benton's  motion, 
the  Committee  on  Finance  was  ordered  to  investigate 
the  specie  transactions  of  the  bank.  Tyler  took  fire  at 
this,  because  it  reflected  on  the  report  which  he  had  just 
made.  In  view  of  subsequent  history,  it  is  worth  while 
to  notice  the  profession  of  faith  which  was  drawn  from 
Tyler  at  this  time.  He  said  that  he  was  opposed  to  any 
national  bank  on  constitutional  grounds,  but  that  he  was 
free  from  Jacksonism,  and  that  he  wanted  to  be  just  to 
the  existing  bank.  January  10th  Polk  introduced  a  bill 
to  forbid  the  receipt  of  notes  of  the  Bank  of  the  United 
States  at  the  Treasury,  unless  the  bank  would  pay  at 
once  the  dividend  which  had  been  withheld  in  1834. 
Bills  were  also  proposed  for  regulating  the  deposits  in 
the  deposit  banks.  No  action  resulted. 

In  the  message  of  1835  Jackson  referred  to  the  war 
which  (as  he  said)  the  bank  had  waged  on  the  govern 
ment  for  four  years,  as  a  proof  of  the  evil  effects  of  such 
an  institution.  He  declared  that  the  bank  belonged  to 
R,  system  of  distrust  of  the  popular  will  as  a  regulator  oi 
political  power,  and  to  a  policy  which  would  supplan/ 
1  Document  J. 


REVIEW  OF  THE  BANK   WAR.  321 

mr  system  by  a  consolidated  government.  Here,  then, 
%t  the  end  of  the  bank  war,  we  meet  again  with  the  sec 
ond  of  the  theories  of  the  bank  which  Ingham  formulated 
in  his  letter  to  Biddle  of  October  5,  1829,1  at  the  be 
ginning  of  the  bank  war.  Ingham  said  that  some  peo 
ple  held  that  theory.  The  assumption  that  the  bank 
held  that  theory  concerning  itself  had  been  made  the 
rule  of  action  of  the  government,  and  the  laws  and  ad 
ministration  of  the  country  had  been  made  to  conform 
to  that  assumption  as  an  established  fact.  At  the  ses 
sion  of  1835-36  an  attempt  was  made  to  investigate  the 
transactions  of  members  of  Congress  with  the  bank. 
It  was  abandoned  when  Adams  declared  that  a  similar 
attempt  in  1832  had  been  abandoned,  because  it  eat 
both  ways. 

1  See  page  240. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

IPECULATION,     DISTRIBUTION,    CURRENCY    LEGISLATIONS 
AND    END    OF   THE   BANK    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES. 

IN  the  spring  of  1835  the  phenomena  of  a  period  ot 
speculation  began  to  be  distinctly  marked.  There  was 
great  monetary  ease  and  prosperity  in  England  and 
France,  as  well  as  here.  Some  important  improvements 
in  machinery,  the  first  railroads,  greater  political  satisfac 
tion  and  security,  and  joint  stock  banks  were  especially 
favorable  elements  which  were  then  affecting  France 
and  England.  The  price  of  cotton  advanced  sharply 
during  1834—35.  Speculation  seized  upon  cotton  lands 
in  Mississippi  and  Louisiana,  and  on  negroes.  Next  it 
affected  real  estate  in  the  cities  at  which  cotton  was 
handled  commercially.  The  success  of  the  Erie  Canal 
led  to  numerous  enterprises  of  a  like  nature  in  Pennsyl 
vania,  Maryland,  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois.  Capital 
for  these  enterprises  was  not  at  hand.  The  States  en 
deavored  to  draw  the  capital  from  Europe  by  the  use 
of  their  credit.  The  natural  consequence  was  great 
recklessness  in  contracting  debt,  and  much  "  financier 
ing  "  by  agents  and  middle-men.  The  abundant  and 
".heap  capital,  here  and  abroad,  of  1835-36  favored  all 
the  improvement  enterprises.  These  enterprises  were, 
however,  in  their  nature,  investments,  returns  from 
which  could  not  be  expected  for  a  long  period.  In 
the  mean  time,  they  locked  up  capital.  It  appears 


SPECULATION.    1835-36.  323 

<hat  labor  and  capital  were  withdrawn  for  a  time  from 
agriculture,  and  devoted  to  means  of  transportation. 
Wheat  and  flour  were  imported  in  1836.1  The  land  of 
the  Western  States  had  greatly  risen  in  value  since  the 
Erie  Canal  had  been  open.  Speculation  in  this  land 
became  very  active.  Timber  lands  in  Maine  were  an 
other  mania.2  The  loans  of  capital  from  Europe  in 
creased  month  by  month.  The  entire  payment  of  the 
public  debt  of  the  United  States  had  a  great  effect  upon 
the  imagination  of  people  in  Europe.  It  raised  the 
credit  of  the  United  States.  It  was  thought  that  a 
country  which  could  pay  off  its  debt  with  such  rapidity 
must  be  a  good  country  in  which  to  invest  capital.  The 
credit  extended  to  the  United  States  depressed  the  ex 
changes,  and  gave  an  unusual  protection  to  the  excessive 
bank-note  issues  in  the  United  States.  Those  issues 
sustained  and  stimulated  the  excessive  credit  which  the 
public  deposits  were  bringing  into  existence.  The  banks 
had  an  arbitrary  rule  that  a  reserve  of  specie  for  one 
third  of  the  circulation  would  secure  them  beyond  any 
danger.  So  long  as  the  ^exchanges  were  depressed  by 
the  exportation  of  capital  from  Europe  to  America,  no 
shipment  of  specie  occurred,  and  the  system  was  not 
tested.  All  prices  were  rising ;  all  was  active  and 
hopeful;  debt  was  the  road  to  wealth.  If  one  could 
obtain  capital  for  margins,  and  speculate  on  differences 
in  stocks,  commodities,  and  real  estate,  he  had  a  chance 
to  win  enormous  profits  while  the  credit  system  went 
on.  Large  classes  of  persons  were  drawn  to  city  occu 
pations,  exchange,  banking,  and  brokerage,  because  these 
industries  were  most  profitable.  Cities  grew,  rents  ad« 
ranced,  real  estate  rose  in  value.  Pown  to  October  1, 
1  50  Niles,  50,  74;  51  Nilea,  17  2  48  Nilea,  167. 


824  ANDREW  JACKS  UX. 

1836,  the  following  States  had  forbidden  notes  undei 
$5.00  :  New  York,  Pennsylvania, Virginia,  Georgia,  Lou 
isiana,  Indiana,  Alabama,  New  Jersey,  Maryland,  North 
Carolina,  Tennessee,  Kentucky,  and  Maine.  It  appears, 
however,  that  small  notes  of  earlier  issue  were  still  in 
circulation,  and  the  state  of  things  which  the  legislation 
meant  to  bring  about  never  was  reached,  so  far  as  one 
can  now  learn. 

In  the  autumn  of  1835,  the  money  market  became 
more  stringent.  This  fact  was  charged  to  the  pet  banks 
and  to  fears  of  trouble  with  France.1  The  pet  banka 
had  every  interest  to  arrest  inflation.  If  they  were  held 
to  conservative  rules,  while  the  non-deposit  banks  about 
them  were  not  so  held,  the  former  only  left  free  room 
for  the  latter,  and  then  the  former  had  to  receive  the 
notes  of  the  latter.  In  January,  1836,  the  rate  of  dis 
count  at  Philadelphia  was  two  per  cent  per  month.8 
Banks  were  still  being  multiplied.8  During  1836  prices 
continued  to  rise,  speculation  was  active,  rates  for  cap 
ital  increased  ;  there  was  complaint  of  a  scarcity  of 
money,  and  a  demand  for  more  banks.  Governor 
Marcy,  of  New  York,  in  his  message  for  1836,  pointed 
out  the  "  unregulated  spirit  of  speculation  "  which  pre 
vailed,  and  he  warned  the  Legislature  against  the  falla 
cies  involved  in  the  demand  for  more  banks.4  In  April 
the  best  commercial  paper  was  quoted,  at  New  York, 
at  thirty  per  cent  to  forty  per  cent  per  annum ;  second 
rate,  at  one  half  of  one  per  cent  per  day.5  At  Bostor 
the  rate  was  one  per  cent  per  month.  Exchange  or 
England  at  New  York  was  one  hundred  and  five  (par 

l  49  Niles,  225,  281.  2  49  Niles,  313. 

*  49  Niles,  435.  4  2  Hammond,  44«. 

Evening  Post,  in  50  Niles,  134. 


LAND  DISTRIBUTION.  825 

roe  hundred  and  nine  and  three  fifths),  showing  the  cur 
rent  of  capital  in  spite  of  the  inflation.  In  May  Niles 
gaid,  "  There  is  an  awful  pressure  for  money  in  most 
of  the  cities,"  l  yet  he  also  describes  the  unprecedented 
activity  of  business  in  Baltimore. 

In  the  first  message  after  his  reelection,  in  1832,  Jack 
son  proposed,  in  regard  to  the  public  lands,  that  they 
should  be  sold  to  the  new  States  and  to  actual  settlers  at 
a  very  low  price.  December  12th  of  that  year  Clay  re- 
introduced  his  land  bill.2  He  succeeded  in  getting  it 
passed,  but  it  was  sent  to  the  President  within  ten  days 
of  the  end  of  the  session.  Jackson  did  not  sign  it.  In 
December,  1833,  he  sent  in  a  message  stating  his  rear 
sons  for  not  doing  so.  He  objected  especially  to  the 
policy  of  giving  away  the  proceeds  of  the  lands  while 
levying  heavy  duties  on  imports.  The  session  of  1833-34 
was  fully  occupied  with  the  bank  question  and  the  re 
moval  of  the  deposits.  At  the  session  of  1834-35  Clay 
again  brought  in  a  land  bill,  but  no  action  was  taken. 
Relations  with  France  occupied  the  attention  of  Con 
gress  during  that  session,  which  was  a  short  one.  At 
the  session  of  1835-36  Clay  introduced  a  bill  to  dis 
tribute  the  net  proceeds  of  the  lands,  after  taking  out  ten 
per  cent  for  the  ten  new  States.  Calhoun  introduced  a 
joint  resolution  to  amend  the  Constitution  so  that  the 
surplus  revenue  could  be  distributed  among  the  States. 
He  also  introduced  a  bill  to  regulate  the  public  deposits. 
A  bill  to  distribute  the  surplus  revenue  was  also  intro 
duced.  The  land  bill  passed  the  Senate  May  4,  1836, 
by  25  to  20.  It  was  tabled  in  the  House,  104  to  85, 
June  22d.  The  distribution  bill  and  the  deposit  bill 
frere  consolidated  into  one,  and  passed  by  the  Senate 

i  50  Nile*,  185.  2  See  page  19e. 


326  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

June  17th,  38  to  6.  On  the  20th  of  June,  in  the  House, 
an  effort  was  made  to  divide  the  bill,  so  as  to  separate 
the  regulation  of  the  deposits  from  the  distribution,  but 
the  effort  failed.  The  House  then  changed  the  plan  of 
distributing  the  surplus  to  the  States  as  a  gift  into  a 
plan  for  "  depositing  "  it  with  them  subject  to  recall. 
Tn  this  shape  the  bill  passed,  155  to  38,  and  became  a 
law  by  the  concurrence  of  the  Senate  and  the  President. 
The  "  Globe  "  l  said  that  Jackson  would  have  vetoed 
the  bill  as  it  came  from  the  Senate.  He  thought  the 
plan  of  "  depositing  "  the  surplus  was  free  from  consti 
tutional  objections,  but  the  "  Globe  "  gave  notice  to  all 
whom  it  might  concern  that  the  President  would  not 
sign  any  bill  the  effect  of  which  would  be  to  raise 
revenue  by  federal  taxation,  and  distribute  the  proceeds 
among  the  States.  The  distribution  measure  was  one 
of  those  errors  which  are  apt  to  be  committed  on  the 
eve  of  a  presidential  election,  when  politicians  do  not 
dare  to  oppose  measures  which  gratify  class  or  local 
feelings  or  interests.  Webster  opposed  distribution,  un 
less  the  land  income  could  be  separated.  He  said  that 
taxes  must  be  reduced  even  at  the  risk  of  injuring  some 
industries.2  It  was  provided  in  the  bill  that  there 
should  be  in  each  State  a  deposit  bank,  if  a  bank  could 
be  found  which  would  fulfil  the  prescribed  conditions. 
Each  of  these  banks  was  to  redeem  all  its  notes  in  specie, 
and  to  issue  no  notes  for  less  than  $5.00  after  July  4, 

1836.  The  Treasury  was  not  to  receive,  after  that  date, 
the  notes  of  any  bank  which  did  issue  notes  under  $5.00. 
Lt  was  to  pay  out  no  note  under  $10.00  after  the  passagt 
»f  the  act,  and  no  note  under   $20.00  after  March  3 

1837,  If  the  public  deposits  in  any  bank  should  ex 
1  50  Eilea.  281  a  1  Curtis's  We  bster.  537. 


THE  DEPOSIT  AND  DISTRIBUTION  ACT.      327 

eeed  one  fourth  of  the  capital  of  the  bank,  it  was  to  pay 
two  per  cent  interest  on  the  excess.  No  transfer  of  de 
posits  from  bank  to  bank  was  to  be  made  by  the  Sec* 
retary,  except  when  and  because  the  convenience  of  the 
Treasury  required  it.  In  that  case,  he  was  to  transfer 
from  one  deposit  bank  to  the  next  deposit  bank  in  the 
neighborhood,  and  so  on  ;  i.  e.,  not  from  one  end  of  the 
country  to  the  other.  As  to  distribution,  the  bill  pro 
vided  that  all  the  money  in  the  Treasury,  January  1, 
1837,  in  excess  of  $5  million,  was  to  be  deposited  with 
the  States  in  the  proportion  of  their  membership  in  the 
electoral  college,  and  in  four  instalments,  January,  April, 
July,  and  October,  1837.  The  States  were  to  give  nego 
tiable  certificates  of  deposit,  payable  to  the  Secretary  or 
his  assigns  on  demand.  If  the  Secretary  should  negoti 
ate  any  certificate,  it  should  bear  five  per  cent  interest 
from  the  date  of  assignment.  While  not  assigned,  the 
certificates  bore  no  interest.1 

In  his  message  of  1836  Jackson  offered  a  long  and 
very  just  criticism  on  this  act.  His  objections  were  so 
pertinent  and  so  strong  that  we  are  forced  to  believe 
that  he  did  not  veto  only  on  account  of  the  pending 
election.  A  number  of  doubtful  States  were  "  improve 
ment  States ; "  that  is,  they  had  plunged  recklessly  into 
debt  for  canals,  etc.,  which  were  not  finished,  and  credit 
was  declining  while  the  money  market  was  growing 
Btringent.  Those  States  were  very  eager  (or,  at  least, 
many  people  in  them  were)  to  get  the  money  in  the  fed 
eral  Treasury  with  which  to  go  on  with  the  works. 
Jackson  argued  in  favor  of  the  redaction  and  abolition 
i»f  all  the  taxes  with  which  the  compromise  tariff  allowed 
Congress  to  deal,  and  he  exposed  completely  the  silly 
1  50  Nilea.  290, 


328  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

device  by  which  the  whigs  tried  to  justify  distribution 
separating  the  revenue  in  imagination,  and  pretending 
to  distribute  the  part  which  came  from  land.  Jackson 
made  a  lame  attempt  to  explain  the  recommendations 
which  he  had  made  in  his  early  messages  in  favor  of  dis 
tribution.  He  gave  a  table  showing  the  effect  of  dis 
tribution  according  to  the  ratio  of  membership  in  the 
electoral  college  as  compared  with  that  on  the  ratio  of 
federal  population.  The  small  and  new  States  gained 
enormously  by  the  plan  adopted. 

The  best  that  can  be  said  in  excuse  for  distribution  is 
that  the  surplus  was  doing  so  much  mischief  that  tho 
best  thing  to  do  with  it  was  to  throw  it  away.  Unfort 
unately,  it  could  not  be  thrown  away  without  doing 
other  harm.  We  have  already  noticed  the  shocks  given 
to  the  money  market  by  the  debt-paying  operation.1  The 
removal  of  the  deposits  took  place  before  that  was  com 
pleted,  and  produced  a  new  complication.  The  credit 
relations  formerly  existing  towards  and  around  the  great 
bank  were  rudely  cut  off,  and  left  to  reconstruct  them 
selves  as  best  they  could.  As  soon  as  the  new  state  ot 
things  had  become  a  little  established,  there  was  an  accu 
mulation  of  a  great  surplus,  nominally  in  the  deposit 
banks,  really  loaned  out  to  individuals,  and  fully  en 
gaged  in  speculative  importations  with  credit  for  duties, 
or  in  speculative  contracts  payment  on  which  was  to  be 
received  in  state  bonds  and  scrip,  or  in  still  other  inde 
scribable  repetitions  of  debt  and  contract.  The  capital, 
when  thus  fully  absorbed,  was  next  all  called  in  again, 
in  order  to  be  transferred  to  the  States.  The  States  did 
not  intend  to  loan  the  capital,  they  intended  to  spend  it 
%  public  works ;  that  is,  for  the  most  part,  corsidering 
1  See  page  271. 


BTATE  DEPOSIT  FUNDS.  329 

the  acttoil  facts  as  they  existed,  to  sink  it  entirely.  In 
one  way  or  another  these  funds  were  squandered  by  all 
the  States,  or  worse  than  squandered,  since  they  served 
corruption  and  abuse.  In  1877  it  was  declared  that  the 
Controller  of  New  York  did  not  know  what  had  become 
of  the  deposit  fund  of  the  State.  For  many  years  the 
commissioners  of  only  nine  counties  had  made  any  re 
port.  The  ControUer  asked  for  $15,000  with  which  to 
find  out  what  had  become  of  the  $4  million  which  was 
the  share  of  New  York.  The  fact  that  the  funds  were 
squandered  was  the  least  of  the  purely  financial  evils  at 
tendant  on  distribution.  The  effect  on  all  the  relations 
of  capital,  credit,  and  currency,  that  is,  the  effect  on 
every  man's  rights  and  interests,  was  the  most  far-reach 
ing  and  serious  consequence. 

On  the  1st  of  June,  1836,1  the  deposit  banks  stood 
thus :  capital,  $46.4  million ;  due  to  the  Treasurer  of 
the  United  States,  $37.2  million  ;  due  to  public  officers, 
$3.7  million;  circulation,  $27.9  million;  other  depos 
its,  $16  million ;  due  to  other  banks,  $17.1  million. 
Contra :  loans,  $71.2  million ;  domestic  exchange,  $37.1 
million  ;  due  from  banks,  $17.8  million ;  notes  of  other 
banks,  $10.9  million ;  specie,  $10.4  million.  It  appears 
then  that  these  banks  owed  the  United  States  $41  mill 
ion,  while  their  whole  capital  was  only  $46  million ; 
that  is  to  say,  the  public  deposits  furnished  them  with  a 
capital  nearly  equal  to  their  own.  If  their  "  other  depos 
its  "  had  been  all  cash  capital  deposited,  four  elevenths 
of  all  their  loanable  funds  would  have  been  public  de 
posits,  which  would  have  been  "  called  "  by  the  act  of 
June  23, 1836.  It  is  also  ndti  *eabie  what  a  large  sura 
te  due  to  and  from  other  banks.  The  feeling  that  bankf 
i  50  Niles,  313, 


830  AJNVKEW  JACKSON. 

wight  to  forbear  demands  on  each  other  seems  to  hava 
been  an  outgrowth  of  the  war  against  the  Bank  of  the 
United  States.  The  consequence  was  that  the  banks 
were  all  locked  together,  and  when  the  trouble  came 
they  all  went  down  together. 

In  December,  1836,  Calhoun  introduced  another  dis 
tribution  bill  to  distribute  any  surplus  which  might  be  in 
the  Treasury  on  January  1,  1838.  It  was  finally  added 
as  a  "rider  "  to  an  appropriation  bill,  providing  money 
for  fortifications.  The  Senate  passed  the  bill  and  rider, 
but  the  House  rejected  the  whole.  Clay  also  intro 
duced  another  land  distribution  bill.  Schemes  of  dis 
tribution  were  great  whig  measures  down  to  Tyler's 
time. 

The  first  and  second  instalments  of  the  distribution 
of  1837  were  paid  in  specie,  in  January  and  April. 
The  commercial  crisis  began  in  March.  The  banks 
suspended  in  May.  The  third  instalment  was  paid  in 
notes  in  July.  Before  August  the  Treasury,  which  waa 
giving  away  $35  million,  was  in  the  greatest  straits. 
Van  Buren  was  forced  to  call  an  extra  session  of  Con 
gress.  That  body  had  no  more  urgent  business  than  to 
forbid  the  Secretary  to  negotiate  any  of  his  "  deposit " 
certificates,  or  to  call  on  any  of  the  States  for  the  money 
deposited  with  them.  The  payment  of  the  fourth  in 
stalment  was  postponed  until  January  1,  1839.  At 
that  date  there  was  debt,  not  surplus,  and  the  fourth 
instalment  never  was  paid.  Congress  has  never  re 
called  any  part  of  the  other  three  instalments.  Even 
when  the  civil  war  broke  out,  it  would  not  venture  to  do 
this.  The  amount  of  the  three  instalments,  $28  mill 
ion,  stands  on  the  books  as  unavailable  funds.  Tha 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was  obliged  to  draw  his  firs! 


SPECIE   CURRENCY.  831 

ihree  instalments  where  he  could  get  them,  so  he  drew 
them  from  the  North  and  East,  the  banks  of  the  South 
west  being  really  ruined.  The  fourth  instalment  re 
mained  due  from  the  banks  of  the  Southwestern  States. 
It  was  years  before  any  part  of  it  could  be  jecovered. 
The  Southwestern  States  participated  in  the  distribu- 
ion  of  the  three  instalments.1 

Reference  has  been  made  above  2  to  the  plans  of  the 
administration  for  a  specie  currency,  as  a  complement 
or  offset  to  the  removal  of  the  deposits  and  destruction 
of  the  bank.8  Benton,  who  was  the  strongest  bullionist 
in  the  administration  circle,  was  under  an  exaggerated 
opinion  of  the  efficacy  of  a  metallic  currency  to  prevent 
abuses  of  credit.  A  metallic  currency  is  not  liable  to 
certain  abuses,  and  it  requires  no  skill  for  its  manage 
ment.  In  contrast  with  paper,  therefore,  it  is  surer  and 
safer.  It,  however,  offers  no  guarantees  against  bad 
banking.  At  most  it  could!  relieve  the  non-capitalist 
wage-receiver  from  any  direct  share  or  risk  in  bad  bank 
ing.  In  contending  against  plutocracy  democracy  ought 
to  put  a  metallic  currency  high  up  on  its  banner.  The 
most  subtle  and  inexcusable  abuse  of  the  public  which 
has  ever  been  devised  is  that  of  granting  to  corporations, 
without  exacting  an  equivalent,  the  privilege  of  taking 
out  of  the  circulation  the  value  currency,  for  which  the 
public  must  always  pay,  whether  they  get  it  or  not,  and 
putting  into  it  their  own  promises  to  pay.  The  subtlety 
of  this  device  and  the  fallacies  which  cluster  about  it  and 
impose  upon  uneducated  people  are  a  full  justification 
for  men  of  democratic  convictions,  if  they  say :  We 
do  not  understand  it  well  enough  to  control  it.  We 

1  See  table,  53  Niles,  35.  2  See  page  317. 

•  The  Globe  in  46  Nile*,  33i. 


882  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

eannot  spend  time  and  attention  to  watch  it.  We  will 
not  allow  it  at  all.  Such  confession  of  ignorance  and 
abnegation  of  power,  however,  is  hardly  in  the  spirit  of 
democracy.  As  a  matter  of  history,  the  bullionist  ten 
dencies  of  a  section  of  the  Jacksonian  party  were  at  war 
with  other  parts  of  the  policy  of  the  same  party,  notably 
the  distribution  of  the  public  deposits  in  eighty  banks, 
with  encouragement  to  loan  freely. 

The  opposition  party,  on  the  other  hand,  took  up 
cudgels  for  banks  and  bank  paper,  as  if  there  would  be 
no  currency  if  bank  paper  were  withdrawn,  and  as  if 
there  would  be  no  credit  if  there  were  no  banks  of 
issue.  In  their  arguments  against  the  bullionist  party, 
they  talked  as  if  they  believed  that,  if  the  public  Treas 
ury  did  its  own  business,  and  did  it  in  gold,  it  would  get 
possession  of  all  the  gold  in  the  country,  and  that  this 
would  give  it  control  of  all  the  credit  in  the  country, 
because  the  paper  issue  was  based  on  gold. 

In  1834  the  administration  was  determined  to  have 
a  gold  currency.  The  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means 
reported,  April  22,  1834,1  that  it  was  useless  to  coin 
gold  while  the  rating  remained  as  it  was  fixed  by  the 
laws  of  1792  and  1793.  The  coinage  law  had  often 
been  discussed  before.  Lowndes  studied  it  and  re 
ported  on  it  in  1819  ;  J.  Q.  Adams  in  1820.  In  1830 
Sanford,  of  New  York,  proposed  a  gold  currency  with 
subsidiary  silver.  In  the  same  year  Ingham  made  a 
report,  recommending  the  ratio  1 :  15.625.  In  1831  a 
coinage  bill  passed  the  Senate,  but  was  not  acted  on  in 
the  House.  At  the  session  of  1831-32  White  and  Ven. 
pianck,  of  New  York,  wanted  silver  made  sole  money- 
On  account  of  the  difficulty  and  delicacy  of  the  subject 
1  46  Niles,  159. 


BULLION  MARKET.  o33 

BO  action  had  been  reached.  In  1834  a  new  interest 
ranie  in.  The  gold  product  of  the  Southern  Alleghanies 
was  increasing.  In  1832  there  came  to  the  mint  from 
that  region  $678,000  value  of  gold,  and  in  1833 
$868,000.  There  was  a  protectionist  movement  in  be 
half  of  gold,  the  interest  of  which  was  that  gold  should 
supplant  silver,  to  which  end  an  incorrect  rating  was 
desired.1  By  the  laws  of  1792  and  1793  the  gold  eagle 
weighed  270  grains  and  was  \\  fine.  The  silver  dollar 
weighed  416  grains  and  was  ^£f£  fine,  giving  a  ratio  of 
1 : 15.  The  market  ratio  was,  from  1792  to  1830,  about 
1 : 15.6.  Therefore  gold  was  not  money,  but  merchan 
dise.  From  1828  to  1833  the  average  premium  on  gold 
at  Philadelphia  was  4§  per  cent.2  The  reports  before 
Congress  in  1834  showed  that  the  real  ratio  was  be 
tween  1 : 15.6  and  1 : 15.8.  The  mint  put  1 : 15.8  as 
the  highest  ratio  admissible.  Duncan,  of  Illinois,  in  a 
speech,  showed  that  the  ratio  since  1821  had  been,  on  an 
average,  1 : 15.625.8  These  authorities  were  all  disre 
garded. 

The  administration  politicians  had  determined  to  have 
gold  as  a  matter  of  taste,  and  the  Southern  gold  interest 
wanted  it.  The  law  of  June  28,  1834,  made  the  gold 
eagle  weigh  258  grains,  of  which  232  grains  were  to  be 
pure  ;  fineness,  .8992.  The  silver  dollar  was  unaltered. 
The  ratio  of  gold  to  silver,  by  this  law,  was  therefore 
1 : 16.002.  The  old  eagles  were  worth  in  the  new  ones 
$10.681,  or  old  gold  coins  were  worth  94.827  cents  per 
pennyweight  in  the  new.  Taking  gold  to  silver  at 
1 : 15.625,  an  old  silver  dollar  was  worth  $1.024  in  the 
new  gold  one,  and  as  the  silver  dollar  had  been  the 
standard  of  prices  and  contracts,  and  the  new  gold  one 

t  Ruguet,  238.  a  Ragcst  250.  8  47  Nilas,  29 


B34  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

now  was  such,  the  money  of  account  had  been  depre- 
slated  2£  per  cent.  In  the  new  standard  a  pound  stei> 
ling  was  worth,  metal  for  metal,  $4.87073,  and  if  tho 
old  arbitrary  par,  £1  =  $4.44$,  were  100,  the  true  par 
of  exchange  would  be  109.59.  Of  course  the  supposed 
gain  to  the  gold  producers  from  the  incorrect  rating  was 
a  pure  delusion.  They  got  no  more  goods  for  their  gold 
than  they  would  have  got  before,  save  in  so  far  as  the 
United  States  added  some  small  increment  to  the 
previous  demand  in  the  whole  world  for  gold.  The 
bullion  brokers  won  by  exchanging  gold  coins  for  silver 
coins  and  exporting  the  latter. 

In  December,  1834,  Woodbury,  who  had  become 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  gave  the  following  statistics 
of  the  circulation  on  December  1st :  state  bank  paper, 
from  $57  million  to  $68  million ;  Bank  of  the  United 
States  paper,  $16  million ;  gold,  $4  million ;  silver, 
$16  million  ;  total  active  circulation  per  head,  $7.00. 
Iti  bank:  specie,  $18£  million;  paper,  $35  million; 
grand  total  per  head,  $10.00.1  The  currency  was  then 
in  a  very  sound  condition,2 

The  bank  paper  increased  before  the  gold  could  be 
brought  into  circulation,  and  the  gold  currency  never 
was  made  a  fact.  Silver  rose  to  a  premium,  and  was 
melted  or  exported.8  The  new  mint  law  therefore 
produced  the  inconvenience  of  driving  out  silver  just 
when  the  administration  was  trying  to  abolish  small 
notes.  A  gold  dollar  had  been  proposed  in  the  new 
\aw,  but  the  provision  for  it  was  stricken  out.  The 
ailver  dollars  then  on  hand  appear  to  have  been  aL 
slipped  or  worn.4  The  first  which  had  been  coined  since 

*  Document  K.  p.  64.  2  See  page  318. 

•  47  Niles,  147.  4  37  Niles,  393 


THE  "SPECIE   CIRCULAR"  335 

1805  were  coined  in  1836.1  They  could  not,  however^ 
be  kept  in  circulation.  JJy  the  act  of  January  18, 1837, 
two  tenths  of  a  grain  were  added  to  the  pure  contents  of 
fche  eagle.  This  made  the  fineness  just  .900.  The  pure 
contents  of  the  silver  dollar  were  left  unaltered,  but  the 
gross  weight  was  reduced  to  412 1  grains,  so  that  the 
fineness  of  this  coin  also  was  .900.  The  ratio  of  the 
metals  in  the  coinage  was  then  1:15.988.  One  pound 
sterling  was  then  worth  $4.8665,  or,  if  $4.44f  be  as 
sumed  100,  par  of  exchange  was  109f .  As  soon  as  the 
crisis  broke  out,  in  1837,  all  specie  disappeared,  and 
notes  and  tickets  for  the  smallest  denominations  came 
into  use. 

At  the  session  of  1835-36  Benton  tried  to  get  a  reso 
lution  passed  that  nothing  but  gold  or  silver  should  be 
taken  for  public  lands.  He  did  not  succeed.  After 
Congress  adjourned,  July  11,,  1836,  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  issued,  by  the  President's  order,  a  circular  to 
all  the  land  offices,  known  afterwards  as  the  "  specie 
circular,"  ordering  that  only  gold,  or  silver,  or  land 
scrip  should  be  received  for  public  lands.  The  occa 
sion  for  this  order  was  serious.  The  sales  of  public 
lands  were  increasing  at  an  extraordinary  rate.  Lands 
irere  sold  for  $4.8  million  in  1834 ;  for  $14.7  million 
m  1835 ;  for  $24.8  million  in  1836.  The  receipts  for 
the  lands  consisted  largely  of  notes  of  irresponsible 
banks.  Land  speculators  organized  a  "  bank,"  got  it  ap 
pointed  a  deposit  bank  if  they  could,  issued  notes,  bor 
rowed  them  and  bought  land ;  the  notes  were  deposited, 
they  borrowed  them  again,  and  so  on  indefinitely.  The 
guarantees  required  of  the  deposit  banks  were  idle 
igainst  such  a  scheme.  There  was,  of  course,  little 
i  51  Niles  241 


336  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

specie  in  the  West  on  account  of  the  flood  ol  papei 
there.  The  circular  caused  inconvenience,  and  bad 
temper  on  the  part  of  those  who  were  checked  in  theii 
transactions.  It  also  caused  trouble  and  expense  in 
transporting  specie  from  the  East,  and  it  no  doubt 
made  a  demand  for  specie  in  the  East  against  the  banks 
there.  In  the  existing  state  of  the  Eastern  banks,  this 
demand  was  probably  just  the  touch  needed  to  push 
down  the  rickety  pretense  of  solvency  which  they  were 
keeping  up.  Specie  could  not  be  drawn  in  from  Europe, 
except  by  a  great  fall  in  prices  and  a  large  contraction 
of  the  currency.  Either  through  demand  for  specie  or 
fall  in  prices,  the  inflated  currency  must  collapse,  and 
the  crisis  was  at  hand.  Moreover,  the  banks  were  un 
der  notice  to  surrender,  on  January  1st,  one  fourth  of 
the  public  deposits.  Thousands  of  people  who  were 
carrying  commodities  or  property  for  a  rise,  or  who 
were  engaged  in  enterprises,  to  finish  which  they  de 
pended  on  bank  loans,  found  themselves  arrested  by  the 
exorbitant  rate  for  loans.  The  speculative  period  in 
England  had  also  run  its  course,  and  the  inflation  here 
could  no  longer  be  sustained  by  borrowing  there.  From 
all  these  facts,  it  is  plain  that  the  specie  circular  may 
have  played  the  role  of  the  spark  which  produces  an  ex 
plosion  when  all  the  conditions  and  materials  have  been 
prepared ;  but  those  who  called  the  circular  the  cause  of 
the  crisis  made  a  mistake  which  is  only  too  common  in 
the  criticism  of  economic  events.  A  similar  circular 
was  issued  in  Adams's  administration,  which  has  hardly 
been  noticed.1  There  was  a  great  deal  of  outcry  agains* 
-he  President  for  high-handed  proceedings  in  this  mat* 
tofj  but  without  reason.  There  were  only  two  forms  o, 
1  7  Adams,  427. 


WINDING    UP   THE    UNITED  STATES  SANK.    337 

Currency  which  were  at  this  time  by  law  receivable  foi 
iands,  —  specie  and  notes  of  specie  value.1  The  notes 
ivhich  were  being  received  in  the  West  were  not  of 
specie  ralue. 

A  bill  to  annul  the  specie  circular  passed  the  Senate, 
41  to  5,  and  the  House,  143  to  59.  The  President  sent 
it  to  the  State  Department  at  11.45  P.  M.,  March  3, 
1837,  and  filed  his  reasons  for  not  signing  it,  it  having 
been  sent  to  him  less  than  ten  days  before  the  end  of 
the  session.  His  reason  for  not  signing  the  bill  was  that 
it  was  obscure. 

The  charter  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  was  to 
expire  March  3,  1836.  The  history  of  the  internal 
affairs  of  the  bank,  after  Tyler's  report  in  1834,  was 
not  known  to  the  public  until  1841,  when  committees  of 
the  stockholders  published  reports,  from  which  we  are 
able  to  state  the  internal  history  of  the  bank  in  its  true 
historical  connection.  March  6,  1835,  by  a  resolution  of 
the  directors,  the  exchange  committee  was  directed  to 
loan  the  capital  of  the  bank,  so  fast  as  it  should  be  re 
leased,  on  call  on  stock  collateral.  The  exchange  com- 
miteee,  from  this  time  on,  secured  entire  control  of  the 
bank.  During  the  year  1835  branches  were  sold  for 
bonds  having  from  one  to  five  years  to  run.  Down  to 
November,  fifteen  branches  had  been  sold.2  In  No 
vember  projects  began  to  be  talked  about  for  getting  a 
»tate  charter  from  Pennsylvania.8  There  was  a  great 
deal  of  jealousy  at  this  time  between  New  York  and 
Philadelphia.  There  was  a  proposition  for  a  great  fifty- 
million-dollar  bank  at  New  York,  and  it  seemed  that  if 

1  Report  by  Silas  Wright,  May  16   1888,  with  history  of  the 
laws  about  currency  receivable  at  the  Treasury,  55  Niles,  iiHi 
a  49  Niles,  182.  8  49  Niles,  162. 

22 


B38  ANDREW  JACKSON: 

Philadelphia  lost  her  bank,  and  New  York  got  one,  th« 
financial  hegemony  would  be  permanently  transferred 
In  December,  1835,  after  the  great  fire  in  New  York, 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States  was  asked  to  give  aid.  It 
did  so  by  opening  credits  for  $2  million  in  favor  of  the 
insurance  companies.1 

The  act  of  the  Pennsylvania  Legislature,  by  which 
the  United  States  Bank  of  Pennsylvania  was  chartered, 
is,  on  its  face,  a  piece  of  corrupt  legislation.  Its  cor 
ruption  was  addressed  to  the  people  of  the  State,  not  to 
private  individuals.  It  comprised  three  projects  in  an 
obvious  log-rolling  combination,  —  remission  of  taxes, 
public  improvements,  and  bank  charter.  The  bank  was 
chartered  2  for  thirty  years.  It  was  to  pay  a  bonus  of 
$2^-  million,  pay  $100,000  per  year  for  twenty  years  for 
schools,  loan  the  State  not  over  a  million  a  year  in  tem 
porary  loans  at  four  per  cent,  and  subscribe  $640,000 
to  railroads  and  turnpikes.  Personal  taxes  were  re 
pealed  by  other  sections  of  the  bill,  and  $1,368,147 
were  appropriated,  out  of  the  bank  bonus,  for  various 
canals  and  turnpikes.  Either  this  bill  was  corruptly 
put  together  to  win  strength  by  enlisting  local  and  per 
sonal  interests  in  favor  of  it,  or  else  the  Pennsylvanians, 
having  got  their  big  bank  to  themselves,  set  to  work  to 
plunder  it.  The  charter  passed  the  Senate,  19  to  12, 
and  the  House,  57  to  30.8  Inasmuch  as  the  democrats 
aad  a  majority  in  the  Senate,  it  was  charged  that  private 
corruption  had  passed  the  bill.  An  investigation  re 
sulted  in  nothing.  There  was  found,  in  1841,  an  entry, 
of  about  the  date  of  the  charter,  of  $400,000  expend! . 
Hure,  vouchers  for  which  could  not  be  produced.4  Biddle 

*  *5  Niles,  307.  2  49  Niles,  377,  396. 

'8  Niles,  434.  4  Second  report,  1841,  60  Niles,  20* 


RETROSPECT  OF  THE  BANK    WAR.  33  S 

represented  the  case  as  if  the  proposition  that  the  State 
should  charter  the  bank  had  originated  with  leading 
members  of  the  Legislature,  who  asked  the  bank  if  it 
would  accept  a  state  charter.1  The  act  was  dated 
February  18,  1836.  The  bank  accepted  the  charter, 
and  presented  a  service  of  plate  to  Biddle.2 

In  the  story  of  the  bank  war,  which  has  been  given 
in  the  preceding  pages,  the  reader  has  perceived  that 
the  writer  does  not  believe  that  Jackson's  administration 
had  a  case  against  the  bank,  or  that  the  charges  it  made 
were  proven.  To  say  this  is  to  say  that  Jackson's  ad 
ministration  unjustly,  passionately,  ignorantly,  and  with 
out  regard  to  truth  assailed  a  great  and  valuable 
financial  institution,  and  caluminated  its  management. 
Such  was  the  opinion  of  people  of  that  generation,  at 
least  until  March  3,  1836.  Jackson's  charges  against 
the  bank  were  held  to  be  not  proven.  The  effect  of 
them  naturally  was  to  make  confidence  in  the  bank 
blind  and  deaf.  In  January,  1836,  when  it  was  ex 
pected  that  the  bank  would  wind  up  in  two  months,  its 
stock  stood  at  116.  For  four  years  afterwards,  nothing 
seemed  able  to  destroy  public  confidence  in  the  bank. 
One  thing  alone  suggests  a  doubt,  and  makes  one  hold 
back  from  the  adoption  of  a  positive  judgment  in  favor 
of  the  bank,  even  down  to  the  end  of  its  national  char 
ter  :  that  is,  a  doubt  of  Biddle's  sincerity.  If  he  was 
jot  sincere,  we  have  no  measure  for  the  degree  of  mis- 
*epresentation  there  may  have  been  in  his  plausible 
statements  and  explanations,  or  for  how  much  may  have 
been  hidden  under  the  financial  expositions  he  was  so 
fond  of  making,  and  which  were,  liKe  the  expositions  of 
ft  juggler,  meant  to  mystify  the  audience  still  more. 

1  Biddle  to  Adams,  51  Niles,  230.  2  4«  Niles,  441. 


840  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

The  final  catastrophe  of  the  Lank  has  always  affected 
the  judgment  which  all  students  of  its  history  have 
formed  of  the  merits  of  its  struggle  with  Jackson.  The 
Jackson  men  always  claimed  that  the  end  proved  that 
Jackson  and  his  coterie  were  right  all  the  time.  Thia 
has  probably  been  the  general  verdict.  The  whigs  felt 
the  weight  of  the  inference,  and  they  tried  to  distin 
guish  between  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  and  the 
United  States  Bank  of  Pennsylvania.  A  little  reflec 
tion  will  show  that  both  these  views  are  erroneous.  A 
bank  may  go  on  well  and  be  sound  for  twenty  years, 
and  then  go  wrong.  It  may  make  mistakes  and  re 
cover,  and  then  make  more  mistakes  and  perish.  We 
must  go  by  the  facts  all  the  way  along.  The  state  bank 
and  the  national  bank  of  the  United  States  had  an 
unbroken  life.  The  attempt  to  save  one  and  condemn 
the  other,  aside  from  an  investigation  of  the  merits,  ia 
a  partisan  proceeding.  It  is  not  sound  historically  or 
financially.  We  have  now  reached  as  just  an  opinion 
as  we  can  form  about  the  bank  up  to  the  time  of  ita 
state  charter. 

The  bank  started  on  its  new  career  under  very  bad 
auspices.  It  never  threw  off  the  suspicion  which  at 
tached  to  its  legislative  birth.  It  was  too  large  for  its 
new  sphere,  yet  pride  prevented  its  reduction.  It  had 
other  aims  than  to  win  profits  by  sound  banking.  It 
wanted  to  prove  itself  necessary,  or  to  show  itself  a 
public  benefactor,  or  to  sustain  the  rivalry  of  Philadel 
phia  with  New  York.  Biddle,  freed  from  the  restraints 
of  the  old  organization,  launched  out  into  sensational 
banking,  and  tested  his  theories  of  banking  to  tht 
utmost.  There  is  scarcely  anything  vicious  and  un 
Sound  in  banking  which  the  great  bank  did  not  illustrate 


UNITED  STATES  BANK   OF  PENNSYLVANIA.    341 

during  the  next  five  years.  Its  officers  plundered  it. 
Its  end  was  so  ignominious  that  no  one  wanted  to  re 
member  that  he  had  ever  believed  in  it. 

On  the  1st  of  February,  1836,  the  account  of  the 
bank  1  showed  a  surplus  of  $7.8  million,  which  was  ex 
pected  to  pay  off  the  bonus,  notes,  etc.  There  were  $20 
million  loaned  on  stocks,  and  there  was  the  state  bonus, 
the  government  stock,  and  the  circulation  of  the  old 
bank  to  be  paid.  New  stock  was  sold  to  pay  off  the 
government  stock.  £1  million  were  borrowed  in  Lon 
don,  and  12.5  million  francs  in  Paris.2  Jaudon  was 
sent  to  England  as  agent  of  the  bank.  In  May,  the 
money  market  at  New  York  being  very  stringent,  the 
bank  was  asked  for  aid,  which  it  gave.8  By  an  act  of 
June  15,  1836,  Congress  repealed  the  14th  section  of 
the  bank  charter.  This  put  an  end  to  the  receipt  of 
the  notes  of  the  old  bank  by  the  Treasury,  and  crippled 
the  circulation  of  the  bank.  In  October  there  was  a 
report  that  the  bank  would  surrender  its  state  charter 
if  it  could  get  back  its  bonus.4  In  that  same  month, 
however,  Biddle  wrote  another  letter  to  Adams  to  show 
the  wrong  of  trying  to  repeal  the  state  charter.  June 
23d,  Congress  authorized  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
to  treat  with  the  bank  for  the  payment  of  the  govern 
ment  stock.  No  agreement  was  reached,  but,  February 
25,  1837,  the  bank  sent  a  memorial  to  the  Speaker,  in 
which  it  offered  to  pay  off  the  public  shares,  at  $115.58 
per  share,  in  four  instalments,  September,  1837-38- 
39-40.  This  proposition  was  accepted  March  3,  1837, 
ind  the  instalments  were  all  paid. 

In   his   message    1836,   Jackson    discharged  a  last 

*  60  Niles,  106.  2  First  report,    841,  60  Niles,  105. 

•  50  Niles,  267.  *  51  Niles,  113. 


342  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

broadside  at  the  bank.  He  seemed  to  be  as  angry  tha. 
the  bank  had  escaped  annihilation  as  he  was  in  1818 
that  Billy  Bowlegs  got  across  the  Suwanee  river.  He 
complained  that  the  bank  had  not  paid  off  the  public 
stock,  and  was  reissuing  its  old  notes.  This  latter  pro 
ceeding  was  stopped  by  an  act  of  July  6,  1838.  The 
bank  failed  three  times  during  the  years  of  commerciaJ 
distress  which  followed,  namely,  May  10,  1837,  with  all 
the  other  banks  ;  October  9, 1839,  when  it  carried  down 
with  it  all  which  had  resumed,  except  those  in  New 
York  and  a  few  in  New  England ;  February  4,  1841, 
when  it  was  entirely  ruined.  Its  stockholders  lost  all 
their  capital. 

Biddle  had  resigned  March  29, 1839,  but  he  had  been 
so  identified  with  the  bank  that  its  ruin  was  attributed 
to  him.  He  fell  into  disgrace.  He  was  arraigned  for 
conspiracy  to  plunder  the  stockholders,  but  escaped  on 
a  technicality.  He  died,  insolvent  and  broken-hearted, 
February  27,  1844,  aged  fifty-eight.1 

Webster  declared,  in  1842,  that  a  bank  of  the  United 
States  founded  on  a  private  subscription  was  an  "  obso 
lete  idea ; "  2  but  perhaps  the  unkindest  cut  of  all  waa 
that  the  Whig  Almanac  for  1843  could  refer  to  "  Nick 
Biddle "  as  a  rascal,  and  to  "  his  bank  "  as  one  which 
was  "  corruptly  managed." 

1  Ingersoll,  285 ;  a  very  touching  description  of  Biddle'i  lut 

m. 

«  1  Webster's  Works,  135. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

SEW  SPIRIT   IN  VARIOUS   POINTS    OF   FOREIGN 

DOMESTIC    POLICY.  » 

THE  neglect  of  France  to  fulfil  the  stipulations  of  the 
treaty  of  July  4,  1831,  offered  the  occasion  for  the  most 
important  diplomatic  negotiation  in  which  Jackson  was 
engaged.  In  his  message  of  1834,  he  gave  a  full  ac 
count  of  the  treaty  and  of  the  neglect  of-  the  .French 
Chambers,  at  two  sessions,  to  appropriate  money  to  meet 
engagements  which  had  been  made,  on  behalf  of  the 
French  nation,  by  the  k  constitutional  authorities  of 
France.  The  King  had  shown  strong  personal  interest 
in  the  matter,1  and  had '  exerted  himself  to  secure  a 
satisfactory  settlement  and  to  prevent  any  bad  feeling 
from  arising  between  the  two  nations.  In  the  mean 
time  the  United  States  had  reduced  the  dirties  on  wine, 
according  to  the  engagement  in  the  treaty,  by  ah  act  of 
July  13, 1832,  and  France  was  getting  the  benefit  of  the 
treaty  without  performing  her  share  of  it.  It  seemed  to 
Jackson  that  this  state  of  things  called  for  spirited 
action.  Moreover,  Livingston  wrote  a  very  important 
dispatch  from  Paris,  November  22, 1834,2  in  which  he 
%aid  that  there  was  a  disposition  in  France  to  wait  and 
lee  what  the  message  would  be ;  also  that  the  moderate 

1  Livingston's  dispatch,  47  Niles,  417     Hires  came  hc-aae  in 
1831.     Livingston  went  out  in  1833. 
8  47  Niles,  417. 


344  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

tone  of  the  United  States  up  to  this  time  had  had  a  bad 
effect.  "  From  all  this  you  may  imagine  the  anxiety  I 
shall  feel  for  the  arrival  of  the  President's  message* 
On  its  tone  will  depend  very  much,  not  only  the  pay 
ment  of  our  claims,  but  our  national  reputation  for 
energy."  If  Jackson  had  made  a  bad  effect  by  toe 
great  moderation,  that  was  precisely  the  error  he  knev 
haw  to  correct,  and  our  "  reputation  for  energy  "  was 
just  what  he  was  prepared  to  sustain.  Accordingly  he 
prepared  his  message  for  1834.  The  Due  de  Broglie, 
the  French  minister,  afterwards  declared  that  the  ap 
propriation  would  have  been  passed  in  December,  1834, 
if  copies  of  this  message  had  not  been  just  then  received. 
Jackson  was  under  erroneous  information  as  to  the  time 
of  meeting  of  the  French  Chambers.  The  Due  de 
Broglie  had  also,  in  the  March  previous,  when  the  bill 
drawn  by  the  American  Treasury  went  to  protest,  found 
fault  with  the  American  government  for  selling  the  bill 
to  a  bank,  instead  of  receiving  the  money  through  a 
liplomatic  agent.1  He  argued  that  the  United  States 
ought  not  to  have  regarded  the  treaty  as  definitive  until 
all  the  organs  of  the  French  government  had  assented  to 
it.  In  his  message,  before  mentioned,  Jackson  suggested 
that,  if  Congress  inferred  from  the  inaction  of  France 
that  she  did  not  intend  to  fulfil  the  treaty,  it  might  pro 
ceed  to  measures  of  coercion,  amongst  which  he  men 
tioned,  as  suitable  and  "peaceable,"  reprisals.  He 
proposed  that  a  law  should  be  passed  authorizing  re 
prisals,  if  France  should  neglect  the  fulfilment  of  the 
reaty  beyond  a  certain  time.  He  added  that  this  sug 
gestion  ought  not  to  be  regarded  by  France  as  a 
*  menace."  Chevalier  thought  that  Jackson,  having 
i  47  Niks,  327. 


RELATIONS   WIT II  FRANCE.  345 

kad  his  bout  with  the  nullifiers,  found  his  blood  heatea 
and  his  appetite  for  war  reawakened  ;  that  he  satisfied 
this  appetite  first  in  the  bank  war,  and  then  in  tho 
difficulty  with  France.1 

The  message  caused  great  excitement  in  France. 
The  French  journals  all  regarded  it  as  a  menace. 
1  he  feeling  was  aroused  that  France  could  not  then  pay 
without  dishonor.2  Additional  embarrassment  arose 
from  the  fact  that  the  King's  active  interest  was  re 
vealed  by  the  documents  published  in  America.  The 
bad  temper  of  the  French  was  still  further  increased 
when  they  read  Rives's  letters,  in  which  he  seemed  to 
boast  of  having  outwitted  the  French  minister,  and 
Livingston's  letter,  in  which  he  suggested  that  France 
never  would  pay  unless  the  message  brought  her  be 
havior  before  Congress  in  a  spirited  way.  The  Com 
mittee  on  Foreign  Relations  of  the  Senate  made  a 
report,3  in  which  they  expressed  full  agreement  with  the 
President  on  all  the  essential  points,  but  they  regarded 
the  proposition  to  employ  reprisals  as  premature,  and 
likely  to  embarrass  the  negotiations.  In  the  House  two 
reports  were  made,4  but  they  were  not  important.  The 
Senate  voted  unanimously,  January  14,  1835,  that  it 
was  not  expedient  to  adopt  any  legislative  measures  in  re 
gard  to  the  relations  with  France.  In  the  House,  J.  Q. 
Adams  took  the  lead  in  sustaining  Jackson's  position, 
and  was  largely  influential  in  securing  the  adoption  by 
the  House,  unanimously,  March  2,  1835,  of  a  resolution 
ihat  the  execution  of  the  treaty  should  be  insisted  on. 
The  French  minister  to  the  United  States  was  recalled 

1  Chevalier,  177.     See  his  estimate  of  Jackson's  character. 

2  French  newspapers  quoted,  47  Niles,  327. 

•  47  Itfiles,  344.  4  48  Niles,  5  and  6. 


346  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

His  final  note  of  January  14,  1835,  was  net  received  by 
Jackson,  but  was  referred  back  to  the  French  govern 
ment.  They  approved  of  it. 

In  December,  1834,  the  French  Chambers  rejected  a 
bill  appropriating  money  to  pay  the  indemnities.  A 
cabinet  crisis  followed,  not  on  account  of  this  vote,  but 
also  not  entirely,  as  it  appears,  without  reference  to  it. 
The  Due  de  Broglie,  however,  returned  to  office  with 
the  understanding  that  provision  was  to  be  made  for 
fulfilling  the  treaty.  April  25,  1835,  the  French 
Chambers  passed  the  appropriation,  but  with  a  condi 
tion  that  no  money  should  be  paid  until  "  satisfactoiy 
explanations "  of  the  President's  message  of  1834 
should  be  received.  The  original  condition  in  the  law 
was,  "until  it  shall  have  been  ascertained  that  the 
government  of  the  United  States  has  adopted  no  meas 
ures  injurious  to  French  interests  ;  "  x  but  it  was  after 
wards  changed  to  the  other  form2  by  amendment. 
Livingston  wrote  a  note,  April  25,  1835,  declaring  that 
the  message  was  a  domestic  document,  for  which  no 
responsibility  to  any  foreign  power  would  be  admitted ; 
that  the  message  of  1834  itself  contained  a  sufficient 
disclaimer ;  and  f-hat  the  condition  which  had  been  in 
corporated  in  the  act  of  the  French  Chambers  would  pre 
vent  it  from  being  a  satisfactory  settlement.8  He  then 
came  home.  In  Congress,  whose  session  ended  March 
4th,  an  amendment  to  the  usual  appropriation  bill  for 
fortifications  was  proposed,  by  which  $3  million  were 
appropriated  for  extraordinary  expenditures  for  defence, 
in  case  such  should  become  necessary  before  the  next 
session.  The  whole  bill  was  lost,  borne  down,  as  it  ap 
pears,  by  this  amendment.  As  the  relations  with  Franct 

*  47  Niles,  436.  2  48  Niles,  220.  3  48  Niles,  318. 


RUPTURE    OF  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS      347 

were  still  more  critical  when  Congress  next  met,  and 
nothing  had  been  done  for  defence  on  account  of  the 

^ 

failure  of  that  bill,  a  great  deal  of  crimination  and  re 
crimination  took  place  in  an  effort  to  fix  the  blame 
and  responsibility.  No  result  was  reached.  It  is  an 
interesting  instance  of  the  working  of  the  element  of 
responsibility  under  the  American  system.1 

In  the  message  of  1835  Jackson  reviewed  the  whole 
affair,  insisted  that  he  had  never  used  menace,  and 
alluded  to  Livingston's  final  note  to  the  French  minister 
as  having  clearly  so  stated.  He  said  that  he  would 
never  apologize.  A  long  dispatch  of  the  Due  de  Brog- 
lie  to  the  French  charge  here,  in  June,  1835,  set  forth 
the  French  case.  It  was  read  to  Forsyth,  but  he  de 
clined  to  receive  a  copy.2  Jackson  directed  Barton, 
charge  d'affaires  at  Paris,  to  make  a  specific  inquiry 
what  France  intended  to  do.  The  Due  de  Broglie  re 
plied  that  France  would  pay  whenever  the  United 
States  would  say  that  it  regretted  the  misunderstanding, 
that  the  misunderstanding  arose  from  mistake,  that  the 
good  faith  of  France  had  not  been  questioned,  and  that 
no  menace  was  ever  intended.  This  question  and 
answer  were  exchanged  in  October,  1835.8  Barton 
came  home  in  January,  1836,  and  Pageot,  the  French 
charge,  was  recalled  at  the  same  time,  so  that  diplomatic 
relations  were  entirely  broken  off. 

January  18,  1836,  Jackson  sent  in  a  special  message 
on  the  relations  with  France,4  sending  copies  of  Bar 
ton's  correspondence.  Livingston  toned  down 5  this 
message  somewhat  from  the  first  intention ;  nevertheless 
Jackson  again  recommended  coercive  measures.  He 

1  49  Niles,  446.  2  49  KUes,  353.  3  49  Niles,  347. 

*  49  Niles  345.  6  Hunt's  Livingston^  428 


348  ANDREW  JACKS  Off. 

proposed  to  exclude  French  ships  and  products  from  the 
ports  of  the  United  States ;  that  is  to  say,  his  reserve 
of  force  by  which  to  sustain  his  spirited  diplomacy  was 
the  old,  imbecile,  and  worn-out  device  of  a  commercial 
war.  He  said  that  France  was  strengthening  her  navy ; 
if  against  us,  an  apology  from  us  was  out  of  the  ques 
tion. 

Thus  this  question  had  been  pushed  into  the  worst 
kind  of  a  diplomatic  dead-lock,  out  of  which  neither 
party  could  advance  without  fighting,  and  neither  could 
recede  without  (supposed)  dishonor.  That  is  the  evil 
of  spirited  diplomacy,  for  good  diplomacy  would  avoid 
such  a  dead-lock  as  one  of  the  worst  blunders  possible 
in  the  profession.  The  English  government  now  inter 
vened,  and  offered  its  good  offices  as  mediator.  The 
French  government  declared  to  the  English  that  the 
President's  message  of  1835  had  removed  the  bad  im 
pressions  of  that  of  1834.  This  declaration  was  made 
known  to  Forsyth  by  the  English  minister  at  Washing 
ton,  and  was  transmitted  to  Congress,  with  a  message, 
by  the  President,  February  22,  1836.1  It  was  very 
good-natured  of  France  to  regard  the  message  of  1835 
P.S  compliance  with  the  demands  which  had  been  made 
to  Barton  in  October.  She  simply  covered  her  retreat, 
for  she  had  been  in  the  wrong  on  the  merits  of  the 
question  from  the  beginning,  and  she  justly  bore  half 
the  blame  of  the  diplomatic  dead-lock.  March  19, 
1836,  the  King  of  France  ordered  four  instalments  of 
the  indemnity  to  be  paid  at  once,  in  order  to  settle  the 
matter  down  to  date,  according  to  the  terms  of  the 
treaty 

Barry,  the  Postmaster-General,  was  the  only  niembe? 
1  49  Nileg,  442. 


THE  POST  OFFICE  DEPARTMENT.     349 

»f  the  cabinet  retained  in  1831.  In  his  hands  the  ad 
ministration  of  the  Post-Office  Department,  both  in  ita 
business  and  its  finance,  steadily  declined.  The  com 
plaints  in  1834-35  of  the  irregularity  and  delay  of  the 
mails  were  very  numerous  and  bitter.  The  department 
was  also  running  in  arrears  in  its  finances.  Both  Houses 
of  Congress,  at  the  session  of  1834-35,  investigated  the 
department.  Barry's  personal  honesty  does  not  seem 
to  have  been  questioned,  but  his  chief  clerk,  Rev. 
Obadiah  B.  Brown,1  became  for  the  time  a  very  distin 
guished  man,  on  account  of  relations  with  mail  contract 
ors,  which,  if  innocent,  were  very  improper.  The 
contractors  had  made  use  of  familiar  devices,  "  straw 
bids,"  "  unbalanced  bids,"  "  expedited  service,"  etc.,  if 
not  of  corrupt  influences  on  subordinates  in  the  depart 
ment,  by  which  devices  shrewd  men  take  advantage  of 
inefficient  public  officers.2  .Barry  refused  to  answer 
some  of  the  questions  put  to  him,  and,  after  the  fashion 
of  the  time,  published  an  "  Appeal  to  the  American 
People,"  8  instead.  Brown  resigned  in  an  official  docu 
ment,  imitated  apparently  from  Van  Buren's  resignation 
of  1831.4  He  also  published  an  "  Appeal,"  etc.  Jack 
son  selected  Kendall  for  Barry's  successor,  May  1, 1835. 
Kendall's  administrative  ability  was  great,  and  he 
speedily  reorganized  the  department,  and  restored  its 
efficiency.  There  was  great  doubt,  however,  when  he 
was  appointed,  whether  he  would  be  confirmed.  Barry 
was  sent  as  minister  to  Spain,  but  died  on  his  way 
Ihither. 

The  emancipation  of  the  slaves  in  the  British  West 
Indies   in   1833    gave  a  great  impulse  in  the  United 

1  See  page  377.  *  47  Niles,  381,  393. 

8  46  Niles,  338.  *  47  Niles,  395. 


850  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

States  to  abolition  sentiment  and  effort,  which  had  not 
been  active  since  the  compromise  of  1820  was  adopted 
The  new  spirit  was  manifested  in  the  organization  of 
societies,  distribution  of  pamphlets  and  newspapers,  peti 
tions  to  Congress  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District  of 
Columbia,  and  other  forms  of  agitation.  The  first 
efforts  of  this  kind  were  frowned  down  all  over  the 
North,  but  the  general  movement  grew.  The  senti 
ments  of  democracy  and  of  religion  were  both  against 
slavery,  and  every  step  which  was  taken  to  arrest  the 
agitation  —  the  gag  law  in  Congress,  by  which  peti 
tions  about  slavery  were  practically  shut  out,  and  the 
mob  violence  which  was  employed  against  the  agitators 
—  only  strengthened  it.  Towards  the  end  of  Jackson's 
second  administration  the  antislavery  agitation  was  a 
real  growing  movement,  and  an  element  in  the  social 
and  civil  life  of  the  nation.  The  story  of  these  things 
has  been  often  told  in  detail,  and  may  be  passed  over 
here.  The  history  of  the  United  States  has,  in  fact, 
been  studied  by  the  present  generation  chiefly  with  re 
gard  to  the  slavery  question.  Jackson's  administration 
was  not  called  upon  to  act  on  the  slavery  issue  save  in 
one  or  two  points. 

The  abolition  societies  adopted  the  policy  of  sending 
documents,  papers,  and  pictures  against  slavery  to  the 
Southern  States.  If  the  intention  was,  as  was  charged, 
to  incite  the  slaves  to  revolt,  the  device,  as  it  seems  to 
us  now,  must  have  fallen  far  short  of  its  object,  for  the 
chance  that  anything  could  get  from  the  post-office  into 
the  hands  of  a  black  man,  without  going  through  the 
hands  of  a  white  man,  was  poor  indeed.  These  publica 
tions,  however,  caused  a  panic  and  a  wild  indignation  ui 
tiie  South.  The  postmaster  at  Charleston,  being  lee  I 


KENDALL'S   ORDER  ABOUT  THE  MAILS.       351 

Iired  by  the  people  there  on  his  duty,  turned  to  the 
Postmaster-General  for  orders.  August  4,  1835,  Ken 
dall  gave  an  ambiguous  reply,  so  far  as  orders  were 
concerned.  He,  however,  threw  the  postmaster  on  his 
own  discretion,  and  then  said  for  himself,  "  By  no  act 
or  direction  of  mine,  official  or  private,  could  I  be  in 
duced  to  aid,  knowingly,  in  giving  circulation  to  papers 
of  this  description,  directly  or  indirectly  "  (i.  «.,  papers 
alleged  by  the  postmaster  to  be  "  the  most  inflamma 
tory  and  incendiary,  and  insurrectionary  to  the  last 
degree  ").  "We  owe  an  obligation  to  the  laws,  but  a 
higher  one  to  the  communities  in  which  we  live,  and,  if 
the  former  be  perverted  to  destroy  the  latter,  it  is  pa 
triotism  to  disregard  them.  Entertaining  these  views, 
I  cannot  sanction,  and  will  not  condemn,  the  step  you 
have  taken  "  [in  refusing  to  deliver  certain  mail-matter]. 
August  22d  Kendall  wrote  a  long  letter  to  Gouverneur, 
postmaster  at  New  York,  elaborating  and  defending  his 
position.1  Politics  were  already  combined  with  the 
slavery  question  in  this  incident.  Kendall's  confirma 
tion  by  the  Senate  was  very  doubtful,  and  Van  Buren's 
Southern  support  was  ready  to  abandon  him  at  a  mo 
ment's  notice  if  slavery  came  into  account.  Kendall 
won  enough  Southern  votes  to  carry  his  confirmation. 
,'  When  J.  Q.  Adams,  in  1819,  was  negotiating  with 
the  Spanish  minister  the  treaty  by  which  the  western 
boundary  of  the  United  States  was  defined,  he  could  get 
no  encouragement  from  Monroe  or  any  of  his  ministers 
o  try  to  push  the  boundary  westwards.2  Monroe  ap 
peared  to  think  the  United  States  would  be  weakened 
>>  oy  including  territory  west  of  the  Sabine.8  It  was  no} 
V>ng,  however,  before  the  Southern  slave-holding  in 
i  49  Niles.  8.  '  2  See  page  6"  **  11  Adam  348. 


852  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

ierest  began  to  see  the  error  of  this  view  of  the  matter 
After  the  Missouri  Compromise  was  adopted,  it  appeared 
that  wild  land  for  the  formation  of  new  free  States  was 
owned  north  of  that  line  from  the  Mississippi  to  the 
Pacific,  while  south  of  that  line  similar  land,  available 
for  new  slave  States,  extended  only  to  the  Sabine  and 
the  100  degree  meridian.  Only  a  few  persons,  however, 
as  yet  perceived  this  view  of  the  matter.  In  1819  (June 
23d),  one  James  Long  proclaimed  the  independence  of 
Texas.1  In  1821  Austin  colonized  three  hundred  famil 
ies  in  Texas,  by  permission  of  Mexico.  In  1826  some 
American  immigrants  at  Nacogdoches  declared  Texas 
independent.  In  1824  the  Emperor  of  Russia  tried  to 
establish  exclusive  control  over  the  Northern  Pacific, 
and  the  attention  of  the  most  far-seeing  statesmen  was 
drawn  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States  in  the  North 
west  and  on  the  Pacific.  It  seems  necessary  to  bear  in 
mind,  all  through  the  history  of  the  annexation  of  Texas, 
the  connection  of  that  question  with  the  acquisition  of 
California,  including  the  port  of  San  Francisco,  which 
<vas  then  the  chief  reason  for  wanting  California. 
Adams,  when  President  (1827),  sent  to  Poinsett,  min- 
.ster  of  the  United  States  in  Mexico,  orders  to  try  to 
buy  Texas  for  a  million  dollars.  Poinsett  did  not 
make  the  attempt.  He  gave  as  his  reason  the  danger 
of  irritating  Mexico  by  a  proposition  which  was  sure  to 
be  rejected.2 

"C    In  1824  Mexico  took  the  first  steps  towards  the  aboli 
tion  of  slavery.     By  a  decree  of  September  15,  1829 

V*  17  Niles,  31  ;  Jay. 

./  a  The  attempt  to  buy  Texas  seems  to  have  been  Clay's  act 
Of.  7  Adams,  239,   240 ;  9  Adams,  379  ;  especially  1 1  AJaras 


SLAVERY  IN  TEXAS.  353 

llavery  was  definitively  abolished.  In  the  mean  time, 
Americans  had  emigrated  to  Texas,  chiefly  from  the 
Southern  States,  and  had  taken  slaves  thither.  They 
resisted  the  abolition  decree,  and  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  saw  itself  forced  to  except  the  State  of  Texas* 
from  the  decree.  It,  however,  united  Texas  with  Coa- 
huila,  as  a  means  of  holding  the  foreign  and  insubor 
dinate  settlers  in  check.  The  abolition  of  slavery  by 
Mexico  affected  the  Southern  States  doubly :  first,  it 
lessened  the  area  open  to  slavery ;  second,  it  put  a  free 
State  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  slave  territory.  The 
interest  of  the  Southwestern  States  in  the  independence 
of  Texas,  or  its  annexation,  was  at  once  aroused.  A 
fanciful  doctrine,  in  the  taste  of  the  Southwestern  states 
men,  was  immediately  invented  to  give  a  basis  for 
stump-speaking  in  defence  of  a  real  act  of  violence.  It 
was  declared  that  the  United  States  must  KE-annex  what 
had  once  been  maliciously  given  away  by  a  Northern 
statesman.  The  gravity  and  care  with  which  re-annex 
ation  was  talked  about  had  its  parallel  only  in  the 
theatrical  legislation  of  nullification.  In  1780  Spain 
claimed  that  the  eastern  boundary  of  Louisiana  was  such 
as  to  include  nearly  all  the  present  State  of  Alabama, 
and  the  Hiawasee,  Tennessee,  Clinch,  and  Cumberland 
rivers  through  what  is  now  Tennessee  and  Kentucky.1 
Inside  of  this  claim  she  would  take  what  she  could  get. 
The  boundaries  to  the  westward  were  still  more  vague. 
Therefore,  any  one  who  chose  to  dabble  In  the  author 
ities  could  prove  anything  he  liked,  and  think  himself 
no  contemptible  scholar  into  the  bargain.  "  Texas/'  as 
ft  State  of  the  Mexican  confederation,  embraced  only 

1  Kamsey,  523 
S3 


354  ANDREW  JACKSOtf. 

Ihe  southeastern   corner  of  the  territory  now  included 
in  the  State  of  that  name.1 

In  the  summer  of  1829  Van  Buren  sent  instructions 
to  Poinsett  to  try  to  buy  Texas,  and  five  million  dollars 
were  offered  for  it.  In  1830_Mexico,  which  had  at  first 
welcomed  the  immigrants,  forbade  Americans  to  settle 
in  Texas.  Of  course  this  law  had  no  effect. 

We  are  indebted  to  a  Di.  Mayd,  who  was  a  hanger-on 
at  Washington  during  Jackson's  time,  for  a  little  book 
in  which  most  of  the  Texas  intrigue  is  laid  bare.  Mayo 
was  in  the  way  of  picking  up  certain  information,  and 
more  came  to  him  by  accident.  He  gives  also  many 
documents.  He  was  intimate  with  ex-Governor  Samuel 
Houston,  of  Tennessee,  an  old  •  companion  in  arms  of 
Jackson,  who  came  to  Washington  in  1829  to  get  Jack 
son's  connivance  at  an  enterprise  which  Houston  had 
in  mind  for  revolutionizing  Texas.  That  Jackson  did 
connive  at  this  enterprise,  just  as  he  supposed  Monroe 
connived  at  his  own  proceedings  in  Florida,  cannot  be 
established  by  proof,  but  it  is  sustained  by  very  strong 
inference.9 

April  5,  1832,  two  treaties  with  Mexico  were  pub 
lished,  —  one  of  commerce  and  one  of  boundaries,  — 
confirming  the  boundary  of  the  Florida  treaty. 

In  1833  a  revolution  broke  out  in  Mexico,  which 
threw  the  whole  country  into  anarchy,  Texas  with  the 
rest.  Santa  Anna  gradually  established  his  authority. 

Yl  Carey  &  Lea's  Atlas,  1822.  Cf.  Carey's  map  of  1814.  02 
which  Texas  neems  to  be  delineated  as  extending  from  the  Nue- 
cps  to  the  Sabine. 

^  2  See  11  Adams,  41,  347,  357,  363;  and  his  Fifteen  Day 
Speech,  of  June,  1838.  Wise  (Decades,  148),  affirms  it  very  pos 
itively.  He  is  better  authority  on  this  point  than  on  some  other* 
»bout  which  he  is  very  positive,  e,  g.t  the  Adams-Clay  bargain. 


INDEPENDENCE   OF  TEXAS.  355 

Tn  the  autumn  of  1835  he  tried  to  extend  it  over 
Texas,  but  he  met  with  armed  resistance,  and  was  de 
feated.  In  July^  1835,  Jackson  authorized  an  offer  of 
an  additional  half  million  dollars  if  Mexico  would  allow 
the  boundary,  after  the  cession  of  Texas,  to  follow  the 
Rio  Grande  up  to  the  thirty-seventh  degree,  and  then 
run  on  that  parallel  to  the  Pacific.1  All  propositions 
to  purchase  failed.  After  the  Texans  proved  able  to 
beat  the  Mexicans  in  battle,  no  further  propositions  of 
that  kind  were  made. 

March  2,  1836,  a  Declaration  of  Independence,  on 
behalf  of  Texas,  was  adopted.  March  6th  the  fort  of 
the  Alamo  was  taken  by  the  Mexicans,  and  its  de 
fenders  massacred.  On -the  27th  Colonels  Fannin  and 
Ward,  with  other  Texan  (or  American)  prisoners,  were 
massacred.  On  the  17th  of  March  the  Constitution  of 
Texas  was  adopted.  It  contained  the  strongest  pro 
visions  in  favor  of  slavery.  The  massacres  aroused 
great  indignation  in  the  Southwest,  and  hundreds  of 
adventurers  hastened  to  Texas,  where  Houston  was  now 
chief  in  command,  to  help  him  win  independence.2  The 
decisive  battle  was  fought  at  San  Jacinto  April  21st, 
when  Santa  Anna  was  routed  and  captured.  He  prom 
ised  everything  in  captivity,  but  cancelled  his  promises 
after  he  was  released.  In  June,  1836,  Judge  Catron 
wrote  to  Webster,  from  Tennessee,  that  the  spirit  was 
abroad  through  the  whole  Mississippi  Valley  to  march 
to  Texas.8  Perhaps  the  disposition  to  march  was  not 
10  strong  elsewhere,  but  immense  speculations  in  land 
lad  already  been  organized,  and  great  speculators  in 

tf 11  Adams,  362.  2  Jay,  28. 

8  1  Webster's  Cvrrespondence,  523. 


B56  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

"-  Texan  l  socuiities  soon  after  began,  which  enlisted  the 
pecuniary  interests  of  great  numbers  of  people  in  the 
independence  of  Texas. 

A  correspondence  now  began  between  the  representa 
tives  of  the  governments  of  the  United  States  and 
Mexico,  which  no  American  ought  to  read  without 
shame.  It  would  be  hard  to  find  an  equally  gross  in 
stance  of  bullying  on  the  part  of  a  large  State  towards  a 
small  one.  Jackson  had  ordered  that  General  Gaines 
should  enter  the  territory  of  Texas,  and  march  to 
Nacogdoches,  if  he  thought  there  was  any  danger  of 
hostilities  on  the  part  of  the  Indians,  and  if  there  was 
suspicion  that  the  Mexican  general  was  stirring  up  the 
Indians  to  war  on  the  United  States.  Here  we  have 
another  reminiscence  of  Florida  revived.  Gaines  under 
stood  his  orders,  and  entered  the  Mexican  territory. 
Understanding  also,  no  doubt,  that  the  Jacksonian  pro 
ceedings  of  1818  had  now  been  legitimized  as  the  cor 
rect  American  line  of  procedure  for  a  military  officer, 
he  called  on  the  governors  of  the  neighboring  States  for 
militia.  Although  companies  were  forming  and  march 
ing  to  Texas  under  full  organization,  this  "  call "  was 
overruled  by  the  War  Department.  The  energetic  re 
monstrances  of  the  Mexican  minister  finally  led  to  an 
>rder  to  Gaines  to  retire  from  Texan  territory,  not, 
however,  until  after  the  Mexican  minister  had  broken 
off  diplomatic  relations. 

In  July,  1836,  both  Houses  voted,  the  Senate  unam 
mously,  that  the  independence  of  Texas  ought  to  be 
acknowledged  as  soon  as  Texas  had  proved  that  sh* 

The  first  issue  of  Texan  bonds  was  authorized  in  Novembei 
836.    The  first  Treasury  notes  were  issued  November  1,  1837 
'Gouge  b  Texas,  57,  71.) 


DEFINITION  OF  "  TEXAS.  "  357 

tould  maintain  it.  Texas  was  already  represented  by 
agents  applying  for  annexation.  Jackson  recommended 
longer  delay  in  a  message  of  December  21,  1836.  The 
fact  was  that  the  geographical  definition  of  "  Texas  " 
was  not  yet  satisfactorily  established,  and  it  was  not  de 
sirable  to  have  annexation  settled  too  soon.  An  act 
was  passed  by  the  Legislature  of  Texas,  December  19, 
1836,  by  which  the  Rio  Grande  was  declared  to  be  the 
western  boundary  of  Texas.  In  his  message  of  Decem 
ber  22d  Jackson  submitted  the  report  of  his  agent  that 
the  boundaries  of  Texas,  before  the  last  revolution,  were 
the  Nueces,  the  Red,  and  the  Sabine  rivers,  but  that 
Bhe  now  claimed  as  her  boundary  the  Rio  del  Norte  to 
its  source,  and  from  that  point  eastward  and  south 
ward  the  existing  boundary  of  the  United  States.1  That 
is  as  if  Maine  should  secede  and  claim  that  her  boun 
daries  were  the  Alleghanies  and  the  Potomac.  Jackson's 
message  distinctly  pointed  out  that  in  taking  Texas  then, 
or  later,  the  United  States  would  take  her  with  her  new 
boundary  claims.  That  is  as  if  Maine  should  join  the 
Dominion  of  Canada,  and  England  should  set  up  a  claim 
to  the  New  England  and  Middle  States  based  on  the 
"  declaration  "  of  Maine  above  supposed.  The  policy 
was  to  keep  the  Texas  question  open  until  California 
could  be  obtained.  The  Mexican  war  ultimately  be 
came  necessary  for  that  purpose,  and  for  no  other ;  for 
Texas,  even  to  the  Rio  Grande,  could  have  been  ob 
tained  without  it.2  Another  reason  for  delay  was  that 
opposition  to  the  annexation  of  Texas  had  been  aroused 
in  the  North,  and  there  wasjaot  yet  strength  enough  to 
carry  it.  May  25, 1836,  Adams8  made  a  speech  against 

*  Document  L. 

2  3  Von  Hoist,  67,  81,  103,  108,  112;  Jay,  ISSJ 

•  50  Niles,  276 


358  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

a  war  with  Mexico  to  conquer  Texas,  which  had  great 
influence  in  the  North. 

March  1,  1837,  the  Senate  recognized  the  indepen 
dence  of  Texas,  23  to  19.  The  House  did  not  concur  in 
full  form,  but  in  effect. 

In  1836  the  government  of  the  United  States  opened 
a  new  battery  against  that  of  Mexico  in  the  shape  of  a 
series  of  claims  and  charges.  The  diplomatic  agent  of 
the  former  power,  Powhatan  Ellis,  performed  his  duties 
in  such  a  rude  and  peremptory  manner  that  one  is  forced 
to  suspect  that  he  acted  by  orders,  especially  as  his 
rank  was  only  that  of  charge  d'affaires.  The  charges 
were  at  first  15  in  number,  then  46,  then  57.  They 
were  frivolous  and  forced,  and  bear  the  character  of  at 
tempts  to  make  a  quarrel.1  Ellis  abruptly  came  home. 
In  August,  1837,  the  agent  of  Texas,  Memucan  Hunt, 
made  a  formal  proposal  for  annexation.  Van  Buren 
declined  it.  Mexico  next  proposed  a  new  negotiation 
with  arbitration  in  regard  to  the  claims  and  charges 
made  against  her  by  the  United  States.  The  opposition 
to  annexation  in  the  North  had  grown  so  strong  that  de 
lay  was  necessary,  and  negotiations  were  opened  which 
resulted  in  the  convention  of  August  17,  1840.  Mexico 
could  not  fulfil  the  engagements  she  entered  into  in  that 
treaty,  or  in  a  subsequent  one  of  1843,  and  so  the  ques 
tion  was  reopened,  and  finally  was  manoeuvred  into  a 
war.  It  appears  that  Van  Buren  had  the  feeling  which 
any  President  will  be  sure  to  have,  adverse  to  any  war 
during  his  administration.  The  Mexican  war  was  forced 
vn  by  a  cabinet  intrigue,  and  Tyler  forced  it  on  Polk. 

The  Texas  intrigue  and  the  Mexican  war  were  full  of 
Jaeksonian  acts  and  principles.  There  are  constant 
1  Jay,  36  fg. 


BRISCOE  vs.  BANK  OF  KENTUCKY.  859 

mtcroppings  of  the  old  Seminole  war  proceedings  and 
doctrines.  The  army  and  navy  were  corrupted  by 
swagger  and  insubordination,  and  by  the  anxiety  of  the 
officers  to  win  popularity  by  the  methods  of  which  Jack- 
Bon  had  set  the  example.1  The  filibustering  spirit,  one 
law  for  ouraelves  and  another  for  every  one  else,  gained 
a  popularity  for  which  Jackson  was  much  to  blame. 
During  the  Texas  intrigue  Jackson  engaged  in  private 
and  personal  correspondence  on  public  questions  with 
diplomatic  agents,  who  were  not  always  accredited,  after 
the  fashion  of  Louis  XV.  in  the  King's  Secret.2  His 
"  spirited  diplomacy  "  was  reduced  to  a  farce  when  two 
Buch  men  as  Polk  and  Buchanan  tried  to  employ  it  in 
the  Oregon  question. 

In  1834  the  case  of  Briscoe  vs.  The  Bank  of  the  Com 
monwealth  of  Kentucky  was  argued  before  the  Supreme 
Court.3  Briscoe  and  others  gave  a  note,  in  1830, 
which  they  did  not  pay  at  maturity.  In  the  state  Cir 
cuit  Court,  Briscoe  pleaded  "  no  consideration,"  on  the 
ground  that  the  note  was  given  for  a  loan  of  notes  of 
the  Bank  of  the  Commonwealth,  which  were  "  bills  of 
credit "  within  the  prohibition  of  the  Constitution,  and 
therefore  of  no  value.  The  state  court  found  for  the 
bank.  The  state  Court  of  Appeals  affirmed  that  decision. 
The  case  was  carried  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  on  a  writ  of  error.  The  court  consisted, 
in  1834,  of  Chief  Justice  Marshall,  of  Virginia,  ap 
pointed  by  Adams  in  1801 ;  and  Associate  Justices 

1  In  1824  Commodore  Porter  was   guilty  of  an  outrage  at 
Foxardo,  Porto  Eico.      When  court-martialled,   he  made  an 
ilaborate  comparison  of  his  proceedings  with  those  of  Jackson  IB 
Florida,  by  way  of  defence.   (28  Niles,  370.)     He  was  cashiered. 
t/*  11  Adams,  357  8  8  Petert,  118. 


B60  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Johnson,  of  South.  Carolina,  appointed  by  Jefferson  in 
1804 ;  Duvall,  of  Maryland,  appointed  by  Madison  in 
1811 ;  Story,  of  Massachusetts,  appointed  in  the  same 
jrear  by  the  same  ;  Thompson,  of  New  York,  appointed 
by  Monroe  in  1823  ;  McLean,  of  Ohio,  appointed  by  Jack 
son  in  1829 ;  and  Baldwin,  of  Pennsylvania,  appointee 
by  Jackson  in  1830.  Johnson  was  absent  all  the  terra, 
Duvall  was  absent  part  of  tbo  term.  Of  the  five  who 
heard  the  argument  in  Briscoe's  case,  a  majority  thought 
that  the  notes  of  the  Bank  of  the  Commonwealth  were 
bills  of  credit  under  the  decision  in  Craig  vs.  Missouri,1 
but  there  were  not  four,  a  majority  of  the  whole,  who 
concurred  in  this  opinion.  The  rule  of  the  court  waa 
not  to  pronounce  a  state  law  invalid  for  unconstitution- 
ality  unless  a  majority  of  the  whole  court  should  concur. 
Hence  no  decision  was  rendered. 

The  Circuit  Court  of  Mercer  County,  Kentucky,  de 
cided  in  1834,  under  the  decision  in  Craig  vs.  Missouri, 
that  the  notes  of  the  Bank  of  the  Commonwealth  were 
bills  of  credit.2 

Judge  Johnson  died  in  1834.  Duvall  resigned  in 
January,  1835.  Wayne  took  his  seat  January  14,  1835. 
Hence  there  was  one  vacancy  in  1835,  and  Briscoe's 
case  went  over.  Marshall  died  July  6,  1835.  In  1836 
there  were  only  five  judges  on  the  bench  of  the  court. 
Taney  was  confirmed  March  15,  1836.  P.  P.  Barbour, 
of  Virginia,  was  confirmed  on  the  same  day.  This  made 
the  co  art  complete  again.  Three  changes  had  taken 
place  since  1834,  and  five  of  the  seven  judges  were  now 
Jackson's  appointees. 

Briscoe  vs.  The  Bank  was  decided  in  January,  1837 
The  decision  was  by  McLean.  It  was  held  that  a  bL 

<  See  page  135.  «  46  NUes,  210 


DEFINITION  OF  BILLS  OF  CREDIT.  861 

>% 

uf  credit  "  is  a  paper  issued  by  the  sovereign  power, 
containing  a  pledge  of  its  faith  and  designed  to  circulate 
us  money."  Notes,  to  be  bills  of  credit,  must  be  issued 
by  the  State  and  bind  the  faith  of  the  State.  Commis 
sioners  of  issue  must  not  impart  any  credit  by  signature, 
nor  be  responsible.  Hence  it  was  held  that  the  notes  of 
the  Bank  of  the  Commonwealth  were  not  bills  of  credit- 
Story  rendered  a  very  strong  and  unusually  eager  dis 
senting  opinion.  In  it  he  gave  a  summary  history  and 
analysis  of  "  bills  of  credit  "  as  they  existed  before  the 
Revolution,  and  as  they  were  understood  by  the  Consti 
tution-makers.  He  explicitly  referred  to  the  former 
hearing  of  the  case,  and  said  that  Marshall  had  been 
in  the  majority  against  the  constitutionality  of  the  is 
sues. 

The  decision  in  Briscoe's  case  marks  the  beginning  of 
t  new  era  in  the  history  of  the  constitutional  law  of  the 
United  States.  Up  to  that  time  the  court  had  not 
failed  to  pursue  the  organic  development  of  the  Consti 
tution,  and  it  had,  on  every  occasion  on  which  it  was 
put  to  the  test,  proved  the  bulwark  of  constitutional 
liberty,  by  the  steadiness  and  solidity  of  judgment  with 
which  it  had  established  the  interpretation  of  the  Con 
stitution.  Our  children  are  familiarized,  in  their  school- 
books,  with  the  names  of  statesmen  and  generals,  and 
popular  tradition  carries  forward  the  fame  of  men  who 
have  been  conspicuous  in  public  life ;  but  no  one  who 
really  knows  how  the  national  life  of  the  United  States 
has  developed  will  dispute  the  assertion  that  no  man  can 
be  named  to  whom  the  nation  is  more  indebted  for  solid 
and  far-reaching  services  than  it  is  to  John  Marshall. 
The  proceedings  of  the  Supreme  Court  are  almost  always 
overlooked  in  ordinary  narrations  of  history,  but  he  who 


362  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

looks  for  real  construction  or  growth  in  the  institution! 
of  the  country  should  look  to  those  proceedings  first  ol 
all.  Especially  in  the  midst  of  a  surging  democracy, 
exposed  to  the  chicane  of  political  mountebanks  and 
the  devices  of  interested  cliques,  the  firmness  and  cor 
rectness  with  which  the  court  had  held  its  course  on 
behalf  of  constitutional  liberty  and  order  had  been  of 
inestimable  value  to  the  nation.  The  series  of  great 
constitutional  decisions,  to  which  reference  has  been 
made  in  the  preceding  pages,  have  now  entered  into 
the  commonplaces  of  our  law.  They  have  been  tested 
through  three  quarters  of  a  century.  To  see  in  the  ret 
rospect  that  they  were  wise,  and  that  the  contrary  decis 
ions  would  have  produced  mischief,  is  one  thing ;  to  see 
at  the  time,  in  the  heat  of  controversy  and  under  the 
clamor  of  interests,  what  was  the  sound  and  correct  in 
terpretation,  and  to  pronounce  it  in  spite  of  abuse,  was 
another  thing. 

In  Briscoe's  case  the  court  broke  the  line  of  its  de 
cisions,  and  made  the  prohibition  of  bills  of  credit 
nugatory.1  If  the  degree  of  responsibility  and  inde 
pendent  authority  which  the  directors  of  the  Bank  of 
the  Commonwealth  of  Kentucky  possessed,  and  the 
amount  of  credit  they  gave  to  the  notes  aside  from  the 
credit  of  the  State,  was  sufficient  to  put  those  notes  out 
side  the  prohibition  of  the  Constitution,  then  no  State 
could  find  any  difficulty  in  making  a  device  for  escaping 
the  constitutional  prohibition.  Wild-cat  banking  was 
granted  standing  ground  under  the  Constitution,  and  the 

1  "A  virtual  and  incidental  enforcement  of  the  depreciated 
lotes  of  the  state  banks,  by  their  crowding  out  a  sound  medium 
Ihough  a  great  evil,  was  not  foreseen."  (Madison  to  C.  J.  luge* 
toll,  February  22,  1831  ;  4  Elliott,  641.) 


EFFECT  ON  THE  COURT.         365 

hoast  that  the  Constitutional  Convention  had  closed  and 
carred  the  door  against  the  paper  money  with  which  the 
colonies  had  been  cursed  was  without  foundation.  The 
great  "  banks "  set  up  by  the  southwestern  States  be 
tween  1835  and  1837  were  protected  by  this  decision. 
They  went  on  their  course,  and  carried  those  States 
down  to  bankruptcy  and  repudiation.  The  wild-cat 
banking  which  devastated  the  Ohio  States  between  1837 
and  1860,  and  miseducated  the  people  of  those  States 
until  they  thought  irredeemable  government  issues  an 
unhoped-for  blessing,  never  could  have  existed  if  Story's 
opinion  had  been  law.  The  legal-tender  notes  of  1862 
and  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  on  the  constitu 
tionality  of  the  legal-tender  act  must  have  borne  an 
entirely  different  color,  if  Marshall's  opinion  had  pre 
vailed  in  Briscoe's  case. 

Jackson's  appointments  introduced  the  mode  of  action 
by  the  Executive,  through  the  selection  of  the  judges, 
on  the  interpretation  of  the  Constitution  by  the  Supreme 
Court.  Briscoe's  case  marked  the  victory  of  Kentucky 
relief  finance  and  state-rights  politics  over  the  judiciary. 
The  effect  of  political  appointments  to  the  bench  is  al 
ways  traceable,  after  two  or  three  years,  in  the  reports, 
which  come  to  read  like  a  collection  of  old  stump 
speeches.  The  climax  of  the  tendency  which  Jackson 
inaugurated  was  reached  when  the  court  went  to  pieces 
on  the  Dred  Scott  case,  trying  to  reach  a  decision 
which  should  be  politically  expedient,  rather  than  one 
which  should  be  legally  sound.  A  later  and  similar 
instance  is  furnished  by  the  legal-tender  cases.  As  for 
ihe  immediate  effect  of  Jackson  s  appointments,  it  may 
ae  most  decorously  stated  by  quoting  from  Story's 
reasons,  in  1845,  for  proposing  to  resign :  "  I  have  been 


564  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

long  convinced  that  the  doctrines  and  opinions  of  the 
old  court  were  daily  losing  ground,  and  especially  those 
on  great  constitutional  questions.  New  men  and  new 
opinions  have  succeeded.  The  doctrines  of  the  Consti 
tution,  so  vital  to  the  country,  which,  in  former  times, 
received  the  support  of  the  whole  court,  no  longer  main 
tain  their  ascendency.  I  am  the  last  member  now 
living  of  the  old  court,  and  I  cannot  consent  to  remain 
where  I  can  no  longer  hope  to  see  those  doctrines 
recognized  and  enforced."  l 

During  Jackson's  second  term  the  growth  of  the 
nation  in  wealth  and  prosperity  was  very  great.  It  is 
plain,  from  the  history  we  have  been  pursuing,  in  spite 
of  all  the  pettiness  and  provincialism  which  marked 
political  controversies,  that  the  civil  life  of  the  nation 
was  growing  wider  and  richer.  It  was  just  because 
there  was  an  immeasurable  source  of  national  life  in  the 
physical  circumstances  and  in  the  energy  of  the  people 
that  the  political  follies  and  abuses  could  be  endured. 
If  the  politicians  and  statesmen  would  only  let  the 
nation  alone  it  would  go  on,  not  only  prosperously,  but 
smoothly  ;  that  is  why  the  non-interference  dogma  of  the 
democrats,  which  the  whigs  denounced  as  non-govern- 
jient,  was  in  fact  the  highest  political  wisdom.  On  re 
flection  it  will  not  be  found  strange  that  the  period  1829 
to  1837  should  have  been  marked  by  a  great  deal  of 
violence  and  turbulence.  It  is  not  possible  that  a  grow 
ing  nation  should  spread  over  new  territory,  and  feel 
ihe  thrill  of  its  own  young  energies  contending  success 
fully  with  nature  in  all  her  rude  force,  without  social 
sommotions  and  a  certain  recklessness  and  uproar.  The 
sontagion  of  these  forms  of  disorder  produces  other  and 
1  2  Story's  Story,  527. 


VIOLENCE  365 

less  excusable  forms.  On  account  of  the  allowance  to 
be  made  for  violence  and  lawlessness  under  the  eircum- 
itances,  and  also  on  account  of  the  disagreeableness  of 
recalling,  if  it  can  be  avoided,  old  follies,  no  recapitu 
lation  of  the  outrages,  mobs,  riots,  etc.,  of  the  period  will 
here  be  attempted.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  they  were 
worse  and  more  numerous  than  either  before  or  since. 
Brawls  and  duels  between  congressmen,  and  assaults  on 
congressmen  by  persons  who  considered  themselves  ag 
grieved  by  words  spoken  in  debate,  were  very  frequent 
at  Washington.  The  cities  possessed,  as  yet,  no  police. 
The  proposition  to  introduce  police  was  resented  as  an 
assault  on  liberty.  Rowdies,  native  Americans,  protest- 
ants,  firemen,  anti-abolitionists,  trades-unionists,  anti- 
bank  men,  etc.,  etc.,  in  turn  produced  riots  in  the  streets 
of  the  great  Eastern  cities.  From  the  South  came 
hideous  stories  of  burning  negroes,  hanging  abolition 
ists,  and  less  heinous  violence  against  the  mails.  From 
Charlestown,  Massachusetts,  came  the  story  of  the  cruel 
burning  of  a  convent.  Niles,  in  August,  1835,  gathered 
three  pages  of  reports  of  recent  outrages  against  law  and 
order.1  A  month  later  he  has  another  catalogue,  and 
he  exclaims  in  astonishment  that  the  world  seems  upside 
down.2  The  fashion  of  the  time  seemed  to  be  to  pass  at 
once  from  the  feeling  to  the  act.  That  Jackson's  char 
acter  and  example  had  done  something  to  set  this 
fashion  is  hardly  to  be  denied.  Harriet  Martineau  and 
Richard  Cobden,  both  friendly  critics,  were  shocked  and 
disappointed  at  the  social  condition.  Adams,  in  1834, 
wrote  thus:  "The  prosperity  of  the  coantry,  indepen 
dent  of  all  agency  of  the  government,  is  so  great  that  the 
^eople  have  nothing  to  disturb  them  but  their  own  way 
1  48  Niles,  439.  2  49  Nilea,  49. 


366  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

wardness  and  corruption.  They  quarrel  upon  dissent 
sions  of  a  doit,  and  split  up  in  gangs  of  partisans  of  A, 
B,  and  C,  without  knowing  why  they  prefer  one  to 
another.  Caucuses,  county,  state,  and  national  conven* 
tions,  public  dinners  and  dinner-table  speeches,  two  or 
three  hours  long,  constitute  the  operative  power  of 
electioneering ;  and  the  parties  are  of  working  men, 
temperance  reformers,  anti-masons,  Union  and  state- 
rights  men,  milliners,  and,  above  all,  Jackson  men,  Van 
Buren  men,  Clay  men,  Calhoun  men,  Webster  men, 
and  McLean  men,  whigs  and  tories,  republicans  and 
democrats,  without  one  ounce  of  honest  principle  to 
choose  between  them."  l  In  his  long  catalogue  he  yet 
omitted  abolitionists  and  native  Americans,  the  latter  of 
whom  began  to  be  heard  of  as  soon  a£  foreign  immigra 
tion  became  great.  Great  parties  did  not  organize  on 
the  important  political  questions.  Men  were  led  off  on 
some  petty  side  issue,  or  they  attached  themselves  to  a 
great  man,  with  whom  they  hoped  to  come  to  power. 
The  zeal  of  these  little  cliques  was  astonishing.  One 
feels  that  there  must  have  been  a  desire  to  say  to  them : 
No  doubt  the  thing  you  have  taken  up  as  your  hobby  is 
fairly  important,  but  why  get  so  excited  about  it,  and 
why  not  pursue  your  reformatory  and  philanthropic 
»vork  outside  of  politics  ?  Why  not  go  about  your  pro 
posed  improvement  soberly  and  in  due  measure  ?  The 
truth  was  that  nearly  all  the  cliques  wanted  to  reach 
their  object  by  the  short  cut  of  legislation,  that  is,  to 
force  other  people  to  do  what  they  were  convinced  it 
was  a  wise  thing  to  do,  and  a  great  many  of  them  also 
wanted  to  make  political  capital  out  of  their  "  causes.'' 
There  was  something  provincial  about  the  gossip  an* 
1  9  Adams,  187. 


ATTEMPTED  ASSASSINATION  OF  JACKSON.    367 

ttews-mongering  over  small  things,  and  about  the  din 
ners  and  ovations  to  fourth-rate  men.  One  wonders  if 
the  people  had  not  enough  interesting  things  to  occupy 
them.  They  could  not  have  been  very  busy  or  hard- 
worked,  if  they  had  time  to  spend  on  all  these  things. 
There  was  something  bombastic,  too,  about  the  way  in 
which  an  orator  took  up  a  trifle.  Everything  in  the 
surroundings  forced  him  to  be  inflated  and  meretricious, 
in  order  to  swell  up  to  the  dimensions  of  the  occasion 
the  trifle  with  which  he  was  forced  to  deal.  At  the 
game  time  serious  things,  like  nullification,  were  treated 
by  the  same  inflated  method,  which  made  them  ridicu 
lous.  On  every  occasion  of  general  interest  the  peo 
ple  ran  together  for  a  public  meeting.  Their  method 
of  doing  their  thinking  on  any  topic  seemed  to  be  to 
hear  some  speeches  about  it.  No  doubt  this  was  one 
reason  why  there  was  so  much  heat  mixed  up  with  all 
opinions. 

The  prevailing  disposition  to  boast,  and  the  over- 
sensitiveness  to  foreign  criticism  which  was  manifested, 
were  additional  symptoms  of  immaturity. 

January  30,  1835,1  Jackson  attended  the  funeral,  at 
the  Capitol,  of  Warren  R.  Davis,  of  South  Carolina. 
As  he  came  out  through  the  rotunda,  a  man  named 
Uichard  Lawrence  snapped  two  pistols  in  succession  at 
him.  Neither  was  discharged.  Lawrence  gave  half  a 
dozen  inconsistent  reasons  for  the  act.  He  was  plainly 
insane.  Jackson  immediately  gave  the  attack  a  political 
significance.  Some  days  after  it  occurred  Harriet  Mar- 
tine  au  called  upon  him,  and  referred  to  the  "  insane  at 
tempt."  "  He  protested,  in  the  presence  of  many 
itrangers,  that  there  was  no  insanity  in  the  case.  I  was 
1  47  Niles,  340. 


B68  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

silent,  of  course.  He  protested  that  there  was  a  plot, 
and  that  the  man  was  a  tool."  1  He  went  so  far  as  to 
name  Senator  Poindexter,  of  Mississippi,  as  the  insti 
gator.  He  was  at  feud  with  Poindexter,  although  the 
latter  had  been  with  him  at  New  Orleans,  and  had  de~ 
fended  him  in  Congress  in  the  Seminole  war  affair. 
Harriet  Martineau  says  it  was  expected  at  Washington 
that  they  would  have  a  duel  as  soon  as  Jackson's  term 
was  out.  This  was  probably  based  on  a  reputed  speech 
of  Poindexter,  to  which  the  "  Globe  "  gave  currency.2 
That  paper,  nearly  a  month  after  the  attempted  assassina 
tion,  treated  the  charge  against  Poindexter  as  not  at  all 
incredible.  Poindexter  obtained  an  investigation  by  the 
Senate,  when  the  charge  was,  of  course,  easily  proven  to 
rest  upon  the  most  frivolous  and  untrustworthy  asser 
tions,  no  one  of  which  would  bear  the  slightest  exami 
nation,  and  some  of  which  were  distinctly  false.  The 
incident,  however,  illustrated  one  trait  of  Jackson's  char 
acter,  which  has  been  noted  several  times  before.  The 
most  extravagant  and  baseless  suspicion  of  a  personal 
enemy  in  connection  with  an  injury  to  himself  struck  his 
mind  with  such  a  degree  of  self-evident  truth  that  ex 
ternal  evidence  to  the  contrary  had  no  influence  on  him. 
In  the  present  case,  this  fault  laid  him  open  to  a  charge 
of  encouraging  persons  who  had  committed  perjury  and 
suborned  others  to  do  so.  Lawrence,  on  his  trial,  con 
tinually  interrupted  the  proceedings.  He  was  acquitted 
and  remanded  to  custody  as  an  insane  person. 

A  faction  arose  in  New  York  city  in  1834-35,  whic* 

*  1   Martineau,  Western  Travel,  162.     She  was  in  the  Capita 
k  con  the  attack  occurred. 
8  43  Niks,  33. 


THE  EQUAL  RIGHTS  PARTY.  369 

jailed  itself  the  "  equal  rights  party,"  or  the  "  Jeffer- 
eonian  anti-monopolists."  The  organization  of  the 
Tammany  Hall  democrats,  under  Van  Buren  and  the 
regency,  had  become  rigid  and  tyrannical.  The  equal 
rights  faction  revolted,  and  declared  that  Tammany 
was  aristocratic.  They  represented  a  new  upheaval  of 
democracy.  They  took  literally  the  dogmas  which  had 
been  taught  them,  just  as  the  original  Jackson  men  had 
done  ten  years  before,  only  that  now,  to  them,  the  Jack 
son  party  seated  in  power  seemed  to  have  drifted  away 
from  the  pure  principles  of  democracy,  just  as  Monroe 
had  once  appeared  to  the  Jackson  men  to  have  done. 
The  equal  rights  men  wanted  "  to  return  to  the  Jeffer- 
sonian  fountain  "  again,  and  make  some  new  deductions. 
They  revived  and  extended  the  old  doctrines  which 
Duane,  of  the  "  Aurora,"  taught  at  the  beginning  of  the 
century  in  his  "Politics  for  Farmers,"  and  similar 
pamphlets.  In  general  the  doctrines  and  propositions 
might  be  described  as  an  attempt  to  apply  the  procedure 
of  a  township  democracy  to  a  great  state.  The  equal 
rights  men  held  meetings  at  first  secretly,  at  four  differ 
ent  places,  and  not  more  than  two  successive  times  at 
the  same  place.1  They  were,  in  a  party  point  of  view, 
conspirators,  rebels,  —  "  disorganizes,  "  in  short ;  and 
they  were  plotting  the  highest  crime  known  to  the  polit 
ical  code  in  which  they  had  been  educated,  and  which 
they  accepted.  Their  platform  was  :  No  distinction  be 
tween  men  save  merit ;  gold  and  silver  the  only  legiti 
mate  and  proper  circulating  medium ;  no  perpetuities 
or  monopolies ;  strict  construction  of  the  Constitution ; 
no  bank  charters  by  States  (because  oanks  of  issue 
(avor  gambling,  and  are  "calculated  t<r  build  up  and 

1  Byrdsall,  16. 
24 


370  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

strengthen  in  our  country  the  odious  distribution  ol 
wealth  and  power  against  merits  and  equal  rights"); 
approval  of  Jackson's  administration ;  election  of  Presi 
dent  by  direct  popular  vote.  They  favored  the  doc 
trine  of  instructions.  They  also  advocated  free  trade 
and  direct  taxes.1  They  had  some  very  sincere  and 
pure-minded  men  among  them,  a  large  number  of  over 
heated  brains,  and  a  still  larger  number  of  demagogues, 
who  were  seeking  to  organize  the  faction  as  a  means  oi 
making  themselves  so  valuable  that  the  regular  managers 
would  buy  them.  The  equal  rights  men  gained  strength 
BO  rapidly  that,  on  the  29th  of  October,  1835,  they  were 
able  to  offer  battle  to  the  old  faction  at  a  primary  meet 
ing  in  Tammany  Hall  for  the  nomination  of  a  con 
gressman  and  other  officers.  The  "  regular "  party 
entered  the  hall  by  the  back  entrance,  and  organized 
the  meeting  before  the  doors  were  opened.  The  anti- 
monopolists  poured  in,  nominated  a  chairman  and 
elected  him,  ignoring  the  previous  organization.  The 
question  of  "  equal  rights  "  between  the  two  chairmen 
was  then  settled  in  the  old  original  method  which  haa 
prevailed  ever  since  there  has  been  life  on  earth.  The 
equal  rights  men  dispossessed  the  other  faction,  and 
BO  proved  the  justice  of  their  principles.  The  non- 
equal  rights  party  then  left  the  hall,  but  they  "  caused  " 
the  equal  rights  men  "  to  be  subjected  to  a  deprivation 
of  the  right"  to  light  by  turning  out  the  gas.  The 
equal  rights  men  were  thus  forced  to  test  that  theory 
of  natural  rights  which  affirms  that  said  rights  are 
only  the  chance  to  have  good  things,  if  one  can  get  them 
In  spite  of  their  dogma  of  the  equality  of  all  men,  whicli 
Would  make  a  prudent  man  no  better  than  a  carelesl 
1  Byrdsall,  103. 


THE  "LOCO-FOCOS."  371 

one,  and  a  man  with  capital  no  better  than  one  without 
capital,  the  equal  rights  men  had  foreseen  the  emer 
gency,  and  had  provided  themselves  with  capital  in  the 
shape  of  candles  and  loco-foco  matches.  They  thus 
established  their  right  to  light,  against  nature  and 
against  their  enemies.  They  duly  adopted  their  plat 
form,  nominated  a  ticket,  and  adjourned.  The  regular 
leaders  met  elsewhere,  nominated  the  ticket  which  they 
had  previously  prepared,  and  dispensed,  for  that  occa 
sion,  with  the  ornamental  and  ceremonious  formality  of 
a  primary  meeting  to  nominate  it. 

On  the  next  day  the  "  Courier  and  Enquirer  "  dubbed 
the  equal  rights  party  the  loco-focos,  and  the  name 
clung  to  them.1  Hammond  quotes  a  correspondent 2 
who  correctly  declared  that  "  the  workingmen's  party 
and  the  equal  rights  party  have  operated  as  causes, 
producing  effects  that  will  shape  the  course  of  the  two 
great  parties  of  the  United  States,  and  consequently 
the  destinies  of  this  great  republic."  The  faction,  at 
least  in  its  better  elements,  evidently  had  convictions 
and  a  programme.  It  continued  to  grow.  The  "  Even 
ing  Post "  became  its  organ.  That  paper  quarrelled 
with  the  administration  on  Kendall's  order  about  the 
mails,  and  was  thereupon  formally  read  out  of  the  party 
by  the  "  Globe."  8  The  loco-focos  ceased  to  be  a  re 
volting  faction.  They  acquired  belligerent  rights.  The 
faction,  however,  in  its  internal  economy  ran  the  course 
of  all  factions.  It  went  to  extremes,  and  then  began 
to  split  up.  In  January,  1836,  it  declared  its  indepen 
dence  of  the  democratic-republican  party.  This  alienated 
nil  who  hated  the  party  tyranny,  but  who  wanted  re 

1  49  Mies,  162.  2  2  Hammond,  503. 

*  49  Niles,  78. 


872  ANDREW  JACKSON 

form  in  the  party.  The  faction  declared  itself  opposed 
to  all  acts  of  incorporation,  and  held  that  all  such  acts 
were  repealable.  It  declared  that  representative  insti 
tutions  were  only  a  practical  convenience,  and  that 
Legislatures  could  not  create  vested  rights.1  Then  it 
went  on  to  adopt  a  platform  of  "  equality  of  position,  as 
well  as  of  rights." 

In  October,  1836,  Tammany  made  overtures  to  the 
equal  rights  men  for  a  reunion,  in  preparation  for  the 
presidential  election.  Some  of  the  loco-focos  wanted 
to  unite ;  others  refused.  The  latter  were  the  men  of 
conviction  ;  the  former  were  the  traders.  The  former 
called  the  latter  "  rumps  ;  "  the  latter  called  the  former 
"  buffaloes."  2  Only  one  stage  now  remained  to  com 
plete  the  old  and  oft-repeated  drama  of  faction.  A 
man  named  Slamm,  a  blatant  ignoramus,  who,  to  his 
great  joy,  had  been  arrested  by  order  of  the  Assembly 
of  New  York  for  contempt  and  breach  of  privilege, 
and  who  had  profited  to  the  utmost  by  this  incident 
to  make  a  long  "  argument "  against  the  "  privilege  " 
of  an  American  Legislature,  and  to  pose  as  a  martyr 
ko  equal  rights,  secured  his  own  election  to  the  posi 
tion  of  secretary  of  the  equal  rights  party.  He  then 
secured  a  vote  that  no  constitutional  election  could  be 
held  unless  called  by  the  secretary.  He  never  would  call 
one.  There  were  those  who  thought  that  he  sold  out 
the  party. 

Thus  the  faction  perished  ignominiously,  but  it  was 
not  without  reason  that  its  name  passed,  a  little  later, 
to  the  whole  Jackson- Van  Buren  party ;  i.  e.,  to  the  rad 
fcai  anti-paper  currency,  not  simply  anti-United  States 
Bank,  wing  of  the  national  democratic  party.  The 
i  Byrdsall,  41.  2  Byrdsall,  178, 


INFLUENCE   OF  THE  LOCO-FOC08.  37S 

»qual  rights  men  maintained  impracticable  doctrines  of 
eivil  authority  and  fantastic  dogmas  about  equality,  but 
when  these  were  stripped  away  there  remained  in  their 
platform  sound  doctrines  and  imperishable  ideas.  They 
first  put  the  democratic  party  on  the  platform  which  for 
five  or  six  years  it  had  been  trying  to  find.  When  it 
did  find  that  platform  it  was  most  true  to  itself,  and  it 
contributed  most  to  the  welfare  of  the  country.  To 
day  the  democratic  party  is,  by  tradition,  a  party  of 
hard  money,  free  trade,  the  non-interference  theory  of 
government,  and  no  special  legislation.  If  that  tradi 
tion  be  traced  up  to  its  source,  it  will  lead  back,  not  to 
the  Jackson  party  of  1829,  but  to  the  loco-focoa  of 
1835 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

SHE    ELECTION    OF    1836. END    OF   JACKSON'S    CAREER. 

THE  attempt  was  made  in  1834  to  unite  and  organize 
the  whole  opposition  to  Jackson.  Niles  first  mentions 
the  party  name  "  whig "  in  April,  1834.1  He  saya 
that  it  had  come  into  use  in  Connecticut  and  New  York. 
It  was  adopted  with  antagonistic  reference  to  the  high 
prerogative  and  (as  alleged)  tory  doctrines  of  Jackson. 
The  anti-masons  and  national  republicans  ultimately 
merged  in  the  new  whig  party,  but  time  was  required 
to  bring  about  that  result.  In  1834  it  was  impossible. 
The  anti-masons  insisted  on  acting  independently.  Their 
candidate  for  President  then  was  Francis  Granger.3 
Clay  would  not  run  in  1836  because  he  could  not  unite 
the  opposition.  He  was  disgusted  with  public  life,  and 
desired  to  retire.8 

The  administration  party,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
perfectly  organized.  The  corps  of  federal  office-holders 
had  been  drilled  by  the  "  Globe  "  into  thorough  disci 
pline  and  perfect  accord  of  energy  and  will.  Each  offi 
cer  was  held  to  "  revere  the  chief,"  and  to  act  in  obedi 
ence  to  the  indications  of  his  will  which  came  through 
the  "  Globe."  They  did  so.  There  was  no  faltering. 
There  was  only  zealous  obedience.  It  caused  some 
bewilderment  to  remember  that  this  was  the  party  which 
Had  denounced  Adams  for  using  the  federal  officers  t« 

1  46  Nilen,  101.  2  50  Niles  234.  8  9  Adams,  17tt 


DEMOCRATIC  CONVENTION— 1835.  375 

electioneer.  Lewis  had  been  known  to  interfere  di 
rectly  in  elections,  and  Blair  had  done  the  same  in  his 
private  capacity.1  The  party  had  been  wonderfully  held^ 
together.  In  1830  there  were  only  four  anti-Jackson 
Legislatures  in  the  Union,  namely,  Vermont,  Massa 
chusetts,  Connecticut,  and  Delaware.  In  the  six  years 
from  1830  to  1835,  both  inclusive,  twenty-seven  States 
held  162  sessions  of  their  Legislatures.  Of  these  116 
had  Jackson  majorities,  40  anti-Jackson,  and  4  Cal- 
houn.2  There  was  some  talk  of  a  third  term  for  Jack- 
Bon,  but  it  never  grew  strong.  The  precedents  were 
cited  against  it.  Jackson's  bad  health  and  Van  Buren's 
aspirations  were  perhaps  stronger  objections.  Adams 
Bays  that  Jackson  had  "  wearied  out  the  sordid  subser 
viency  of  his  supporters."  8  That  is  not  at  all  improb 
able. 

The  democratic  convention  was  held  at  Baltimore, 
May  20,  1835.  Jackson  had  written  to  Tennessee 
recommending  that  a  convention  should  be  held  of 
"  candidates  fresh  from  the  people."  There  were  not 
wanting  those  who  called  this  convention  a  caucus,  and 
said  that  it  was  the  old  congressional  monster  in  a  new 
mask.  Tennessee  did  not  send  any  delegates.  Even 
Jackson  could  not  bring  that  State  to  support  Van  Bu- 
ren.  Tennessee  was  a  whig  State  until  1856.  Her 
hostility  to  Van  Buren  was  adroitly  combined  with  that 
of  Pennsylvania,  in  1844,  by  the  selection  of  Polk  as  a 
candidate,  to  defeat  Van  Buren.  In  1835  a  caucus  of 
the  New  Hampshire  Legislature,  which  nominated  Hill 
Cor  Governor,  passed  a  resolution  begging  Tennessee  not 
to  divide  the  party.4  Tennessee,  however,  had  another 

*  40  Niles,  299.  2  63  Niles,  308. 

8  9  Adams,  312.  4  48  Nilet.  822- 


376  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

rery  popular  candidate,  Hugh  L.  White,  a  former  friend 
of  Jackson,  whom  Jackson  now  hated  as  a  traitor  and 
renegade.1  John  Bell,  the  Speaker,  was  a  supporter  of 
White,  and  he  and  his  friends  claimed  that  they  were 
not  in  opposition  ;  that  they  and  White  were  good  repub 
licans,  and  that  they  preferred  White  to  the  man  whom 
Jackson  had  selected.2  The  "Globe"  attacked  Bell 
with  bitterness.  Jackson  was  greatly  enraged,  and  ex 
erted  himself  personally  and  directly  against  White.8 
One  Tennessee  man,  being  in  Baltimore  when  the  con 
vention  was  held,  took  upon  himself  to  represent  that 
State.  His  name  was  Rucker,  and  to  "  ruckerize " 
passed  into  the  political  slang  of  the  day,  meaning  to  as 
sume  functions  without  credentials. 

The  Baltimore  convention  was  largely  composed  of 
office-holders.  Twenty-one  States  were  represented.4 
Andrew  Stevenson,  of  Virginia,  was  chairman.  The 
two-thirds  rule  was  adopted,  because  Van  Buren  was 
sure  of  two  thirds.  He  actually  got  a  unanimous  vote, 
265.  For  Vice-President,  R.  M.  Johnson,  of  Kentucky, 
got  178  votes;  W.  C.  Rives,  of  Virginia,  87.  The 
Virginia  delegation  declared,  on  the  floor  of  the  con 
vention,  that  Virginia  would  never  vote  for  Johnson,  be 
cause  he  favored  tariff,  bank,  and  internal  improve 
ments,  and  because  they  had  no  confidence  in  his 
principles  or  character.5  Van  Buren,  in  his  letter  of 
acceptance,6  said  that  he  had  been  mentioned  as  Jack- 
ion's  successor  "  more  through  the  ill-will  of  opponents 
.ban  the  partiality  of  friends."  That  statement  was 
jo  adroit  that  it  would  take  a  page  to  tell  whether  ft 

1  See  page  312.  2  Bell's  speech  in  48  Mies,  334. 

»  49  Niles,  35.  *  48  Niles,  207,  227,  244. 

'  48  Niles,  248.  «  48  Niles,  257. 


CANDIDATES  AND  PLATFORMS  — 1836.         377 

was  true  or  not.  He  made  a  full  and  eager  declaiation 
that  lie  had  asked  for  no  man's  support.  He  said  that 
he  would  "  endeavor  to  tread  generally  in  the  footsteps 
of  President  Jackson,  —  happy  if  I  shall  be  able  to  per 
fect  the  work  which  he  has  so  gloriously  begun." 
Johnson,  in  his  letter  of  acceptance,1  declared  that  he 
was  opposed  to  the  old  bank,  or  to  one  like  it,  but 
thought  that  such  a  bank  as  Jackson  talked  of  in  his 
earliest  messages  might  be  a  good  thing.  On  tariff  and 
internal  improvements  he  said  that  he  agreed  with 
Jackson.  Van  Buren  was  fifty-four  years  of  age  and 
Johnson  fifty-six.  Johnson  had  been  in  Congress  ever 
since  1807,  except  during  the  second  war  with  England, 
when  he  took  the  field.  He  served  with  some  distinc 
tion,  but  a  ridiculous  attempt  to  credit  him  with  the  kill 
ing  of  Tecumseh  has  caused  his  real  merits  to  be  for 
gotten.  As  a  public  man  he  managed  to  be  as  near  as 
possible  to  the  head  of  every  popular  movement,  and  to 
get  his  name  connected  with  it,  but  he  never  contrib 
uted  assistance  to  any  public  business.  His  name  is 
also  met  with  frequently  as  a  messenger,  middle-man, 
manipulator,  and  general  efficiency  man  of  the  Jackson 
party.  He  made  a  report,  in  1829,  on  the  question  of 
running  the  mails  on  Sunday,  which  was  one  of  his 
claims  to  fame.  It  was  written  for  him  by  the  Rev.  O. 
B.  Brown.2  A  chance  was  found  in  this  report  to  utter 
some  noble  sentiments  on  religious  liberty,  and  to  lay 
down  some  specification  of  American  principles  in  that 
regard  which  were  not  likely  to  provoke  contradiction. 
This  valuable  production  was  printed  on  cloth,  and  hung 
dp  in  stage  offices  and  bar-rooms  all  o~er  the  country 

i  48  Niles,  329. 

*  See  page  349.    Kendall's  Autobiography,  107. 


378  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Johnson  had  nourished  presidential  aspirations  for  some 
years.  He  did  not  abandon  them  till  1844. 

The  anti-Jackson  men,  in  1834-35,  were  opposed,  on 
principle,  to  a  national  convention.  They  said  that 
the  convention  was  King  Caucus  revived.  The  anti- 
masons  held  a  state  convention  at  Harrisburg,  Decem 
ber  16,  1835. l  It  was  decided  not  to  call  a  national 
convention.  They  thought  the  free  action  of  the  people 
would  be  best  brought  out  by  state  conventions.  They 
nominated  William  H.  Harrison  by  89  votes  to  29  for 
Webster  and  3  for  Granger.  For  Vice-President, 
Granger  got  102  votes  ;  Hugh  L.  White,  5 ;  William 
Slade,  of  Vermont,  5  ;  and  William  A.  Palmer,  of  Ver 
mont,  7.  The  whigs  of  Pennsylvania  adopted  the  nom 
inations  of  the  anti-masons,  and  coalesced  with  them. 
Webster  was  very  anxious,  at  this  time,  to  be  nominated 
and  supported  by  the  whigs.  It  pleases  some  people  to 
think  that  Webster  ought  not  to  have  had  this  ambition. 
He  was  a  strange  compound  of  the  greatest  powers  and 
some  mean  traits.  To  such  a  man  the  presidential  am 
bition  is  very  sure  to  mean  moral  shipwreck.  Still  it 
was  not  wrong  for  Webster  to  want  the  insignia  of  suc 
cess  in  his  career.  His  dissatisfaction  was  well-founded 
when,  after  his  splendid  services,  he  saw  William  Henry 
Harrison  preferred  before  him  ;  and  it  is  a  point  which 
deserves  careful  attention,  that,  if  Webster's  just  am 
bition  had  been  fairly  gratified,  he  would  have  been  a 
better  man.  He  was  nominated  by  the  Legislature  of 
Massachusetts. 

Hugh  L.  White,  of  Tennessee,  was  nominated  by  the 
Legislatures  of  Alabama,  Tennessee,  and  Illinois.  Judgt 
McLean  was  nominated  in  Ohio.  He  had  had  presi 
>  49  Niles,  265,  287. 


ADMISSION  OF  MICHIGAN.  379 

i 

dential  aspirations  ever  since  1828.1  The  Northern 
whigs  supported  Harrison,  and  the  Southern  whigs  sup- 
ported  White.  Thus  the  opposition  went  into  the  cam« 
paign  disorganized  and  devoted  to  defeat. 

Harrison  and  White  were  of  the  same  age,  sixty-three. 
Harrison  was  a  man  of  no  education.  He  had  done 
some  good  service  as  an  Indian  fighter.  The  anti-Jack 
son  men,  who  had  derided  Jackson's  candidature  be 
cause  he  was  not  a  statesman,  selected,  in  Harrison,  the 
man  nearest  like  him  whom  they  could  find.  They 
hoped  to  work  up  a  popularity  for  him  on  the  model  of 
Jackson's  popularity.2  Harrison  answered  the  anti- 
masons  that  he  was  not  a  mason,  and  did  not  like 
masonry,  but  that  the  federal  government  had  nothing 
to  do  with  that  subject.  This  did  not  satisfy  Thaddeus 
Stevens,  who  wanted  Webster.8  White  has  been  men 
tioned  several  times.  He  had  a  fair  education,  a  good 
character,  and  was  very  much  respected,  but  he  was  a 
man  of  only  ordinary  ability. 

During  the  winter  of  1835-36  there  was  a  great  strug 
gle  in  the  House  over  a  contested  election  in  North  Car- 
olina.  It  was  thought  very  probable  that  the  presiden 
tial  election  might  be  thrown  into  the  House,  and  the 
vote  of  North  Carolina  might  decide  the  result.  The 
sitting  member  (Graham)  was  unseated,  and  the  case  was 
referred  back  for  a  new  election. 

There  were  two  States  whose  admission  was  pending 
when  the  election  approached,  —  Arkansas  and  Miehi- 
gan.  In  1835  Michigan  became  involved  in  a  boundary 

1  Kendall's  Autobiography,  304. 

2  For  an  estimate  of  Harrison,  written  in  1828,  which  is  per 
haps  too  highly  colored  to  quote,  see  "  Adams,  530. 

8  9  Adams,  273 


B80  ANDREW  JACKSON 

dispute  with  Ohio.  The  act  which  organized  the  terri 
toiy  of  Michigan,  January  11,  1805,  described,  as  ita 
southern  boundary,  a  due  east  and  west  line  running 
through  the  southernmost  point  of  Lake  Michigan.  The 
Constitution  of  Ohio  gave  that  State,  as  its  northern 
boundary,  a  line  drawn  from  the  southernmost  point  of 
Lake  Michigan  to  the  northernmost  cape  of  Maumee 
Bay.  Indiana's  northern  boundary  had  been  described 
as  a  due  east  and  west  line  ten  miles  north  of  the 
southernmost  point  of  Lake  Michigan.  The  northern 
boundary  of  Illinois  had  been  placed  on  the  parallel  of 
42°  30'.  Michigan,  therefore,  found  her  territory  re 
duced.  Jackson,  at  first,  on  the  advice  of  Butler,  the 
Attorney-General,  took  the  side  of  Michigan.  The  peo 
ple  of  Michigan  held  a  convention  in  September,  1835, 
and  framed  a  Constitution,  which  was  to  go  into  effect  in 
November.  In  October,  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State, 
Asbury  Dickens,  wrote,  at  the  President's  orders,  that 
no  such  reorganization  of  the  government  could  take 
place  without  the  consent  of  Congress.  In  1835-36  there 
was  some  danger  of  an  armed  collision  between  Ohio  and 
Michigan  ;  but  it  is  not  easy,  on  account  of  the  rhetoric 
which  was  then  in  fashion,  to  judge  how  great  this  dan 
ger  was.  June  15,  1836,  Arkansas  and  Michigan  were 
admitted  together;  but  Michigan  was  put  under  the 
eondition  that  she  must  accept  the  southern  boundary 
which  resulted  from  the  northern  lines  of  Indiana  and 
Ohio,  and  accept  compensation  on  the  peninsula  north  of 
Lake  Michigan.  The  Legislature  of  Michigan,  in  July 
called  a  convention,  which  met  September  26th,  and  re 
jected  the  condition.  On  the  5th  and  6th  of  December 
by  the  spontaneous  action  of  the  people,  delegates  wen 
elected  to  a  convention,  which  met  December  14,  1836 


THE    VOTE  IN  1836.  381 

Mid  assented  to  the  condition.  Jackson,  in  a  message, 
December  26th,  informed  Congress  of  the  action  of 
Michigan.1  Michigan  was  admitted  January  26,  1837. 
She  offered  a  vote  in  the  presidential  election.  In  an 
nouncing  the  vote,  the  vote  of  Michigan  was  included  in 
the  alternative  form. 

In  the  spring  of  1836  Sherrod  Williams  interrogated 
ihe  candidates  for  President.  Harrison 2  favored  dis 
tribution  of  the  surplus  revenue  and  of  the  revenue  from 
lands  ;  opposed  internal  improvements  except  for  works 
of  national  scope  and  importance  ;  would  charter  a  bank, 
but  with  great  reservations  ;  thought  that  neither  House 
of  Congress  had  a  right  to  expunge  anything  from  its  rec 
ords.  Van  Buren  opposed  national  bank,  internal  im 
provements,  and  all  distribution.  The  equal  rights  men 
interrogated  the  candidates.  The  committee  reported 
that  they  were  greatly  pleased  with  Johnson's  replies, 
but  that  Van  Buren's  were  unsatisfactory.  Many  "  ir 
reconcilable  "  equal  rights  men  refused  to  vote  for  Van 
Buren.  Later,  however,  he  became  fully  identified  with 
that  wing  of  the  national  democratic  party  which  took 
up  the  essential  features  of  the  loco-foco  doctrine. 

In  the  election  8  Van  Buren  received  170  votes,  count 
ing  3  of  Michigan ;  Harrison,  73  ;  White,  26  (Georgia 
and  Tennessee)  ;  Webster,  14  (Massachusetts)  ;  W.  P 
Mangum,  of  North  Carolina,  11  (South  Carolina).  Van 
Buren's  majority  over  all  was  46.  Van  Buren's  and 
Garrison's  votes  were  well  distributed  geographically. 
Van  Buren  carried  Maine,  New  Hampshire,  Rhode  Isl« 
find,  Connecticut,  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  Virginia, 
North  Carolina,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  Louisiana,  Uli 
tois,  Missouri,  Arkansas,  Michigan.  Harrison  carried 

1  51  Niles,  278.  2  51  N'les,  23,  8  58  Niles,  392. 


382  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

Vermont,  New  Jersey,  Delaware,  Maryland,  Kentucky 
Ohio,  and  Indiana.  The  popular  vote  was  :  for  Van 
Buren,  761,549  ;  for  all  others,  736,656  ;  Van  Buren'a 
majority,  24,89s.1  For  Vice-President,  R.  M.  Johnson 
got  147  votes  ;  Francis  Granger,  77  ;  John  Tyler,  47  , 
William  Smith,  of  Alabama,  23  (Virginia).  As  no  one 
had  a  majority,  the  Senate  elected  Johnson.  In  Janu 
ary,  1837,  Webster  wrote  to  Massachusetts 2  that  he 
should  renign  his  seat.  He  intended  to  retire  from  pub 
lic  life,  at  least  temporarily. 

Van  Buren  was  now  at  the  height  of  his  ambition ; 
but  the  financial  and  commercial  storm  which  had  been 
gathering  for  two  or  three  years,  the  accumulated  result 
of  rash  ignorance  and  violent  self-will  acting  on  some  of 
the  most  delicate  social  interests,  was  just  ready  to  burst. 
High  prices  and  high  rents  had  already  before  the  elec 
tion  produced  strikes,  trades-union  conflicts,  and  labor 
riots,8  things  which  were  almost  unprecedented  in  the 
United  States.  The  price  of  flour  wras  so  high  that 
493,100  bushels  of  wheat  were  imported  at  New  York 
in  1836,  and  857,000  bushels  before  April,  in  1837.4 
Socialistic  notions  of  course  found  root,  and  flourished 
like  weeds  at  such  a  time.  An  Englishwoman,  named 
Fanny  Wright,  became  notorious  for  public  teachings  of 
an  "  emancipated  "  type.  The  loco-focos  were  charged 
with  socialistic  notions,  not  without  justice.  There  were 
Bocialists  amongst  them.  The  meeting  held  in  the  City 
Hall  Park,  at  New  York,  February  13,  1837,  out  of 
vhich  the  "  bread  riots  "  sprang,  was  said  to  have  beec 

1  American  Almanac  for  1880.  The  figures  in  Niles  are  full  o' 
tbyicus  errors. 

*  i  Webster's  Correspondence,  25  fg. 

•  48  Niles,  171  ;  50  Niles,  130.  *  52  Niles,  147. 


TEE  BREAD  RIOTS.  388 

sailed  by  them.  They  certainly  had  habituated  the  city 
populace  to  public  meetings,  at  which  the  chance  crowd 
of  idlers  was  addressed  as  "  the  people,"  with  all  the 
current  catch-words  and  phrases,  and  at  which  blatant 
urators,  eager  for  popularity  and  power,  harangued  the 
crowd  about  banks,  currency,  and  vested  rights.  Of 
course  in  these  harangues  violence  of  manner  and  lan 
guage  made  up  for  poverty  of  ideas,  and  the  minds  of 
the  hearers  were  inflamed  all  the  more  because  they 
could  understand  nothing  of  what  the  orators  said,  except 
that  they  were  being  wronged  by  somebody.  On  that 
day  in  February  the  crowd  got  an  idea  which  it  under 
stood.1  Some  one  said  :  Let  us  go  to  Hart  [a  provision 
merchant],  and  offer  him  eight  dollars  a  barrel  for  his 
flour.  If  he  will  not  take  it  —  !  In  a  few  hours  the 
mob  destroyed  five  hundred  barrels  of  flour  and  one 
thousand  bushels  of  wheat.  The  militia  were  needed  to 
restore  order.2  The  park  meetings  were  continued. 

The  commercial  crisis  burst  on  the  country  just  at 
the  beginning  of  March,  when  Jackson's  term  ended. 
There  was  a  kind  of  poetic  justice  in  the  fact  that  Van 
Buren  had  to  bear  the  weight  of  all  the  consequences  of 
Jackson's  acts  which  Van  Buren  had  allowed  to  be 
committed,  because  he  would  not  hazard  his  standing 
in  Jackson's  favor  by  resisting  them.  Van  Buren  dis 
liked  the  reputation  of  a  wire-puller  and  intriguer,  but 
lie  had  well  earned  his  title,  the  "  little  magician,"  by 
the  dexterity  with  which  he  had  manoeavred  himself 
across  the  slippery  arena  of  Washington  politics  and  up 
to  the  first  place.  He  had  just  the  temper  for  a  poll* 

1  Byrdsall  (103)  says  the  not  was  not  tne  fault  of  the  \«o» 
faces. 
*  51  Niies,  403. 


384  ANDREW  JACKSON. 

tician.  Nothing  ruffled  him.  He  was  thick-skinned, 
elastic,  and  tough.  He  did  not  win  confidence  from 
anybody.  He  was,  however,  a  man  of  more  than  aver 
age  ability,  and  he  appears  to  have  been  conscious  ol 
lowering  himself  by  the  political  manoeuvring  which  he 
had  practised.  As  President  he  showed  the  honorable 
desire  to  have  a  statesman-like  and  high-toned  adminis 
tration,  and  perhaps  to  prove  that  he  was  more  than  a 
creature  of  Jackson's  whim.  He  could  not  get  a  fair 
chance.  The  inheritances  of  party  virulence  and  dis 
trust  which  he  had  taken  over  from  Jackson  were  too 
heavy  a  weight.  He  lost  his  grip  on  the  machine  with 
out  winning  the  power  of  a  statesman.  He  never  was 
able  to  regain  control  in  the  party.  American  public 
life  is  constituted  out  of  great  forces,  which  move  on  in 
a  powerful  stream,  under  constantly  changing  phases 
and  combinations,  which  it  is  hard  to  foresee.  Chance 
plays  a  great  role.  If  a  man,  by  a  chance  combination 
of  circumstances,  finds  himself  in  one  of  the  greater 
currents  of  the  stream,  he  may  be  carried  far  and  high, 
and  may  go  on  long ;  but  if  another  chance  throws  him 
put,  his  career  is,  almost  always,  ended  forever.  The 
course  of  our  political  history  is  strewn  with  men  who 
were  for  a  moment  carried  high  enough  to  have  great 
ambitions  and  hopes  excited,  but  who,  by  some  turn  in 
the  tide,  were  stranded,  and  left  to  a  forgotten  and  dis 
appointed  old  age.  Van  Buren  illustrated  all  these 

eases.    G^fc  >kMj(U>'vv;  - 

Parton  quotes  a  letter  of  Jackson  to  Trist,1  written 

March  2,  1837,  in  which  he  says :  "  On  the  4th  I  hop* 

to  be  able  to  go  to  the  Capitol  to  witness  the  glorioui 

scene  of  Mr.  Van  Buren,  once  rejected  by  the  Senate, 

1  3  Parton,  624 


JACK  SOWS  LAST  DAYS. 

rworn  into  office  by  Chief  Justice  Taney,  also  being  re 
jected  by  the  factious  Senate."  The  election  of  Van 
Buren  is  thus  presented  as  another  personal  triumph  of 
Jackson,  and  another  illustration  of  his  remorseless  pur 
suit  of  success  and  vengeance  in  a  line  in  which  any  one 
had  dared  to  cross  him.  This  exultation  was  the  temper 
in  which  he  left  office.  He  was  satisfied  and  triumph 
ant.  Not  another  President  in  the  whole  list  ever  went 
out  of  office  in  a  satisfied  frame  of  mind,  much  less 
with  a  feeling  of  having  completed  a  certain  career  in 
triumph. 

On  the  7th  of  March  Jackson  set  out  for  Tennessee. 
He  was  surrounded  to  the  last  writh  affection  and  re 
spect.  On  his  way  home  he  met  more  than  the  old 
marks  of  attention  and  popularity.  He  was  welcomed 
back  to  Nashville  as  he  had  been  every  time  that  he 
had  returned  for  twenty  years  past.  These  facts  were 
riot  astonishing.  He  retained  his  popularity.  Hence 
he  was  still  a  power.  It  was  still  worth  while  to  court 
him  and  to  get  his  name  in  favor  of  a  man  or  a  measure. 
Parton  says  that  office-seekers  pursued  and  pestered 
him  up  to  his  last  days.  Politicians  sought  to  get  let 
ters  from  him  which  they  could  use  for  their  purposes. 
In  1843  a  letter  was  obtained  from  him  favoring  the 
annexation  of  Texas,  which  was  then  being  pushed  for 
ward  by  a  new  intrigue  in  and  around  Tyler's  cabinet. 
This  letter  was  evidently  prepared  for  Jackson  after  the 
fashion  of  Lewis.  It  was  held  back  for  a  year,  and 
then  published  with  a  false  date.  So  Jackson  was  used 
by  the  annexation  clique  to  ruin  his  friend  Van  Buren. 
The  party  which  he  and  Van  Buren  had  consolidated 
passed,  by  tLa  Texas  intrigue,  away  from  Van  Buren 
and  under  the  control  cf  the  slavery  wing  of  it  Th« 


ANDREW  JACKSON. 

last-mentioned  letter  of  Jackson  brought  him  again  into 
collision  with  Adams,  for  in  it  Jackson  repeated  his 
former  assertions  that  he  had  always  disapproved  oi 
the  treaty  of  1819,  and  of  the  boundary  of  the  Sabine, 
Adams  produced  the  entries  in  his  "  Diary  "  as  proof  to 
the  contrary.  Jackson  lent  all  his  influence  to  Polk  in 
1844.  Probably  he  was  mortified  that  Tennessee  voted 
for  Clay,  although  by  only  113  majority  in  a  vote  of 
120,000.  Letters  signed  by  him  favoring  Polk  were 
constantly  circulated  through  the  newspapers,  and  they 
no  doubt  had  their  effect.  This  was  his  last  public  ac 
tivity.  He  died  June  8,  1845.  He  had  had  honors 
beyond  anything  which  his  own  heart  had  ever  coveted. 
His  successes  had  outrun  his  ambition.  He  had  held 
more  power  than  any  other  American  had  ever  pos 
sessed.  He  had  been  idolized  by  the  great  majority  of 
his  countrymen,  and  had  been  surfeited  with  adulation. 
He  had  been  thwarted  in  hardly  anything  on  which  he 
had  set  his  heart.  He  had  had  his  desire  upon  all  his 
enemies.  He  lived  to  see  Clay  defeated  again,  and  to 
help  to  bring  it  about.  He  saw  Calhoun  retire  in  de 
spair  and  disgust.  He  saw  the  bank  in  ruins  ;  Biddle 
arraigned  on  a  criminal  charge,  and  then  dead  broken 
hearted.  In  his  last  years  he  joined  the  church,  and, 
on  that  occasion,  under  the  exhortations  of  his  spiritual 
adviser,  he  professed  to  forgive  all  his  enemies  in  a 
, — Ijody.^  It  does  not  appear  that  he  ever  repented  of 
anything.,  ever  thought  that  he  had  been  in  the  wrong  ic 
anything,  or  ever  forgave  an  enemy  as  a  specific  inii 
ridwO. 


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SHORTER  DESIGNATIONS  BY  WHICH  THEY  HAVE 
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American  Annual  Register  for  1796.     Philadelphia. 

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Benton :  Thirty  Years'  View  ;  or,  A  History  of  the  Working  ot 
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Appleton  :  New  York,  1854. 

Binns :  Recollections  of  the  Life  of  John  Binns ;  written  by  him- 
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Brothers :  The  United  States  of  North  America  as  They  Are, 
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Byrdsall :  The  History  of  the  Loco-Foco  or  Equal  Rignts  Party 
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Carey's  Letters:  Nine  Letters  to  Dr.  Adam  Seybert;  by  Mat 
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Carey's  Olive  Branch  :  The  Olive  Branch ;  or,  Faults  on  Botii 
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Chevalier  :  Society,  Manners,  and  Politics  in  the  United  States  : 
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bett.     Harpers:  New  York,  1834. 
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Cincinnati,  1847. 
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edited  by  Henry  Adams.     Little,  Brown  &  Co.  :  Boston,  1877 
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Document  C.  22d  Congress,  1st  Session,  2  Reports,  No.  283. 
Document  D.  22d  Congress,  2d  Session,  1  Exec.  Docs.  No.  9. 
Document  E.  22d  Congress,  2d  Session,  Reports,  No.  121. 
Document  E.  23d  Congress,  1st  Session,  1  Senate  Docs.  No.  17. 
Document  G.  23d  Congress,  1st  Session,  1  Senate  Docs.  No.  2. 
Document  H.  23d  Congress,  1st  Session,  1  Senate  Docs.  No.  16. 
Document  I.  23d  Congress,  2d  Session,  I  Senate  Docs.  No.  17. 
Document  J.  23d  Congress,  2d  Session,  1  Exec.  Docs.  No.  9. 
Document  K.  23d  Congress,  2d  Session,  2  Senate  Docs.  No.  13. 
Document  L.  24th  Congress,  2d  Session,  2  Exec.  Docs. 
Document  M.  23d  Congress,  1st  Session,  Senate  Docs.  No.  238. 
Drake's  Tecumseh  :  Life  of  Tecumseh,  and  of  his  Brother,  the 

Prophet,  with  a  Historical  Sketch  of  the  S  hawanoe  Indians ; 

by  Benjamin  Drake.     Morgan:  Cincinnati,  1841. 
The  Duplicate  Letters,  the  Fisheries,  and  the  Mississippi ;  Docu 
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Collected  and  Published  by  John  Quincy  Adams.    Davis  & 

Force:  Washington,  1822. 
Duane  :  Narrative  and  Correspondence  Concerning  the  Removal 

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Duane's  Pamphlets:   Duane's  Collection  of  Select  Pamphlets 

[W.  Duane.]     Philadelphia,  1814. 
Raton's  Jackson :  The  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson  ;  Commen  ced  by 

John  Reid,  Completed  by  John  H.  Eaton.     Carey  :  Philade' 
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Edwards:  History  of  Illinois,  from  1778  to  1833;  and  Life  and 
Times  of  Ninian  Edwards ;  by  his  Son,  Ninian  W.  Edwards. 
Illinois  State  Journal  Co. :  Springfield,  Illinois,  1870. 

Elliott :  The  Debates  in  the  Several  State  Conventions  on  the 
Adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution.  4  vols.  Edited  by 
Jonathan  Elliott:  Washington,  1836. 

Folio  State  Papers  :  American  State  Papers ;  Documents  Legis 
lative  and  Executive  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  from 
the  1st  Session  of  the  18th  Congress  to  the  1st  Session  of  the 
20th  Congress.  Gales  &  Seaton :  Washington,  1859.  Subdi 
visions  :  Finance,  Indian  Affairs,  etc.,  etc. 

Gallatin :  Considerations  on  the  Currency  and  Banking  System 
of  the  United  States;  by  Albert  Gallatin.  Carey  &  Lea: 
Philadelphia,  1831.  Reprinted  from  the  American  Quarterly 
Review  for  December,  1830. 

Gallatin's  Writings :  The  Writings  of  Albert  Gallatin ;  edited  by 
Henry  Adams.  Lippincott :  Philadelphia,  1879. 

Garland's  Randolph :  The  Life  of  John  Randolph  of  Roanoke ; 
by  Hugh  A.  Garland.  2  vols.  Appleton:  New  York,  1851. 

Gibbs :  Memoirs  of  the  Administrations  of  Washington  and 
John  Adams ;  edited  from  the  Papers  of  Oliver  Wolcott, 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury;  by  George  Gibbs.  2  vols.  New 
York,  1846. 

Goodrich :  Recollections  of  a  Life-Time ;  by  S.  G.  Goodrich.  2 
vols.  Miller  :  New  York,  1851. 

Goodwin's  Jackson  :  Biography  of  Andrew  Jackson ;  by  Philo  A. 
Goodwin.  Clapp  &  Benton:  Hartford,  1832. 

Gouge :  A  Short  History  of  Paper  Money  and  Banking  in  the 
United  States ;  by  William  M.  Gouge.  Collins :  New  York, 
1835. 

Gouge's  Texas  :  The  Fiscal  History  of  Texas ;  by  William 
Gouge.  Lippincott :  Philadelphia,  1852. 

Greeley :  The  American  Conflict ;  by  Horace  Greeley.  Case : 
Hartford,  1873. 

Hamilton's  Works :  The  Works  of  Alexander  Hamilton.  Fran 
cis  :  New  York,  1851. 

Hammond  :  The  History  of  Political  Parties  in  the  State  of  New 
York,  from  the  Ratification  of  «he  Federal  Constitution  to  De 
cember,  1840.  2  vols.  By  Jabez  D.  Hammond,  fourth  Edi 
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Hammond's   Wright:     Life  and   Times  of   Silas   Wright;    bj 

Jabez  D.  Hammond.     Barnes  :  New  York,  1848. 
Harpers's   Calhoun :    Life  of    John   C.  Calhoun.    (Anonyraoui 

Pamphlet.)     Harpers  :  New  York,  1843. 
Hewitt :    An  Historical  Account  of  the  Rise  and  Progress  of  th« 

Colonies  of   South  Carolina  and   Georgia.     2  vols.     Anony 
mous  [Alexander  Hewitt].     Donaldson  :  London,  1779. 
Hodgson:    The  Cradle  of  the    Confederacy,  or   the  Times  of 

Troup,  Quitman,  and  Yancey  by   Joseph   Hodgson,  of  Mo 
bile.     Register  Office  :  Mobile,  1876. 

Howard  :    Reports  of  Cases  Argued  and  Adjudged  in  the  Su 
preme  Court  of  the  United  States. 
Hunt's  Livingston :    Life  of  Edward   Livingston ;   by   Charlef 

Havens  Hunt.     Appleton  :  New  York,  1864. 
>ngersoll :    Historical  Sketch  of  the  Second  War  between  the 

United  States  of  America  and  Great  Britain  -   by  Charles  J. 

Ingersoll.    Events  of  1814.     Lea  &  Blan chard  •  Pl/j^adelphia, 

1849. 
/ay  :   A  Review  of  the  Causes  and  Consequences  of  the  Mexican 

War  ;  by  William  Jay.     Mussey  :  Boston,  1849. 
Kendall's  Autobiography  :    Autobiography  of  Amos  Kendall ; 

edited  by  his  Son-in-law,  William  Stickney.     Lee  &  Shepard : 

Boston,  1872. 
Kendall's  Jackson  :    Life  of  Andrew  Jackson,  Private,  Military, 

and  Civil;    by  Amos  Kendall.     Harpers  :  New  York,   1843. 

(Unfinished.) 
Kennedy's  Wirt  :    Memoirs  of  the  Life  of  William  Wirt ;  by 

John  P.  Kennedy.    2  vols.     Lea  &  Blanchard  :  Philadelphia 

1849. 
Latour :    Historical   Memoir  of  the  War  in  West  Florida  and 

Louisiana  in   1814-15;   by  Major   A.   L.   Latour.     Conrad 

Philadelphia,  1816. 
Lodge's  Cabot :  Life  and  Letters  of  George  Cabot ;  by  Henrj 

Cabot  Lodge.     Little,  Brown  &  Co. :  Boston,  1877. 
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Columbus  to   the   Year   1846  ;  by  John  Macgregor.    2  void 

Whittaker:  London,  1847. 
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1837. 
Martineau's  Western  Travel :    Retrospect  of  Western  Travel 

by  Harriet  Martineau.     2  vols.     Harpers  :  New  York,  1838. 
Mayo  :  Political  Sketches  of  Eight  Years  in  Washington ;  by 

Robert  Mayo  :  Baltimore,  1839. 
Memoirs  of  Bennett :  Memoirs  of  James  Gordon  Bennett  and 

his  Times  ;  by  a  Journalist.  Stringer  &  Townsend  :  New  York, 

1855. 
Morse's  Adams  :  John  Quincy  Adams ;  by  John  T.  Morse,  Jr. 

Houghton,  Mifflin  &  Co. :  Boston,  1 882. 
Niles:  Niles's  Weekly  Register,  1811  to  1848. 
Opinions  of  the  Attorneys-General  :    Official   Opinions  of  the 

Attorneys-General  of  the  United  States.     Washington,  1852. 
Parton :    Life  of  Andrew  Jackson  ;  by  James  Parton.     3  vols. 

Mason  Brothers  :  New  York,  1861. 
Perkins :    Historical  Sketches  of  the  United   States  from  th« 

Peace  of  1815  to  1830;  by  Samuel  Perkins.     Converse:  New 

York,  1830. 
Peters  :    See  Howard. 
Pickett :   History  of  Alabama  and  Incidentally  of  Georgia  and 

Mississippi,  from  the  Earliest  Period ;    by  A.  J.  Pickett.     9 

vols.     Walker  &  James  :  Charleston,  1851. 
Pitkin  :   A    Statistical  View  of  the   Commerce  of   the  United 

States  of  America ;  by  Timothy  Pitkin.     Durrie  &  Peck  :  New 

Haven,  1835. 
Plumer's  Plumer :    Life  of  William  Plumer ;  by  his  son,  William 

Plumer,  Jr.     Phillips,  Sampson  &  Co. :  Boston,  1856. 
Putnam  :    History  of  Middle  Tennessee,  or  Life  and  Times  of 

General  James  Robertson ;    by  A.   W.  Putnam.     Nashville, 

1859. 
Quincy's  Adams  :  Memoirs  of  the  Life  of  John  Quincy  Adams ; 

by  Josiah  Quincy.     Phillips,  Sampson  &  Co. :  Boston,  1858. 
Raguet :   A  Treatise  on   Currencv  and  Banking ;  by    Condy 

Raguet.     Grigg  &  Elliott  •   Philadelphia,  1839. 
Ramsey :  The  Annals  of  Tennessee  to  toe  End  of  the  Eight 
eenth  Century ;  by  J.  G    M.  Ramsey.     Russell :  Charleston, 

1853. 
Rush  :    Memoranda  of  a  Residence  at  the  Court  of  London  ;  by 


92    FULL   TITLES   OF  BOOKS  REFERRED    TO. 

Richard  Rush.     I.    Key  &  Biddle :  Philadelphia,  1833.      II 

Lea  &  Blanchard:  Philadelphia,  1845. 
Sargent:    Public  Men  and  Events  from  the  Commencement  oj 

Mr.  Monroe's  Administration  in  1817  to  the  Close  of  Mr.  Sill 

more's  Administration  in  1853  ;  by  Nathan  Sargent.     2  vols. 

Lippincott :  Philadelphia,  1875. 
Beybert:  Statistical  Annals  of  the  United  States  from  1789  to 

1818;  by  Adam  Seybert.     Dobson  :  Philadelphia,  1818. 
Sparks's  Morris :   Life  of  Gouvcmeur  Morris,  with  Selection! 

from  his  Correspondence  and  Miscellaneous  Papers  ;  by  Jared 

Sparks.    3  vols.     Gray  &  Bowen  :  Boston,  1832. 
[The]  Statesman's  Manual.     3  vols.      Williams  :    New  York, 

1854. 
Stevens :    A  History  of  Georgia  from   its  First   Discovery  by 

Europeans    to    1798  ;    by  William  Bacon  Stevens.     2    vols. 

Butler:  Philadelphia,  1859. 
Story's  Story  :   Life  and  Letters  of  Joseph  Story  ;  by  his  Son, 

W.  W.  Story.     Little,  Brown  &  Co. :  Boston,  1851. 
Telegraph,  Extra :  United  States  Telegraph,  Extra  ;  March  to 

November,  1828.     Weekly.     Green  &  Jarvis :  Washington. 
Tyler's  Taney :  Memoirs  of  Roger  Brook  Taney ;  by  Samuel 

Tyler.     Murphy:  Baltimore,  1872. 
Von  Hoist  :   The  Constitutional  and   Political  History  of   the 

United  States  ;    by  Dr.  H.  von  Hoist    (translated).     3  vola. 

Callaghan  :  Chicago,  1878-81. 
Webster's    Correspondence :     The   Private    Correspondence    o£ 

Daniel  Webster  ;  edited  by  Fletcher  Webster.    2  vols.    Little, 

Brown  &  Co. :  Boston,  1857. 
Webster's  Works  :  The  Works  of  Daniel  Webster.    6  vols.    Lit- 

tie,  Brown  &  Co. :  Boston,  1851. 
Wheaton:    See  Howard. 
Whig  Almanac :   The  Whig  Almanac   (from    1838).     Horac« 

Greeley :  New  York. 
Wilson's  Works :    The  Works  of  James   Wilson,  LL.  D.     3 

vols.    Philadelphia,  1804. 
Wi*^  •   Seven  Decades  of  the  Union ;  by  Henry  A.  Wise.    Lip 

pincctt.  Philadelphia,  1872 


ESTDEX. 


A.  B.,"  83. 

Aberdeen,  Lord,  169. 

Abolition.    See  Slavery. 

Accommodation  paper.  268  294. 

Adair,  General,  40, 126. 

Adams,  John,  27,  29,  118, 145,  171, 
216,  302. 

Adams,  J.  Q.,  47-386  passim 

'  Addresser,"  83. 

Alamo,  the,  355. 

Alien  act.     See  Law. 

Almanac,  the  Whig,  342. 

Ambrister,  II.,  59,  60,  62. 

Amelia  Island,  54. 

Amendment  of  the  Constitution,  104, 
106,  128,  325. 

American,  the  N.  Y.,  139. 

'American  System,"  194,  19S,  198, 
212,  222. 

Amiens,  peace  of ,  19. 

Ancestry,  Jackson's,  1. 

Animosity,  Jackson's,  68,  91,  291, 
298. 

Anti-bank,  120,  234,  259,  272,  274. 

Anti-masons  and  -masonry,  252-255, 
379. 

Anti-relief.     See  Relief. 

Appalachicola,  62,  53. 

Appointments,  104,  105,  106,  112, 
148;  correspondence  of  Jnckson 
and  Monroe  on.  50,  51,  79,  297. 

Arbuthnot,  A.,  58,  59,  60,  62,  66. 

Argus,  the  Albany,  87,  88, 117. 

Argus,  the  Frankfort,  142, 159. 

Aristocracy,  colonial,  4. 

i.rkan?as,379. 

Army,  the,  68, 109,  359. 

Arrogance,  Jackson's,  278. 

Issassination,  attempted,  of  Jack- 
eon,  367. 

Assault  on  Jackson,  301. 

Athens,  Ga.,216. 

,  uction,  76. 

Auctioneering,  47. 

Aurora,  the.  151,  296,  869. 


Austin,  S.  F.,  352. 
Autobiography,  Kendall's,  3*2. 

BACHE,  116. 

Balch,  162. 

Baltimore,  231,  254,  273,  826,  376. 

Bank :  of  Cairo,  122  ;  of  the  Com 
monwealth  of  Kentucky,  124-134, 
142,  159,  247,  361,  36-2,  (vs.  Wisterj 
135,  (Briscoe  vs.)  359-363  ;  of  Eng 
land,  228,  298  ;  of  Illinois,  122  ;  of 
Kentucky,  120-125,261;  Manhat 
tan  Co. ,  307 ;  of  the  Metropolis,  305, 
306 :  of  North  America,  227  ;  State, 
of  Illinois,  122  ;  of  Tennessee,  122  ; 

'  Union,  of  Maryland,  307 ;  of  the 
United  States  (the  first),  12,  41,  83, 
84,  227-229,  232;  (the  second),  88, 
121-123  128, 129,  132, 142,  159, 191. 
231-249,  257-272, 274, 275,  278, 291- 
310,  315-320,  330,  337-341;  (of 
Pennsylyania),  338,  340-342,  386, 
(vs.  Halsted)  128,  (vs  William  Ow 
ens)  261,  (vs.  Planters'  Bank)  129, 
135,  see  Rechaner  and  Removal; 
charters,  230,  281,  245,  246  ;  demo 
crats,  259;  contraction,  316;  ma 
nia,  120,  229,  318.  323,  324  ;  na 
tional,  13,  82,  224,  225,  232,  234, 
246,  257  275,  305,  320,  342 ;  notion 
of  a,  230,  319 ;  proposed  by  Jack- 
son,  244,  246,  248,  258,  274  ;  re 
striction,  13;  swindles.  134,  230, 
234,  335  ;  theor^  of  a'  national, 
240,  241,  321 ;  war,  241,  246,  257, 
261,  320,  321,  339,  345. 

Banking,  119,  232,  233,  234,  312,  331, 
340,  362. 

Bank-notes.  229,  230,  234.  269,  270. 
317,  32?,  324,  331,  362,  369. 

Bankruptcy,  109. 

Banks,  41,  132,  363,  3P9 ;  "tb«  for- 
ty,"  of  Kentucky,  120-124  ;  local 
or  state,  275,  301, 305,  309,  316,  318 
331,  336;  the  '•  pet"  or  deposit 
305-307,  317,  318,  324,  328,  329 


394 


INDEX. 


835;  and  politics,  227,  228,  237- 
239,  241,  259,  275, 276,  305-308,311 ; 
safety  fund,  275,  276,  301. 

Banquet,  Jefferson's  birth-day,  156, 
157. 

Ban  quo 's  ghost,  152. 

Barbour,  P.  P.,  236. 

Bargain,  98  ;  between  Clay  and  Ad 
ams,  90-96, 106,  139, 152;  354. 

Baring  Bros.,  292,  293. 

Barry,  W.  T.,  127,  135. 141.  144,  160, 
297,348. 

Barton,  T.  P.,  347. 

Batavia,  N.  Y.,250. 

Bell,  J.,  376: 

Belligerent 'regulations,  13,  27. 

Ben  ton,  Jesse,  31. 

Benton,  T.  H..  30,  31,  88,  91,  96,  97, 
105,  106,  108,  145,  154,  178,  188, 
190,  248,  257,  260,  271.  272,  297, 
311,  313,  S17,  320,  331,  335. 

Berrien,  J  M.,  141, 160,  173,  216. 

Beverly,  Carter,  94. 

Bibb,  G.  M.,  190,  312. 

Biddle,  Nicholas,  234,  237-240,  248, 
257,  259-275,  292-296,  304,311,312, 
317,  ?20,  321,  338-342,  386. 

Biddle,  Thomas,  263,  264. 

Billiard-table,  115. 

Binney,  H.,  235. 

Binus,  J.,  112-114, 148,  244. 

Birth-place,  Jackson's,  1. 

Black  George,  101. 

Black-leg,  101. 

Blair,  F.  P.,  92.  159,  160,  243,  259, 
278,  280,  297,  298,  375. 

Blifll,  101. 

Blount,  Governor,  8,  10 

Boleck,  58,  66,  342. 

Boss,  102. 

Boston,  137,  221,  230. 

Boundary :  of  Florida,  19  ;  of  Loui 
siana,  67,  353 ;  of  Michigan,  379. 

Bowlegs.     See  Boleck. 

Branch,  J.,  141, 160. 

Branch  drafts,  235,  236,  261-270,315, 
320. 

Briscoe  vs.  The  Bank  of  the  Com 
monwealth.  See  Sank. 

Broglie,  Due  de,  344,  346,  347. 

Brokers,  334. 

Brooke,  F.,  92. 

Brown,  General,  68. 

Brown,  Rev.  0.  B.,  349,  377. 

Buchaaan,  James,  94, 174,  359. 

Bucktails,  74,  252,  253. 

Buffalo,  239. 
Buffaloes,"  372. 

Bullion! sm      See  Currency,  specie. 

Bund,  the  German,  131. 

Burke.  E.,  118. 

Burr,  A.,  19,  21,  33, 104. 


I  Butler,  missionary ,  181 
Butler,  B.  F.,  247,  380. 

CABAL,  298. 

Cabinet,  137,  140  ;  paper  read  in  th« 

303,  304,  309,  310  ;    the  kitchen 

140,  141,  157,  159,  264,  272,  273 

298. 

Cadwallader,  General,  291,  292 
Caesar,  277. 

Calhoun,  J.  C.,  51-336  passim. 
Calboun,  Mrs.  J.  C.,  150. 
California,  352,  357. 
CallaTa,  69-71. 
Cambreleng,  C.  C.,  152,  261. 
Campaign  methods,  112,  114,  115. 
Campbell,  G.  W.,  22. 
Campbell,  Rev.  Mr.,  150,  162. 
Canada,  29,  40, 168  357. 
Canal,  the  Erie,  86,  110,  322,  323. 
Candles,  167. 

Canning,  George,  168,  169. 
Capital,  224,  225,  319,  322 
Carey,  M.,  229. 
Cass,  L.,  162,  248,  297. 
Catron,  Judge,  355. 
Caucus :     102,  313,    375 ;     congrw 

sional,  73,  79,  84,  85, 100,  254,375 

state,  80,  156;  "King,"  100,  108 

378. 

Censure.    See  Resolutions. 
Central  America,  107. 
Ceremonies,  137. 
Charleston,  S.  C.,  5,  10,  112, 220,  283 

350. 

Charlestown,  Mass.,  365. 
Charter,  130.     See  Bank. 
Chatham,  Lord,  118. 
Chattahoochee,  177. 
Cherokees,  49,  138, 174-183,  277. 
Ohevalier,  M.,  312,  344. 
Cheves,  L.,  234,  235,  265. 
Chickasaws,  179. 
China,  264,  265. 
Choctaws  53,  179,  183. 
Cholera,  266. 
Circulation,  318,  323,  334.    See  Cwt 

rency. 
Civil  service,  83,  103,  116, 118, 14& 

147.     See  Patronage. 
Civilization  of  Indians,  178. 
Clark,  Judge,  125. 
Clay,  H.,  29-386  passim. 
Clayton,  A.  S.,  180, 182,  216,  200. 
Clayton,  J.  M.,  270,  286,  291. 
Clinton,  George,  229. 
Clinton,  De  Witt,  80,  86,  89, 100, 26ft 

254. 

Clintonians,  74,  252,  258. 
Coahuila,  353. 
Cobb,  T.  W.,  216. 
Cobden,  R    865 


INDEX. 


396 


Pochnme,  Admiral,  42. 

Code  of  honor,  17. 

Coffin  hand-bills,  114. 

Cohens  vs.  Virginia,  130. 

Coin,  262. 

Coleman,  Dr.,  76  ;  It-tter  to,  139 

Colombia,  105. 

Colonial  system,  164. 

Colonies,  Spanish,  20. 

Colonization  Society,  216. 

Columbia,  S.  0.,  282. 

Columbia,  District  of,  295  350 

Columbian  Observer,  92. 

Committee,  party,  102,  103. 

Common  sense,  plain,  312. 

Community,  frontier,  2,  3,  5,  16,  17, 
251. 

Compromise,  the  Missouri,  350,  352  ; 
tariff.  See  Tariff  of  1833. 

Concord,  N.  H..,  238. 

Congress :  American,  107,  108  ;  of 
the  United  States,  101,  104,  105, 
108,  330;  Jackson  a  member  of, 
10-13. 

Connecticut,  254,  267,  374. 

Conscription,  41. 

Constitution,  the,  97,  104, 109,  128, 
130-132,  212-216,  246,  255,  278,  283, 
298,  311,  361-363  ;  the  English, 
138 ;  state,  137. 

Constitutional  theories,  285,  286. 

Constitutionality,  119,  126-130,  173, 
360. 

Continental  system,  170. 

Contracts,  119,  121,  130. 

Controller  of  New  York,  73,  74. 

Controversy  between  Adams  and  the 
federalists,  116. 

Convention :  87,  102,  216 ;  anti-ma 
sonic  state,  253,  378  ;  the  consvitu- 
tional,  of  1787,  363 ;  free  trade, 
220 ;  Harrisburg  tariff,  201,  204  ; 
Hartford,  41,  50,  157,  213;  nullifi 
cation,  219,  281,  290  ;  protectionist, 
220;  union,  282.;  national,  254, 
378 ;  of  anti-masons,  254,  255 ;  of 
democrats,  273,  375  ;  of  national 
republicans,  258,  273. 

Coosa,  177. 

Coppinger,  71. 

Corn  laws,  202,  203,  206. 

Correspondence  of  Jackson  and  Mon- 

ro«.     See  Appointments. 
Corruption,  political,  105,  329. 
Cotton,  136,  322. 

Countervailing,   164,   165,  168,   170, 

196, 197, 198,  206.     See  Reciprocity. 

Courier  and  Enquirer,  114,  15t>,  156, 

243,  263,  271. 

Court :  contempt  of,  46,  173,  17* 
282  ;  supreme,  of  the  United  States, 
128. 132,  277,  359,  361. 


Craig  vs.  Missouri,  135,  360. 

Crawford,  W.  H.,  49,  51,  65,  «6,  82 
83,  86,  89,  99,  101,  109,  111,  113 
152-158,  193,  216.  229,  307. 

Credit :  226,  265,  328.  332  ;  abuse  of 
6,  16,  126,  234,  323 ;  bills  of,  135 
359-362  ;  for  duties,  76,  206,  271 
288,  328 ;  public,  12,  119,  231  . 
system,  123,  323. 

Creeks,  the,  32,  35,  37,  38,  49,  52,  56 
60,  63, 174-1^3. 

Crisis:    commercial,  229,  318,  336 
of  1798,  13, 17 ;  of  1819,  75,  234 ; 
of  1825, 197  ;  of  1834,  315-317  ;  cf 
1837,  330,  383. 

Crittenden,  J.  J.,  290. 

Cumberland  Road,  191,  192. 

Currency,  229,  312,  331.  See  Circu 
lation-;  of  Europe,  12,  75;  of  the 
States,  16,  120,  134,  135;  of  th« 
United  States,  41,  75,  76,  229,  231- 
234,  243-245,  318,  332,  334,  336 ; 
specie,  317,  331,  332,  334,  369, 
value,  331. 

Curtis,  Q.  T.,  290. 

DALLAS,  G.  M.,  47,  87,  116,  259. 
Damages.     See  France,  Draft  on. 
Dancing  Rabbit  Creek,  183. 
Dartmouth  College,  142;  vs.  Wood 

ward,  129. 
Davis,  W.R.,  367. 
Dearborn,  H.  A.  S.,  221. 
Debt :  121,  126,  222,  256,  260,  822 ; 

the  public,  110, 189,  220,  266,  272, 

319,  323. 

Debtors,  119, 124,  126-128,  319. 
Defaulter,  74, 116,  145. 
Democracy,  7.  97,  127, 136, 157,  234, 

241,  280,  299,  310-313, 331, 332, 360 

362,  369. 

Democratic  Press,  113. 
Democrats.     See  Party. 
Deposit  Act  of  1836,  325,  326. 
Deposits:   the  public,  228,  232,  240 

243,  265,  271,  272,  276,  292,  295 

298,  299,  304,  307,  316-319,  326, 

329,  332,  336,  see  Removal ;  regu 

lation  of  the,  305,  306,  320,  325 

326. 

Desertion,  68. 
Desha,  Governor,  132,  133. 
Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams,  95,  160,  3001 

386. 

Dickens,  A.,  380. 
Pickenson,  C.,  18. 

Differential  duties,  165,166, 168,  2M 
Dinsmore,  S. ,  22. 
Directors,  government,  308,  309. 
Disorgan-zers,  79,  87,  152,  253,  3<)9 
Distribution,  189, 193,  325-330 
District  attorney,  Jackson,  8. 


396 


INDEX. 


Dividend    withheld.       See    France, 

Draft  on. 
Divorce,  8,  9. 
Donelson,  J.,  8, 
Donelson,  Mrs.  A.  J.,  150 
Donelson,  Mrs.  J.,  8. 
Donelson,  Rachel,  8. 
Dray  ton,  W.,  49,  50,  163. 
Dred  Scott  case,  363. 
Duane,  W.,  120,  296,  369. 
Duane,  W.  J.,  296,  298  300,  302,  303, 

312,  317. 
Duel,  18,  52, 101. 
Duncan,  J.,  333. 

BAST  ROOM,  the,  114. 

Eaton,  J..H.,  91,  105,  141,  144,  148- 
153, 160-162,  272,  273. 

Eaton,  Mrs.  J.  H.,  149-153, 161, 162, 
273,  278. 

Editors,  145,  148, 159. 

Education,  Jackson's,  2. 

Edwards,  N..  83. 

Election :  79,  97,  98,  116,  118,  127, 
182,  242,  313,  326  ;  contested,  379  ; 
presidential,  of  1796,  10  ;  of  1800, 
104 ;  of  1808,  49 ;  of  1S12,  29 ;  of 
1816,  49:  of  1820,  73,  76;  of  1824, 
89,  90,  98,  105,  151 ;  of  1828,  105, 
106,  116,  242,  253 ;  of  1832,  182, 
221,  223,  249,250-276  ;  of  1836,  372, 
379 ;  of  1844,  375,  386. 

Electioneering,  77,  91,  106,  112,  113, 
146, 152,  308,  311 ,  366,  375. 

Electors,  87. 

Ellis,  P.,  358. 

Ellmaker,  A.,254. 

Ellsworth,  W.  W.,  315. 

Ely,  Rev.  Mr.,  150. 

Embargo,  13,  27,  28,  75,  83,  210. 

Emissaries,  57,  59,  63. 

Emphasis,  185,  252,  312,  367,  383. 

Empire,  the  democratic,  299. 

Encroachments,  federal,  133,  135. 

Energy:  Jackson's,  33,  34,  38,  43, 
170 ;  American,  136. 

Enforcement  Act,  285,  287,  289,  290. 

England:  11,  13,  17,  27,  57,  62,  66, 
161,  165,  167-169,  174,  357 ;  King 
of,  166. 

English,  the,  2,  52,  53,  58. 

Enquirer,  the  Richmond,  263. 

Epitaph,  139. 

Era  of  good  feeling,  101. 

Etiquette.  82,  137, 149. 

Etowah,  177. 

Everett,  A   H.,  220. 

Everett,  Edward,  315. 

Rxchauge  committee,  the,  267. 

Sxchanges  :  the  domestic,  233  far- 
elgn,  317,  323,  324. 

I xchequer  bills,  243. 


Execution,  sales  under,  122, 124, 129 
Executive,    the,  107,  2-47,  278,  299 

305,311,363. 
Expedition  :  Burr's,    21 ;  Miranda'! 

20 ;  the  Nickajack,  15. 
Experiment,  315,  317. 
Expunging.     See  Resolution. 
Extravagance,  113. 

FACTIONS,  74,  76, 77, 101-103, 109, 110 
139, 151, 155,  249,  366,  371 

Fair- traders,  196. 

Fannin,  Colonel,  355. 

Federalism,  214,  282. 

Federalist,  88,  213,  228,  297.  Set 
Party. 

Filibusters,  53,  314,  359. 

Financiering,  322. 

Finances,  public,  41. 

Fine,  Jackson's,  47. 

Fire  at-New  York,  319,  338. 

Fisheries,  81,  95. 

Flint  River,  177. 

Florida:  19,  36,  37,  52,  54,  56,  153 
157,  159,  162,  354,356,359;  cession 
of,  69  ;  invasion  of,  60-65,  see  War 
Seminole ;  Jackson  governor  of 
68,  70,  71,  242;  laws  for,  69:  pur 
chase  of,  20,  67,  69,  246.  S*« 
Treaty  of  1819. 

Foot,  S.  A.,  166. 

Forbes,  firm  of,  70. 

Forsyth,  J.,  153,  154.  347,  348. 

Fort :  Bowyer,  37,  40  ;  Jackson,  35 
44;  Mims,  32;  Negro,  52,  53;  Ni 
agara,  250 ;  Scott,  56. 

Fortifications,  109,  330,  346. 

Fowltown,  55,  56,  63. 

Foxardo,  359. 

France :  13,  17, 27,170, 171,  295,  324 
325,  343-348;  draft  on,  295,  303 
309,  320,  344,  345 ;  King  of  (Louii 
Philippe),  343,  345,  348. 

Franklin,  7. 

Freemasons  and  masonry,  250,  252. 

Free  trade,  76, 166,  167, 210,  217,  220 
289,  370,  373  ;  convention,  220. 

Fromentin,  E.,  70,  71. 

Frontier,  2,  5,  35,  261 

Funding,  12. 

Funds,  state  deposit,  323. 

GAINES,  General,  53-55,  356. 

Gales  and  Seaton,  263. 

Gallatin,  A..,  14,  41,  42,  86,  164, 16? 

191,  220,  228,  307,  308. 
Galphinton,  175. 
Gardner,  J.  B.,  147. 
Georgia,  53,  66,  84, 117,  176-188, 21& 

218,  283. 
Ghent,  40,  41,  46,  59,  60,  81,  84,  81 

95,  231 


INDEX. 


397 


libbons  vs.  Oirden,  130. 

files,  W.B.,ll6. 

Hlmer,  Governor,  181,  216. 

rlobe,  the,  156,  159,  160,  273,  280, 
326,  368,  371,  374,  376. 

tfold,  332-334. 

douge,  W.,  125,  264,  271. 

Souverneur,  S.  L.,351. 

government:  constitutional,  97;  pa 
ternal,  109,  258  ;  personal,  277.  279, 
280,  299,  302,  309,  314 ;  non-inter 
ference  theory  of,  256.  277,  279. 
299,  364,  373. 

Sranger,  E.,  374,  378. 

Ireat  Britain.    See  England. 

Qreeley,  H.,  182. 

areen,  Duff,  104,  105,  140, 143,  157, 
159,  263. 

Sreen  vs.  Biddle,  129. 

Srandy,  F.,286. 

HABEAS  CORPUS,  46,  70,  72. 

Halifax,  165. 

Hall.  Judge,  46. 

Hamilton,  A.,  11,  41,  227,  230,  231, 

308. 

Hamilton,  James,  212,  289. 
Hamilton,  James  A.,  152,  153. 
Hammond,  J.,  371. 
Hard  Times,  75,  204. 
Harper,  R.  G.,  104. 
Harrison,  W.  H.,  378,  379,  381. 
Harvard  College,  254,  300. 
Hayne,  R.  Y.,  152,  190, 198,  217,  284, 

Health,  Jackson's,  34, 154,  300. 

Hiawassee,  177,  353. 

Hickory  Ground,  35, 177 

Hill,  I. ,  140, 143,  143,  157,  163,  237- 

239.  242,  248,  259,  278,  375. 
Hillis  Hajp,  58. 
Himollemico,  58. 
Holston,  176. 
Holy  Ground,  35. 
Honorable,  title  of,  137. 
Elopewell,  175. 
Horse  Shoe  Bend,  35. 
Hottinger,  295. 
House  of  Representatives,   64,  190, 

230  ;   on  the  Bank,  247,  248,  274, 

314  ;  power  of,  to  elect  President 

97. 

Houston,  S.,  354,  355 
Hunt,  M.,  358. 
Huskisson,  W.,  167, 197, 198. 
Huyghens,  Mrs.,  150 

ILLINOIS,  122, 189,  380. 
Illiteracy,  Jackson;s,  15,  49. 
»mmaturity,  367. 
jnmigration,  110. 
hupeaonment,  174,  302,  308  311. 


Impressment,  30,  43. 

Improvements,  internal,  f7,  81,  82 
109, 188,  191-194, 216, 221,  256, 263 
278,  279,  327.  ~ 

Inaugural,  Adams's,  104. 

Inaugural,  Jackson's,  139, 145. 

Inauguration,  Adams's,  93. 

Inauguration,  Jackson's,  138. 

Incendiary  publications,  350. 

Indiana,  189,  380. 

Indians,  174-183,  219,  283 ;  aggru* 
sions  by  or  on,  14,  31,  54,  55,  176 
356 ;  treaty  rights  of,  181. 

Indian  Spring,  177,  178. 

Indian  Territory,  179,  180,  183. 

Indian  title  to  land,  13,  176. 

Inflation,  120,  236,  261,  270,  318,  324 
325. 

Ingham,  S.  D.,  116, 141, 160, 162, 236- 
242,  261,  321,  332. 

Insolvent  laws,  128. 

Institutions,  representative,  280,  313 
372. 

Instructions,  96,  108,  212,  243,  278 
313,  370  ;  to  McLane.  161,  169. 

Insubordination,  33,  34,  44,  359. 

Interference  theory.  See  Govern 
ment,  paternal. 

Intrigues,  90. 

Iron,  206. 

Irreconcilables,  13. 

JACKSON,  A.,  SEN.,  1. 

Jackson,  A.,  Jr.,  2. 

Jackson,  Mrs.  A.,  Jr.,  9,  18,  49, 189 

149. 

Jacksonism,  320. 
Jacobinism,  11,  215. 
Jaudon,  S.,  341. 
Jay,  J.,  11,  41. 
Jefferson,  T.,  10. 12, 14,  22,  27-29, 33 

41,  72,  88,  104,  115,  127,  145,  ^56 

171, 174,  213,  215,  228,  314. 
Jeffersonians.     See  Party. 
Jeffersonian  school,  131,  256. 
Jingo  policy,  108. 
Johnson,  R.  M.,  73, 128, 139, 145,260 

376,  377,  381. 
Johnson,  W.  C.,  273. 
Jones,  W.,  308. 
Jamaica,  166. 
Judge,  Jackson  a,  14. 
"Judge-breaking  "  125,  127. 
Judiciary,  the,  119, 120, 126, 127,  863 ; 

the  federal,  1  >9,  127-130, 136,  171- 

174, 180. 
Judiciary  Act,  130. 

KENDALL  A.,  1, 5,  8, 15, 140, 142, 143 
146.  148\  157,  159. 160.  242,  243, 248 
259;  273  278,  m-306  349,  361, 
371. 


398 


INDEX. 


Kenhlgee,  54. 

Kentucky,  9, 19.  21,  96, 119,  121, 123, 
126,  128, 129.  132  193,  204,  2ll,  222, 
242,  257,  353. 


King's  Chapel.  137 
Kremer,  G.,  92. 


LACOCK,  A.,  67,  258. 

Land,  16, 17, 69, 109, 184-186, 191, 256, 
325,  335. 

Latour,  39. 

JAW,  alien  and  sedition,  13,  213-215  ; 
coinage,  332-334 ;  constitutional, 
131, 361;  endorsement  and  replevin, 
122,  124-126,  129,  133  ;  the  "  gag," 
350;  homestead,  186,  189;  insol- 
Tent,  128;  international,  62,  107; 
martial,  38,  45,  46 ;  merchant,  296  ; 
occupying  claimant,  129,  133  ;  rev 
enue,  69  ;  student,  Jackson  a,  2  ; 
the  study  of,  3, 4 ;  Spanish,  69. 

Lawless,  L.,  174. 

Lawrence,  R.,  367,  368. 

Laws,  Jackson  a  Doctor  of,  300. 

Lawyers,  4. 

Lee,  II.,  49,  9%  105, 144, 147, 153. 

Legal-tende  125;  act,  363;  cases, 
363 ;  no*^,  363. 

Leigh,  B.  W.,  313,  314 

Letcher,  J.,  95,  96,  129. 

Letters,  campaign.  76,  93. 

Lewis,  W.  B.,  49, 50, 76-79, 91, 93, 105, 
140-145, 151-162,  243,  248,  273, 278, 
282,  296,  297,  299,  375,  385. 

Lexington,  Ky.,  121,  294  303. 

Liberty,  constitutional,  99,  132,  224, 
279,  283,  361,362 ;  religious,  377. 

Liquidation,  16,  234. 

Livingston,  B.,  11,  38,  45,  49,  91,105, 
145,  162,  214,  274,  282,  343,  345- 
347. 

Loco-focos.     See  Party. 

Log-rolling,  191 

Long,  J.,  352. 

Louaillier,  38,  46. 

Louisiana,  19,  20,  67,  98,  201,  246, 
282,  322,  353. 

Louis  XIV.,  99  ;  XV.,  359  ;  Philippe, 
170.  See  France.  King  of. 

Louisville,  Ky.,  121. 

Lowndes,  W.,  332. 

MACHINE,  79,  84. 

Madison.  J.,  29,  30, 145, 191, 193, 214, 

215,  230. 

M&disonian  federalism,  214,  282. 
Mails,  incendiary  documents  in  the, 

360,  372 :  Sunday,  377. 
«aine,  179',  323,  357. 
Jtajor-general,  J»ckson  a,  15,  36. 
Majority,  the,  157.  210,  217.  224. 
fcallary,  V  C.,  200,  202-204,  219. 


Manners,  Jackson's.  14,  88, 131 

Marcy,  W.  L.,  162,  247,  324. 

"  Marmion,"  the,  130. 

Marriage,  Jackson's,  9,  115. 

Marshall,  J.,  131,  182,  309,  361. 

Martin  vs.  Hunter's  Lessee,  130. 

Martineau,  H.,  284,  365,  367. 

Maryland,  98. 

Mason,  J.,  Ill,  144,  236-239. 

Masons.     See  Freemasons. 

Massachusetts,  254,  314,  378 

Massacre,  32,  55,  355. 

Mayo,  Dr.,  354. 

McCulloch  vs.  Maryland,  128,  246. 

McDuffle,  G..  207,  219.  221,  222,  W. 
259,  260,  295,  308. 

McGillivray,  175. 

McGregor,  54. 

Mclntosh,  177. 

McLane,  L.,  161,  162,  169,  190,  223 
249,  296,  &7. 

McLean,  J.,  112, 116, 141,  254,  378 

McNairy,  J.,  5, 18. 

Message,  280  ;  Adair's,  126  ;  Adams's 
108  ;  Desha's,  132 ;  Jackson's,  o 
1829,  179, 189,  193,  243,  244,  247 
of  1§30, 248  ;  of  1831,222,  24§, 249 
257  ;  of  1832, 285, 292 ;  of  1833, 308 
of  1834,  344,  346,  348  ;  of  1835, 347 
348  ;  of  1836. 341 ;  special,  on  Frencfc 
relations,  347,  348  ;  special,  on 
Texas,  857. 

Metcalf,  Governor,  135. 

Methodists,  116. 

Mexico,  107,  264, 352-359 ;  mission  to 
72,  89. 

Michigan,  379-381. 

Military  service,  Jackson's,  61. 

Militiamen,  "  the  six,"  44. 

Minimum,  199,  200,  205,  208. 

Missionaries,  181,  182. 

Mississippi,  180,  183,322;  river,  IP 
19,  20, 42,  81,  95,  352  ;  valley,  119 
134,  355. 

Missouri,  96,  135. 

Mitchell,  ex-Governor,  54,  55. 

Mobile,  21,  30,  36,  37. 

Money,  16  ;  money-market,  231,  266 
267, 271, 272,  301, 324, 327, 328.  341 
"  money  power,"  225-230,  312. 

Monroe,  J.,  42-193  passim,  351,  354 
369. 

Monroe  doctrine,  108. 

Morgan,  W.,  250-252,  255. 

Mortgage,  122, 124, 128, 135. 

Muter,  Judge,  120. 

NACOGDOCHES,  352,  356 

Napoleon  Bonaparte,  21,  26,  27,  91 

42,  170  277,  279. 
National  taaracter,  136. 
National  Intelligencer,  263 


INDEX. 


39S 


Jhehville.  5,  8,  270,  294. 

Vatchez,  9,  30,  33. 

Vaval  echool,  109. 

Navigation  system,  164, 167, 168. 

Navy,  the,  40,  41,  359. 

Jfegrofort  53,  6s). 

Negroes,  62,  67, 130. 

"  New  Court,"  127, 133,  242. 

New  England,  28,  76,  82,  198,  204 

211,  300. 

New  Hampshire  82,144,273. 
New  Jersey,  98. 
New  Orleans,  19.  30,  36,  38,  42,  44, 

48, 112,  242,  368  ;  battle  of,  39. 
Newspapers,   partisan,  35,  103,  104, 

112, 115,  148. 

New  York  city,  67,  82,  337,  338,  MO. 
New  York  State,  80, 100, 147,  179, 254, 

272,  329,  374. 
Nichols,  Colonel,  57. 
Niles,  H.,  62-374  passim. 
Nomination  of  Calhoun,   1822,  82; 

of  Clay,  1832,  258,  274  ;  of  Jackson, 

1822,  79,  87  ;  1825,  104 ;  1832,  154- 

i56 :  of  Van  Buren,  1832,  154, 161, 

272,  273. 

Nominations  by  Jackson,  147 
Non-intercourse,  75. 
Non-interference.    See  Government. 
Non-user,  263. 
North  Carolina,  7,  8,  79,  98,  216, 218, 

220,  379. 

Nova  Scotia,  168. 
Nueces,  357. 
.Nullification,  154-159,  183,  207-223, 

281-291,  300,  345,  353 

OAKLET,  T.  J.,  193. 

Obligations,  international.  130. 

Occupying  claimant,  129, 132,  133. 

Office-holders,  145,  160,  374,  376. 

Office-seekers,  145,  385. 

Ohio,  121, 204,  254,  257,  380. 

"  Old  Court."    See  "  New  Court." 

Oligarchy,  102. 

O'Neil,  Peggy.  See  Mrs.J.  H.  Eaton. 

"  Onslow,"  111. 

Order,  Jackson's  departmental,  51 ; 
Jackson's  general,  68 ;  Kendall's 
mail,  350,  371 ;  in  council,  30, 166 
168. 

Oregon,  359. 

Organ,  104,  143,  148, 159,  160,  280. 

Osborn  vs.  United  States  Bank,  128. 

Overton,  Judge,  155. 

Owenfl,  183. 

PACIFIO,  the,  352. 
Palmer,  W.  A.,  378. 
Pamphlets,  114,  267,  276. 
Panama  Congress,  106-108. 
fcnic,  804,  30°  315,  316 


Paper  money,  119,  121, 122, 126,  280 

246,  363. 

Parliament,  Act  of,  165,  167, 168. 

Parton,  J.,  1,  3,  16,  21,  23,  49.  70,  76 
79,  117,  151,  154, 159,  160,  162,  273 
291,  296,  384,  386. 

Party,  280;  the  an ti- Jackson,  250 
256,  374, 378, 379 ;  the  anti-masonic, 
253-255,  374;  the  anti-monopoly, 
eee  the  equal-rights  ;  the  demo 
cratic-republican  Jeffersonian,  1L 
18,  21,  26,  27,  29,  41,  50,  80,  101, 
102,  106,  120,  136,  144,  173,  191, 
228-230,  234,  253,  371,  372;  th« 
equal-rights,  or  loco-foco,  369-373 
381,  382;  the  federal,  11,  12,  20 
60,  96,  101,  102,  112,  115, 116, 139 
144,  238,  252 ;  the  Jackson,  139 
154, 173, 188,  205,  236, 248, 256, 257, 
313,  374,  375;  the  Jackson- Van 
Buren,  372  ;  the  national  republi 
can,  189,  187,  374 ;  the  nullifica 
tion,  212;  the  people's,  86;  the 
whig,  328,  330.  332,  340,  374,  379 ; 
the  union,  163;  discipline,  248, 
313;  exigency,  109,  192;  hatred, 
300,  384  ;  policy,  22i ;  strife,  139. 

"  Patrick  Henry,"  111. 

Patriot,  the  New  Hampshire,  143  ;  th 
Baltimore,  146. 

Patronage, 102, 106, 112, 116, 118, 147, 
149.  See  Civil  Service. 

Peck,  Judge,  173. 

Pennsylvania,  82,  117,  147, 155,  187 
188,  204,  205,  211,  227,  254,  267 
272,  278,  337,  375. 

Pennsylvania  Reporter,  156. 

Pennsylvanian,  the,  3ll. 

Pensacola,  30,  36-38,  53,  66,  60,  64, 
67,  70. 

Pension,  120,  221 ;  agency,  238,  248, 
310. 

People,  will  of  the,  96-98. 

Perdido,  20. 

Personal  feeling,  Jackson's,  23  24 
65, 156,  162,  219,  272,  313,  314. 

Phi  Beta  Kappa,  254. 

Philadelphia,  10,  14,  80,  87,  112, 116 
231,  233,  254,  324,  337,  338,  840.  ' 

Pickering,  T.,  96. 

Pinckney,  T.,  35. 

Pinkney,  W.,  43. 

Pioneers,  6,  33. 

Piracy,  54. 

Pitkin,  T.,  228,231. 

Planter,  Jackson  a,  16, 17 

Plaster  trade,  197. 

Platform,  253. 

Pluiner,  \V.,  27,  73. 144, 238 

Plutocracy    225,    331.     See 
power. 

Poindaiter,  G    868 


400 


INDEX. 


Poinsett,  .T.  R.,  852,  354. 

Police,  365. 

Political  philosophy,  Jackson's,  277. 

Politics,  104  ;  domestic,  26  ;  national, 

119  ;  New  York,  102,  103. 
Polk.  J.  K.,  292,  314,  320,  358,  359, 

375,  386.     See  Report. 
Popularity,  Jackson's,  14,  15,  31,  34- 

36,  43,  49,  63,  64,  68,  72,  78,  100, 

135,   156,  187,  259,  279,  297,  379, 

385. 

Porter,  P.  B.,  179  ;  Commodore,  359. 
Portsmouth,  N.  II.,  236,  238,239,248, 

261. 

Post,  N.  Y.  Evening,  371. 
Post-office,  349-351. 
Potomac,  117,  357. 
Powers,  implied,  109. 
Presidency,  the,  47, 100, 102. 
President,  the.    See  the  Executive. 
Press,  the,  263. 
Prices,  12l,  382. 
Primary,  87,  102. 

Principles,  political,  138,  246,  286. 
Printing,  public,  148, 160. 
Privateers,  53. 
Privileges,  130. 
Procedure,  172.  173. 
Proclamation,  anti-nullification,  282, 

289 ;    on   West  India   trade,   169 ; 

Monroe's,  165. 
Prohibitory  taxes,  221. 
Proscription ,  party,  102,  111 ,  112, 141, 

144-146,   149;    of    the  federalists, 

96  ;  of  printers,  148. 
Prosperity,  110,  121,  364,  365. 
Protectionists.  167,  170, 187,  209, 212, 

216,  220,  m. 
Detective  duties,  75,  81,  84, 196,  206, 

220,  221,  223,  326 ;  system,  166, 168, 

188,207,208,  210,  285,  286,  288-290, 

333.    See  Tariff. 
Protest,  Jackson's,  311. 
Proxies,  85. 

Public  prosecutor,  5,  7. 
Puritan,  101. 

QUARREL,  52;  of  Jackson  and  Cal- 

houn,  158, 160. 
Quarrelsomeness,  Jackson's,  17,  47, 

52,  60,  67,  72,  80. 
Quincy,  J.,  314. 

RABUN,  Governor,  60 
'Race-horse  bills,"    236,   294,  302, 

316. 

Radicals,  109. 
Randolph,  J.,  88,  101,  102,  111,174, 

284  ;  Lieutenant,  162,  301. 
Ratio  of  value,  gold  to  silver,  333. 
ftecharter  of  the  first  national  bank, 

11,  88,  84,  228, 229, 246,  248 ;  of  the 


B«cond,  244,  257,  259,  260,  272,  274 
275,  304,  308. 

Reciprocity  and  retaliation,  164.  166- 
168,  195-197.  See  Countervailing. 

Redrawing,  293,  294. 

Red  River,  357. 

Red  Sticks,  55. 

Reelection,  Jackson's  interpretatioi 
of  his,  277,  278. 

Reform,  113, 117. 

Regency,  86,  87,  369. 

Register,  the  Annual,  19,  105,  110 
118,  202,  203;  the  Mobile,  72 
Niles's,  85,  200,  301,  317. 

Reid,  Major,  141. 

Relief  system,  122,  124,  126,  12? 
132-135, 142, 159, 172, 241,  242,363 

Removal,  from  office,  106,  113,  118 
145,  147 ;  of  judges,  125,  127,  set 
"  Judge-breaking ;  "  of  the  public 
deposits,  232,  240,  241,  295-304 
306-315,  325,  328,  331. 

Rents,  382. 

Report,  on  the  bank,  247,  259,  260 
268,  292-294,  295,308,  315,  33?;  on 
manufactures,  221 ;  on  the  Mor 
gan  outrage,  251 ;  on  the  removal 
of  the  deposits,  308 ;  on  the  Semi- 
nole  war,  64,  67, 258 ;  on  the  tarifl, 
207,  223. 

Republicans.    See  Party. 

Resignation,  Jackson's,  of  senator- 
ship,  104 ;  Clay's,  374 ;  Webster's 
378. 

Resolutions,  Virginia  and  Kentucky. 
212,  213,  215;  Calhoun's,  287; 
Clay's,  censuring  Jackson,  310- 
313 ;  Benton's  expunging,  313, 314. 

Responsibility  of  the  President,  246, 
310. 

Resumption  of  specie  payments,  231, 

Retaliation.       See    Reciprocity  and 

Countervailing. 
Retrenchment,  113. 
Revenue   taxes,  221,  223;   surplus, 

325,  328. 

Revolutions,  170,  268,  354. 
Rhea,  J.,66,  65,  157,  158. 
Rights,  belligerent,  63;  protection 

of,    126;     natural,    370;    notions 

about,  230,  260 ;  vested,  119, 130 

372. 

Ringold,  153. 

Rio  Grande  del  Xorte.  357. 
Riots,  318,  382.  383. 
Ritchie,  T.,  263. 
Rive.s,  W.  C.,  170,  312-814,  343,  841 

376. 

Roane,  A.,  15. 
Robards,  L.,  8, 9. 
Hobards,  MM.  L.,  8,  ». 


INDEX. 


fcobinstt  wn,  Me.,  191. 
Rowan,  J.,  123, 172. 
Rucker,  to  "  ruckerize,"  376. 
"  Rumps,"  372. 

Rush,  R.,  66,  111,  164,  188,  202,  235. 
Russia,  Emperor  of,  115,  352 ;  mis 
sion  to,  72,  102. 

BABINE,  67,  351,  352,  357,  386. 

Saddler,  Jackson  a,  2. 

&t.  Augustine,  64. 

Bt.  John's,  165. 

St.  Mark's,  57-60, 64 

St.  Mary's,  Ga.,  191. 

Salisbury,  N.  G.,  2. 

Sanford,  N.,  332. 

San  Francisco,  352. 

San  Jacinto,  355. 

Santa  Anna,  354,  355. 

Sargent,  N.,  107,  259. 

Sargent,  T.,  116. 

Scandal,  52. 

Scire  facias,  263. 

Scott',  General,  51.  88,  282 

Scott,  J.,  96. 

Secession,  116,  216,  282. 

Secessionist,  213. 

Secret,  the  King's,  359. 

Self-government,  102,  127,  147, 155, 


Self-will,  Jackson's,  278. 

Senate,  67,  106,  111.  113,  128,  147, 
148,  172,  177,  189,  190,  230,  268 ; 
democracy  vs.  the,  311 ;  on  the 
Bank,  247,  248, 274, 275,  315  ;  Jack- 
eon's  quarrel  with  the,  272,  278, 
314,  384  ;  committees  of  the,  111. 

Senator,  Jackson  a,  10,  76. 

Sergeant,  J.,  258. 

Sevier,  Governor,  15, 18. 

Seward,  W.  H.,  254. 

feybert,  A.,  229. 

Shoulder  Bone  Creek,  175. 

Silver,  120, 123,  332,  333. 

Blade,  W.,  378. 

Blamm,  372. 

Slavery  and  slaves,  349-352,  355. 

Blave-trade.  23,  54,  69. 

Smith,  A.,  289. 

Smith,  S.,  247 

Socialists,  382. 

South  American  republics,  84,  105, 
107, 108,  202. 

Bouth  Carolina  215-220,  281-291: 
police  act,  130, 173,  215. 

Sovereignty,  185,  224,  281. 

Spain,  19,  21,  38,  63,  64, 67, 62,  64,  66 
107,  353. 

Bpecial  legislation,  194. 

Ipecie,  120,  121,  123,  125,  134,  135, 
231,  264,268,304,318.320,  823,835-^ 
837  J  circular,  the,  836-337  ;  pay 


ments,  121,  230,  232.    See  Rtsump 

tion,  Suspension,  and  Currency. 
Speculation,   32*^-324;     Texan   laaj 

and  stoc,k,  355. 
Spencer,  A.,  255. 
Spencer,  J.  C.,  251. 
Spoils,  108, 146, 147, 162. 
Spoliation  claims,  170,  171,  221,  266. 
Stanbaugh,  Colonel,  155. 
Standard,  the,  New  York,  311. 
tote  rights,  82, 109, 123, 130-134, 188 

157,  173,  256,  284, 363. 
Steamboats,  136. 
Stevens,  Thad.,  254,  379. 
Stevenson,  A.,  202,  376. 
Stock-jobbing,  13. 
Storekeeper,  Jackson  a,  16. 
Story,  J.,  131,  254,  361,  363. 
Strict  construction,  109,  134,  266. 
Strikes,  382. 
Stump  speaking,  6, 113. 
Sturges  vs.  Crowninshield,  128. 
Suability  of  a  State,  129, 135. 
Sub-treasury,  248. 
Suspension  of  specie  payments,  121 

123,  229,  330. 
Suwanee  River,  58,  342. 
Swartwout,  91,  93, 105 

TAMMANY,  86, 117,  369,  372. 

Taney,  R.  B.,  163,  282,  297,  300-509 
314,  317,  385. 

Tariff,  188,  194-209,  212,  215,  218, 
221,  222,  279,  285,  286,  288-291,  see 
Protective  duties  and  Nullification  ; 
of  1789,  286 :  of  1816,  75  :  in  1820, 
76  ;  of  1824,  76, 197  :  of  1828  ("of 
abominations  »),  206,  207,  211,212, 
216-220,  281;  of  1832,  222,  223. 
281,  288,  290;  "compromise,"  of 
1833,  28o,  288,  289-291,  327  ;  J.  Q 
Adams  on  the,  81,  109 ;  Calhoun 
on  the,  82 :  constitutionality  of 
the,  220,  285;  convention,  220  j 
Jackson  on  the,  76,  139,  256,  257  ; 
and  land,  186,  188,  190. 

Tassel,  G.,  180,  181. 

Taxes,  69,  75, 187,  217,  218,  see  Pro. 
hibitory,  Revenue,  and  Protective  : 
levied  on  the  United  States  Bank 
123,  128,  132. 

Tecumseh,  31,  32,  36,  377. 

Telegraph,  the,  104,  114,  148,  155 
159, 160,  263. 

Tellico,  176. 

Tennessee,  6,  ".  8, 10, 13, 14, 16,  19 
21,  56, 104, 105, 117,  121,  122,  160 
353,  375,  386  :  river,  353. 

Texas,  67,  352-359,  385. 

Thames,  battle  of  the,  86. 

Theatricalism  in  po  itics,  77. 

Third  term,  375. 


INDEX. 


Three  per  cents,  the,  266,  268,  269, 
291-293,  303,  304,  309. 

Fimberlake,  Mrs.  See  Airs.  J.  H. 
Eaton. 

Titles,  contested  land,  129,  132;  of 
courtesy,  137. 

Toast,  Jackson's  union,  156,  219. 

Tohopeka,  35. 

Toland,  II.,  292. 

Tomkins,  D.  D..  73. 

Trade,  illicit,  166,  169,  170. 

Trades  unions,  382. 

Transfer  drafts,  307. 

Treasury,  the  federal,  74,  114,  115, 
secretary  of  the,  232,  302,  308,  311. 

Treaty,  with  France  (1778),  195: 
with  England  (1795),  11,  12,  27, 
130 ;  with  Spain  (1795),  19 ;  of  St. 
Ildefonso,  19  ;  with  France  (1803), 
186  ;  proposed  with  England  (1806' 
28 :  with  Spain  (1819),  20,  67,  69, 
186,354,386;  with  France  (ikl), 
171,  295,  343,  344,  346  ;  with  Mex 
ico  (1832),  354,  (1840  and  1843), 
358  ;  commercial,  164,  194,  195 ; 
Indian,  174-183. 

Triet,  N.  P.,  384. 

Troup,  Governor,  177, 178,  21S-. 

Trustee,  Jackson  a,  15 . 

Tyler,  J.,  47,  313,  325,  330, 358,  385. 

UKION,  the,  12, 19,  29,  157,  210,  216, 

279,  283-285. 
Pinion,  the  Nashville,  95. 
University,  national,  109. 
Usages,  diplomatic,  137. 
Usury,  261. 

VAN  BUBEN,  84-384  passim. 
Veracity,  "  adjourned  question  of," 

Vermont,  254. 

Verplanck,  G.  C.,  292,  332.  See  Re 
port. 

Veto.  124, 134, 193, 194,  230, 274, 275, 
299\  82& 

Vidal,  heirs  of,  70. 

Vindictiveness,  Jackson's  148,  385. 

Violence,  mob,  etc.,  350,  363, 365. 

Virginia.  8,  9,  85,  129, 130,  218,  288, 
312,  313,  376. 

Tote  (or  President,  89,  90, 117,  276, 


Votes  cast  by  Jackson,  13,  77,  139. 

WAGES,  136, 186, 189. 

War,  285 ;  civil,  133,  282,  330 ;  con> 
mercial,  12,  27,  28,  348  ;  the  Creek 
33,  35 ;  with  France,  13,  29 ;  In 
dian,  15,  32,  33, 175, 176  ;  the  Mex 
ican,  357, 358  ;  Revolutionary,  2, 3 
62,  174,  361 ;  of  1812,  26,  29,  30 
40,  42,  43,  68,  75,  234;  the  Sen* 
nole,  55,  61,  65.  151,  167, 161,  258 
272,  356,  359,  368. 

Ward,  Colonel,  355. 

Warren,  Admiral,  30. 

Washington,  G.,  8,  10-12,  27,  145 
175;  mother  of,  301. 

Washington,  city  of,  33,  87,  42,  48 
70, 105, 138, 143, 145,  149, 156,  156 
221,  231,  239. 

Watkins,  T.,  146. 

Wayman  vs.  Southard,  129. 

Wayne,  J.  M.,  216. 

Weatherford,  32. 

Webb,  J.  W.,  263. 

Webster,  D.,  82-379  passim 

West  Indies,  202,  349. 

West  India  trade,  161,  164-170,  266. 

Whig.    See  Party. 

Wheat  imported,  323,  382. 

White,  C.  P.,  332. 

White,  H.  L.,  13,  162,  291,  312,  876 
378,  379. 

White  House,  114, 115, 150, 160,280. 

Whitney,  R.  M.,  263,  268,  269,  297 
300,306. 

Wilkinson,  General,  21,  80,  86. 

Williams,  J.,  76. 

Williams,  S.,  381. 

Wire-pulling.  77, 154,  273. 

Wirt,  W.,  72,  130,  173,  236,  264 
255. 

Wood,  J.,  34. 

Woodbury,  L.,  115, 162,  236-238,297 
306,  320,  334. 

Wool,  199. 

Woollens,  198, 199,  203,  207. 

Woollens  bill,  200,  201. 

Worcester,  missionary,  181. 

Worthington,  71. 

Wright,  Fanny,  382. 

Wright,  S.,  204,  306. 

Writs  of  execution,  129.  188,  172 ,  • 
error,  181, 182. 


CA 


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